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Philosophy homework help

5/9/22, 1:30 AM Week 6 Overview – Capitalism: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-6-overview-capitalism?module_item_id=17540444 1/2

Week 6 Overview – Capitalism
This week we finally move on to
directly discuss the economic system
of our modern world: capitalism. No
other economic system in history has
expanded over the entire globe,
connecting and altering every society.
Here in the West, and especially in
the USA, we have been taught the
positives of capitalist development,
and the reading in Shaw this week will
provide a balanced summary of
capitalism as an economic system.
But what is the underside to this
economic system, its hidden costs,
that are not always brought to light?
The launchpad and lecture notes
therefore will supplement the
dominant positive views by
highlighting some of the unexamined
negatives within the history of this
globalizing system. How should we
better understand its historical
emergence in a more comprehensive
way that allows us also to better
assess its future? Before we begin
applying our ethical reasoning more
directly to business issues we will
want to get a handle on what
capitalism is, its history, its essence,
and the ways it influences our ethical
reasoning: in other words, we want to

5/9/22, 1:30 AM Week 6 Overview – Capitalism: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-6-overview-capitalism?module_item_id=17540444 2/2

know something about the rules of the
dominant socioeconomic game, how
and why it is structured the way it is,
and how it might be better regulated,
reformed, or possibly transformed in a
humane way.

To read or watch:
Review the materials on the Launchpad page What is Capitalism?
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-what-is-capitalism) , which
includes my video and lecture notes
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034401?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034401/download?download_frd=1) .
Read William H. Shaw’s chapter 4 on “The Nature of Capitalism”
Read Nick Hanauer, “The Pitchforks are Coming”
(https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-pitchforks-are-coming-for-us-plutocrats-
108014/)
Read Matthew Desmond, “The Brutality of Capitalism and the Plantation”
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034392/download?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034392/download?download_frd=1)
Read Angela Hanks and Danyelle Solomon, “Systematic Inequality: How America’s Structural
Racism Helped Create the Black-White Wealth Gap”
(https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-inequality/)

To complete or submit:
Complete the Reading Assignment Questions
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/assignments/7016122) assignment, which is due
by Saturday at midnight
Answer the Case Discussion Questions
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/discussion_topics/7964154) . Your initial post is
due by Wednesday and subsequent posts by Sunday.

Philosophy homework help

Tell me what you intend to research and write on for your paper. Good topics will be fairly specific. Big topics get overwhelming quickly. The only constraints are that your topic address ethical issues in IT. There are a great many more specific issues related to the big themes of privacy, intellectual property, and security. But you needn’t feel limited strictly to these. There may be worthy philosophical issues to consider regarding AI, for instance, or cyborgs (are we already cyborgs?).

Also tell me what’s on your mind at this point concerning potential sources. It would be a good idea to read a few things as you are refining your topic plans. Manageable clear discussion of specific issues typically start with some review of an ongoing conversation in print. Think of yourself as joining into that conversation, but only after you’ve listened enough to gain a sense for what might be worth contributing. 

There is no length requirement for this step. I just want to make sure you are onto a manageable project before you get in too deep.

Philosophy homework help

5/4/22, 12:47 AM Week 5 Overview – Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-5-overview-deontology?module_item_id=17540440 1/2

Week 5 Overview – Deontology

Last week in studying utilitarianism we saw that Mill challenged Bentham’s relativism
and reductionism, bringing forth instead a more progressive kernel by showing that
there needs to be a robust normative sense of human nature: a sense of our common
humanity according to qualitatively distinct faculties or capabilities that are not
reducible simplistically to animal appetites or monetary values. Without any higher
notion of who we are and what we are socially and creatively capable of, modern
society is left to the cost-benefit calculations of the market, which means human life
itself is left to being quantifiably measured according to its market value, and therefore
disposable. Thus, whereas Bentham’s utilitarianism lacked the ability to uphold the
inherent worth of individuals and especially minorities, Mill suggested a way beyond
Bentham that seemed to overlap also with virtue ethics. This week we will see another
philosopher–Immanuel Kant–try to affirm and uphold the intrinsic value of human life,
especially each individual regardless of majority rules and market values. Yet Kant
provides us with a somewhat opposing view to utilitarianism and virtue ethics. Unlike
the previous two ethical frameworks Kant’s ethical framework of deontology is in no
way oriented to happiness but rather to a principled sense of duty for its own sake. In
our modern capitalist society deontology has become an important theory for
elaborating a universal duty to affirm the inherent worth, and thus “rights”, of each
individual against market utility–the rights of each individual are to be respected
regardless of whether or not this brings happiness to anyone. But this week we will

5/4/22, 12:47 AM Week 5 Overview – Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-5-overview-deontology?module_item_id=17540440 2/2

wrestle with how this cherished notion of “rights” and the duty to respect such should
be theoretically formulated as well as practically applied. What is it about our human
nature for Kant that demands such rights to be respected for their own sake, and how
should we best uphold them? We will especially focus on whether deontology can offer
a robust guide for practice that not only protects individual rights but also positively
empowers people and transforms society for mutual flourishing. A big question we will
want to ask: it is one thing to affirm universal rights in theory, but can we uphold them
in practice without actually cultivating higher qualities through virtuous practices … and
thus can rights be practically upheld without any overarching orientation to happiness?

To read or watch:
Review the materials on the Launchpad page Introduction to Kant’s Deontology
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-introduction-to-
kants-deontology) , which includes my video and lecture notes
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034388?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034388/download?
download_frd=1)
Read Sandel, What’s the Right Thing, ch. 5
Read Kant in the Justice Reader, pp. 161-167 (sections 7–14), p. 176 (section 25),
pp. 178-185 (sections 29–37)

To complete or submit:
Complete the Reading Assignment Questions
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/assignments/7016121) , which is
due by Saturday at midnight.
Answer the Case Discussion Questions
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/discussion_topics/7964152)
regarding the youtube video about never lying, which is located on the discussion
page. Your initial post is due by Wednesday and subsequent posts by Sunday.

Philosophy homework help

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd i 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Thirteenth
Edition

Brooke Noel Moore
Richard Parker
California State University, Chico

with help in Chapter 12
from Nina Rosenstand and Anita Silvers

Critical
Thinking

Final PDF to printer

moo7069X_fm_ISE.indd ii 12/24/19 06:04 PM

CRITICAL THINKING

Published by McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2021 by McGraw-Hill
Education. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Previous editions © 2017, 2015, and 2012.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database
or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education, including, but not limited to, in
any network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning.

Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers outside the
United States.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 LWI 24 23 22 21 20

ISBN 978-1-260-57069-4
MHID 1-260-57069-X

Cover Image: McGraw-Hill

All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of the copyright page.

The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication. The inclusion of a website does
not indicate an endorsement by the authors or McGraw-Hill Education, and McGraw-Hill Education does not
guarantee the accuracy of the information presented at these sites.

mheducation.com/highered

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd iii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Chapter 1 Driving Blindfolded 1

Chapter 2 Two Kinds of Reasoning 35

Chapter 3 Clear Thinking, Critical Thinking, and
Clear Writing 73

Chapter 4 Credibility 102

Chapter 5 Rhetoric, the Art of Persuasion 141

Chapter 6 Relevance (Red Herring) Fallacies 185

Chapter 7 Induction Fallacies 207

Chapter 8 Formal Fallacies and Fallacies of Language 233

Chapter 9 Deductive Arguments I: Categorical Logic 257

Chapter 10 Deductive Arguments II: Truth-Functional
Logic 305

Chapter 11 Inductive Reasoning 362

Chapter 12 Moral, Legal, and Aesthetic Reasoning 420

Brief Contents

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd iv 12/10/19 01:23 PM

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd v 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Contents

Preface xviii
Changes to the 13th Edition  xix
Acknowledgments xxi
About the Authors xxiv

Chapter 1 Driving Blindfolded 1
Beliefs and Claims 4

Objective Claims and Subjective Judgments 4

Fact and Opinion 6

Relativism 7

Moral Subjectivism 7

Issues 7

Arguments 8

Cognitive Biases 15

Truth and Knowledge 21

What Critical Thinking Can and Can’t Do 22

A Word About the Exercises 22

Recap 23

Additional Exercises 24

Answers and Tips 33

Chapter 2 Two Kinds of Reasoning 35
Arguments: General Features 35

Conclusions Used as Premises 36

Unstated Premises and Conclusions 36

Two Kinds of Arguments 37

Deductive Arguments 37

Inductive Arguments 38

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 40

Two Kinds of Deductive Arguments 40

Four Kinds of Inductive Arguments 41

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vi CONTENTS

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd vi 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Telling the Difference Between Deductive and Inductive
Arguments 42

Deduction, Induction, and Unstated Premises 44

Balance of Considerations 46

Not Premises, Conclusions, or Arguments 46

Selfies (and Other Pictures) 46

If . . . Then . . . Sentences 47

Lists of Facts 47

“A because B” 48

Ethos, Pathos, and Logos 48

Techniques for Understanding Arguments 53

Clarifying an Argument’s Structure 54

Distinguishing Arguments from Window Dressing 56

Evaluating Arguments 57

Recap 57

Additional Exercises 58

Answers and Tips 68

Chapter 3 Clear Thinking, Critical Thinking, and
Clear Writing 73

Vagueness 74

Ambiguity 76

Semantic Ambiguity 77

Grouping Ambiguity 77

Syntactic Ambiguity 77

Generality 79

Defining Terms 84

Purposes of Definitions 84

Kinds of Definitions 85

Tips on Definitions 85

Writing Argumentative Essays 87

Good Writing Practices 89

Essay Types to Avoid 89

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CONTENTS vii

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd vii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Persuasive Writing 90

Writing in a Diverse Society 91

Recap 92

Additional Exercises 92

Answers and Tips 100

Chapter 4 Credibility 102
The Believability of Claims 103

Does the Claim Conflict with Personal Observation? 104

Does the Claim Conflict with Our Background Information? 107

Might the Claim Reinforce Our Biases? 108

The Credibility of Sources 111

Interested Parties 111

Physical and Other Characteristics 112

Expertise 113

The News 118

Mainstream News Media 118

Advertising 126

Three Kinds of Ads 126

Recap 129

Additional Exercises 130

Answers and Tips 139

Chapter 5 Rhetoric, the Art of Persuasion 141
Rhetorical Force 142

Rhetorical Devices I 143

Euphemisms and Dysphemisms 143

Weaselers 144

Downplayers 144

Rhetorical Devices II 146

Stereotypes 147

Innuendo 148

Loaded Questions 149

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viii CONTENTS

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd viii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Rhetorical Devices III 150

Ridicule/Sarcasm 150

Hyperbole 151

Rhetorical Devices IV 151

Rhetorical Definitions and Rhetorical Explanations 152

Rhetorical Analogies and Misleading Comparisons 153

Proof Surrogates and Repetition 157

Proof Surrogates 157

Repetition 157

Persuasion Through Visual Imagery 161

The Extreme Rhetoric of Demagoguery 162

Recap 166

Additional Exercises 167

Answers and Tips 183

Chapter 6 Relevance (Red Herring) Fallacies 185
Argumentum Ad Hominem 186

Poisoning the Well 187

Guilt by Association 187

Genetic Fallacy 187

Straw Man 188

False Dilemma (Ignoring Other Alternatives) 189

The Perfectionist Fallacy 190

The Line-Drawing Fallacy 190

Misplacing the Burden of Proof 191

Begging the Question (Assuming What You Are Trying to Prove) 193

Appeal to Emotion 194

Argument from Outrage 194

Scare Tactics 195

Appeal to Pity 196

Other Appeals to Emotion 197

Irrelevant Conclusion 198

Recap 200

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CONTENTS ix

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd ix 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Exercises 200

Answers and Tips 206

Chapter 7 Induction Fallacies 207
Generalizations 207

Generalizing from Too Few Cases (Hasty Generalization) 208

Generalizing from Exceptional Cases 210

Accident 211

Weak Analogy 212

Mistaken Appeal to Authority 213

Mistaken Appeal to Popularity (Mistaken Appeal to
Common Belief) 214

Mistaken Appeal to Common Practice 215

Bandwagon Fallacy 216

Fallacies Related to Cause and Effect 217

Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc 217

Cum Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc 221

Slippery Slope 223

Untestable Explanation 224

Line-Drawing Again 225

Recap 225

Exercises 225

Answers and Tips 232

Chapter 8 Formal Fallacies and Fallacies of
Language 233

Three Formal Fallacies: Affirming the Consequent, Denying the
Antecedent, and Undistributed Middle 233

Affirming the Consequent 233

Denying the Antecedent 234

The Undistributed Middle 235

The Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly 237

The Fallacies of Composition and Division 239

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x CONTENTS

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd x 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Confusing Explanations with Excuses 240

Confusing Contraries and Contradictories 242

Consistency and Inconsistency 244

Miscalculating Probabilities 244

Incorrectly Combining the Probability of Independent Events 245

Gambler’s Fallacy 246

Overlooking Prior Probabilities 247

Faulty Inductive Conversion 247

Recap 249

Additional Exercises 250

Answers and Tips 256

Chapter 9 Deductive Arguments I: Categorical Logic 257
Categorical Claims 259

Venn Diagrams 260

Translation into Standard Form (Introduction) 261

Translating Claims in Which the Word “Only” or the Phrase “The Only” Occurs 262

Translating Claims About Times and Places 263

Translating Claims About Specific Individuals 264

Translating Claims that Use Mass Nouns 265

The Square of Opposition 268

Existential Assumption and the Square of Opposition 268

Inferences Across the Square 268

Three Categorical Relations 269

Conversion 269

Obversion 270

Contraposition 270

Categorical Syllogisms 278

The Venn Diagram Method of Testing for Validity 279

Existential Assumption in Categorical Syllogisms 282

Categorical Syllogisms with Unstated Premises 284

Real-Life Syllogisms 285

The Rules Method of Testing for Validity 289

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CONTENTS xi

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xi 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Recap 291

Additional Exercises 291

Answers and Tips 301

Chapter 10 Deductive Arguments II: Truth-Functional
Logic 305

Truth Tables and Logical Symbols 306

Claim Variables 306

Truth Tables 306

Symbolizing Compound Claims 312

“If” and “Only If” 312

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 314

“Unless” 316

“Either . . . Or” 316

Truth-Functional Argument Patterns (Brief Version) 318

Three Common Valid Argument Patterns 319

Three Mistakes: Invalid Argument Forms 322

Truth-Functional Arguments (Full Version) 325

The Truth-Table Method 326

The Short Truth-Table Method 328

Deductions 334

Group I Rules: Elementary Valid Argument Patterns 334

Group II Rules: Truth-Functional Equivalences 339

Conditional Proof 347

Recap 350

Additional Exercises 351

Answers and Tips 358

Chapter 11 Inductive Reasoning 362
Argument from Analogy 362

Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy 363

Three Arguments from Analogy 365

Other Uses of Analogy 366

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xii CONTENTS

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Generalizing from a Sample 371

Evaluation of Arguments That Generalize from a Sample 372

Three Arguments That Generalize from a Sample 372

Scientific Generalizing from a Sample 373

De-generalizing (Reverse Generalizing; the Statistical Syllogism) 375

Causal Statements and Their Support 382

Forming Causal Hypotheses 382

Weighing Evidence 384

Confirming Causal Hypotheses 395

Inference to the Best Explanation 399

Reasoning from Cause to Effect 401

Calculating Statistical Probabilities 402

Joint Occurrence of Independent Events 402

Alternative Occurrences 403

Expectation Value 403

Calculating Conditional Probabilities 404

Causation in the Law 406

Recap 407

Additional Exercises 408

Answers and Tips 416

Chapter 12 Moral, Legal, and Aesthetic Reasoning 420
Value Judgments 421

Moral Versus Nonmoral 422

Two Principles of Moral Reasoning 422

Moral Principles 424

Deriving Specific Moral Value Judgments 424

Major Perspectives in Moral Reasoning 427

Consequentialism 427

Duty Theory/Deontologism 429

Moral Relativism 430

Religious Relativism 432

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CONTENTS xiii

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xiii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Religious Absolutism 432

Virtue Ethics 432

Moral Deliberation 435

Legal Reasoning 439

Justifying Laws: Four Perspectives 441

Aesthetic Reasoning 444

Eight Aesthetic Principles 444

Using Aesthetic Principles to Judge Aesthetic Value 447

Evaluating Aesthetic Criticism: Relevance and Truth 448

Why Reason Aesthetically? 450

Recap 452

Additional Exercises 453

Answers and Tips 455

Appendix: Selected Exercises from Previous Editions 457

Glossary 480

Index 488

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xiv 12/10/19 01:23 PM

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xvi 12/10/19 01:23 PM

More Engaging

Moore & Parker are known for fresh and lively writing. They rely on their own classroom
experience and on feedback from instructors in getting the correct balance between

explication and example.

■ ■ Examples and exercises are drawn from today’s
headlines.

■ ■ Students learn to apply critical thinking skills to situ-
ations in a wide variety of areas: advertising, poli-
tics, the media, popular culture.

Critical Thinking . . . Skills for

First Pages

Co Gn ITIv E BIASES 19

moo41025_ch01_001-032.indd 19 09/06/19 12:33 PM

impossible to think that good judgment or rational
thought would lead them to such excess.*

Yet another possible source of psychological
distortion is the overconfidence effect, one of several
self-deception biases that may be found in a variety
of contexts.** If a person estimates the percentage
of his or her correct answers on a subject, the esti-
mate will likely err on the high side—at least if the
questions are difficult or the subject matter is unfa-
miliar.† Perhaps some manifestation of the overcon-
fidence effect explains why, in the early stages of the
American Idol competition, many contestants appear
totally convinced they will be crowned the next
American Idol—and are speechless when the judges
inform them they cannot so much as carry a tune.††

Closely related to the overconfidence effect is
the better-than-average illusion. The illusion crops up
when most of a group rate themselves as better than
most of the group relative to some desirable charac-
teristics, such as resourcefulness or driving ability.
The classic illustration is the 1976 survey of SAT tak-
ers, in which well over 50 percent of the respondents
rated themselves as better than 50 percent of other
SAT takers with respect to such qualities as leader-
ship ability.‡ The same effect has been observed when
people estimate how their intelligence, memory, or
job performance stacks up with the intelligence,
memory, and job performances of other members of
their profession or workplace. In our own informal
surveys, more than 80 percent of our students rate
themselves in the top 10 percent of their class with
respect to their ability to think critically.

Unfortunately, evidence indicates that even when they are informed about the
better-than-average illusion, people may still rate themselves as better than most in their
ability to not be subject to it.‡‡

‡‡http://weblamp.princeton.edu/ psych/f ACUl TY/Articles/Pronin/The%20Bias%20Blind.PDf . The better-than-average bias has not been
found to hold for all positive traits. In some things, people underestimate their abilities. The moral is that for many abilities, we are
probably not the best judges of how we compare to others. And this includes our ability to avoid being subject to biasing influences.

‡See Mark D. Alicke and other authors in “The Better-Than-Average Effect,” in Mark D. Alicke and others, The Self in Social
Judgment: Studies in Self and Identity (new York: Psychology Press, 2005), 85–106. The better-than-average illusion is
sometimes called the l ake Wobegon effect, in reference to Garrison Keillor’s story about the fictitious Minnesota town “where all
the children are above average.”

††This possibility was proposed by Gad Saad, Psychology Today, www.psychologytoday.com/blog/homo-consumericus/200901/
self-deception-american-idol-is-it-adaptive.

†See Sarah lichtenstein and other authors, “ Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980, ” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 306–34.

**However, a universal tendency among humans to irrationally exaggerate their own competencies hasn’t been established. for
an online quiz purportedly showing the overconfidence effect, see www.tim-richardson.net/joomla15/finance-articles-profmenu-
70/73-over-confidence-test.html.

*Jamey Keaton, Associated Press. Reported in The Sacramento Bee, Thursday, March 18, 2010. Did the subjects suspect the
shocks weren’t real? Their statements afterward don’t rule out the possibility but certainly seem to suggest they believed they
truly were administering painful electrical shocks to the actor.

■ Does Kim Kardashian
wear too much makeup?
The issue is subjective, or,
as some people say, “a
matter of opinion.”

Stephen l ovekin/WWD/
Shutterstock

Confirming Pages

moo41025_ch07_207-232.indd 216 11/05/19 06:15 PM

216 CHAPTER 7 : InduCTIon FAllA CIES

Bandwagon Fallacy
Sometimes a speaker or writer will try to get
us to do something by suggesting that every-
one or most people are doing it. The idea is
not to cite what people believe as evidence
of the truth of a claim. Rather, the attempt is
made to induce us to do something by mak-
ing us feel out of step with things if we don’t.
This is the infamous Bandwagon Fallacy,
illustrated by this example:

Appealing to Tradition

According to Representative Steve King of Iowa (pictured here), “Equal protection [under the Constitution] is not equal protection
for same sex couples to marry. Equal protection has always been for a man and a woman to be able to get married to each other.”

YuRI GRIPAS/uPI/newscom Pete Marovich/ZuMAPRESS. com/newscom

I am the most popular candidate by far.
Only a minority support my opponent.

The speaker wants us to jump on the
bandwagon. He or she has not said anything
that is relevant to who we should support or
how we should vote.

Here is one more example:

Let’s get a spa. They are very popular
these days.

The speaker hasn’t really shown that
we need a spa. He wants us to get on the
bandwagon.

More Relevant

Moore & Parker spark student interest in skills
that will serve them throughout their lives,
making the study of critical thinking a meaning-
ful endeavor.

■ ■ Boxes show students how critical thinking
skills are relevant to their day-to-day lives.

■ ■ Striking visuals in every chapter show stu-
dents how images affect our judgment and
shape our thinking.

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xvii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

More Student Success

Moore & Parker provide a path to student suc-
cess, making students active participants in their
own learning while teaching skills they can apply
in all their courses.

■ ■ Learning objectives link to chapter sections
and in turn to print and online activities, so
that students can immediately assess their
mastery of the learning objective.

■ ■ Exercises are dispersed throughout most
chapters, so that they link tightly with the
concepts as they are presented.

■ ■ Students have access to over 2,000 exer-
cises that provide practice in applying
their skills.

the course. Skills for life.
First Pages

moo41025_ch08_223-246.indd 240 09/19/19 02:23 PM

240 CHAPTER 8: FoRMAl FAllA CIEs ANd FAllA CIEs o F lANG u AGE

Exercise 8-4
Here are 107 examples of the fallacies discussed in this chapter. Match each item to one
or more of the following categories or otherwise answer as indicated:

a. affirming the consequent
b. denying the antecedent
c. undistributed middle fallacy
d. confusing explanations with excuses
e. equivocation
f. composition
g. division
h. miscalculating probabilities

Note

Your instructor may or may not ask you to further assign miscalculating probabilities
into the following subcategories: Incorrectly combining the probabilities of indepen-
dent events, the gambler’s fallacy, overlooking prior probabilities, and faulty inductive
conversion.

1. Professor Parker can tell you if you are sick; after all, he is a doctor.

2. If this man is the president, then he believes in immigration reform. If this man
is vice president, then he believes in immigration reform. Therefore, if this man is
president, then he is vice president.

3. If global warming is for real, then the mean global temperature will have risen
over the past ten years. And that is what happened. Therefore, global warming is
for real.

4. My chance of being born on December 25 was the same as yours. So the chances
we were both born on December 25 have to be twice as good.

5. Sodium is deadly poisonous, and so is chlorine. Salt consists of sodium and chlo-
rine, which must be why we’re told not to eat too much of it.

6. The Bible commands you to leave life having made the world a better place. And
therefore it commands you to make the world a better place each and every day.

7. A dialogue:
JILL: Helen has her mother’s eyes.
BILL: Good lord! Can the woman still see?

8. Is an explanation clearly being offered as an excuse/justification? I didn’t buy tick-
ets to see Chris Angel’s show because I heard that he spends half his act with his
shirt off strutting around in front of the ladies in the audience.

9. If Congress changes marijuana from a Class 1 drug to something lesser, next year
the penalties for possession will be much less than they are now. But Congress is
not going to declassify marijuana this year. So we’ll have to live with the drastic
penalties for at least another year.

10. If you are rich, then your car is something like a Mercedes or a Bentley. Oh! Is
that your Bentley, you rich old thing, you?

11. Man! Three sons in a row? Your next kid is bound to be a girl.

Additional
Exercises

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xviii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

I t is remarkable how much university students have changed over the decades since we first began teaching in our 20s. Back then they called us by our first names or even “Dude.” Nowadays they call us “Sir,” as in, “Sir, do you need help?”
They are also better informed. Thanks to Instagram and Snapchat and other

sources of breaking news, they know what friends are doing and thinking at any
given moment.

Educators seem not to agree on what exactly critical thinking is, though they do
agree that, whatever it is, we can use more of it. They also agree that being informed is
important, though what they think is important to be informed about doesn’t necessar-
ily include how Emily did her nails or what Jacob thinks about the new Starbucks cups.

You have to wonder. How can teachers compete with such stimulating infor-
mation? Critical thinking instruction is fairly abstract. It doesn’t deal with topics. In
this book, we don’t discuss whether someone’s a good president or if global climate is
changing. Rather, we offer instruction on good and bad reasoning. We try to help read-
ers develop facility in spotting irrelevancies, emotional appeals, empty rhetoric, and
weak evidence. To compete with distractions, we offer examples and exercises we hope
first-year university students can understand and relate to, and we try to be as concise
and readable as possible.

What, by the way, is our definition of critical thinking? This is something we go
into more in Chapter 1; for now, let’s just point out that critical thinking is aimed at mak-
ing wise decisions about what to think and do. This book is not about critical thinking
as much as it is a book in critical thinking. We try to provide guided practice in what
we think are the most important critical thinking skill sets. Although as authors we dif-
fer somewhat in our emphasis, we both agree (as do many instructors) that drill-and-
practice is useful in improving students’ critical thinking ability. Online technology can
be helpful when it comes to drill-and-practice, as well as in enabling students to learn
at their own pace. (Details coming up shortly). But if you don’t use online assignment,
practice, and assessment platforms such as ours, this text contains hundreds and hun-
dreds of exercises of the sort that (we think) can be applied directly to the world at large.
Exercise questions are all answered in the answer sections at the end of each chapter.

If you use this text or the online peripherals, we would appreciate hearing
from you. We can both be contacted through McGraw-Hill Education or by way of the
philosophy department at Chico State.

Preface

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xix 12/10/19 01:23 PM

A friend recently asked us which critical thinking skills we worry about people not having. At this point in time, we admit we are especially concerned about information- acquisition skills, the skills people use to acquire veridical information and to weed
out bogus news sources, misinformation, flimflam, and snake oil. There is much talk these
days about people lacking these skills, and everyone seems to assume the problem lies with
the people on the other side of the political aisle. Maybe both sides are right.

So, important revisions in this edition are aimed at improving information-
acquisition skills, and these revisions are found in Chapter 4 (Credibility). This chapter
is about recognizing dubious claims and sources. In it you will find our long-standing
analysis of credibility as having two parts, the believability of claims and the credibility
of sources. In this edition, we have expanded on the credibility of mainstream news,
social media, and other internet sources of information.

A society could become mis- or ill-informed through indifference or overt censor-
ship, to name two possibilities. But it could also get that way if enough people obtain
information primarily from sources assumed to be accurate and comprehensive, but
which in fact are not. Nobody wants to be misled, but most of us do like information
that fits with our view of the world, especially if it reinforces our pre-existing opinions
(or riles us up about people who don’t share our views). Motivated information-seeking
(seeking information for the purpose of confirming opinions we already hold) can lead
people to news sources that tailor the news for their audience. If enough people get
tailored news, society may become divided not only as to which sources are regarded as
authoritative but also as to what are and are not facts. Some of the reasons for thinking
such divisions exist today are discussed in Chapter 4. In that chapter, we also put forth
what we think is a non-partisan recommendation for obtaining legitimate news.

Another important batch of changes in this edition relates to inductive reasoning,
which is introduced in Chapter 2 and examined in more detail in Chapter 11. We now
divide inductive reasoning into four fundamental kinds: generalizing, de-generalizing
(which is the opposite of generalizing), analogical reasoning, and cause-effect reason-
ing. Other forms of inductive reasoning commonly discussed in texts such as this,
including notably sign arguments, arguments from examples, and inferences to the best
explanation, can be treated as one or another of the four basic kinds of inductive rea-
soning (as we ex

Philosophy homework help

Appendix A

Saint Mary’s University

Clinical Field and Seminar Log of Professional Experiences in the Field

The field log provides a concrete means for the student to:

· Account for professional activity in the field placement;

· Demonstrate professional development related to contracted learning experiences and the clinical-year competencies;

· Reflect on professional growth and development;

· Provide information that facilitates dialogue between the student and Field Supervisor;

· Document for the Field Supervisor, concerns, dilemmas and issues as they arise in the agency setting.

Students will complete bi-weekly logs using the format provided below. Logs are expected to be no more than 3 pages in length (double-spaced). Due dates are noted in the syllabus and on Engage. Every log submitted by the student should reflect a unique experience with the client system context and provide an example of professional development.

The reported activities account for cumulative total 300+ hours per semester.

Student:

Concentration:

Agency Supervisor:

Field Instructor:

Describe one intrapersonal/interpersonal strength or challenge that you experienced this week at the Field agency (150-300 words—please be very specific in your description/reflection). Respond to the following prompts:

1. In what way was the experience a strength/challenge for you?

2. In your assessment how was this experience a strength/challenge/learning experience for others (e.g., client, co-worker)?

3. Describe the social context of the experience.

4. Cite the practice framework (e.g., theory, model, etc.) that best facilitates resolution of the practice challenge or that supports the strength(s) you experienced. Relate this practice framework to your overall practice this week and explain how it is relevant to the practice context.

5. Identify at least one other practice framework that might also be relevant in this week’s practice context. Justify your choice.

6. Identify at least two strengths of your client system that you observed this week.

7. Identify at least two practice behaviors that relate to the experience and that you enhanced as a result of this week’s experiences.

(Include narrative here)

Activity and Related Competency-Clinical Practice Level

Briefly list additional activities completed this week and indicate their relationship to the SLC and Foundation-Practice-behaviors:

Practice Behavior

Learning Contract Tasks/Related Outcomes

Specific Activity/task during this log period

(Expand this chart as needed)

Philosophy homework help

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd i 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Thirteenth
Edition

Brooke Noel Moore
Richard Parker
California State University, Chico

with help in Chapter 12
from Nina Rosenstand and Anita Silvers

Critical
Thinking

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moo7069X_fm_ISE.indd ii 12/24/19 06:04 PM

CRITICAL THINKING

Published by McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2021 by McGraw-Hill
Education. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Previous editions © 2017, 2015, and 2012.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database
or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education, including, but not limited to, in
any network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning.

Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers outside the
United States.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 LWI 24 23 22 21 20

ISBN 978-1-260-57069-4
MHID 1-260-57069-X

Cover Image: McGraw-Hill

All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of the copyright page.

The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication. The inclusion of a website does
not indicate an endorsement by the authors or McGraw-Hill Education, and McGraw-Hill Education does not
guarantee the accuracy of the information presented at these sites.

mheducation.com/highered

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd iii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Chapter 1 Driving Blindfolded 1

Chapter 2 Two Kinds of Reasoning 35

Chapter 3 Clear Thinking, Critical Thinking, and
Clear Writing 73

Chapter 4 Credibility 102

Chapter 5 Rhetoric, the Art of Persuasion 141

Chapter 6 Relevance (Red Herring) Fallacies 185

Chapter 7 Induction Fallacies 207

Chapter 8 Formal Fallacies and Fallacies of Language 233

Chapter 9 Deductive Arguments I: Categorical Logic 257

Chapter 10 Deductive Arguments II: Truth-Functional
Logic 305

Chapter 11 Inductive Reasoning 362

Chapter 12 Moral, Legal, and Aesthetic Reasoning 420

Brief Contents

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd iv 12/10/19 01:23 PM

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd v 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Contents

Preface xviii
Changes to the 13th Edition  xix
Acknowledgments xxi
About the Authors xxiv

Chapter 1 Driving Blindfolded 1
Beliefs and Claims 4

Objective Claims and Subjective Judgments 4

Fact and Opinion 6

Relativism 7

Moral Subjectivism 7

Issues 7

Arguments 8

Cognitive Biases 15

Truth and Knowledge 21

What Critical Thinking Can and Can’t Do 22

A Word About the Exercises 22

Recap 23

Additional Exercises 24

Answers and Tips 33

Chapter 2 Two Kinds of Reasoning 35
Arguments: General Features 35

Conclusions Used as Premises 36

Unstated Premises and Conclusions 36

Two Kinds of Arguments 37

Deductive Arguments 37

Inductive Arguments 38

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 40

Two Kinds of Deductive Arguments 40

Four Kinds of Inductive Arguments 41

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vi CONTENTS

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd vi 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Telling the Difference Between Deductive and Inductive
Arguments 42

Deduction, Induction, and Unstated Premises 44

Balance of Considerations 46

Not Premises, Conclusions, or Arguments 46

Selfies (and Other Pictures) 46

If . . . Then . . . Sentences 47

Lists of Facts 47

“A because B” 48

Ethos, Pathos, and Logos 48

Techniques for Understanding Arguments 53

Clarifying an Argument’s Structure 54

Distinguishing Arguments from Window Dressing 56

Evaluating Arguments 57

Recap 57

Additional Exercises 58

Answers and Tips 68

Chapter 3 Clear Thinking, Critical Thinking, and
Clear Writing 73

Vagueness 74

Ambiguity 76

Semantic Ambiguity 77

Grouping Ambiguity 77

Syntactic Ambiguity 77

Generality 79

Defining Terms 84

Purposes of Definitions 84

Kinds of Definitions 85

Tips on Definitions 85

Writing Argumentative Essays 87

Good Writing Practices 89

Essay Types to Avoid 89

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CONTENTS vii

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd vii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Persuasive Writing 90

Writing in a Diverse Society 91

Recap 92

Additional Exercises 92

Answers and Tips 100

Chapter 4 Credibility 102
The Believability of Claims 103

Does the Claim Conflict with Personal Observation? 104

Does the Claim Conflict with Our Background Information? 107

Might the Claim Reinforce Our Biases? 108

The Credibility of Sources 111

Interested Parties 111

Physical and Other Characteristics 112

Expertise 113

The News 118

Mainstream News Media 118

Advertising 126

Three Kinds of Ads 126

Recap 129

Additional Exercises 130

Answers and Tips 139

Chapter 5 Rhetoric, the Art of Persuasion 141
Rhetorical Force 142

Rhetorical Devices I 143

Euphemisms and Dysphemisms 143

Weaselers 144

Downplayers 144

Rhetorical Devices II 146

Stereotypes 147

Innuendo 148

Loaded Questions 149

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viii CONTENTS

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd viii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Rhetorical Devices III 150

Ridicule/Sarcasm 150

Hyperbole 151

Rhetorical Devices IV 151

Rhetorical Definitions and Rhetorical Explanations 152

Rhetorical Analogies and Misleading Comparisons 153

Proof Surrogates and Repetition 157

Proof Surrogates 157

Repetition 157

Persuasion Through Visual Imagery 161

The Extreme Rhetoric of Demagoguery 162

Recap 166

Additional Exercises 167

Answers and Tips 183

Chapter 6 Relevance (Red Herring) Fallacies 185
Argumentum Ad Hominem 186

Poisoning the Well 187

Guilt by Association 187

Genetic Fallacy 187

Straw Man 188

False Dilemma (Ignoring Other Alternatives) 189

The Perfectionist Fallacy 190

The Line-Drawing Fallacy 190

Misplacing the Burden of Proof 191

Begging the Question (Assuming What You Are Trying to Prove) 193

Appeal to Emotion 194

Argument from Outrage 194

Scare Tactics 195

Appeal to Pity 196

Other Appeals to Emotion 197

Irrelevant Conclusion 198

Recap 200

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CONTENTS ix

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd ix 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Exercises 200

Answers and Tips 206

Chapter 7 Induction Fallacies 207
Generalizations 207

Generalizing from Too Few Cases (Hasty Generalization) 208

Generalizing from Exceptional Cases 210

Accident 211

Weak Analogy 212

Mistaken Appeal to Authority 213

Mistaken Appeal to Popularity (Mistaken Appeal to
Common Belief) 214

Mistaken Appeal to Common Practice 215

Bandwagon Fallacy 216

Fallacies Related to Cause and Effect 217

Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc 217

Cum Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc 221

Slippery Slope 223

Untestable Explanation 224

Line-Drawing Again 225

Recap 225

Exercises 225

Answers and Tips 232

Chapter 8 Formal Fallacies and Fallacies of
Language 233

Three Formal Fallacies: Affirming the Consequent, Denying the
Antecedent, and Undistributed Middle 233

Affirming the Consequent 233

Denying the Antecedent 234

The Undistributed Middle 235

The Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly 237

The Fallacies of Composition and Division 239

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x CONTENTS

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Confusing Explanations with Excuses 240

Confusing Contraries and Contradictories 242

Consistency and Inconsistency 244

Miscalculating Probabilities 244

Incorrectly Combining the Probability of Independent Events 245

Gambler’s Fallacy 246

Overlooking Prior Probabilities 247

Faulty Inductive Conversion 247

Recap 249

Additional Exercises 250

Answers and Tips 256

Chapter 9 Deductive Arguments I: Categorical Logic 257
Categorical Claims 259

Venn Diagrams 260

Translation into Standard Form (Introduction) 261

Translating Claims in Which the Word “Only” or the Phrase “The Only” Occurs 262

Translating Claims About Times and Places 263

Translating Claims About Specific Individuals 264

Translating Claims that Use Mass Nouns 265

The Square of Opposition 268

Existential Assumption and the Square of Opposition 268

Inferences Across the Square 268

Three Categorical Relations 269

Conversion 269

Obversion 270

Contraposition 270

Categorical Syllogisms 278

The Venn Diagram Method of Testing for Validity 279

Existential Assumption in Categorical Syllogisms 282

Categorical Syllogisms with Unstated Premises 284

Real-Life Syllogisms 285

The Rules Method of Testing for Validity 289

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CONTENTS xi

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xi 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Recap 291

Additional Exercises 291

Answers and Tips 301

Chapter 10 Deductive Arguments II: Truth-Functional
Logic 305

Truth Tables and Logical Symbols 306

Claim Variables 306

Truth Tables 306

Symbolizing Compound Claims 312

“If” and “Only If” 312

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 314

“Unless” 316

“Either . . . Or” 316

Truth-Functional Argument Patterns (Brief Version) 318

Three Common Valid Argument Patterns 319

Three Mistakes: Invalid Argument Forms 322

Truth-Functional Arguments (Full Version) 325

The Truth-Table Method 326

The Short Truth-Table Method 328

Deductions 334

Group I Rules: Elementary Valid Argument Patterns 334

Group II Rules: Truth-Functional Equivalences 339

Conditional Proof 347

Recap 350

Additional Exercises 351

Answers and Tips 358

Chapter 11 Inductive Reasoning 362
Argument from Analogy 362

Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy 363

Three Arguments from Analogy 365

Other Uses of Analogy 366

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xii CONTENTS

moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

Generalizing from a Sample 371

Evaluation of Arguments That Generalize from a Sample 372

Three Arguments That Generalize from a Sample 372

Scientific Generalizing from a Sample 373

De-generalizing (Reverse Generalizing; the Statistical Syllogism) 375

Causal Statements and Their Support 382

Forming Causal Hypotheses 382

Weighing Evidence 384

Confirming Causal Hypotheses 395

Inference to the Best Explanation 399

Reasoning from Cause to Effect 401

Calculating Statistical Probabilities 402

Joint Occurrence of Independent Events 402

Alternative Occurrences 403

Expectation Value 403

Calculating Conditional Probabilities 404

Causation in the Law 406

Recap 407

Additional Exercises 408

Answers and Tips 416

Chapter 12 Moral, Legal, and Aesthetic Reasoning 420
Value Judgments 421

Moral Versus Nonmoral 422

Two Principles of Moral Reasoning 422

Moral Principles 424

Deriving Specific Moral Value Judgments 424

Major Perspectives in Moral Reasoning 427

Consequentialism 427

Duty Theory/Deontologism 429

Moral Relativism 430

Religious Relativism 432

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CONTENTS xiii

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Religious Absolutism 432

Virtue Ethics 432

Moral Deliberation 435

Legal Reasoning 439

Justifying Laws: Four Perspectives 441

Aesthetic Reasoning 444

Eight Aesthetic Principles 444

Using Aesthetic Principles to Judge Aesthetic Value 447

Evaluating Aesthetic Criticism: Relevance and Truth 448

Why Reason Aesthetically? 450

Recap 452

Additional Exercises 453

Answers and Tips 455

Appendix: Selected Exercises from Previous Editions 457

Glossary 480

Index 488

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xiv 12/10/19 01:23 PM

You’re in the driver’s seat.
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Effective, efficient studying.
Connect helps you be more productive with your study time and get better grades using tools like
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More Engaging

Moore & Parker are known for fresh and lively writing. They rely on their own classroom
experience and on feedback from instructors in getting the correct balance between

explication and example.

■ ■ Examples and exercises are drawn from today’s
headlines.

■ ■ Students learn to apply critical thinking skills to situ-
ations in a wide variety of areas: advertising, poli-
tics, the media, popular culture.

Critical Thinking . . . Skills for

First Pages

Co Gn ITIv E BIASES 19

moo41025_ch01_001-032.indd 19 09/06/19 12:33 PM

impossible to think that good judgment or rational
thought would lead them to such excess.*

Yet another possible source of psychological
distortion is the overconfidence effect, one of several
self-deception biases that may be found in a variety
of contexts.** If a person estimates the percentage
of his or her correct answers on a subject, the esti-
mate will likely err on the high side—at least if the
questions are difficult or the subject matter is unfa-
miliar.† Perhaps some manifestation of the overcon-
fidence effect explains why, in the early stages of the
American Idol competition, many contestants appear
totally convinced they will be crowned the next
American Idol—and are speechless when the judges
inform them they cannot so much as carry a tune.††

Closely related to the overconfidence effect is
the better-than-average illusion. The illusion crops up
when most of a group rate themselves as better than
most of the group relative to some desirable charac-
teristics, such as resourcefulness or driving ability.
The classic illustration is the 1976 survey of SAT tak-
ers, in which well over 50 percent of the respondents
rated themselves as better than 50 percent of other
SAT takers with respect to such qualities as leader-
ship ability.‡ The same effect has been observed when
people estimate how their intelligence, memory, or
job performance stacks up with the intelligence,
memory, and job performances of other members of
their profession or workplace. In our own informal
surveys, more than 80 percent of our students rate
themselves in the top 10 percent of their class with
respect to their ability to think critically.

Unfortunately, evidence indicates that even when they are informed about the
better-than-average illusion, people may still rate themselves as better than most in their
ability to not be subject to it.‡‡

‡‡http://weblamp.princeton.edu/ psych/f ACUl TY/Articles/Pronin/The%20Bias%20Blind.PDf . The better-than-average bias has not been
found to hold for all positive traits. In some things, people underestimate their abilities. The moral is that for many abilities, we are
probably not the best judges of how we compare to others. And this includes our ability to avoid being subject to biasing influences.

‡See Mark D. Alicke and other authors in “The Better-Than-Average Effect,” in Mark D. Alicke and others, The Self in Social
Judgment: Studies in Self and Identity (new York: Psychology Press, 2005), 85–106. The better-than-average illusion is
sometimes called the l ake Wobegon effect, in reference to Garrison Keillor’s story about the fictitious Minnesota town “where all
the children are above average.”

††This possibility was proposed by Gad Saad, Psychology Today, www.psychologytoday.com/blog/homo-consumericus/200901/
self-deception-american-idol-is-it-adaptive.

†See Sarah lichtenstein and other authors, “ Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980, ” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 306–34.

**However, a universal tendency among humans to irrationally exaggerate their own competencies hasn’t been established. for
an online quiz purportedly showing the overconfidence effect, see www.tim-richardson.net/joomla15/finance-articles-profmenu-
70/73-over-confidence-test.html.

*Jamey Keaton, Associated Press. Reported in The Sacramento Bee, Thursday, March 18, 2010. Did the subjects suspect the
shocks weren’t real? Their statements afterward don’t rule out the possibility but certainly seem to suggest they believed they
truly were administering painful electrical shocks to the actor.

■ Does Kim Kardashian
wear too much makeup?
The issue is subjective, or,
as some people say, “a
matter of opinion.”

Stephen l ovekin/WWD/
Shutterstock

Confirming Pages

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216 CHAPTER 7 : InduCTIon FAllA CIES

Bandwagon Fallacy
Sometimes a speaker or writer will try to get
us to do something by suggesting that every-
one or most people are doing it. The idea is
not to cite what people believe as evidence
of the truth of a claim. Rather, the attempt is
made to induce us to do something by mak-
ing us feel out of step with things if we don’t.
This is the infamous Bandwagon Fallacy,
illustrated by this example:

Appealing to Tradition

According to Representative Steve King of Iowa (pictured here), “Equal protection [under the Constitution] is not equal protection
for same sex couples to marry. Equal protection has always been for a man and a woman to be able to get married to each other.”

YuRI GRIPAS/uPI/newscom Pete Marovich/ZuMAPRESS. com/newscom

I am the most popular candidate by far.
Only a minority support my opponent.

The speaker wants us to jump on the
bandwagon. He or she has not said anything
that is relevant to who we should support or
how we should vote.

Here is one more example:

Let’s get a spa. They are very popular
these days.

The speaker hasn’t really shown that
we need a spa. He wants us to get on the
bandwagon.

More Relevant

Moore & Parker spark student interest in skills
that will serve them throughout their lives,
making the study of critical thinking a meaning-
ful endeavor.

■ ■ Boxes show students how critical thinking
skills are relevant to their day-to-day lives.

■ ■ Striking visuals in every chapter show stu-
dents how images affect our judgment and
shape our thinking.

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xvii 12/10/19 01:23 PM

More Student Success

Moore & Parker provide a path to student suc-
cess, making students active participants in their
own learning while teaching skills they can apply
in all their courses.

■ ■ Learning objectives link to chapter sections
and in turn to print and online activities, so
that students can immediately assess their
mastery of the learning objective.

■ ■ Exercises are dispersed throughout most
chapters, so that they link tightly with the
concepts as they are presented.

■ ■ Students have access to over 2,000 exer-
cises that provide practice in applying
their skills.

the course. Skills for life.
First Pages

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240 CHAPTER 8: FoRMAl FAllA CIEs ANd FAllA CIEs o F lANG u AGE

Exercise 8-4
Here are 107 examples of the fallacies discussed in this chapter. Match each item to one
or more of the following categories or otherwise answer as indicated:

a. affirming the consequent
b. denying the antecedent
c. undistributed middle fallacy
d. confusing explanations with excuses
e. equivocation
f. composition
g. division
h. miscalculating probabilities

Note

Your instructor may or may not ask you to further assign miscalculating probabilities
into the following subcategories: Incorrectly combining the probabilities of indepen-
dent events, the gambler’s fallacy, overlooking prior probabilities, and faulty inductive
conversion.

1. Professor Parker can tell you if you are sick; after all, he is a doctor.

2. If this man is the president, then he believes in immigration reform. If this man
is vice president, then he believes in immigration reform. Therefore, if this man is
president, then he is vice president.

3. If global warming is for real, then the mean global temperature will have risen
over the past ten years. And that is what happened. Therefore, global warming is
for real.

4. My chance of being born on December 25 was the same as yours. So the chances
we were both born on December 25 have to be twice as good.

5. Sodium is deadly poisonous, and so is chlorine. Salt consists of sodium and chlo-
rine, which must be why we’re told not to eat too much of it.

6. The Bible commands you to leave life having made the world a better place. And
therefore it commands you to make the world a better place each and every day.

7. A dialogue:
JILL: Helen has her mother’s eyes.
BILL: Good lord! Can the woman still see?

8. Is an explanation clearly being offered as an excuse/justification? I didn’t buy tick-
ets to see Chris Angel’s show because I heard that he spends half his act with his
shirt off strutting around in front of the ladies in the audience.

9. If Congress changes marijuana from a Class 1 drug to something lesser, next year
the penalties for possession will be much less than they are now. But Congress is
not going to declassify marijuana this year. So we’ll have to live with the drastic
penalties for at least another year.

10. If you are rich, then your car is something like a Mercedes or a Bentley. Oh! Is
that your Bentley, you rich old thing, you?

11. Man! Three sons in a row? Your next kid is bound to be a girl.

Additional
Exercises

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I t is remarkable how much university students have changed over the decades since we first began teaching in our 20s. Back then they called us by our first names or even “Dude.” Nowadays they call us “Sir,” as in, “Sir, do you need help?”
They are also better informed. Thanks to Instagram and Snapchat and other

sources of breaking news, they know what friends are doing and thinking at any
given moment.

Educators seem not to agree on what exactly critical thinking is, though they do
agree that, whatever it is, we can use more of it. They also agree that being informed is
important, though what they think is important to be informed about doesn’t necessar-
ily include how Emily did her nails or what Jacob thinks about the new Starbucks cups.

You have to wonder. How can teachers compete with such stimulating infor-
mation? Critical thinking instruction is fairly abstract. It doesn’t deal with topics. In
this book, we don’t discuss whether someone’s a good president or if global climate is
changing. Rather, we offer instruction on good and bad reasoning. We try to help read-
ers develop facility in spotting irrelevancies, emotional appeals, empty rhetoric, and
weak evidence. To compete with distractions, we offer examples and exercises we hope
first-year university students can understand and relate to, and we try to be as concise
and readable as possible.

What, by the way, is our definition of critical thinking? This is something we go
into more in Chapter 1; for now, let’s just point out that critical thinking is aimed at mak-
ing wise decisions about what to think and do. This book is not about critical thinking
as much as it is a book in critical thinking. We try to provide guided practice in what
we think are the most important critical thinking skill sets. Although as authors we dif-
fer somewhat in our emphasis, we both agree (as do many instructors) that drill-and-
practice is useful in improving students’ critical thinking ability. Online technology can
be helpful when it comes to drill-and-practice, as well as in enabling students to learn
at their own pace. (Details coming up shortly). But if you don’t use online assignment,
practice, and assessment platforms such as ours, this text contains hundreds and hun-
dreds of exercises of the sort that (we think) can be applied directly to the world at large.
Exercise questions are all answered in the answer sections at the end of each chapter.

If you use this text or the online peripherals, we would appreciate hearing
from you. We can both be contacted through McGraw-Hill Education or by way of the
philosophy department at Chico State.

Preface

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moo41025_fm_i-xxvi.indd xix 12/10/19 01:23 PM

A friend recently asked us which critical thinking skills we worry about people not having. At this point in time, we admit we are especially concerned about information- acquisition skills, the skills people use to acquire veridical information and to weed
out bogus news sources, misinformation, flimflam, and snake oil. There is much talk these
days about people lacking these skills, and everyone seems to assume the problem lies with
the people on the other side of the political aisle. Maybe both sides are right.

So, important revisions in this edition are aimed at improving information-
acquisition skills, and these revisions are found in Chapter 4 (Credibility). This chapter
is about recognizing dubious claims and sources. In it you will find our long-standing
analysis of credibility as having two parts, the believability of claims and the credibility
of sources. In this edition, we have expanded on the credibility of mainstream news,
social media, and other internet sources of information.

A society could become mis- or ill-informed through indifference or overt censor-
ship, to name two possibilities. But it could also get that way if enough people obtain
information primarily from sources assumed to be accurate and comprehensive, but
which in fact are not. Nobody wants to be misled, but most of us do like information
that fits with our view of the world, especially if it reinforces our pre-existing opinions
(or riles us up about people who don’t share our views). Motivated information-seeking
(seeking information for the purpose of confirming opinions we already hold) can lead
people to news sources that tailor the news for their audience. If enough people get
tailored news, society may become divided not only as to which sources are regarded as
authoritative but also as to what are and are not facts. Some of the reasons for thinking
such divisions exist today are discussed in Chapter 4. In that chapter, we also put forth
what we think is a non-partisan recommendation for obtaining legitimate news.

Another important batch of changes in this edition relates to inductive reasoning,
which is introduced in Chapter 2 and examined in more detail in Chapter 11. We now
divide inductive reasoning into four fundamental kinds: generalizing, de-generalizing
(which is the opposite of generalizing), analogical reasoning, and cause-effect reason-
ing. Other forms of inductive reasoning commonly discussed in texts such as this,
including notably sign arguments, arguments from examples, and inferences to the best
explanation, can be treated as one or another of the four basic kinds of inductive rea-
soning (as we ex

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Launchpad: Introduction to Utilitarianism

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As we enter into our modern capitalist world and its mechanistic view of nature, we will
see that utilitarianism emerges as its natural ethical framework because it also
functions in an entirely mechanical and calculating way.

Of course virtue ethics and utilitarianism both use the words “good” and “happiness” in
a central way to their ethical reasoning. Some philosophers have even lumped these
two theories under the category of “consequentialism” because they consider actions
according to their consequences for obtaining happiness. But there are very important
differences between these two frameworks — and they come about from the important
historical changes to society and the economy that we’ve already explored. The key
will be to understand their differing senses of the normative form of human nature. My
lecture notes comparing and contrasting virtue ethics and utilitarianism
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034376/download?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034376/download?
download_frd=1) provides some ways to think about their main differences. But before
you begin comparing and contrasting the two frameworks, I want you to dive into the
works of Bentham and then Mill. There is a nice simplicity to their ethical reasoning
that many have been drawn toward. We will want to first spell out the simple thread,
but then ask bigger questions about it, especially whether it is too reductive and not
comprehensive enough for understanding our qualitatively complex human nature.

Jeremy Bentham provided the first detailed philosophical account of utilitarianism.
Writing during the rise of the English industrial revolution, he wanted to accommodate
the commercialization of society with a simple method of ethical calculation no different
from determining market values. He measures and calculates pains and pleasures just
as an accountant takes up cost-benefit analysis. We want to understand not only his
method, but his presuppositions about human nature that led him to develop his ethical
reasoning. Some key questions to ask while reading Bentham:

How does he understand human beings and the nature of society (what does he
call community)?

Is the human anything more than an individualistic pleasure-seeking machine?
is society a whole greater than the sum of its parts?

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Or is it nothing more than an aggregate of private individuals competing against
each other?
What’s the difference in such understandings of society, and why would it matter
for how we understand ethics? (remember the historical origins of ethics as both
an individual and collective endeavor to determine the common good together)

More Key Questions to Ask
If happiness is equated solely with physical pleasure and the avoidance of pain, can
this account for the rich complexities of our human desires, especially insofar as
they are educated and refined into higher forms? Don’t we desire more than just
physical pleasures?
Is it really true that the only evidence for something being desirable is whether
people actually desire it? There are many things that people desire that might not
be truly good and desirable, just as there are many things good for us that a
majority might not happen to actually desire.

Are there certain objects that should attract our desire for their own sake, or is
desire nothing other than the subjective feelings and preferences we project onto
whatever?

Does the logic here assume that humanity is anything more than an aggregate of
individualistically consuming animals?

John Stuart Mill learned from Bentham as his student, and while he accepted the main
thrust of Bentham’s utilitarianism, he also saw some of its shortcomings and tried to
provide more nuanced answers to the questions above. The lecture notes for
Bentham (https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034406/download?
wrap=1) (https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034406/download?
download_frd=1) and the lecture notes for Mill
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034358/download?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034358/download?
download_frd=1) break down the argument of both and should help you better
understand what is at stake in their arguments. But let me provide some brief key
ideas to think about with John Stuart Mill’s views.

Key Points for Mill

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You will see in Mill’s work and in my lecture notes on Mill, that he is not entirely
satisfied with the simplistic utilitarian logic and its presupposed view of human nature.
Try to follow the ways he begins to press against it as he argues that there are some
qualities distinctive to human nature that are higher than others and therefore require a
higher level of satisfaction. And especially ask whether he can make such an argument
within the original logic of utilitarianism provided by Bentham without transforming it in
the direction of virtue ethics.

One key point that we need to reflect on in Mill is his critical application of his ethics to
an economic analysis. The more Mill provides a nuanced challenge within utilitarianism
the more he is forced to critique business as usual within the capitalist economy of his
day. This seems to be especially the case when he articulates a normative sense of
human nature more in line with virtue ethics. As we saw last week with Merchant’s
reading, the modern mechanized view of nature sees humans as essentially egotistical
pleasure machines because it is based in a mode of privately owned production
organized solely for exchange value and thus private profit. But Mill begins to question
this view of humanity, as noted above, claiming we have higher social qualities much
like Aristotle. I want you all to reflect on what this means for Mill’s analysis of political
economy. Like virtue ethics he is concerned that our economic relations of
production are producing only worker bees or herd animals rather than realizing
our truly human capacities. Try to follow especially his critical view of the capitalist
relations of production, what he means by a cooperative restructuring, and why he
sees a transformation toward a cooperative structure as necessary for fulfilling
humanity.

1. What is dehumanizing about capitalist relations of production?
2. What does he mean by cooperative relations of production? Notice that Mill does

not necessarily endorse certain state-socialist notions of government ownership of
production. So under his cooperative principles and structures, who would own
society’s means of production?

3. And why is this change in ownership a necessary transformation for humanity to
ethically flourish?

4. What is his presupposed view of human nature that seems to be driving this critical
intervention?

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The big question to ask moving forward, which Aristotle already presented, but
Mill brings back to the fore against Bentham:

If we believe human nature holds higher rational potentials and social
qualities beyond the utilitarian view, then how can we continue to justify the
private ownership of society’s means of production and its use for private
profit, rather than production as more adequately democratized and for the
purpose of meeting our real social needs?

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Launchpad: What is Capitalism?

What is Capitalism?

We live and breathe capitalism. It is the global economic order that currently binds the
entire world under a single system and its measure of value: money. Our material lives
—the goods and social relations we subsist on—are produced and reproduced by way
of this system. But what is the system of capitalism? If we are going to practice ethical
reasoning in a way that transforms business, then we need to take a harder look at the
deeper underlying system—the structural rules of the game of capitalism within which
every business operates.

First then we must recognize that capitalism is not eternally the way things have
always been or will always be. It is a contingent historical product. As Carolyn
Merchant’s article from Week 3 highlighted, capitalism is a contingent economic
development that historically arose as a break from previous organic societies and
their production for communal needs in order to produce solely for private profit. But
prior to capitalism there had been markets for exchanging goods, and there had also
been some merchants exchanging goods for private profit (which we already saw
critiqued by Aristotle). So what exactly makes capitalism historically distinctive?

To answer this question, let’s go over some of the questions we’ve been asking since
the beginning of the quarter:

What is it that makes the human species distinctively human? Some typical
proposals: culture, education, consciousness and intellectual capacities, as well as
those social qualities of compassion, love, empathy, etc. (such as proposed by
Aristotle or Mill in their different ways)

Where did these capacities and practices come from? If these important
characteristics did not simply fall from heaven then how did they materially
emerge and evolve in history? What is distinctive about the human that makes
these higher-order qualities and activities possible in the first place?

More fundamental is our ability to shape our environment and our own nature
by socially producing our own means of production and thus our own

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means of subsisting.

Most animals produce only according to their given biological endowments as
genetically adapted to a certain environment, with only a few species using
certain found objects to aid their productive activities. But humans have
learned how to create new productive technologies and new ways of
producing together that transcend the limits of our biological endowments and
thus can transform any environment into a human habitat (or a habitat for any
species).

This creation of our own means of production and thus our own means of subsisting
within any environment has led to the abundance of goods and time (the necessary
production and distribution of a diverse social surplus) that opens the possibility for
developing new qualities, needs, and creative forms of existing as diverse cultural
beings.

Thus, what makes the human the distinctive animal it is, is not merely that we
are social or culturally diverse in our expressions. Rather cultural diversity is a
later healthy sign of developing that distinctive power we all share: the creative
power of our labor to consciously and cooperatively transform the very
means of producing and reproducing the material life of our species
beyond mere survival—to transform the material at hand into new tools as well
as to transform physical resources into new forms of energy, and thus new kinds
of abundance, produced in new ways, through new forms of cooperation and
sharing, and for new reasons—community for its own sake.

This transformative activity of producing together our own means of
subsisting through better organizing both nature and ourselves is the
beginnings of developing real agency for self-determination beyond being
passive objects to biological/environmental dictates, and thus the beginning
for discovering our common good—it is where we first discover the virtues of
cooperation and creativity, the need for solidarity and compassion, the virtue
of wisdom and the intellectual capacity for higher order organization, and thus
the capability for “practical reason” as emancipatory social practice.

In other words: This distinctively transformative quality of our production
and reproduction of the species has been possible because it has been
highly social (sharing of resources, labor, knowledge, abundance, etc.)

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and intentionally planned to increasing degrees (reasoning together
through dialogue).

Moreover, throughout our evolutionary history our social means of
producing a social surplus has been more or less socially owned by
the producers themselves; and societies have advanced more or less
insofar as they consciously reinvested the social surplus back into their
socially creative capacities for cultivating new potentials in nature rather
than violently exploiting certain given mechanisms of nature.

What then makes our capitalist system distinctive within human history?
Humanity’s social means of producing the social surplus that makes any human
society possible, is now entirely privatized by only a few entities, with the social
surplus entirely captured in the form of private profit. As Shaw briefly states in the
reading, capitalism = the privatized ownership of the social means of
production (i.e. land, resources, productive technologies privately owned by
corporations) as well as the private ownership of surplus value (i.e.
commonwealth) thereby generated.
While kings prior to capitalism were able to forcibly appropriate large portions of
society’s wealth and even temporarily capture a small amount of slave labor, no
king or empire in the past was able to privately capture the entirety of its
society’s productive means for producing its material life and commonwealth. For
more details on how capitalism historically arose through the private capture of the
social means of production, especially through land enclosures, slavery, and
colonization, etc., and some of its key enduring features, see the lecture notes
here (https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034401?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034401/download?
download_frd=1)

Thus while we know the story of how capitalism supplanted the strictures of
feudalism, and thus has generated vast amounts of wealth, unprecedented in
history, we don’t often hear the story of exactly how and why it is able to do so,
and thus the hidden costs to generating such a system of monetary wealth–why
is it that within such a system of wealth there is nevertheless a rising inequality
gap, as well as a diminishment of the earth’s resources? Shouldn’t true wealth
be measured more precisely as to how well it universally develops the diverse
creative potentials of humanity and nature for a holistic quality of life?

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The problem in a capitalist society then is not simply that there is such exorbitant
monetary wealth, or that there are only a few wealthy people with power at the
top, but rather the problem is that society’s social means of producing and
reproducing its material life together is now privatized and thus undemocratically
structured toward ends (concentrating private profit) other than advancing the
social life of the people actually producing the commonwealth–a failure that has
existential consequences for all.

This is because the common resources and social means by which we
produce our collective life together is now privately owned and controlled by
institutionalized private entities (i.e. corporations) guided solely by private
ends, with the market allocating goods solely on the basis of this pursuit of
private profit (remember Nussbaum on the question of how goods should be
allocated?). The world is now divided up into those who privately own the
social means of production and the rest who have only their labor to sell for a
wage and yet no real voice in how their world itself is produced.

In other words, the problem is not merely unequal wealth distribution—but
rather more problematically, because more fundamentally, unequal ownership
of the social means for producing wealth: thus a fundamental issue to
address with capitalism is the privatized process of production that
undemocratically and arbitrarily determines how, in what form, and why a
society’s common wealth should be generated in the first place.

Whereas prior to our capitalist world most humans worked more closely
together and with their land to meet real communal needs for creating their
own existence, now our collective labor is divided up and sold as a
commodity for a wage to private corporations, all in order to appropriate
our common land, resources, and time for generating private profit for a
few.

Hence, the very material existence of our social life is mediated back to us
by private capital and its commercial interests. (our collective efforts in
producing needed goods are now organized according to exchange value
rather than social use values–remember this distinction from Aristotle?)

Because the capitalist market is structured so that the competition for
private profit requires accumulating more capital in a zero sum game

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(increasingly privatizing and commodifying more land and labor) the
problems of capitalism therefore tend to be deeply structural and cannot
simplistically be reducible to a few greedy individuals at the top—everyone
is compelled to play this game to some degree in order to survive.

Thus the privatization of the social means of producing the social surplus
that makes social life possible, redirecting it into the form of private profit
that reinvests back into capital accumulation, is inherently structured so
that it is exceptionally difficult to wisely or justly, or even adequately,
reinvest the social surplus back into its very sources of possibility–people
and the environment–since the end goal is now exclusively making profit
in the form of money for its own sake (think about how difficult it has been
during our pandemic for the government to appropriate needed funds for
proper public health care and social services).

As we will later see this is a recipe for our runaway social inequality and
environmental degradation that is now catching up to us

As we will explore, each ethical framework deals with these issues of
capitalism differently, whether they acknowledge them only in part or as a
whole, and whether they seek to regulate, reform, or transform the
economy.

Some Questions to Think about

If in the very first lecture from Week 1 we discussed the origins of ethical discourse
within a community that socially produced according to use values and shared its
social surplus together, now we find we are in a specifically capitalist society in which
the social means of production and its social surplus are privatized for generating
exchange values as an occasion for private profit, thus making the common good more
difficult to see.

But is this socioeconomic system of private ownership and private profit as such
nevertheless able to be made compatible with more robust attempts to critically
pursue the common good and collectively build a democratic society?
Can healthy relationships with one another as well as with nature be adequately
cultivated within a system driven solely by privatization and the profit motive?

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Can issues such as poverty in general, and racial inequality more specifically, be
healed within this system, or does the system itself perpetuate such problems? Can
capitalism be separated from its violent history, or are the costs of this history still
with us and still being generated in other forms?
Is there any robust form of ethical reasoning beyond a reductive sense of
utilitarianism that is compatible with capitalism?

These are the big questions we need to ask within our modern world, especially if we
are going to develop the critical capacity for ethical reasoning within the business world
so as to make it serve more humane interests. Moving forward we will need to
continually refer back to the ethical paradigms as we analyze these issues. Below is a
quick point of reference, especially in thinking about the differing views on justice in all
three theories. You will need to consult this for the case studies moving forward:

Ethical
Paradigm

NormativeStandpoint
Dimensions to
human being

Main Purpose
for ethical
action

Primary Me
for fulfilling
ethical actio

Utilitarianism

Bentham

Mill

We are only
consuming animals
without universal
standpoint

One-
dimensional:
pleasure
machines with no
higher qualities

Maximize and
regulate pleasure
seeking within
given brute
nature

Ends justify
whatever me

Deontology

Kant

We are consuming
animals, but with a
universally shared
rational structure

Dualistically two-
dimensional:

Pleasure
machines +
rational will

To restrain and
transcend given
brute nature
when its interests
conflict

Focuses on
neither ends
means, but o
purifying
intentions fo
obeying duty
duty’s sake

5/9/22, 1:31 AM Launchpad: What is Capitalism?: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-what-is-capitalism 7/7

Virtue

Aristotle

We are inherently
social animals with
universally shared
rational and social
potentials for politics

Organically
multidimensional:
sensible
pleasures, social
qualities, rational
capacities

To transform our
brute nature
according to its
more excellent
potentials for
holistic
development

Virtue as fitt
appropriate
means to en
the practice
building up
highest pow
through hab

Let’s restate a summary of the two principled theories of justice, virtue and
deontology, according to the difference between equality and equity:

Deontology = justice as abstract equality: treating everyone the same by making
sure everyone gets the same regardless of situational needs and diverse histories.
Virtue ethics = justice according to need: in light of uneven histories and situational
contexts, it is about discerning the real needs each diverse individual or group has
in order to build up equity (i.e. real wealth!) precisely as a development of their
human capabilities.

We can sum up virtue’s principle of justice as, to each according to need, from
each according to ability.

Philosophy homework help

Appendix A

Saint Mary’s University

Clinical Field and Seminar Log of Professional Experiences in the Field

The field log provides a concrete means for the student to:

· Account for professional activity in the field placement;

· Demonstrate professional development related to contracted learning experiences and the clinical-year competencies;

· Reflect on professional growth and development;

· Provide information that facilitates dialogue between the student and Field Supervisor;

· Document for the Field Supervisor, concerns, dilemmas and issues as they arise in the agency setting.

Students will complete bi-weekly logs using the format provided below. Logs are expected to be no more than 3 pages in length (double-spaced). Due dates are noted in the syllabus and on Engage. Every log submitted by the student should reflect a unique experience with the client system context and provide an example of professional development.

The reported activities account for cumulative total 300+ hours per semester.

Student:

Concentration:

Agency Supervisor:

Field Instructor:

Describe one intrapersonal/interpersonal strength or challenge that you experienced this week at the Field agency (150-300 words—please be very specific in your description/reflection). Respond to the following prompts:

1. In what way was the experience a strength/challenge for you?

2. In your assessment how was this experience a strength/challenge/learning experience for others (e.g., client, co-worker)?

3. Describe the social context of the experience.

4. Cite the practice framework (e.g., theory, model, etc.) that best facilitates resolution of the practice challenge or that supports the strength(s) you experienced. Relate this practice framework to your overall practice this week and explain how it is relevant to the practice context.

5. Identify at least one other practice framework that might also be relevant in this week’s practice context. Justify your choice.

6. Identify at least two strengths of your client system that you observed this week.

7. Identify at least two practice behaviors that relate to the experience and that you enhanced as a result of this week’s experiences.

(Include narrative here)

Activity and Related Competency-Clinical Practice Level

Briefly list additional activities completed this week and indicate their relationship to the SLC and Foundation-Practice-behaviors:

Practice Behavior

Learning Contract Tasks/Related Outcomes

Specific Activity/task during this log period

(Expand this chart as needed)

Philosophy homework help

Due Date:  April 30 by 11:59 p.m. 

This research paper has two parts.  Be sure to provide a brief introduction and a brief summary/conclusion each to Part A and Part B.


Survey A—Family Crises Survey
According to most experts in the field, all families experience crises at one time or another.  They may very in degrees of severity and/or longevity but it is an experience common to families.  Families respond differently to crises as you will discover in your research.

This family research consists of interviews on the topic of Family Crises.  For the sake of health and safety, you must conduct your interviews remotely.  A phone interview is standard or you may use other technology of your choice.
Please note the 

Guidelines for the Family Crisis Study follow.
There are three (3) parts to this Family Crises Survey

1) Interview two (2) families that you are comfortable talking to about a family crisis that they have had to face. Each family crises that you discuss must be different. (You will also survey your own family, making a total of three (3) family crises surveys in all. See Number 2 below.) You must discuss 
three different

 family crises.  (No, you cannot get all of your survey data from one family, even if they have weathered many crises.) For each family, you must interview (remotely) two or more members of the family individually or together about the same family crises in order to get a more balanced perspective.

For anonymity, in order to protect and respect the families in your survey, you should label  the families as Family A and Family B, . You should also either change the names of individual family members or refer to them as husband, wife, 16 year old daughter or 10 year old son, etc.  

Describe the family.  Example:  Husband (40 years old), Wife (30 years old), 4 children (two males ages 6 and 14; one daughter age 9, and a 11 year old niece living with them.)
List the family members that you interview and record their specific  responses.
Example:  Interviewed wife and 14 year old daughter
Responses of each was…

1.  Ask the family member(s) that you survey to discuss the following components and record their responses in their own words.
a) Nature of crisis
b) How it impacted the family
c) How the family managed the crisis, if at all.
d) Comparison of family life before and after resolution of the crisis.
e) If family, in retrospect, would have handled the crisis the same way or differently.  If differently, how would they have handled it?

2.)  Now reflect on a crisis within your own family and address the same components. You must address a different crisis than those discussed in your survey of other families.You may use either your family of origin or family of procreation, if applicable.

Content of Paper
The Content of the paper you submit should include a) the description of the families selected and the quoted responses of the two members you interviewed in each family b) a summarization of the interviews and of your experience in conducting them, and c) a discussion/comparison of your interview findings with related material in your text. You may want to start with Chapters 10 and 12, if relevant,  but you may use any chapters in the book. The discussion may support, refute or provide additional information to the topic.

Finished paper on Family Crises should be between  2 1/2 – 3 pages long.



Survey B—Blended Families Survey

For the sake of health and safety, you must conduct your interviews remotely.
For anonymity, in order to protect and respect the families in your survey, you should label  the families as Family A and Family B, . You should also either change the names of individual family members or refer to them as husband, wife, 16 year old daughter or 10 year old son, etc.  

Blended families are very common today. Yet, there are special challenges and rewards associated with the blended family form.

Survey three (3) blended families. For each family, ask two (2) members the following three open-ended questions and record their individual responses.

1). What are/were the greatest challenges faced by your blended families or individual

members of the blended family?

2). What are/were the greatest rewards realized by your blended family or individual
members?

3). What advice would you give to people who are considering blending their families?

NOTE: If you are a member of a blended family, you may use your own family as one of the three required families. You must still get responses from two individuals within your family. Yes, you may serve as one of the individuals.

Following is an example of how you should submit your paper.

Family A –Husband, wife, 4 children.  Married (or cohabited) 5 years.
Husband, 34, has two children from previous marriage (or relationship) Daughter 7, and  son. 12; Wife has 1 son,10, from a previous marriage.  They have a 3 year old daughter together.

Record what each of the selected members say in response to your questions. 
The husband says the greatest challenge is/was ….
The  12 year old son says the greatest challenge is/was…
The mother says the greatest reward is …
The 10 year old son says the greatest reward is…
On advice for blending a family, the mother says…
On advice for blending a family, the husband says …

After you have recorded the survey responses, summarize the results of the survey and relate it to at least three (3) concepts, theories, etc. from your textbook.  Do not merely mention the concept or theory or term, but discuss how it relates to, supports, or contradicts your survey findings. Present your information clearly and thoroughly.

The finished paper on the Blended Family Survey should be 2 1/2 – 3 pages long, double-spaced.


To submit your study on Family Crises and Blended Family, scroll to Submit Family Survey and proceed as indicated
.

 

 

Philosophy homework help

5/10/22, 7:08 AM Topic: Week 3 Case Discussion Questions – New Case Study Group 1

https://seattleu.instructure.com/groups/293194/discussion_topics/7969933/submit 1/6

This is a graded discussion: 2 points possible
due Apr 13

Week 3 Case Discussion Questions – New Case Study Group 1
From UCOR 2910 02

2 10

Search entries or author

 Reply

Watch the video about Ron Finley’s urban gardening project. In thinking about Nussbaum’s
capabilities approach and MacIntyre’s revolutionary Aristotelianism how is Finley’s project an
exemplary form of virtue ethics? In answering this question, elaborate how his understanding of
gardening as a community practice provides not only external goods, but more importantly how it
empowers community members by helping them realize certain internal capabilities for agency. In
other words, what are the higher objective needs or common goods being provided here beyond
mere food provisions, and why were they not being met within the status quo of capitalist society?

Be sure to provide your initial answer by Wednesday as well as at least 2 responses to
your group members’ answers by Sunday.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzZzZ_qpZ4w (https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=EzZzZ_qpZ4w)

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzZzZ_qpZ4w)

Unread    Subscribe

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Philosophy homework help

5/4/22, 12:48 AM Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-introduction-to-kants-deontology 1/7

Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s
Deontology

5/4/22, 12:48 AM Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-introduction-to-kants-deontology 2/7

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5/4/22, 12:48 AM Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

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Kant’s ethical theory provides us with something very different than the previous two. If
Bentham’s utilitarianism focuses solely on results in the form of getting pleasures by
any means, then what distinguishes Kant’s morality is that it focuses exclusively on
principled intentions behind the actions regardless of the results. In other words,
whereas utilitarianism is often described as a type of “consequentialism” because it
focuses solely on the pleasurable consequences of our actions, Kant’s moral theory is
described as “deontology” because it focuses on principles alone to the exclusion of
consequences: hence, deontology means the study of duty (deon) for duty’s sake,
doing your moral duty as a matter of principle rather than whether it will be beneficial
for some other purpose or bring about certain happy consequences. This emphasis on
principle is a significant point of departure from utilitarianism and virtue ethics in
several ways:

Kant concedes to utilitarianism that humans are basically selfish pleasure seekers
… BUT, Kant wants to emphasize that nevertheless we can temporarily transcend
this state because we have an inherent rational capacity to defer pleasure and
choose rational ends for their own sake when push comes to shove.

In other words: The normative form of human nature that guides his morality is
that humans are primarily egotistical and selfish animals; yet humans are also
distinctively more than this insofar as each individual has the same faculty of
reason for self-governance beyond being consumer slaves to pleasure.

each person is therefore morally equal and important in principle, because
each individual is able to act autonomously on the basis of universal reason
morality is then primarily about the principle of respecting each person’s
autonomy: hence, each person has inherent dignity not reducible to market
utility–each person is more than the object of someone else’s pleasure.

For Kant morality then is to be focused on intentions: whether we are intending
the right rational principles for their own sake, rather than pursuing external
results with ulterior motives.
There is more to Kant’s reasoning which is further elaborated in my
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034389?wrap=1) lecture
notes on Kant (https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034388?
wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034388/download?
download_frd=1) , with an outline of its overall logic at the end.

5/4/22, 12:48 AM Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-introduction-to-kants-deontology 4/7

Some Key Questions to Think about

In the readings we will want to pay close attention to Kant’s reasoning and ask:

1. how does he build his theoretical case for respecting each person as an end in
themselves?

2. How does Kant define the freedom of the will, as more than arbitrarily doing
whatever you happen to want, according to the dictates of practical reason?

3. What is it about “practical reason” that we all share and is morally significant?
4. Can you distinguish between Kant’s conception of practical reason as the ultimate

form of autonomy and the utilitarian conception of reason as merely instrumental?
(we explored some of the differences between these forms of reason in Week 3)
And how might his notion of practical reason compare and contrast with virtue
ethics’s understanding of practical reason?

But with Kant’s exclusive focus on pure practical reason, principled intentions, and a
formal duty to respect each individual, does his framework turn out to be too abstract?
We will therefore want to further ask:

1. What does it look like within real social relations to concretely treat, rather than
merely theoretically recognize, each person as an end in themselves? And does
Kant’s theory provide any practical guidelines here?

2. Is such an emphasis on purity of principles too abstractly theoretical? Can such an
abstract theory that emphasizes absolute moral law-following for its own sake
without consideration of certain notions of happiness substantively work toward
changing society for the better? Or in other words, can a society that treats each
individual with dignity come about without also emphasizing the practice of certain
socially creative virtues like compassion and solidarity that also seek out the
common good of happiness?

3. Following this, should (and can) acts of compassion and solidarity be understood as
a duty for duty’s sake, i.e., as a self-sacrificial suppression of desire? Shouldn’t
morality be about transforming desire, rather than suppressing it, so that
compassion might be able to consider the good of another as also a common good
for oneself?

5/4/22, 12:48 AM Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-introduction-to-kants-deontology 5/7

This week we will also want to wrap up the first half of the quarter by comparing and
contrasting the theoretical frameworks. I’ve provided lecture notes comparatively
summarizing (https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034351?wrap=1)

(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034351/download?
download_frd=1) all three ethical theories that should provide a touchstone for moving
forward in their practical application. Grasping the similarities and differences of all
three will be key for moving forward: as we analyze case studies you will need to
know the nuanced differences of all three theories in order to apply them
according to their distinctive logic. Your analysis of case studies will be graded
on how well you grasp the distinguishing logic and normative forms of each
ethical framework.

Quick Review and Summary of all Three Ethical Theories

A Snapshot of the Forms of Ethical Reasoning:

Virtue Ethics: Practical reason is about the transformation of desires and needs
toward higher ends of fulfilling our socially creative capabilities through virtuous
practices that allow us to transcend mere herd animals and consciously build
communities together for the sake of individual and collective flourishing. Practical
reason is then emancipatory social practice because it is about coming together for
that end of making a community of mutual flourishing in which everyone can
become an active participant in ruling together.

Utilitarianism: No practical reason as emancipatory social practice, but only
instrumental reason for calculating the most efficient means to privately meet
biological necessities and private appetites–that is, ethics is about maximizing the
consumption of sense experiences and not for realizing higher faculties or
capabilities — though we saw Mill push against this notion of instrumental rationality.
For Bentham we are primarily pleasure seeking machines, and calculating efficient
means for meeting arbitrarily programed and predetermined ends set by biological
impulses, the market, or majority rules is the sole function of reason.

5/4/22, 12:48 AM Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

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Deontology: Instead of instrumental rationality, practical reason as higher
capability for choosing new ends beyond given nature is upheld like virtue ethics.
But it is only the formal cognitive structure and purified logical form of practical
reason: not as the social practice of transforming our nature into its higher social
form, but the cognitive ability, in privately meeting necessities, to also adhere to an
abstract rule of law universally and equally applicable.

A Brief Summary of all Three Ethical Theories on Justice

Utilitarianism:

Justice is about maximizing utility for pleasure amongst the greatest amount of
people, while minimizing pain.

This makes justice a matter of abstract calculation determined by whatever
consumer trends happen to dominate, rather than determined by principles, so
that the imperative to maximize for majority rule can easily step over individuals
and minorities as well as fail to meet real human needs even for the majority.

Deontology:

Justice is about respecting the free will according to a principle of fairness and
equality, and thus about making sure majority power doesn’t encroach on the
individual right to make one’s own rational decision.

On this basis, and thus against utilitarianism, it grounds justice and rights on a
principle of human dignity rather than calculation – individual rights are worthy of
respect regardless of what the majority finds desirable.
Deontology’s principle of justice as fairness, however, also remains abstract,
often reducing equality to a flat homogeneity that cannot account for different
historical inequities and thus differing needs.

Virtue:

Justice is according to need: it is not about simply applying abstract fairness and
equality, but about cultivating the wisdom of how to concretely distribute and
allocate goods so as to meet the varying levels of need amongst differently situated
groups, not only for basic goods, but for developing the social virtues that empower
toward distinctive human excellence.

5/4/22, 12:48 AM Launchpad: Introduction to Kant’s Deontology: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

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Justice according to need rather than fairness demands the harder work of
determining not only the higher needs we all have to become distinctively human
but how those needs are to be uniquely addressed in differing historical
situations—how to build real equity rather than flatten to abstract equality
requires accounting for our diverse social and historical contexts.
This view can pose difficulties if it does not articulate a substantive sense of the
common good for all, since without such it might lapse into appearing to be
arbitrarily preferential toward certain groups or predicated on existing displays of
virtue narrowly defined.

Philosophy homework help

Due Date:  April 30 by 11:59 p.m. 

This research paper has two parts.  Be sure to provide a brief introduction and a brief summary/conclusion each to Part A and Part B.


Survey A—Family Crises Survey
According to most experts in the field, all families experience crises at one time or another.  They may very in degrees of severity and/or longevity but it is an experience common to families.  Families respond differently to crises as you will discover in your research.

This family research consists of interviews on the topic of Family Crises.  For the sake of health and safety, you must conduct your interviews remotely.  A phone interview is standard or you may use other technology of your choice.
Please note the 

Guidelines for the Family Crisis Study follow.
There are three (3) parts to this Family Crises Survey

1) Interview two (2) families that you are comfortable talking to about a family crisis that they have had to face. Each family crises that you discuss must be different. (You will also survey your own family, making a total of three (3) family crises surveys in all. See Number 2 below.) You must discuss 
three different

 family crises.  (No, you cannot get all of your survey data from one family, even if they have weathered many crises.) For each family, you must interview (remotely) two or more members of the family individually or together about the same family crises in order to get a more balanced perspective.

For anonymity, in order to protect and respect the families in your survey, you should label  the families as Family A and Family B, . You should also either change the names of individual family members or refer to them as husband, wife, 16 year old daughter or 10 year old son, etc.  

Describe the family.  Example:  Husband (40 years old), Wife (30 years old), 4 children (two males ages 6 and 14; one daughter age 9, and a 11 year old niece living with them.)
List the family members that you interview and record their specific  responses.
Example:  Interviewed wife and 14 year old daughter
Responses of each was…

1.  Ask the family member(s) that you survey to discuss the following components and record their responses in their own words.
a) Nature of crisis
b) How it impacted the family
c) How the family managed the crisis, if at all.
d) Comparison of family life before and after resolution of the crisis.
e) If family, in retrospect, would have handled the crisis the same way or differently.  If differently, how would they have handled it?

2.)  Now reflect on a crisis within your own family and address the same components. You must address a different crisis than those discussed in your survey of other families.You may use either your family of origin or family of procreation, if applicable.

Content of Paper
The Content of the paper you submit should include a) the description of the families selected and the quoted responses of the two members you interviewed in each family b) a summarization of the interviews and of your experience in conducting them, and c) a discussion/comparison of your interview findings with related material in your text. You may want to start with Chapters 10 and 12, if relevant,  but you may use any chapters in the book. The discussion may support, refute or provide additional information to the topic.

Finished paper on Family Crises should be between  2 1/2 – 3 pages long.



Survey B—Blended Families Survey

For the sake of health and safety, you must conduct your interviews remotely.
For anonymity, in order to protect and respect the families in your survey, you should label  the families as Family A and Family B, . You should also either change the names of individual family members or refer to them as husband, wife, 16 year old daughter or 10 year old son, etc.  

Blended families are very common today. Yet, there are special challenges and rewards associated with the blended family form.

Survey three (3) blended families. For each family, ask two (2) members the following three open-ended questions and record their individual responses.

1). What are/were the greatest challenges faced by your blended families or individual

members of the blended family?

2). What are/were the greatest rewards realized by your blended family or individual
members?

3). What advice would you give to people who are considering blending their families?

NOTE: If you are a member of a blended family, you may use your own family as one of the three required families. You must still get responses from two individuals within your family. Yes, you may serve as one of the individuals.

Following is an example of how you should submit your paper.

Family A –Husband, wife, 4 children.  Married (or cohabited) 5 years.
Husband, 34, has two children from previous marriage (or relationship) Daughter 7, and  son. 12; Wife has 1 son,10, from a previous marriage.  They have a 3 year old daughter together.

Record what each of the selected members say in response to your questions. 
The husband says the greatest challenge is/was ….
The  12 year old son says the greatest challenge is/was…
The mother says the greatest reward is …
The 10 year old son says the greatest reward is…
On advice for blending a family, the mother says…
On advice for blending a family, the husband says …

After you have recorded the survey responses, summarize the results of the survey and relate it to at least three (3) concepts, theories, etc. from your textbook.  Do not merely mention the concept or theory or term, but discuss how it relates to, supports, or contradicts your survey findings. Present your information clearly and thoroughly.

The finished paper on the Blended Family Survey should be 2 1/2 – 3 pages long, double-spaced.


To submit your study on Family Crises and Blended Family, scroll to Submit Family Survey and proceed as indicated
.

 

 

Philosophy homework help

Is Marijuana Use Safe?

Modeled example for the final paper assignment

John Smith

University of Arizona Global Campus

PHI103 Informal Logic

Dr. Christopher Foster

Due: Day 7 of Week 5

Begin with a title page,
formatted according to
APA standards

In recent years, most states have voted to legalize marijuana either for medical and/or

recreational use (DISA Global Solutions, 2020). However, federal law still prohibits the use or

sale of marijuana in the United States, and many groups consider marijuana use to be harmful

(National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2019). As more states consider differing degrees of marijuana

legalization (Sanders, 2018), it is important to consider whether marijuana use is safe. This paper

will explore the question of whether current medical research supports the idea that marijuana

use is harmful to human health. It will present a strong argument that marijuana is relatively safe

and a strong argument that it is unacceptably dangerous. This will be followed by a presentation

of my own argument for the conclusion that marijuana use by adults is acceptably safe. After

answering an objection to my argument, the paper will present an analysis of the merits of

reasoning and support provided by each argument.

Argument that Marijuana Use is Safe

There have been many studies that support the conclusion that marijuana use is safe.

Some of their results are summarized in this argument:

Premise 1: A giant meta-study pooled data from many research studies and determined

that marijuana use did not result in significant cognitive impairment in reaction time,

attention, language, executive function, perceptual function, or motor skills in marijuana

users (Grant et al., 2003).

Premise 2: Meta-data showed minor cognitive impairment from long term marijuana only

in the areas of learning and memory, but these were minor and can be minimized (e.g., in

a medical context) (2003).

Premise 3: Marijuana has beneficial uses that outweigh its minor harms (Wetterau, 2015).

A good intro
paragraph should
close with a
preview of what
the paper will
accomplish.

It is good to have clear
section headings,
showing your instructor
exactly where you
accomplish each of the
main elements of the
assignment instructions.

The clearest
way to
express an
argument is
by putting it
into
standard
form, with
each
premise
clearly
labeled and
listed above
the
conclusion.

Though the premises and conclusion of your
argument are in your own words, specific
sources of information need to be cited.

This argument is an
enhancement of the scholarly
argument presented in the
Week 3 paper.

All premises and conclusions
should be one sentence each.

Premise 4: The above dangers do not constitute being substantially medically dangerous.

Conclusion: Marijuana use is not substantially medically dangerous.

Argument that Marijuana Use is Unsafe

On the other hand, many studies have indicated that there are, in fact, many risks

associated with marijuana use. Some of their chief findings are expressed in the following

argument:

Premise 1: Marijuana is an addictive substance (Volkow et al., 2014).

Premise 2: Marijuana use causes long term negative effects on physical and mental health

(Feeney & Kampman, 2016).

Premise 3: Marijuana use causes elevated driving risks (Neavyn et al., 2014).

Premise 4: Marijuana use among adolescents is correlated with lower academic

achievement, job performance, and social functioning (Palamar et al., 2014).

Premise 5: It is unsafe to use substances that are addictive and that have many negative

effects.

Conclusion: It is unsafe to use Marijuana.

Analysis of the Arguments

As noted, both arguments have premises that are supported by substantial scholarly

research. Both arguments additionally provide strong support for the truth of their conclusions.

Each includes a final premise that links the factual claims made in the previous premises to the

specific language made in the conclusion, resulting in powerful support for each conclusion.

One of the goals of a critical
thinker is to make sure to
understand the reasoning on
all sides of a question as well
as possible. Therefore, it is
essential to present the
strongest reasoning that we
can find/think of in support
of both sides of our question.

These
premises
summarize
much of your
research in
your own
words.

This premise
provides a link
from the
points made in
the first
premises to the
language of
the conclusion.

Neither is deductively valid, but each is inductively strong and appears to have well-supported

premises. However, their conclusions make opposite points, resulting in an apparent

contradiction. There is a good question, therefore, of how to determine which of these

conclusions is most likely to be true.

One way to explain strong evidence for opposite conclusions is with the possibility of

researcher bias. Authors, even of scholarly studies, frequently put more focus on studies whose

results tend to support the conclusions that they personally support. Furthermore, each study will

focus on factors that strengthen the case for its preferred side. For example, a scholar whose

research supports the use of marijuana might focus on mitigating factors such as the fact that

dosages can be carefully controlled in a medical setting. Researchers on the side of the

opposition, on the other hand, may emphasize that addicted users are likely to use the substance

in doses well beyond those recommended by physicians. Therefore, there are biases, including

confirmation bias, even in scholarly sources.

Both arguments provide well-supported premises and very strong reasoning. Evaluating

which is stronger can be a difficult question. It depends upon the specific application we are

considering. If a teenager is considering recreational marijuana use, the second argument

provides substantial evidence that the demonstrated harms make the choice unacceptably

dangerous. However, if a legislator is contemplating voting for a law to legalize medical

marijuana within a state, the evidence from the first argument is adequate, in my view, to

conclude that use by adults in a medical context is acceptably safe. So relative to the question of

adult use, I determine that the first argument is stronger.

Specific
examples can
help to clarify
and strengthen
key points.

Presentation of My Own Argument

Based on my research and my evaluation of the reasoning that I have found therein, I

now present my own reasoning regarding the safety of marijuana use:

Premise 1: A scholarly study found that use of marijuana by adolescents results in long-

term cognitive impairment (Meier et al., 2012).

Premise 2: A substance whose use results in long-term cognitive impairment when used

by adolescents is not acceptably safe for recreational use by adolescents.

Premise 3: These impairments were not found in those who started smoking marijuana as

adults (Meier et. al, 2012).

Premise 4: Marijuana has only minor harms when used by adults (Grant et al., 2003).

Premise 5: Marijuana has many beneficial medical uses (Ault, 1999).

Premise 6: A substance that has many beneficial medical uses and only minor harms is

acceptably safe for medical use.

Conclusion: Marijuana is not acceptably safe for recreational use by adolescents but is

acceptably safe for medical use by adults.

Response to an Objection to the Argument

Though my argument is backed by substantial research and has premises that entail the

truth of its conclusion, there are still potential objections. One potential objection here is that the

legalization of marijuana for medical use by adults could make it more easily accessible for all,

thereby resulting in more recreational use, including by teens.

Though the premises
and conclusion of your
argument are in your
own words, specific
sources of information
need to be cited.

Linking
premises
2 and 6
makes
the
argument
valid.

A response to this objection comes from studies that have investigated this very question.

Though states have different results, the strongest results come from meta-studies, which can

aggregate and analyze the results from many different studies. “A 2018 meta-analysis concluded

that the results from previous studies do not lend support to the hypothesis that MMLs [medical

marijuana laws] increase marijuana use among youth” (Anderson et al., 2019). In fact, some

studies show an actual decline in teen usage after MMLs have been passed, possibly because it

becomes “… more difficult for teenagers to obtain marijuana as drug dealers are replaced by

licensed dispensaries that require proof of age.” Therefore, the risk of increased use by teens

does not seem to be borne out by the scholarly research.

Conclusion

It is my conclusion, therefore, that marijuana use is not safe for adolescents, but that

medical marijuana use by adults is acceptably safe. Though use at a young age can have

deleterious health consequences to mental functioning (Meier et al., 2012), use by adults has

minimal risks and has benefits that render the risks acceptable (Grant et al., 2003).

It is common for people to be wedded to a position and to seek evidence only to support

their side. However, in pursuit of truth, critical thinkers make a point of understanding the best

arguments on all sides of important questions. This allows them to be more informed and also

more fair-minded, open to changing their views to whichever position most aligns with the best

evidence.

A simple concluding
paragraph summarizes
what has been learned
and reaffirms key
conclusions. Make
sure to address both
bullet points.

References

Anderson, M., Hansen, B., Rees, D. I., Sabia, J. (2019). Association of marijuana laws with teen

marijuana use. JAMA Pediatrics 173(9), pp. 879-881.

https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2019.1720

Ault, A. (1999). Institute of medicine says marijuana has benefits. Lancet 353(9159), p. 1077-

1077. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)76443-6

Feeney, K. E., & Kampman, K. M. (2016). Adverse effects of marijuana use. The Linacre

Quarterly, 83(2), 174-178. https://doi.org/10.1080/00243639.2016.1175707

DISA Global Solutions (2020, November 4). Map of marijuana legality by state.

https://disa.com/map-of-marijuana-legality-by-state

Grant, I., Gonzales, R., Carey, C. L., Natarajan, L., & Wolfson, T. (2003). Non-acute (residual)

neurocognitive effects of cannabis use: A meta-analytic study. Journal of the

International Neuropsychological Society, 9(5), 679-689.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617703950016

Meier, M., Caspi, A., Ambler, A., Harrington, H., Houts, R. Keefe, R. S. E., McDonald, K.,

Ward, A., Poulton, R., & Moffitt, T. E. (2012). Persistent cannabis users show

neuropsychological decline from childhood to midlife. PNAS, 109(40), pp. E2657-

E2664. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206820109

National Institute on Drug Abuse (2019, December). Marijuana drug facts.

https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana

Provide as many references as the
assignment instructions state.

Include an APA formatted
references page with your paper.

Neavyn, M. J., Blohm, E., Babu, K. M., & Bird, S. B. (2014). Medical marijuana and driving: A

review. Journal of Medical Toxicology 10(3), 269-279. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13181-

014-0393-4

Palamar, J. J., Fenstermaker, M., Kamboukos, D., Ompad, D. C., Cleland, C. M., & Weitzman,

M. (2014). Adverse psychosocial outcomes associated with drug use among US high

school seniors: A comparison of alcohol and marijuana. American Journal of Drug and

Alcohol Abuse, 40(6), 438-446. https://doi.org/10.3109/00952990.2014.943371

Sanders, L. (2018, January 2). Marijuana legalization 2018: Which states might consider

cannabis laws this year? http://www.newsweek.com/marijuana-legalization-2018-which-

states-will-consider-cannabis-laws-year-755282

Volkow, N. D., Baler, R. D., Compton, W. M., & Weiss, S. R. B. (2014). Adverse health effects

of marijuana use. New England Journal of Medicine, 370, 2219-2227.

https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMra1402309

Wetterau, N. (2015). Medical marijuana—Can we do no harm? Family Doctor: A Journal of the

New York State Academy of Family Physicians, 3(3), 16-20.

http://www.nysafp.org/News/Family-Doctor-A-Journal-for-the-NYSAFP

Philosophy homework help

Aristotle – Nicomachean Ethics

Plato and Aristotle

Raphael’s “The School of Athens” (ca.1511)

I. The historical background: Aristotle was writing and lecturing in Athens, during the 4th century BCE.

a. Athens was a Greek city-state (Polis) that had transitioned from monarchies to a fragile democracy. This new democracy was becoming torn between rivalries from the old monarchies and new commercial forces.

i. Aristotle’s ethics sought to build from a rational conception of a common good that orients human nature beyond the previous narrowness of the warrior ethos without digressing into the new impersonal commercial ethos and it soullessness.

1. The warrior ethos of Homeric society:

a. Exclusive loyalty to family and close friends.

b. Obsessive focus on training for war:

· Courage, strength, and honor are cultivated only to advance military expeditions abroad and protect the palace at home.

· Cunning use of force is privileged to manipulate others, as might-makes-right.

· Obedience is required for accepting a given chain of command, and in accepting one’s lot within the limits of a cosmos supposedly controlled only by violent forces pitted against each other.

2. The newly emerging commercialism:

a. Production of goods not for communal use but rather for private profit (society becomes oriented around indifferent exchange values rather than social use values)

b. Indifferent market exchanges for accumulating money then become the dominant form of social relations rather than cooperatively and creatively producing together.

c. This led to an obsessive focus on the cunning pursuit of money for its own sake, and the cunning use of money to manipulate the people (since profit is made by monopolizing supply and exploiting demand – more on this in Politics).

ii. Aristotle continually argued that neither framework holistically perfects what is most excellent and distinctive within human nature and its capacity for community.

II. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics begins with a simple broad point (1094a):

a. Every human activity aims at an end considered good:

1. Not all ends are complete in themselves but refer to other ends.

a. E.g. Saddle making is a craft that nevertheless serves an end beyond itself.

b. E.g. studying a discipline at school is for larger purposes than that particular study itself.

2. The most complete end—something done for its own sake—is that for which all other relative ends are ordered.

a. The end for which saddle making should contribute is the end of riding a horse well, which itself ultimately serves the end of freedom of mobility.

b. The end for which all your studies should contribute is that ultimate end of becoming a well-rounded, wise, self-determining person.

i. You do not choose to become a complete person for the sake of some lower relative and partial end, but rather choose relative ends (various means) for the sake of becoming a complete human person.

ii. Moreover, the ultimate end has objective standards of excellence that should guide the choice and organization of all relative activities:

· there are better ways to craft a saddle for the art of riding well that allows greater mobility

· and there are better ways to educate for the art of becoming a holistically self-determining person.

c. “there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, clearly this must be the good and the chief good.”

3. What then is the chief or ultimate good desired for its own sake? In other words, Aristotle is asking that basic Socratic question about that ultimate end or purpose of life that unites all other relative activities:

a. “Then do the carpenter and the leatherworker have their functions and actions, while a human being has none, and is by nature idle, without any function?” (1097b30)

i. Are we to assume that while all of our daily actions serve some relative purpose, there is nevertheless no purpose or meaningful form to human life as such, no distinctive activities worth doing for their own sake, and no master art by which to coordinate and craft a whole life?

ii. Notice that his ethical questions about the good are deeply economic matters: they ask “what is the ultimate good for which all our productive activities should be organized?”

III. What then is the ultimate end and chief Good implied in all our activities and of universal interest to all?
HAPPINESS!

a. But in what sense does Aristotle use this commonplace word? The word “Happiness” is actually not an entirely accurate translation of the Greek word that Aristotle uses, which is “eudaimonia”. This Greek term refers to something more holistic than our common psychological sense of happiness as a feeling. Eudaimona is better translated as “well-being” or “flourishing”.

b. To further clarify this more holistic meaning, he begins by claiming that while most people commonly believe the source of happiness (or well-being/flourishing) consists in either pleasure, honor, or wealth, this ultimately cannot be the case:

1. Happiness is not solely about enjoying sensual pleasures.

a. Pursuing only sensual pleasures leads to a pursuit of one momentary pleasure after another.

i. Temporary pleasures are fleeting and therefore are always relative, serving some other purpose or greater pleasure

ii. Moreover, some temporary pleasures might be worth avoiding in order to obtain a deeper satisfaction beyond immediate gratification.

iii. Also, sensual pleasure-seeking is always dependent on something external outside oneself—it can create an unhealthy dependency on something or someone

iv. If Happiness is the ultimate good it must then mean something more than mere sensible pleasures, enjoyable experiences, or a mere smiling disposition.

Image result for smiley face crossed out

2. Happiness is not merely about obtaining honor

a. Honor is externally bestowed and so it relies on the perspectives of others whereas happiness as the ultimate good should be self-sufficient.

b. Moreover, honor can only be given as a recognition of the good; it therefore cannot itself be the good life but functions only by acknowledging this greater good.

3. Wealth in terms of money-making cannot be ultimate happiness

a. Money is a means simply for facilitating exchange, and not an end in itself – more on this in the lecture on Politics below.

4. The ultimate good of happiness is greater than the relative goods of pleasure, moneyed wealth, and honor.

c. Aristotle uses “happiness” to refer to that ultimate sense of satisfaction achieved in reaching the highest fulfillment, over a lifetime, of what it means to be distinctively human—to
holistically
realize our essential human nature in its most excellent form.

i. It pertains to living “a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day; nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make us blessed and happy.” (1098a20)

ii. We call things good that perform their essential function well: a good flute player, a good scientist, a good athlete, a good carpenter, etc. But what are those essential capabilities or activities that distinguishes a good human life as such?

1. What makes us the distinctive animals we are? For Aristotle, we are inherently social and rational beings: the capacity of reason is for realizing a higher form of individual and communal self-determination:

a. We share with all organic beings (plants and animals) basic biological processes of continuing life through nutrition, reproduction, and growth.

b. We also share with all other animals sense perception and mobility.

c. But what distinguishes us as uniquely human animals is that we have a higher social and rational capacity—a means by which to imagine new ends, linguistically reason, and intellectually formulate higher rational principles by which to organize our life activity toward more excellent ways of existing beyond mere survival and sense stimuli.

d. Therefore, as social and rational beings humans uniquely forge higher communal associations on the basis of new social qualities and rational activities rather than brute animality. (more on this later)

e. But rational for Aristotle means the ability to see and choose new ends that fulfill higher potentials: to reason about how to fulfill something according to its highest ends, its ultimate good.

· This is very different from modern notions of reason as merely instrumental rationality, which is just the calculation of efficient means for whatever ends—how to control a process, rather than how to cultivate a potential toward fulfilling its highest organic end.

2. Happiness = holistic flourishing insofar as we realize our distinctive rational and social qualities/capacities that make us truly human rather than brute animals.

a. It is about practicing those distinctively human activities that define us as human,
for their own sake.

iii. The right means for transitioning beyond brute animality and toward realizing our rational and social essence so that we can flourish is what Aristotle calls “virtue”.

IV. What is Virtue? The intentional cultivation of our distinctive powers for transformation that would otherwise remain inactive.

a. For Aristotle, virtue is any practiced and internalized rational activity that actualizes our distinctively human capacities in an integrated and holistic way

i. Virtues are not about “first nature” in terms of biological instincts, drives, and inclinations, but rather about how we distinctively transform these tendencies in a higher
social
and
rational
way, into a kind of “second nature”, or more humanly mediated form.

1. This means virtue is not about repression or restraint as much as disciplined transformation of instincts and desires into higher forms of more complex social manifestations.

2. This transformative nature distinguishes virtue ethics from utilitarianism, which reduces ethics to base inclinations without higher development, and deontology, which emphasizes the repression/restraint of natural inclinations and desires altogether.

ii. Virtue as a means to fulfilling our highest essential nature, however, is not a means separable from the ends like a mere instrument.

1. It is not about using whatever means/coping mechanisms there are to help obtain a desired end, since virtue is the end itself becoming internalized through practice.

a. Practices of
internal goods
(e.g. courage, truthfulness, justice, solidarity, compassion, wisdom) rather than
external goods
(e.g. money, power, status)

· If the end itself is the holistic fulfillment of the best of our nature then there is no shortcut and no means of purchasing it, it can only be made through continual practice:

· e.g. you can’t gain the ends of being courageous, loving, just, or wise by means other than practicing courageous, loving, just, and wise actions themselves.

2. Virtues therefore are about habit-forming practices so that our nature is not controlled by blind drives and irrational forces, but increasingly by our freedom for social and rational self-determination.

a. That is, virtue has to do with educating desire and organizing one’s life in a unified way so as to be able to enjoy life’s many diverse pleasures without being controlled, consumed, or fragmented by them.

b. As practices or habits, virtue does not mean simple rule-following, conformity, or being conventionally well-mannered, but rationally cultivating a flexible “mean”, a skillfully balanced middle way between blinding extremes.

1. It is about learning how to apply a general principle to particular occasions within life (like any science, craft, or art—but virtue has to do with crafting a whole life)

a. The middle ground between deficiency and excess – what is proportionate, providing neither too little nor too much (avoiding inordinate wealth and abject poverty).

· not about simply avoiding the extremes of pleasure and pain as if to become stoically indifferent and insensible:

· it is about practicing a trait to the point of dexterity and facility, so that the internalized practice, while initially unpleasant, becomes more pleasurable itself and more readily applied to a variety of concrete situations.

· Freedom for Aristotle is not in merely having options or having a choice, nor in only the act of choosing, but rather in practicing the necessary arts for self-determination that lead to living well.

1. E.g., one might be free to choose a career path:

a. but having a choice alone is not the meaning and realization of freedom as such (a necessary but not sufficient condition)

b. to be free one must both make the right choice as well as see it through with the right kinds of practices.

· The scholar, master craftsman, master painter, or guitarist, etc., have the most freedom and pleasure in their craft beyond the amateur because of their internalized virtues through committed practice.

c. What is Justice? Aristotle says in book V that justice is not one virtue amongst others but the “whole of virtues”: that wisdom about how to balance, unify, and organize the various virtues toward their ultimate good of a holistically flourishing life together with others.

i. Injustice is either having too much or too little in relation to what it is good to have; it is then about preventing disproportionate distribution or gaining from another’s loss, which means justice is the wisdom of how to meet real needs.

ii. Justice as the sum of virtues is not a purely punitive or legal principle of abstract fairness, but more comprehensively about cultivating the good in things, knowing what is needed or fitting for that thing’s highest fulfillment – “in justice is every virtue comprehended”.

1. you can’t enforce or beat goodness into something—it can only be cultivated and justice is the knowledge for how to cultivate it

a. Aristotle also says that justice is “complete virtue” because it is that wisdom that considers not just private character but the social virtue of how to act in community with others.

iii. The law is meant to facilitate the development of the virtue of justice as the fulfillment of the good:

1. This notion of justice according to needs differs from most modern theories of justice as fairness which claim to be merely a formal and legal matter of rights without presuming any knowledge of what it is good to be, nor providing robust conditions for becoming good (but is this even possible?).

2. Justice according to needs is not just about meeting the basic material needs for life, but more so about meeting the higher needs for living a good life, a truly human life—therefore it is about providing opportunities and guidance by which our higher capacities can be fulfilled.

a. Is it even possible to maintain a meaningful sense of rights while bracketing out any notion of the good? Is a healthy democratic society even possible without meeting the common good of humanity’s highest needs along with their basic needs?

d. In sum: What is important to see so far, and which will be further confirmed in Politics, is that virtue ethics for Aristotle is not simply about personal character formation in terms of psychological attitudes, feelings, and individual behavior, but more so about the material and institutional conditions that support the collective project of raising humanity to its highest social form of the good life.

1. Aristotle’s virtue ethics relies on a normative conception of human nature, which for Aristotle requires necessarily unfolding the unique rational powers and social qualities in a political community.

a. —only in politics can humanity achieve its highest potentials as unique social and rational animals. This is why in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says that ethics is really a subfield of politics, politics being the supreme science of the Good because it concerns itself with securing the highest ends of humanity.

b. To this end we must now move on to Politics

Aristotle – The Politics

“The Science of the human good is politics”

I. What is the polis? The Greek word for “city”, which meant an independent political unit called the city-state.

a. Aristotle begins by saying the city, as a political community, is the highest human form of association because its nature (though, not always lived out) is to aim at the most comprehensive good for humanity, inclusive of all other relative goods.

i. Before he spells out why, however, he briefly traces the natural evolution of human communities toward the city as a political community:

1. First there is the family unit for procreation.

2. Then the household formed for the larger extended family and its organization of familial self-preservation.

3. The first community beyond individual households is that of the village, which formed from different households coming together for mutual long-term advantage.

4. But the first true or complete political community (i.e. definitive of what it means to be fully human) emerging beyond kinship is that of the city:

a. A city forms out of many diverse villages coming together for higher ends beyond mere self-preservation.

ii. His analysis was historically significant since he provided one of the first evolutionary accounts of society.

II. Why is the political community of the city the highest form of human community?

a. The city is a higher association with emergent qualities—that is, its reason for being (or final cause) transcends its initial material causes since “it comes to be for the sake of living, but remains in being for the sake of living well.” (1252b30)

i. This is because the city provides that new context for the virtuous fulfillment of humanity’s highest rational and social nature, beyond brute nature, as an inherently “political animal”:

1. it is a whole greater than the sum of its parts, i.e., it is that higher form of social life by which a greater range of our distinctively human capacities are revealed and can develop in a way not possible in the private sphere alone.

2. “political” here means the human animal as inherently social begins to define itself according to its universally shared capacities, bonds, and qualitative ends beyond merely maintaining lower animal functions—

a.
humanity, through political organization begins to determine itself according to new social purposes, choosing higher communal associations for their own sake.

3. A family unit or kinship village alone still bases community on exclusionary blood ties rather than on universal qualities and capacities that all humans share regardless of genetic familial lines of descent and physical similarities.

4. A true political community is also not determined by mere geographical proximity which would be an accidental gathering rather than an intentional community.

5. Similarly, there can be no political community established purely on the basis of a military alliance against a common enemy, or one that seeks defensively to merely prevent injustice (1280a35).

a. a city based only on impersonal legal decrees to prevent injustice is not yet a true political community because it is “unable to make the citizens good and just.” (1280b10–15)

b. law in such a society would be merely a restraining device on the worst of human nature, rather than cultivating a virtuous unfolding of human nature in its universally positive qualities.

b. But most importantly for our context, Aristotle is keen to emphasize that a market society established solely around commercial exchange is also not a true political community either. This requires diving further into his understanding of the economy and the role of money.

III. What is the economy and what is its purpose according to Aristotle? To materially provide the conditions for fulfilling our higher social and political nature.

a. Aristotle’s understanding of the economy (oiko=house; nomos=law: together the term originally meant = the art of household/communal management): It is a
fundamentally social process
by which people cooperate to satisfy the material needs for the common good of community building.

i. The natural purpose of the economy is then first and foremost ethical for Aristotle in that its nature is to produce and acquire only those socially useful goods that can contribute toward the development of human capabilities:

1. The human is more than the needs of its stomach, but rather a political animal whose highest need is to perfect the best of its rational nature in higher associations of self-determining social existence.

2. As serving human needs the economy then is a relative good toward this greater good of community building for its own sake—it provides a shared material surplus and thus surplus time by which the good life for all can be fulfilled through practicing higher activities in the arts, sciences, politics, and culture.

3. Remember, temples are a reminder of the economy’s inherently moral direction in providing a surplus for serving the social whole.

IV. What are the two different “arts of acquisition”?

a. The first notion of acquisition is the natural form of trade for acquiring goods, tools, skills, and services for better developing the household/city according to its highest qualities:

i. The production process aims at producing what is socially useful for the community, but with the expanding diversification of needs and thus the specialization of craft production there is greater need to exchange for a greater variety of goods.

1. This is about exchanging goods according to uses and needs, and so it is preoccupied with
use values
(the functional purpose of a thing). It is about obtaining goods that are “either necessary for life or useful to the association of the city” (p.272) – exchanging and acquiring goods for the ends of developing our social qualities.

b. The second notion of acquisition is through retail trade for the sake of acquiring money as an end in itself:

i. This art looks like the first because it is also an exchange in a variety of goods; however, it does not serve the purpose of developing those qualities needed for household/city life, but only to increase private gain in the form of
monetary

value.

ii. It produces, exchanges, and treats goods not according to their social usefulness, but only according to their
exchange value
, taking advantage of whatever market demand there happens to be—making extra shoes or even unnecessary commodities solely for trade, or buying wholesale solely to monopolize for the purpose of selling retail at a higher rate.

1. In the first art of acquisition, value is determined qualitatively by what is socially useful for meeting real human needs, but in the second form value is determined quantitatively by monetary market prices regardless of society’s valued qualities and needs.

2. What is wrong with accumulating quantities of money as the ultimate end of exchange?

· It’s a form of value privately accumulated and consumed

· its form has no access to real qualitative values

· its pursuit denies public discourse about how to socially meet real human needs.

· It thus runs against the inherently social nature of productive activity

V. Where did money come from and what is it for? Aristotle’s thought here is significant as he provided one of the first analyses in the ancient world of the historical emergence of money as well as providing a critical social assessment.

a. As noted above, with the development of production and its specialized division, the city evolved into a more highly complex unit of diverse social needs. According to Aristotle, this led to more bartering, which led to a need for more convenient ways to barter.

i. Exchanging one commodity (C) directly for another commodity (C) can be cumbersome if the goods are too large or diverse:

1. Plus, each thing has its own specific use value and so there is no easy way to establish commensurability between two distinct use values (how do you find an equal proportion for a fair exchange between shoes and a house?)

ii. In barter then the direct swap of one commodity for another, C–C, required a common standard of measurement that could more adequately represent their values in the abstract and thus mediate the exchange—hence the invention of currency or money (M).

iii. Money then historically emerged as a social convention serving a moral purpose—it was a symbolic means for facilitating a more just exchange:

1. it was inherently called into being according to a principle of justice for finding a truly proportionate exchange of goods by way of a common mediator, so that there was now C–M–C.

iv. But the very convenience of money opened the door for retail trade, since now one could produce more than necessary, exclusively for obtaining money on the market, and then purchase more than necessary in order to monopolize supply and exploit demand by reselling at a higher price.

v. Instead of the virtue of justice maintaining a fair proportion within the transaction of C–M–C, there were now transactions that sought to gain only more money at the loss of others (buy low, sell high, for the end of making more money), M–C–M’ (M’ = more money).

vi. With the formula M–C–M’ the exchange no longer serves real human needs and a principle of fairness because money no longer functions according to its proper nature as a conventional means, but is now distorted into the beginning and end of the economic activity itself.

1. If justice is the meeting of real needs in a balanced way so as to avoid extremes, then the just nature of money is now eliminated in M–C–M’.

vii. Aristotle, then, does not have a problem with the nature of exchange or money, but only with economic activity distorted by money-making as an end in itself because it leads to
unnatural, false wealth

VI. What is True wealth and False wealth?

a. True wealth: an abundance of socially useful goods and instruments whose use also allows one to internally perfect virtuous qualities and skills for communally organizing the good life together.

b. False wealth: simply the private accumulation of abstract monetary value as the end of economic and social activity itself rather than a means to the social good.

i. True wealth is a common wealth, acquiring an abundance of goods, knowledges, relationships and conditions for enriching humanity through the qualitive development of its distinctive life activities.

1. It structures the production process socially around discussion of real human needs that aim toward the cultivation of humanity’s creative potentials as a whole.

ii. False wealth is merely the private amassing of money as a quantitative abstraction: an empty power that internally perfects no qualities or skills in the possessor—wealth here is only the expansion of possessive/consumptive capacities for a few.

1. Aristotle does not think the problem of pursuing false wealth is merely a problem of individual greed, but rather it represents a tendency that begins to structurally invert the very nature of productive activity.

a. Accumulation of monetary wealth allows the increasing monopolization of supply by privatizing the production process, which means this inherently social process is no longer oriented toward its own genuinely social ends, but rather is used as a means to the private ends of a few.

i. That is, the point of production is reordered away from its communal orientation and is privately employed toward supplying market demands regardless of whether these meet the real human needs of the community of producers.

ii. Real human needs are therefore no longer the ends to which money serves, but rather human needs and social qualities are the means utilized for the end of privately making money.

iii. Therefore, the very structure of M-C-M’ is unjust since it relies on exploiting the social nature of human productive activity as a mere means to private gain, as well as taking advantage of another’s loss in the act of exchange.

iv. This leads to the most egregious form of twisting monetary wealth into an end itself, which is the capitalizing on interest from loans: what Aristotle calls “usury” or “the most unnatural” (1258a35).

v. Such an end therein promotes competitive and antagonistic anti-social relations around exploitation of each other, with greed becoming no longer one vice among others, but now institutionalized as a necessary cardinal virtue.

b. In exclusively pursuing monetary value, commercialized society starts to become determined less by a conscious democratic pursuit of the common good, and more by the blind dictates of market demand and the irrational short-term private interests behind them.

Image result for earth industrialized

Hence market economies have no real means of comprehending actual human and environmental needs. (a gr

Philosophy homework help

In about 350 words discuss this question. Be specific in your answer and hit the necessary key points. No references needed

5. Robert George thinks that the proper foundation for our classical American freedoms (i.e. freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, etc.) is a natural law account of moral origins. First, describe in detail the justification that he provides for these freedoms based on his natural flourishing model. Are there any contemporary rights claims that George thinks are tenuous or that ought to be revised in view of such a model? Then, interact critically with George’s views by providing two arguments either in support for or opposition to his claims about the necessity of grounding our freedoms in an underlying moral foundation.

Philosophy homework help

American Capitalism Is Brutal. You Can Trace
That to the Plantation.
Desmond, Matthew . New York Times (Online) , New York: New York Times Company. Aug 14, 2019.

ProQuest document link

ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)
Slavery helped turn America into a financial colossus. And our economy is still shaped by management practices

invented by enslavers and overseers.

FULL TEXT
A couple of years before he was convicted of securities fraud, Martin Shkreli was the chief executive of a

pharmaceutical company that acquired the rights to Daraprim, a lifesaving antiparasitic drug. Previously the drug

cost $13.50 a pill, but in Shkreli’s hands, the price quickly increased by a factor of 56, to $750 a pill. At a health care

conference, Shkreli told the audience that he should have raised the price even higher. “No one wants to say it, no

one’s proud of it,” he explained. “But this is a capitalist society, a capitalist system and capitalist rules.”

This is a capitalist society. It’s a fatalistic mantra that seems to get repeated to anyone who questions why

America can’t be more fair or equal. But around the world, there are many types of capitalist societies, ranging

from liberating to exploitative, protective to abusive, democratic to unregulated. When Americans declare that “we

live in a capitalist society” —as a real estate mogul told The Miami Herald last year when explaining his feelings

about small-business owners being evicted from their Little Haiti storefronts —what they’re often defending is our

nation’s peculiarly brutal economy. “Low-road capitalism,” the University of Wisconsin-Madison sociologist Joel

Rogers has called it. In a capitalist society that goes low, wages are depressed as businesses compete over the

price, not the quality, of goods; so-called unskilled workers are typically incentivized through punishments, not

promotions; inequality reigns and poverty spreads. In the United States, the richest 1 percent of Americans own 40

percent of the country’s wealth, while a larger share of working-age people (18-65) live in poverty than in any other

nation belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.).

Or consider worker rights in different capitalist nations. In Iceland, 90 percent of wage and salaried workers belong

to trade unions authorized to fight for living wages and fair working conditions. Thirty-four percent of Italian

workers are unionized, as are 26 percent of Canadian workers. Only 10 percent of American wage and salaried

workers carry union cards. The O.E.C.D. scores nations along a number of indicators, such as how countries

regulate temporary work arrangements. Scores run from 5 (“very strict”) to 1 (“very loose”). Brazil scores 4.1 and

Thailand, 3.7, signaling toothy regulations on temp work. Further down the list are Norway (3.4), India (2.5) and

Japan (1.3). The United States scored 0.3, tied for second to last place with Malaysia. How easy is it to fire

workers? Countries like Indonesia (4.1) and Portugal (3) have strong rules about severance pay and reasons for

dismissal. Those rules relax somewhat in places like Denmark (2.1) and Mexico (1.9). They virtually disappear in

the United States, ranked dead last out of 71 nations with a score of 0.5.

Those searching for reasons the American economy is uniquely severe and unbridled have found answers in many

places (religion, politics, culture). But recently, historians have pointed persuasively to the gnatty fields of Georgia

and Alabama, to the cotton houses and slave auction blocks, as the birthplace of America’s low-road approach to

capitalism.

Slavery was undeniably a font of phenomenal wealth. By the eve of the Civil War, the Mississippi Valley was home

to more millionaires per capita than anywhere else in the United States. Cotton grown and picked by enslaved

workers was the nation’s most valuable export. The combined value of enslaved people exceeded that of all the

railroads and factories in the nation. New Orleans boasted a denser concentration of banking capital than New

York City. What made the cotton economy boom in the United States, and not in all the other far-flung parts of the

world with climates and soil suitable to the crop, was our nation’s unflinching willingness to use violence on

nonwhite people and to exert its will on seemingly endless supplies of land and labor. Given the choice between

modernity and barbarism, prosperity and poverty, lawfulness and cruelty, democracy and totalitarianism, America

chose all of the above.

Nearly two average American lifetimes (79 years) have passed since the end of slavery, only two. It is not

surprising that we can still feel the looming presence of this institution, which helped turn a poor, fledgling nation

into a financial colossus. The surprising bit has to do with the many eerily specific ways slavery can still be felt in

our economic life. “American slavery is necessarily imprinted on the DNA of American capitalism,” write the

historians Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman. The task now, they argue, is “cataloging the dominant and recessive

traits” that have been passed down to us, tracing the unsettling and often unrecognized lines of descent by which

America’s national sin is now being visited upon the third and fourth generations.

They picked in long rows, bent bodies shuffling through cotton fields white in bloom. Men, women and children

picked, using both hands to hurry the work. Some picked in Negro cloth, their raw product returning to them by way

of New England mills. Some picked completely naked. Young children ran water across the humped rows, while

overseers peered down from horses. Enslaved workers placed each cotton boll into a sack slung around their

necks. Their haul would be weighed after the sunlight stalked away from the fields and, as the freedman Charles

Ball recalled, you couldn’t “distinguish the weeds from the cotton plants.” If the haul came up light, enslaved

workers were often whipped. “A short day’s work was always punished,” Ball wrote.

Cotton was to the 19th century what oil was to the 20th: among the world’s most widely traded commodities.

Cotton is everywhere, in our clothes, hospitals, soap. Before the industrialization of cotton, people wore expensive

clothes made of wool or linen and dressed their beds in furs or straw. Whoever mastered cotton could make a

killing. But cotton needed land. A field could only tolerate a few straight years of the crop before its soil became

depleted. Planters watched as acres that had initially produced 1,000 pounds of cotton yielded only 400 a few

seasons later. The thirst for new farmland grew even more intense after the invention of the cotton gin in the early

1790s. Before the gin, enslaved workers grew more cotton than they could clean. The gin broke the bottleneck,

making it possible to clean as much cotton as you could grow.

The United States solved its land shortage by expropriating millions of acres from Native Americans, often with

military force, acquiring Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee and Florida. It then sold that land on the cheap —just $1.25

an acre in the early 1830s ($38 in today’s dollars) —to white settlers. Naturally, the first to cash in were the land

speculators. Companies operating in Mississippi flipped land, selling it soon after purchase, commonly for double

the price.

Enslaved workers felled trees by ax, burned the underbrush and leveled the earth for planting. “Whole forests were

literally dragged out by the roots,” John Parker, an enslaved worker, remembered. A lush, twisted mass of

vegetation was replaced by a single crop. An origin of American money exerting its will on the earth, spoiling the

environment for profit, is found in the cotton plantation. Floods became bigger and more common. The lack of

biodiversity exhausted the soil and, to quote the historian Walter Johnson, “rendered one of the richest agricultural

regions of the earth dependent on upriver trade for food.”

As slave labor camps spread throughout the South, production surged. By 1831, the country was delivering nearly

half the world’s raw cotton crop, with 350 million pounds picked that year. Just four years later, it harvested 500

million pounds. Southern white elites grew rich, as did their counterparts in the North, who erected textile mills to

form, in the words of the Massachusetts senator Charles Sumner, an “unhallowed alliance between the lords of the

lash and the lords of the loom.” The large-scale cultivation of cotton hastened the invention of the factory, an

institution that propelled the Industrial Revolution and changed the course of history. In 1810, there were 87,000

cotton spindles in America. Fifty years later, there were five million. Slavery, wrote one of its defenders in De Bow’s

Review, a widely read agricultural magazine, was the “nursing mother of the prosperity of the North.” Cotton

planters, millers and consumers were fashioning a new economy, one that was global in scope and required the

movement of capital, labor and products across long distances. In other words, they were fashioning a capitalist

economy. “The beating heart of this new system,” Beckert writes, “was slavery.”

Perhaps you’re reading this at work, maybe at a multinational corporation that runs like a soft-purring engine. You

report to someone, and someone reports to you. Everything is tracked, recorded and analyzed, via vertical reporting

systems, double-entry record-keeping and precise quantification. Data seems to hold sway over every operation. It

feels like a cutting-edge approach to management, but many of these techniques that we now take for granted

were developed by and for large plantations.

When an accountant depreciates an asset to save on taxes or when a midlevel manager spends an afternoon

filling in rows and columns on an Excel spreadsheet, they are repeating business procedures whose roots twist

back to slave-labor camps. And yet, despite this, “slavery plays almost no role in histories of management,” notes

the historian Caitlin Rosenthal in her book “Accounting for Slavery.” Since the 1977 publication of Alfred Chandler’s

classic study, “The Visible Hand,” historians have tended to connect the development of modern business

practices to the 19th-century railroad industry, viewing plantation slavery as precapitalistic, even primitive. It’s a

more comforting origin story, one that protects the idea that America’s economic ascendancy developed not

because of, but in spite of, millions of black people toiling on plantations. But management techniques used by

19th-century corporations were implemented during the previous century by plantation owners.

Planters aggressively expanded their operations to capitalize on economies of scale inherent to cotton growing,

buying more enslaved workers, investing in large gins and presses and experimenting with different seed varieties.

To do so, they developed complicated workplace hierarchies that combined a central office, made up of owners

and lawyers in charge of capital allocation and long-term strategy, with several divisional units, responsible for

different operations. Rosenthal writes of one plantation where the owner supervised a top lawyer, who supervised

another lawyer, who supervised an overseer, who supervised three bookkeepers, who supervised 16 enslaved head

drivers and specialists (like bricklayers), who supervised hundreds of enslaved workers. Everyone was accountable

to someone else, and plantations pumped out not just cotton bales but volumes of data about how each bale was

produced. This organizational form was very advanced for its time, displaying a level of hierarchal complexity

equaled only by large government structures, like that of the British Royal Navy.

Like today’s titans of industry, planters understood that their profits climbed when they extracted maximum effort

out of each worker. So they paid close attention to inputs and outputs by developing precise systems of record-

keeping. Meticulous bookkeepers and overseers were just as important to the productivity of a slave-labor camp

as field hands. Plantation entrepreneurs developed spreadsheets, like Thomas Affleck’s “Plantation Record and

Account Book,” which ran into eight editions circulated until the Civil War. Affleck’s book was a one-stop-shop

accounting manual, complete with rows and columns that tracked per-worker productivity. This book “was really at

the cutting edge of the informational technologies available to businesses during this period,” Rosenthal told me.

“I have never found anything remotely as complex as Affleck’s book for free labor.” Enslavers used the book to

determine end-of-the-year balances, tallying expenses and revenues and noting the causes of their biggest gains

and losses. They quantified capital costs on their land, tools and enslaved workforces, applying Affleck’s

recommended interest rate. Perhaps most remarkable, they also developed ways to calculate depreciation, a

breakthrough in modern management procedures, by assessing the market value of enslaved workers over their

life spans. Values generally peaked between the prime ages of 20 and 40 but were individually adjusted up or down

based on sex, strength and temperament: people reduced to data points.

This level of data analysis also allowed planters to anticipate rebellion. Tools were accounted for on a regular

basis to make sure a large number of axes or other potential weapons didn’t suddenly go missing. “Never allow

any slave to lock or unlock any door,” advised a Virginia enslaver in 1847. In this way, new bookkeeping techniques

developed to maximize returns also helped to ensure that violence flowed in one direction, allowing a minority of

whites to control a much larger group of enslaved black people. American planters never forgot what happened in

Saint-Domingue (now Haiti) in 1791, when enslaved workers took up arms and revolted. In fact, many white

enslavers overthrown during the Haitian Revolution relocated to the United States and started over.

Overseers recorded each enslaved worker’s yield. Accountings took place not only after nightfall, when cotton

baskets were weighed, but throughout the workday. In the words of a North Carolina planter, enslaved workers

were to be “followed up from day break until dark.” Having hands line-pick in rows sometimes longer than five

football fields allowed overseers to spot anyone lagging behind. The uniform layout of the land had a logic; a logic

designed to dominate. Faster workers were placed at the head of the line, which encouraged those who followed to

match the captain’s pace. When enslaved workers grew ill or old, or became pregnant, they were assigned to

lighter tasks. One enslaver established a “sucklers gang” for nursing mothers, as well as a “measles gang,” which

at once quarantined those struck by the virus and ensured that they did their part to contribute to the productivity

machine. Bodies and tasks were aligned with rigorous exactitude. In trade magazines, owners swapped advice

about the minutiae of planting, including slave diets and clothing as well as the kind of tone a master should use.

In 1846, one Alabama planter advised his fellow enslavers to always give orders “in a mild tone, and try to leave the

impression on the mind of the negro that what you say is the result of reflection.” The devil (and his profits) were in

the details.

The uncompromising pursuit of measurement and scientific accounting displayed in slave plantations predates

industrialism. Northern factories would not begin adopting these techniques until decades after the Emancipation

Proclamation. As the large slave-labor camps grew increasingly efficient, enslaved black people became America’s

first modern workers, their productivity increasing at an astonishing pace. During the 60 years leading up to the

Civil War, the daily amount of cotton picked per enslaved worker increased 2.3 percent a year. That means that in

1862, the average enslaved fieldworker picked not 25 percent or 50 percent as much but 400 percent as much

cotton than his or her counterpart did in 1801.

Today modern technology has facilitated unremitting workplace supervision, particularly in the service sector.

Companies have developed software that records workers’ keystrokes and mouse clicks, along with randomly

capturing screenshots multiple times a day. Modern-day workers are subjected to a wide variety of surveillance

strategies, from drug tests and closed-circuit video monitoring to tracking apps and even devices that sense heat

and motion. A 2006 survey found that more than a third of companies with work forces of 1,000 or more had staff

members who read through employees’ outbound emails. The technology that accompanies this workplace

supervision can make it feel futuristic. But it’s only the technology that’s new. The core impulse behind that

technology pervaded plantations, which sought innermost control over the bodies of their enslaved work force.

The cotton plantation was America’s first big business, and the nation’s first corporate Big Brother was the

overseer. And behind every cold calculation, every rational fine-tuning of the system, violence lurked. Plantation

owners used a combination of incentives and punishments to squeeze as much as possible out of enslaved

workers. Some beaten workers passed out from the pain and woke up vomiting. Some “danced” or “trembled” with

every hit. An 1829 first-person account from Alabama recorded an overseer’s shoving the faces of women he

thought had picked too slow into their cotton baskets and opening up their backs. To the historian Edward Baptist,

before the Civil War, Americans “lived in an economy whose bottom gear was torture.”

There is some comfort, I think, in attributing the sheer brutality of slavery to dumb racism. We imagine pain being

inflicted somewhat at random, doled out by the stereotypical white overseer, free but poor. But a good many

overseers weren’t allowed to whip at will. Punishments were authorized by the higher-ups. It was not so much the

rage of the poor white Southerner but the greed of the rich white planter that drove the lash. The violence was

neither arbitrary nor gratuitous. It was rational, capitalistic, all part of the plantation’s design. “Each individual

having a stated number of pounds of cotton to pick,” a formerly enslaved worker, Henry Watson, wrote in 1848, “the

deficit of which was made up by as many lashes being applied to the poor slave’s back.” Because overseers

closely monitored enslaved workers’ picking abilities, they assigned each worker a unique quota. Falling short of

that quota could get you beaten, but overshooting your target could bring misery the next day, because the master

might respond by raising your picking rate.

Profits from heightened productivity were harnessed through the anguish of the enslaved. This was why the

fastest cotton pickers were often whipped the most. It was why punishments rose and fell with global market

fluctuations. Speaking of cotton in 1854, the fugitive slave John Brown remembered, “When the price rises in the

English market, the poor slaves immediately feel the effects, for they are harder driven, and the whip is kept more

constantly going.” Unrestrained capitalism holds no monopoly on violence, but in making possible the pursuit of

near limitless personal fortunes, often at someone else’s expense, it does put a cash value on our moral

commitments.

Slavery did supplement white workers with what W.E.B. Du Bois called a “public and psychological wage,” which

allowed them to roam freely and feel a sense of entitlement. But this, too, served the interests of money. Slavery

pulled down all workers’ wages. Both in the cities and countryside, employers had access to a large and flexible

labor pool made up of enslaved and free people. Just as in today’s gig economy, day laborers during slavery’s reign

often lived under conditions of scarcity and uncertainty, and jobs meant to be worked for a few months were

worked for lifetimes. Labor power had little chance when the bosses could choose between buying people, renting

them, contracting indentured servants, taking on apprentices or hiring children and prisoners.

This not only created a starkly uneven playing field, dividing workers from themselves; it also made “all nonslavery

appear as freedom,” as the economic historian Stanley Engerman has written. Witnessing the horrors of slavery

drilled into poor white workers that things could be worse. So they generally accepted their lot, and American

freedom became broadly defined as the opposite of bondage. It was a freedom that understood what it was

against but not what it was for; a malnourished and mean kind of freedom that kept you out of chains but did not

provide bread or shelter. It was a freedom far too easily pleased.

In recent decades, America has experienced the financialization of its economy. In 1980, Congress repealed

regulations that had been in place since the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, allowing banks to merge and charge their

customers higher interest rates. Since then, increasingly profits have accrued not by trading and producing goods

and services but through financial instruments. Between 1980 and 2008, more than $6.6 trillion was transferred to

financial firms. After witnessing the successes and excesses of Wall Street, even nonfinancial companies began

finding ways to make money from financial products and activities. Ever wonder why every major retail store, hotel

chain and airline wants to sell you a credit card? This financial turn has trickled down into our everyday lives: It’s

there in our pensions, home mortgages, lines of credit and college-savings portfolios. Americans with some means

now act like “enterprising subjects,” in the words of the political scientist Robert Aitken.

As it’s usually narrated, the story of the ascendancy of American finance tends to begin in 1980, with the gutting of

Glass-Steagall, or in 1944 with Bretton Woods, or perhaps in the reckless speculation of the 1920s. But in reality,

the story begins during slavery.

Consider, for example, one of the most popular mainstream financial instruments: the mortgage. Enslaved people

were used as collateral for mortgages centuries before the home mortgage became the defining characteristic of

middle America. In colonial times, when land was not worth much and banks didn’t exist, most lending was based

on human property. In the early 1700s, slaves were the dominant collateral in South Carolina. Many Americans

were first exposed to the concept of a mortgage by trafficking in enslaved people, not real estate, and “the

extension of mortgages to slave property helped fuel the development of American (and global) capitalism,” the

historian Joshua Rothman told me.

Or consider a Wall Street financial instrument as modern-sounding as collateralized debt obligations (C.D.O.s),

those ticking time bombs backed by inflated home prices in the 2000s. C.D.O.s were the grandchildren of

mortgage-backed securities based on the inflated value of enslaved people sold in the 1820s and 1830s. Each

product created massive fortunes for the few before blowing up the economy.

Enslavers were not the first ones to securitize assets and debts in America. The land companies that thrived

during the late 1700s relied on this technique, for instance. But enslavers did make use of securities to such an

enormous degree for their time, exposing stakeholders throughout the Western world to enough risk to

compromise the world economy, that the historian Edward Baptist told me that this can be viewed as “a new

moment in international capitalism, where you are seeing the development of a globalized financial market.” The

novel thing about the 2008 foreclosure crisis was not the concept of foreclosing on a homeowner but foreclosing

on millions of them. Similarly, what was new about securitizing enslaved people in the first half of the 19th century

was not the concept of securitization itself but the crazed level of rash speculation on cotton that selling slave

debt promoted.

As America’s cotton sector expanded, the value of enslaved workers soared. Between 1804 and 1860, the average

price of men ages 21 to 38 sold in New Orleans grew to $1,200 from roughly $450. Because they couldn’t expand

their cotton empires without more enslaved workers, ambitious planters needed to find a way to raise enough

capital to purchase more hands. Enter the banks. The Second Bank of the United States, chartered in 1816, began

investing heavily in cotton. In the early 1830s, the slaveholding Southwestern states took almost half the bank’s

business. Around the same time, state-chartered banks began multiplying to such a degree that one historian

called it an “orgy of bank-creation.”

When seeking loans, planters used enslaved people as collateral. Thomas Jefferson mortgaged 150 of his

enslaved workers to build Monticello. People could be sold much more easily than land, and in multiple Southern

states, more than eight in 10 mortgage-secured loans used enslaved people as full or partial collateral. As the

historian Bonnie Martin has written, “slave owners worked their slaves financially, as well as physically from

colonial days until emancipation” by mortgaging people to buy more people. Access to credit grew faster than

Mississippi kudzu, leading one 1836 observer to remark that in cotton country “money, or what passed for money,

was the only cheap thing to be had.”

Planters took on immense amounts of debt to finance their operations. Why wouldn’t they? The math worked out.

A cotton plantation in the first decade of the 19th century could leverage their enslaved workers at 8 percent

interest and record a return three times that. So leverage they did, sometimes volunteering the same enslaved

workers for multiple mortgages. Banks lent with little restraint. By 1833, Mississippi banks had issued 20 times as

much paper money as they had gold in their coffers. In several Southern counties, slave mortgages injected more

capital into the economy than sales from the crops harvested by enslaved workers.

Global financial markets got in on the action. When Thomas Jefferson mortgaged his enslaved workers, it was a

Dutch firm that put up the money. The Louisiana Purchase, which opened millions of acres to cotton production,

was financed by Baring Brothers, the well-heeled British commercial bank. A majority of credit powering the

American slave economy came from the London money market. Years after abolishing the African slave trade in

1807, Britain, and much of Europe along with it, was bankrolling slavery in the United States. To raise capital, state-

chartered banks pooled debt generated by slave mortgages and repackaged it as bonds promising investors

annual interest. During slavery’s boom time, banks did swift business in bonds, finding buyers in Hamburg and

Amsterdam, in Boston and Philadelphia.

Some historians have claimed that the British abolition of the slave trade was a turning point in modernity, marked

by the development of a new kind of moral consciousness when people began considering the suffering of others

thousands of miles away. But perhaps all that changed was a growing need to scrub the blood of enslaved workers

off American dollars, British pounds and French francs, a need that Western financial markets fast found a way to

satisfy through the global trade in bank bonds. Here was a means to profit from slavery without getting your hands

dirty. In fact, many investors may not have realized that their money was being used to buy and exploit people, just

as many of us who are vested in multinational textile companies today are unaware that our money subsidizes a

business that continues to rely on forced labor in countries like Uzbekistan and China and child workers in

countries like India and Brazil. Call it irony, coincidence or maybe cause —historians haven’t settled the matter

—but avenues to profit indirectly from slavery grew in popularity as the institution of slavery itself grew more

unpopular. “I think they go together,” the historian Calvin Schermerhorn told me. “We care about fellow members of

humanity, but what do we do when we want returns on an investment that depends on their bound labor?” he said.

“Yes, there is a higher consciousness. But then it comes down to: Where do you get your cotton from?”

Banks issued tens of millions of dollars in loans on the assumption that rising cotton prices would go on forever.

Speculation reached a fever pitch in the 1830s, as businessmen, planters and lawyers convinced themselves that

they could amass real treasure by joining in a risky game that everyone seemed to be playing. If planters thought

themselves invincible, able to bend the laws of finance to their will, it was most likely because they had been

granted authority to bend the laws of nature to their will, to do with the land and the people who worked it as they

pleased. Du Bois wrote: “The mere fact that a man could be, under the law, the actual master of the mind and body

of human beings had to have disastrous effects. It tended to inflate the ego of most planters beyond all reason;

they became arrogant, strutting, quarrelsome kinglets.” What are the laws of economics to those exercising

godlike power over an entire people?

We know how these stories end. The American South rashly overproduced cotton thanks to an abundance of

cheap land, labor and credit, consumer demand couldn’t keep up with supply, and prices fell. The value of cotton

started to drop as early as 1834 before plunging like a bird winged in midflight, setting off the Panic of 1837.

Investo

Philosophy homework help

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Week 4 Overview – Utilitarianism

We are now in the modern world and we
find a different moral logic at work, one
that does not refer to higher qualities or
capacities intrinsic to our nature, but
rather one that accepts humans as
nothing other than consuming animals.
Within our modern capitalist society
value is understood not as born out of
our socially creative capacities to meet
real human needs but rather as arising
from market demands seemingly determined by subjective consumer preferences.
Jeremy Bentham founded the ethical theory of Utilitarianism—building largely on
Thomas Hobbes’s mechanized worldview that reduces humans to machines—in order
to accommodate this new reality in which the market no longer serves the social needs
of community-building, but rather society serves the ends of monetary market
exchange and private profit. Hence, Bentham’s framework is called “utilitarian”
because it views anything and everything as quantitatively priced and potentially
utilized for the sake of arbitrary private pleasures. For Bentham happiness is nothing
other than the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain, which he believed could
be simply calculated.

Bentham is credited with at least trying to come up with an objective criterion that
everyone within a market society could use to assess the pursuit of happiness. What
will be important to see, however, is how Bentham’s uncritical acceptance of the
monetary market and its consumerism leaves him unable to ask whether what we just
so happen to want, whether what the market just so happens to demand at any given
point in time, is actually good for us according to any standards that might transcend
the marketplace and its calculations (remember Nussbaum’s criticisms of the
preference based approach?). If ethics began as a discourse about that common good
beyond commercialism by which we are able to realize our most distinctive capacities
for enabling full human flourishing, then with Bentham’s utilitarianism we find an

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https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-4-overview-utilitarianism?module_item_id=17540436 2/3

inability to rise up to the critical task of ethics. It is instead John Stuart Mill who will
provide an important corrective to utilitarianism, nuancing and supplementing it with a
higher view of our distinctive human qualities whose fulfillment should be the criterion
of happiness. In doing so he began to fundamentally challenge the market ordering of
our social relations around the exclusive ends of private profit and subjective
consumption. But in doing so, does he begin to leave the framework of utilitarianism
and veer closer to virtue ethics?

To read:
Review the materials on the Launchpad page Introduction to Utilitarianism
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-introduction-to-
utilitarianism) , which includes my video and lecture notes
Read Sandel, What’s the Right Thing to Do, chapter 2
Read the Lecture notes on Bentham
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034406/download?wrap=1)

(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034406/download?
download_frd=1) and on Mill
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034358/download?wrap=1)

(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034358/download?
download_frd=1) , as well as the summarizing notes comparing and contrasting
virtue ethics and utilitarianism
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034376/download?wrap=1)

(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034376/download?
download_frd=1) .
Read Bentham in Justice Reader, pp. 9–14
Read Mill in Justice Reader, pp. 14–31
Read Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book IV, ch. VII, sections 4–7
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034404/download?wrap=1)

(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034404/download?
download_frd=1) (pp. 196–204).

To complete or submit:

5/4/22, 1:01 AM Week 4 Overview – Utilitarianism: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-4-overview-utilitarianism?module_item_id=17540436 3/3

Complete the Reading Assignment Questions
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/assignments/7016120) assignment,
which is due by Saturday at midnight
Answer the Case Discussion Questions
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/discussion_topics/7964150)
regarding the Matrix videoclip which is located on the discussion page. Your initial
post is due by Wednesday and 2 subsequent posts by Sunday. Please review the
Class Participation and Discussion
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/class-participation-and-
discussion) page for discussion expectations.

Philosophy homework help

COMMUNICATION

What Great Listeners Actually
Do
by Jack Zenger and Joseph Folkman

JULY 14, 2016

Laura Schneider for HBR

Chances are you think you’re a good listener.  People’s appraisal of their listening ability is

much like their assessment of their driving skills, in that the great bulk of adults think they’re

above average.

In our experience, most people think good listening comes down to doing three things:

Not talking when others are speaking
Letting others know you’re listening through facial expressions and verbal sounds (“Mmm-
hmm”)
Being able to repeat what others have said, practically word-for-word

In fact, much management advice on listening suggests doing these very things – encouraging

listeners to remain quiet, nod and “mm-hmm” encouragingly, and then repeat back to the

talker something like, “So, let me make sure I understand. What you’re saying is…” However,

recent research that we conducted suggests that these behaviors fall far short of describing

good listening skills.

We analyzed data describing the behavior of 3,492 participants in a development program

designed to help managers become better coaches. As part of this program, their coaching

skills were assessed by others in 360-degree assessments. We identified those who were

perceived as being the most effective listeners (the top 5%). We then compared the best

listeners to the average of all other people in the data set and identified the 20 items showing

the largest significant difference.  With those results in hand we identified the differences

between great and average listeners and analyzed the data to determine what characteristics

their colleagues identified as the behaviors that made them outstanding listeners.

We found some surprising conclusions, along with some qualities we expected to hear. We

grouped them into four main findings:

Good listening is much more than being silent while the other person talks. To the
contrary, people perceive the best listeners to be those who periodically ask questions that
promote discovery and insight. These questions gently challenge old assumptions, but do
so in a constructive way. Sitting there silently nodding does not provide sure evidence that
a person is listening, but asking a good question tells the speaker the listener has not only
heard what was said, but that they comprehended it well enough to  want additional
information. Good listening was consistently seen as a two-way dialog, rather than a one-

way “speaker versus hearer” interaction. The best conversations were active.
Good listening included interactions that build a person’s self-esteem. The best listeners
made the conversation a positive experience for the other party, which doesn’t happen
when the listener is passive (or, for that matter, critical!). Good listeners made the other
person feel supported and conveyed confidence in them. Good listening was characterized
by the creation of a safe environment in which issues and differences could be discussed
openly.
Good listening was seen as a cooperative conversation. In these interactions, feedback
flowed smoothly in both directions with neither party becoming defensive about comments
the other made. By contrast, poor listeners were seen as competitive — as listening only to
identify errors in reasoning or logic, using their silence as a chance to prepare their next
response. That might make you an excellent debater, but it doesn’t make you a good
listener. Good listeners may challenge assumptions and disagree, but the person being
listened to feels the listener is trying to help, not wanting to win an argument.
Good listeners tended to make suggestions. Good listening invariably included some
feedback provided in a way others would accept and that opened up alternative paths to
consider. This finding somewhat surprised us, since it’s not uncommon to hear complaints
that “So-and-so didn’t listen, he just jumped in and tried to solve the problem.” Perhaps
what the data is telling us is that making suggestions is not itself the problem; it may be the
skill with which those suggestions are made. Another possibility is that we’re more likely to
accept suggestions from people we already think are good listeners. (Someone who is silent
for the whole conversation and then jumps in with a suggestion may not be seen as
credible. Someone who seems combative or critical and then tries to give advice may not be
seen as trustworthy.)

While many of us have thought of being a good listener being like a sponge that accurately

absorbs what the other person is saying, instead, what these findings show is that good

listeners are like trampolines. They are someone you can bounce ideas off of — and rather

than absorbing your ideas and energy, they amplify, energize, and clarify your thinking. They

make you feel better not merely passively absorbing, but by actively supporting. This lets you

gain energy and height, just like someone jumping on a trampoline.

Of course, there are different levels of listening. Not every conversation requires the highest

levels of listening, but many conversations would benefit from greater focus and listening

skill. Consider which level of listening you’d like to aim for:

Level 1: The listener creates a safe environment in which difficult, complex, or emotional

issues can be discussed.

Level 2: The listener clears away distractions like phones and laptops, focusing attention on

the other person and making appropriate eye-contact.  (This  behavior not only affects how

you are perceived as the listener; it immediately influences the listener’s own attitudes and

inner feelings.  Acting the part changes how you feel inside. This in turn makes you a better

listener.)

Level 3: The listener seeks to understand the substance of what the other person is saying. 

They capture ideas, ask questions, and restate issues to confirm that their understanding is

correct.

Level 4: The listener observes nonbverbal cues, such as facial expressions, perspiration,

respiration rates, gestures, posture, and numerous other subtle body language signals.  It is

estimated that 80% of what we communicate comes from these signals. It sounds strange to

some, but you listen with your eyes as well as your ears.

Level 5: The listener increasingly understands the other person’s emotions and feelings about

the topic at hand, and identifies and acknowledges them. The listener empathizes with and

validates those feelings in a supportive, nonjudgmental way.

Level 6: The listener asks questions that clarify assumptions the other person holds and helps

the other person to see the issue in a new light.  This could include the listener injecting some

thoughts and ideas about the topic that could be useful to the other person.  However, good

listeners never highjack the conversation so that they or their issues become the subject of the

discussion.

Each of the levels builds on the others; thus, if you’ve been criticized (for example) for

offering solutions rather than listening, it may mean you need to attend to some of the other

levels (such as clearing away distractions or empathizing) before your proffered suggestions

can be appreciated.

We suspect that in being a good listener, most of us are more likely to stop short rather than

go too far. Our hope is that this research will help by providing a new perspective on

listening.  We hope those who labor under an illusion of superiority about their listening skills

will see where they really stand. We also hope the common perception that good listening is

mainly about acting like an absorbent sponge will wane.  Finally, we hope all will see that the

highest and best form of listening comes in playing the same role for the other person that a

trampoline plays for a child. It gives energy, acceleration, height and amplification. These are

the hallmarks of great listening.

Jack Zenger is the CEO of Zenger/Folkman, a leadership development consultancy. He
is a coauthor of the October 2011 HBR article “Making Yourself Indispensable” and the

book Speed: How Leaders Accelerate Successful Execution (McGraw Hill, 2016). Connect with

Jack at twitter.com/jhzenger.

Joseph Folkman is the president of Zenger/Folkman, a leadership development consultancy. He is a
coauthor of the October 2011 HBR article “Making Yourself Indispensable” and the book Speed: How Leaders

Accelerate Successful Execution (McGraw Hill, 2016). Connect with Joe at twitter.com/joefolkman.

This article is about COMMUNICATION

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Philosophy homework help

Aristotle – Nicomachean Ethics

Plato and Aristotle

Raphael’s “The School of Athens” (ca.1511)

I. The historical background: Aristotle was writing and lecturing in Athens, during the 4th century BCE.

a. Athens was a Greek city-state (Polis) that had transitioned from monarchies to a fragile democracy. This new democracy was becoming torn between rivalries from the old monarchies and new commercial forces.

i. Aristotle’s ethics sought to build from a rational conception of a common good that orients human nature beyond the previous narrowness of the warrior ethos without digressing into the new impersonal commercial ethos and it soullessness.

1. The warrior ethos of Homeric society:

a. Exclusive loyalty to family and close friends.

b. Obsessive focus on training for war:

· Courage, strength, and honor are cultivated only to advance military expeditions abroad and protect the palace at home.

· Cunning use of force is privileged to manipulate others, as might-makes-right.

· Obedience is required for accepting a given chain of command, and in accepting one’s lot within the limits of a cosmos supposedly controlled only by violent forces pitted against each other.

2. The newly emerging commercialism:

a. Production of goods not for communal use but rather for private profit (society becomes oriented around indifferent exchange values rather than social use values)

b. Indifferent market exchanges for accumulating money then become the dominant form of social relations rather than cooperatively and creatively producing together.

c. This led to an obsessive focus on the cunning pursuit of money for its own sake, and the cunning use of money to manipulate the people (since profit is made by monopolizing supply and exploiting demand – more on this in Politics).

ii. Aristotle continually argued that neither framework holistically perfects what is most excellent and distinctive within human nature and its capacity for community.

II. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics begins with a simple broad point (1094a):

a. Every human activity aims at an end considered good:

1. Not all ends are complete in themselves but refer to other ends.

a. E.g. Saddle making is a craft that nevertheless serves an end beyond itself.

b. E.g. studying a discipline at school is for larger purposes than that particular study itself.

2. The most complete end—something done for its own sake—is that for which all other relative ends are ordered.

a. The end for which saddle making should contribute is the end of riding a horse well, which itself ultimately serves the end of freedom of mobility.

b. The end for which all your studies should contribute is that ultimate end of becoming a well-rounded, wise, self-determining person.

i. You do not choose to become a complete person for the sake of some lower relative and partial end, but rather choose relative ends (various means) for the sake of becoming a complete human person.

ii. Moreover, the ultimate end has objective standards of excellence that should guide the choice and organization of all relative activities:

· there are better ways to craft a saddle for the art of riding well that allows greater mobility

· and there are better ways to educate for the art of becoming a holistically self-determining person.

c. “there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, clearly this must be the good and the chief good.”

3. What then is the chief or ultimate good desired for its own sake? In other words, Aristotle is asking that basic Socratic question about that ultimate end or purpose of life that unites all other relative activities:

a. “Then do the carpenter and the leatherworker have their functions and actions, while a human being has none, and is by nature idle, without any function?” (1097b30)

i. Are we to assume that while all of our daily actions serve some relative purpose, there is nevertheless no purpose or meaningful form to human life as such, no distinctive activities worth doing for their own sake, and no master art by which to coordinate and craft a whole life?

ii. Notice that his ethical questions about the good are deeply economic matters: they ask “what is the ultimate good for which all our productive activities should be organized?”

III. What then is the ultimate end and chief Good implied in all our activities and of universal interest to all?
HAPPINESS!

a. But in what sense does Aristotle use this commonplace word? The word “Happiness” is actually not an entirely accurate translation of the Greek word that Aristotle uses, which is “eudaimonia”. This Greek term refers to something more holistic than our common psychological sense of happiness as a feeling. Eudaimona is better translated as “well-being” or “flourishing”.

b. To further clarify this more holistic meaning, he begins by claiming that while most people commonly believe the source of happiness (or well-being/flourishing) consists in either pleasure, honor, or wealth, this ultimately cannot be the case:

1. Happiness is not solely about enjoying sensual pleasures.

a. Pursuing only sensual pleasures leads to a pursuit of one momentary pleasure after another.

i. Temporary pleasures are fleeting and therefore are always relative, serving some other purpose or greater pleasure

ii. Moreover, some temporary pleasures might be worth avoiding in order to obtain a deeper satisfaction beyond immediate gratification.

iii. Also, sensual pleasure-seeking is always dependent on something external outside oneself—it can create an unhealthy dependency on something or someone

iv. If Happiness is the ultimate good it must then mean something more than mere sensible pleasures, enjoyable experiences, or a mere smiling disposition.

Image result for smiley face crossed out

2. Happiness is not merely about obtaining honor

a. Honor is externally bestowed and so it relies on the perspectives of others whereas happiness as the ultimate good should be self-sufficient.

b. Moreover, honor can only be given as a recognition of the good; it therefore cannot itself be the good life but functions only by acknowledging this greater good.

3. Wealth in terms of money-making cannot be ultimate happiness

a. Money is a means simply for facilitating exchange, and not an end in itself – more on this in the lecture on Politics below.

4. The ultimate good of happiness is greater than the relative goods of pleasure, moneyed wealth, and honor.

c. Aristotle uses “happiness” to refer to that ultimate sense of satisfaction achieved in reaching the highest fulfillment, over a lifetime, of what it means to be distinctively human—to
holistically
realize our essential human nature in its most excellent form.

i. It pertains to living “a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day; nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make us blessed and happy.” (1098a20)

ii. We call things good that perform their essential function well: a good flute player, a good scientist, a good athlete, a good carpenter, etc. But what are those essential capabilities or activities that distinguishes a good human life as such?

1. What makes us the distinctive animals we are? For Aristotle, we are inherently social and rational beings: the capacity of reason is for realizing a higher form of individual and communal self-determination:

a. We share with all organic beings (plants and animals) basic biological processes of continuing life through nutrition, reproduction, and growth.

b. We also share with all other animals sense perception and mobility.

c. But what distinguishes us as uniquely human animals is that we have a higher social and rational capacity—a means by which to imagine new ends, linguistically reason, and intellectually formulate higher rational principles by which to organize our life activity toward more excellent ways of existing beyond mere survival and sense stimuli.

d. Therefore, as social and rational beings humans uniquely forge higher communal associations on the basis of new social qualities and rational activities rather than brute animality. (more on this later)

e. But rational for Aristotle means the ability to see and choose new ends that fulfill higher potentials: to reason about how to fulfill something according to its highest ends, its ultimate good.

· This is very different from modern notions of reason as merely instrumental rationality, which is just the calculation of efficient means for whatever ends—how to control a process, rather than how to cultivate a potential toward fulfilling its highest organic end.

2. Happiness = holistic flourishing insofar as we realize our distinctive rational and social qualities/capacities that make us truly human rather than brute animals.

a. It is about practicing those distinctively human activities that define us as human,
for their own sake.

iii. The right means for transitioning beyond brute animality and toward realizing our rational and social essence so that we can flourish is what Aristotle calls “virtue”.

IV. What is Virtue? The intentional cultivation of our distinctive powers for transformation that would otherwise remain inactive.

a. For Aristotle, virtue is any practiced and internalized rational activity that actualizes our distinctively human capacities in an integrated and holistic way

i. Virtues are not about “first nature” in terms of biological instincts, drives, and inclinations, but rather about how we distinctively transform these tendencies in a higher
social
and
rational
way, into a kind of “second nature”, or more humanly mediated form.

1. This means virtue is not about repression or restraint as much as disciplined transformation of instincts and desires into higher forms of more complex social manifestations.

2. This transformative nature distinguishes virtue ethics from utilitarianism, which reduces ethics to base inclinations without higher development, and deontology, which emphasizes the repression/restraint of natural inclinations and desires altogether.

ii. Virtue as a means to fulfilling our highest essential nature, however, is not a means separable from the ends like a mere instrument.

1. It is not about using whatever means/coping mechanisms there are to help obtain a desired end, since virtue is the end itself becoming internalized through practice.

a. Practices of
internal goods
(e.g. courage, truthfulness, justice, solidarity, compassion, wisdom) rather than
external goods
(e.g. money, power, status)

· If the end itself is the holistic fulfillment of the best of our nature then there is no shortcut and no means of purchasing it, it can only be made through continual practice:

· e.g. you can’t gain the ends of being courageous, loving, just, or wise by means other than practicing courageous, loving, just, and wise actions themselves.

2. Virtues therefore are about habit-forming practices so that our nature is not controlled by blind drives and irrational forces, but increasingly by our freedom for social and rational self-determination.

a. That is, virtue has to do with educating desire and organizing one’s life in a unified way so as to be able to enjoy life’s many diverse pleasures without being controlled, consumed, or fragmented by them.

b. As practices or habits, virtue does not mean simple rule-following, conformity, or being conventionally well-mannered, but rationally cultivating a flexible “mean”, a skillfully balanced middle way between blinding extremes.

1. It is about learning how to apply a general principle to particular occasions within life (like any science, craft, or art—but virtue has to do with crafting a whole life)

a. The middle ground between deficiency and excess – what is proportionate, providing neither too little nor too much (avoiding inordinate wealth and abject poverty).

· not about simply avoiding the extremes of pleasure and pain as if to become stoically indifferent and insensible:

· it is about practicing a trait to the point of dexterity and facility, so that the internalized practice, while initially unpleasant, becomes more pleasurable itself and more readily applied to a variety of concrete situations.

· Freedom for Aristotle is not in merely having options or having a choice, nor in only the act of choosing, but rather in practicing the necessary arts for self-determination that lead to living well.

1. E.g., one might be free to choose a career path:

a. but having a choice alone is not the meaning and realization of freedom as such (a necessary but not sufficient condition)

b. to be free one must both make the right choice as well as see it through with the right kinds of practices.

· The scholar, master craftsman, master painter, or guitarist, etc., have the most freedom and pleasure in their craft beyond the amateur because of their internalized virtues through committed practice.

c. What is Justice? Aristotle says in book V that justice is not one virtue amongst others but the “whole of virtues”: that wisdom about how to balance, unify, and organize the various virtues toward their ultimate good of a holistically flourishing life together with others.

i. Injustice is either having too much or too little in relation to what it is good to have; it is then about preventing disproportionate distribution or gaining from another’s loss, which means justice is the wisdom of how to meet real needs.

ii. Justice as the sum of virtues is not a purely punitive or legal principle of abstract fairness, but more comprehensively about cultivating the good in things, knowing what is needed or fitting for that thing’s highest fulfillment – “in justice is every virtue comprehended”.

1. you can’t enforce or beat goodness into something—it can only be cultivated and justice is the knowledge for how to cultivate it

a. Aristotle also says that justice is “complete virtue” because it is that wisdom that considers not just private character but the social virtue of how to act in community with others.

iii. The law is meant to facilitate the development of the virtue of justice as the fulfillment of the good:

1. This notion of justice according to needs differs from most modern theories of justice as fairness which claim to be merely a formal and legal matter of rights without presuming any knowledge of what it is good to be, nor providing robust conditions for becoming good (but is this even possible?).

2. Justice according to needs is not just about meeting the basic material needs for life, but more so about meeting the higher needs for living a good life, a truly human life—therefore it is about providing opportunities and guidance by which our higher capacities can be fulfilled.

a. Is it even possible to maintain a meaningful sense of rights while bracketing out any notion of the good? Is a healthy democratic society even possible without meeting the common good of humanity’s highest needs along with their basic needs?

d. In sum: What is important to see so far, and which will be further confirmed in Politics, is that virtue ethics for Aristotle is not simply about personal character formation in terms of psychological attitudes, feelings, and individual behavior, but more so about the material and institutional conditions that support the collective project of raising humanity to its highest social form of the good life.

1. Aristotle’s virtue ethics relies on a normative conception of human nature, which for Aristotle requires necessarily unfolding the unique rational powers and social qualities in a political community.

a. —only in politics can humanity achieve its highest potentials as unique social and rational animals. This is why in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says that ethics is really a subfield of politics, politics being the supreme science of the Good because it concerns itself with securing the highest ends of humanity.

b. To this end we must now move on to Politics

Aristotle – The Politics

“The Science of the human good is politics”

I. What is the polis? The Greek word for “city”, which meant an independent political unit called the city-state.

a. Aristotle begins by saying the city, as a political community, is the highest human form of association because its nature (though, not always lived out) is to aim at the most comprehensive good for humanity, inclusive of all other relative goods.

i. Before he spells out why, however, he briefly traces the natural evolution of human communities toward the city as a political community:

1. First there is the family unit for procreation.

2. Then the household formed for the larger extended family and its organization of familial self-preservation.

3. The first community beyond individual households is that of the village, which formed from different households coming together for mutual long-term advantage.

4. But the first true or complete political community (i.e. definitive of what it means to be fully human) emerging beyond kinship is that of the city:

a. A city forms out of many diverse villages coming together for higher ends beyond mere self-preservation.

ii. His analysis was historically significant since he provided one of the first evolutionary accounts of society.

II. Why is the political community of the city the highest form of human community?

a. The city is a higher association with emergent qualities—that is, its reason for being (or final cause) transcends its initial material causes since “it comes to be for the sake of living, but remains in being for the sake of living well.” (1252b30)

i. This is because the city provides that new context for the virtuous fulfillment of humanity’s highest rational and social nature, beyond brute nature, as an inherently “political animal”:

1. it is a whole greater than the sum of its parts, i.e., it is that higher form of social life by which a greater range of our distinctively human capacities are revealed and can develop in a way not possible in the private sphere alone.

2. “political” here means the human animal as inherently social begins to define itself according to its universally shared capacities, bonds, and qualitative ends beyond merely maintaining lower animal functions—

a.
humanity, through political organization begins to determine itself according to new social purposes, choosing higher communal associations for their own sake.

3. A family unit or kinship village alone still bases community on exclusionary blood ties rather than on universal qualities and capacities that all humans share regardless of genetic familial lines of descent and physical similarities.

4. A true political community is also not determined by mere geographical proximity which would be an accidental gathering rather than an intentional community.

5. Similarly, there can be no political community established purely on the basis of a military alliance against a common enemy, or one that seeks defensively to merely prevent injustice (1280a35).

a. a city based only on impersonal legal decrees to prevent injustice is not yet a true political community because it is “unable to make the citizens good and just.” (1280b10–15)

b. law in such a society would be merely a restraining device on the worst of human nature, rather than cultivating a virtuous unfolding of human nature in its universally positive qualities.

b. But most importantly for our context, Aristotle is keen to emphasize that a market society established solely around commercial exchange is also not a true political community either. This requires diving further into his understanding of the economy and the role of money.

III. What is the economy and what is its purpose according to Aristotle? To materially provide the conditions for fulfilling our higher social and political nature.

a. Aristotle’s understanding of the economy (oiko=house; nomos=law: together the term originally meant = the art of household/communal management): It is a
fundamentally social process
by which people cooperate to satisfy the material needs for the common good of community building.

i. The natural purpose of the economy is then first and foremost ethical for Aristotle in that its nature is to produce and acquire only those socially useful goods that can contribute toward the development of human capabilities:

1. The human is more than the needs of its stomach, but rather a political animal whose highest need is to perfect the best of its rational nature in higher associations of self-determining social existence.

2. As serving human needs the economy then is a relative good toward this greater good of community building for its own sake—it provides a shared material surplus and thus surplus time by which the good life for all can be fulfilled through practicing higher activities in the arts, sciences, politics, and culture.

3. Remember, temples are a reminder of the economy’s inherently moral direction in providing a surplus for serving the social whole.

IV. What are the two different “arts of acquisition”?

a. The first notion of acquisition is the natural form of trade for acquiring goods, tools, skills, and services for better developing the household/city according to its highest qualities:

i. The production process aims at producing what is socially useful for the community, but with the expanding diversification of needs and thus the specialization of craft production there is greater need to exchange for a greater variety of goods.

1. This is about exchanging goods according to uses and needs, and so it is preoccupied with
use values
(the functional purpose of a thing). It is about obtaining goods that are “either necessary for life or useful to the association of the city” (p.272) – exchanging and acquiring goods for the ends of developing our social qualities.

b. The second notion of acquisition is through retail trade for the sake of acquiring money as an end in itself:

i. This art looks like the first because it is also an exchange in a variety of goods; however, it does not serve the purpose of developing those qualities needed for household/city life, but only to increase private gain in the form of
monetary

value.

ii. It produces, exchanges, and treats goods not according to their social usefulness, but only according to their
exchange value
, taking advantage of whatever market demand there happens to be—making extra shoes or even unnecessary commodities solely for trade, or buying wholesale solely to monopolize for the purpose of selling retail at a higher rate.

1. In the first art of acquisition, value is determined qualitatively by what is socially useful for meeting real human needs, but in the second form value is determined quantitatively by monetary market prices regardless of society’s valued qualities and needs.

2. What is wrong with accumulating quantities of money as the ultimate end of exchange?

· It’s a form of value privately accumulated and consumed

· its form has no access to real qualitative values

· its pursuit denies public discourse about how to socially meet real human needs.

· It thus runs against the inherently social nature of productive activity

V. Where did money come from and what is it for? Aristotle’s thought here is significant as he provided one of the first analyses in the ancient world of the historical emergence of money as well as providing a critical social assessment.

a. As noted above, with the development of production and its specialized division, the city evolved into a more highly complex unit of diverse social needs. According to Aristotle, this led to more bartering, which led to a need for more convenient ways to barter.

i. Exchanging one commodity (C) directly for another commodity (C) can be cumbersome if the goods are too large or diverse:

1. Plus, each thing has its own specific use value and so there is no easy way to establish commensurability between two distinct use values (how do you find an equal proportion for a fair exchange between shoes and a house?)

ii. In barter then the direct swap of one commodity for another, C–C, required a common standard of measurement that could more adequately represent their values in the abstract and thus mediate the exchange—hence the invention of currency or money (M).

iii. Money then historically emerged as a social convention serving a moral purpose—it was a symbolic means for facilitating a more just exchange:

1. it was inherently called into being according to a principle of justice for finding a truly proportionate exchange of goods by way of a common mediator, so that there was now C–M–C.

iv. But the very convenience of money opened the door for retail trade, since now one could produce more than necessary, exclusively for obtaining money on the market, and then purchase more than necessary in order to monopolize supply and exploit demand by reselling at a higher price.

v. Instead of the virtue of justice maintaining a fair proportion within the transaction of C–M–C, there were now transactions that sought to gain only more money at the loss of others (buy low, sell high, for the end of making more money), M–C–M’ (M’ = more money).

vi. With the formula M–C–M’ the exchange no longer serves real human needs and a principle of fairness because money no longer functions according to its proper nature as a conventional means, but is now distorted into the beginning and end of the economic activity itself.

1. If justice is the meeting of real needs in a balanced way so as to avoid extremes, then the just nature of money is now eliminated in M–C–M’.

vii. Aristotle, then, does not have a problem with the nature of exchange or money, but only with economic activity distorted by money-making as an end in itself because it leads to
unnatural, false wealth

VI. What is True wealth and False wealth?

a. True wealth: an abundance of socially useful goods and instruments whose use also allows one to internally perfect virtuous qualities and skills for communally organizing the good life together.

b. False wealth: simply the private accumulation of abstract monetary value as the end of economic and social activity itself rather than a means to the social good.

i. True wealth is a common wealth, acquiring an abundance of goods, knowledges, relationships and conditions for enriching humanity through the qualitive development of its distinctive life activities.

1. It structures the production process socially around discussion of real human needs that aim toward the cultivation of humanity’s creative potentials as a whole.

ii. False wealth is merely the private amassing of money as a quantitative abstraction: an empty power that internally perfects no qualities or skills in the possessor—wealth here is only the expansion of possessive/consumptive capacities for a few.

1. Aristotle does not think the problem of pursuing false wealth is merely a problem of individual greed, but rather it represents a tendency that begins to structurally invert the very nature of productive activity.

a. Accumulation of monetary wealth allows the increasing monopolization of supply by privatizing the production process, which means this inherently social process is no longer oriented toward its own genuinely social ends, but rather is used as a means to the private ends of a few.

i. That is, the point of production is reordered away from its communal orientation and is privately employed toward supplying market demands regardless of whether these meet the real human needs of the community of producers.

ii. Real human needs are therefore no longer the ends to which money serves, but rather human needs and social qualities are the means utilized for the end of privately making money.

iii. Therefore, the very structure of M-C-M’ is unjust since it relies on exploiting the social nature of human productive activity as a mere means to private gain, as well as taking advantage of another’s loss in the act of exchange.

iv. This leads to the most egregious form of twisting monetary wealth into an end itself, which is the capitalizing on interest from loans: what Aristotle calls “usury” or “the most unnatural” (1258a35).

v. Such an end therein promotes competitive and antagonistic anti-social relations around exploitation of each other, with greed becoming no longer one vice among others, but now institutionalized as a necessary cardinal virtue.

b. In exclusively pursuing monetary value, commercialized society starts to become determined less by a conscious democratic pursuit of the common good, and more by the blind dictates of market demand and the irrational short-term private interests behind them.

Image result for earth industrialized

Hence market economies have no real means of comprehending actual human and environmental needs. (a gr

Philosophy homework help

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Practical Ethics

Third Edition

For thirty years, Peter Singer’s Practical Ethics has been the classic
introduction to applied ethics. For this third edition, the author
has revised and updated all the chapters and added a new chapter
addressing climate change, one of the most important ethical chal-
lenges of our generation.

Some of the questions discussed in this book concern our daily
lives. Is it ethical to buy luxuries when others do not have enough to
eat? Should we buy meat produced from intensively reared animals?
Am I doing something wrong if my carbon footprint is above the
global average? Other questions confront us as concerned citizens:
equality and discrimination on the grounds of race or sex; abortion,
the use of embryos for research, and euthanasia; political violence
and terrorism; and the preservation of our planet’s environment.

This book’s lucid style and provocative arguments make it an ideal
text for university courses and for anyone willing to think about how
she or he ought to live.

Peter Singer is currently Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at
the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University and
Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public
Ethics at the University of Melbourne. He is the author or editor of
more than forty books, including Animal Liberation (1975), Rethinking
Life and Death (1996) and, most recently, The Life You Can Save (2009).
In 2005, he was named one of the 100 most influential people in the
world by Time magazine.

Practical Ethics

Third Edition

PETER SINGER
Princeton University and the University of Melbourne

cambridge university press

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, ny 10013-2473, usa

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521707688

C© Peter Singer 1980, 1993, 2011

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First edition published 1980
Second edition published 1993
Third edition published 2011

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data

Singer, Peter, 1946–
Practical ethics / Peter Singer. – 3rd ed.

p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-521-88141-8 (hardback) – isbn 978-0-521-70768-8 (paperback)
1. Ethics. 2. Social ethics. I. Title.
bj1012.s49 2011
170–dc22 2010043690

isbn 978-0-521-88141-8 Hardback
isbn 978-0-521-70768-8 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not
guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

Preface page vii

1 About Ethics 1

2 Equality and Its Implications 16

3 Equality for Animals? 48

4 What’s Wrong with Killing? 71

5 Taking Life: Animals 94

6 Taking Life: The Embryo and Fetus 123

7 Taking Life: Humans 155

8 Rich and Poor 191

9 Climate Change 216

10 The Environment 238

11 Civil Disobedience, Violence and Terrorism 256

12 Why Act Morally? 276

Notes, References and Further Reading 297

Index 323

v

Preface

Practical ethics covers a wide area. We can find ethical ramifications in
most of our choices, if we look hard enough. This book does not attempt
to cover the whole area. The problems it deals with have been selected on
two grounds: relevance and the extent to which philosophical reasoning
can contribute to discussion of them.

The most relevant ethical issues are those that confront us daily: is
it right to spend money on entertaining ourselves when we could use
it to help people living in extreme poverty? Are we justified in treating
animals as nothing more than machines producing flesh for us to eat?
Should we drive a car – thus emitting greenhouse gases that warm the
planet – if we could walk, cycle or use public transport? Other problems,
like abortion and euthanasia, fortunately are not everyday decisions for
most of us; but they are still relevant because they can arise at some
time in our lives. They are also issues of current concern about which
any active participant in a democratic society should have informed and
considered opinions.

The extent to which an issue can be usefully discussed philosophically
depends on the kind of issue it is. Some issues are controversial largely
because there are facts in dispute. Should we build nuclear power stations
to replace the coal-fired ones that are a major cause of global warming?
The answer to that question seems to hang largely on whether it is pos-
sible to make the nuclear fuel cycle safe, both against accidental release
of radioactive materials and against terrorist attacks. Philosophers are
unlikely to have the expertise to answer this question. (That does not
mean that they can have nothing to say about it – for instance, they may
still be able to say something useful about whether it is acceptable to run

vii

viii Preface

a given risk.) In other cases, however, the facts are clear and accepted
by both sides, and it is conflicting ethical views that give rise to disagree-
ment over what to do. The important facts about abortion are not really
in dispute – as we shall see in Chapter 6, when does a human life begin? is
really a question of values rather than of facts – but the ethics of abortion
is hotly disputed. With questions of this kind, the methods of reasoning
and analysis in which philosophers engage really can make a difference.
The issues discussed in this book are ones in which ethical, rather than
factual, disagreement plays a major role. Thinking about them philo-
sophically should enable us to reach better-justified conclusions.

Practical Ethics, first published in 1980, has been widely read, used in
many courses at universities and colleges and translated into fifteen
languages. I always expected that many readers would disagree with the
conclusions I defend. What I did not expect was that some would try
to prevent the book’s arguments being discussed. Yet in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, opposition to the
views on euthanasia contained in this book reached such a peak that con-
ferences or lectures at which I was invited to speak were cancelled, and
courses taught by professors at German universities in which the book
was to be used were subjected to such repeated disruption that they had
to be abandoned. In Zurich in 1991, when I was attempting to lecture,
a protester leapt onto the stage, tore my glasses from my face, threw
them down on the floor and stamped on them. Less violent protests
took place at Princeton University in 1999, when I was appointed to a
chair of bioethics. People objecting to my views barred the entrance to
the central administrative building of the university, demanding that my
appointment be rescinded. Steve Forbes, a trustee of the university and
at the time a candidate for the Republican nomination for the President
of the United States, announced that as long as I was at the university,
he would withhold further donations to it. Both the university president
and I received death threats. To its great credit, the university stood firm
in its defence of academic freedom.

The protests led me to reflect on whether the views defended in this
book really are so erroneous or so dangerous that they would be better left
unsaid. Although many of the protesters were simply misinformed about
what I am saying, there is an underlying truth to the claim that the book
breaks a taboo – or perhaps more than one taboo. In Germany since the
Nazi era, for many years it was impossible to discuss openly the question
of euthanasia or whether a human life may be so full of misery as not to

Preface ix

be worth living. More fundamental still, and not limited to Germany, is
the taboo on comparing the value of human and nonhuman lives. In the
commotion that followed the cancellation of a conference in Germany at
which I had been invited to speak, the German sponsoring organization,
to disassociate itself from my views, passed a series of motions, one of
which read: ‘The uniqueness of human life forbids any comparison –
or more specifically, equation – of human existence with other living
beings, with their forms of life or interests.’ Comparing, and in some
cases equating, the lives of humans and animals is exactly what some
chapters of this book are about; in fact, it could be said that if there is any
single aspect of this book that distinguishes it from other approaches to
such issues as human equality, abortion, euthanasia and the environment,
it is the fact that these topics are approached with a conscious disavowal of
any assumption that all members of our own species have, merely because
they are members of our species, any distinctive worth or inherent value
that puts them above members of other species. The belief in human
superiority is a very fundamental one, and it underlies our thinking
in many sensitive areas. To challenge it is no trivial matter, and that
such a challenge should provoke a strong reaction ought not to surprise
us. Nevertheless, once we have understood that the breaching of this
taboo on comparing humans and animals is partially responsible for
the protests, it becomes clear that there is no going back. For reasons
that are developed in subsequent chapters, to prohibit any cross-species
comparisons would be philosophically indefensible. It would also make
it impossible to overcome the wrongs we are now doing to nonhuman
animals and would reinforce attitudes that have done irreparable damage
to the environment of our planet.

So I have not backed away from the views that have caused so much
controversy. If these views have their dangers, the danger of attempting to
continue to silence criticism of widely accepted ideas is greater still. Since
the days of Plato, philosophy has advanced dialectically as philosophers
have offered reasons for disagreeing with the views of other philosophers.
Learning from disagreement leads us to a more defensible position and
is one reason why, even if the views I hold are mistaken, they should be
discussed.

Though I have not changed my views on those topics – euthanasia
and abortion – against which most of the protests were directed, this
third edition is significantly different from the first and second editions.
Every chapter has been reworked, factual material has been updated,
and where my position has been misunderstood by my critics, I have tried

x Preface

to make it clearer. On some issues, new questions and new arguments
relevant to old questions have emerged. In the discussion of the moral
status of early human life, for instance, scientific advances have led to
a new debate about the destruction of human embryos to obtain stem
cells. The developing scientific understanding of early human life has
not only given rise to hopes of major gains in treating disease; it has also
demonstrated that many cells – not only the fertilized egg – contain the
potential to start a new human life. We need to ask whether this changes
the arguments about the moral status of human embryos and, if so, in
what way.

The sections of the book that have left me in the greatest philosophical
uncertainty are those parts of Chapters 4 and 5 that discuss whether there
is some sense in which bringing into existence a new being – whether a
human being or a nonhuman animal – can compensate for the death of
a similar being who has been killed. That issue in turn leads to questions
about the optimum population size and whether the existence of more
sentient beings enjoying their lives would, other things being equal, be
a good thing. These questions may seem arcane and far removed from
the ‘practical ethics’ promised by the title of this book, but they have
important ethical implications. As we shall see, they can serve as an
example of how our judgments of what is right and wrong need to be
informed by investigations into deep and difficult philosophical issues.
In revising these sections for this edition, I have found myself unable to
maintain with any confidence that the position I took in the previous
edition – based solely on preference utilitarianism – offers a satisfactory
answer to these quandaries.

That reconsideration of my earlier position is the most significant
philosophical change to this edition. The addition with the greatest prac-
tical importance, however, is a new chapter that deals with the great moral
challenge of our time – climate change. Too often, we fail to see climate
change as an ethical issue. I hope this chapter will show clearly that it is.
The number of chapters in this edition remains the same as it was for
the second edition because a chapter that I added to that edition, on our
obligation to accept refugees, does not appear in this edition. This is not
because the issue of admitting refugees has become any less important
than it was in 1993. On the contrary, it is probably more significant now
and will become more significant still, in coming decades, as we begin to
see increasing numbers of ‘climate refugees’ – people who can no longer
live where their parents and grandparents lived, because rainfall patterns
have changed or sea levels have risen. But I had become dissatisfied with

Preface xi

the chapter as it stood. This is partly because the issue is one to which
the facts – for example, about the possibility of a country taking in large
numbers of refugees without this leading to a racist backlash that would
harm minority groups within the country – are highly relevant. I had also
become more aware of differences between countries that are relevant
to this issue, and so I reluctantly concluded that any attempt to deal with
the issue in a single chapter of a volume such as this, aimed at an interna-
tional audience, is bound to be superficial. If the issue cannot be treated
adequately and in a properly nuanced way, I decided, it would be better
not to include it in this book, especially as it is one of those issues on
which governments must set policy rather than one on which individuals
actions can make a significant difference.

In writing and revising this book, I have made extensive use of my
own previously published articles and books. Chapter 3 is based on my
book, Animal Liberation (2nd edition, New York Review/Random House,
1990), although it also takes account of objections made since the book
first appeared in 1975. The sections of Chapter 6 on such topics as in
vitro fertilization, the argument from potential, embryo experimenta-
tion and the use of fetal tissue, all draw on work I wrote jointly with
Karen Dawson, which was published as “IVF and the Argument from
Potential”, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 17 (1988) and in Peter
Singer, Helga Kuhse and others, Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1990). In the third edition, this chapter includes material
responding to the arguments of Patrick Lee and Robert George that first
appeared in Agata Sagan and Peter Singer, “The Moral Status of Stem
Cells”, Metaphilosophy, 38 (2007). Chapter 7 contains material from the
much fuller treatment of the issue of euthanasia for severely disabled
infants that Helga Kuhse and I provided in Should the Baby Live? (Oxford
University Press, 1985). Chapter 8 restates arguments from “Famine,
Affluence and Morality”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1 (1972), and
for this edition, I drew on my much more recent and comprehensive
account of the issue in The Life You Can Save (Random House, 2009).
The new Chapter 9 draws on material first published in One World (Yale
University Press, 2002) and from “Climate Change as an Ethical Issue”, in
Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Social Justice (Melbourne University
Press, 2009). Chapter 10 is based on “Environmental Values”, a chapter
I contributed to Ian Marsh (ed.), The Environmental Challenge (Longman
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991). Portions of Chapter 11 draw on my first
book, Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973). The
revisions for the third edition also include passages from my responses

xii Preface

to critics in Peter Singer Under Fire, edited by Jeff Schaler (Open Court,
Chicago, 2009).

H. J. McCloskey, Derek Parfit and Robert Young provided useful com-
ments on a draft version of the first edition of this book. Robert Young’s
ideas also entered into my thinking at an earlier stage, when we jointly
taught a course on these topics at La Trobe University. The chapter on
euthanasia, in particular, owes much to his ideas, though he may not
agree with everything in it. Going back further still, my interest in eth-
ics was stimulated by H. J. McCloskey, whom I was fortunate to have as
a teacher during my undergraduate years; and the mark left by R. M.
Hare, who taught me at Oxford, is apparent in the ethical foundations
underlying the positions taken in this book. Jeremy Mynott of Cambridge
University Press encouraged me to write the book and helped to shape
and improve it as it went along. The second edition of the book benefited
from work I did with Karen Dawson, Paola Cavalieri, Renata Singer and
especially Helga Kuhse. For this third edition, I must give what are, sadly,
posthumous thanks to Brent Howard, a gifted thinker who several years
ago sent me extensive notes for a possible revision of the second edi-
tion. I am also most grateful to Agata Sagan for suggestions and research
assistance throughout the revision of the book. Her contribution is most
evident in the discussion of the moral status of embryos and stem cells,
but her ideas and suggestions have improved the book in several other
areas as well.

There are, of course, many others with whom I have discussed the
issues that are the subject of this book. Back in 1984, Dale Jamieson
made me aware of the significance of climate change as an ethical issue,
and I continue to check my thoughts on that topic and on many others
with him. I have learned a lot from Jeff McMahan, from personal contact,
from a graduate seminar we co-taught on issues of life and death and from
his many writings. At Princeton University, I have often benefited from
comments on my work from my colleagues, from visiting Fellows at the
University Center for Human Values and from students, both graduate
and undergraduate. Don Marquis and David Benatar each spent a year
at the Center, and those visits provided opportunities for many good
discussions. I also thank my colleagues and the graduate students at the
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of
Melbourne for their comments at occasional lectures and seminars at
which I have presented my work.

Harriet McBryde Johnson and I disagreed vehemently about euthan-
asia for infants with severe disabilities, but there was never any acrimony

Preface xiii

between us, and she always presented my views with scrupulous fairness.
Sadly, our exchanges ended with her death in 2008, and I miss her critical
presence.

The astute reader who compares this edition with the previous one may
notice that I am now more ready to entertain – although not yet embrace –
the idea that there are objective ethical truths that are independent of
what anyone desires. I owe that shift – which could not be adequately
explored in a book of this nature – to my reading of a draft of Derek
Parfit’s immensely impressive forthcoming book, On What Matters. I hope
to write more about this question on another occasion.

Peter Singer
Princeton and Melbourne, 2010

Note to the reader: To avoid cluttering the text, notes, references and sug-
gested further reading are grouped together at the end of the book.

1

About Ethics

This book is about practical ethics, that is, about the application of ethics
or morality – I shall use the words interchangeably – to practical issues.
Though the reader may be impatient to get to these issues without delay,
if we are to have a useful discussion within ethics, it is necessary to say a
little about ethics so that we have a clear understanding of what we are
doing when we discuss ethical questions. This first chapter, therefore,
sets the stage for the remainder of the book. To prevent it from growing
into an entire volume itself, it is brief and at times dogmatic. I cannot
take the space properly to consider all the different conceptions of ethics
that might be opposed to the one I shall defend, but this chapter will at
least serve to reveal the assumptions on which the remainder of the book
is based.

what ethics is not

Ethics is not Primarily About Sex

There was a time, around the 1950s, when if you saw a newspaper head-
line reading RELIGIOUS LEADER ATTACKS DECLINING MORAL
STANDARDS, you would expect to read yet again about promiscuity,
homosexuality and pornography, and not about the puny amounts we
give as overseas aid to poorer nations or the damage we are causing to
our planet’s environment. As a reaction to the dominance of this nar-
row sense of morality, it became popular to regard morality as a system
of nasty puritanical prohibitions, mainly designed to stop people from
having fun.

1

2 Practical Ethics

Fortunately, this era has passed. We no longer think that morality,
or ethics, is a set of prohibitions particularly concerned with sex. Even
religious leaders talk more about global poverty and climate change and
less about promiscuity and pornography. Decisions about sex may involve
considerations of honesty, concern for others, prudence, avoidance of
harm to others and so on, but the same could be said of decisions about
driving a car. (In fact, the moral issues raised by driving a car, both
from an environmental and from a safety point of view, are much more
serious than those raised by safe sex.) Accordingly, this book contains no
discussion of sexual morality. There are more important ethical issues to
be considered.

Ethics is not ‘Good in Theory but not in Practice’

The second thing that ethics is not is an ideal system that is all very noble
in theory but no good in practice. The reverse of this is closer to the
truth: an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must suffer from a
theoretical defect as well, for the whole point of ethical judgments is to
guide practice.

People sometimes believe that ethics is inapplicable to the real world
because they assume that ethics is a system of short and simple rules
like ‘Do not lie’, ‘Do not steal’ and ‘Do not kill’. It is not surprising that
those who hold this model of ethics should also believe that ethics is not
suited to life’s complexities. In unusual situations, simple rules conflict;
and even when they do not, following a rule can lead to disaster. It may
normally be wrong to lie, but if you were living in Nazi Germany and the
Gestapo came to your door looking for Jews, it would surely be right to
deny the existence of the Jewish family hiding in your attic.

Like the failure of a morality focused on restricting our sexual beha-
vior, the failure of an ethic of simple rules must not be taken as a failure
of ethics as a whole. It is only a failure of one view of ethics, and not
even an irremediable failure of that view. Those who think that ethics is a
system of rules – the deontologists – can rescue their position by finding
more complicated and more specific rules that do not conflict with each
other, or by ranking the rules in some hierarchical structure to resolve
conflicts between them. Moreover, there is a long-standing approach to
ethics that is quite untouched by the complexities that make simple rules
difficult to apply. This is the consequentialist view. Consequentialists start
not with moral rules but with goals. They assess actions by the extent to
which they further these goals. The best-known, though not the only,
consequentialist theory is utilitarianism. The classical utilitarian regards

About Ethics 3

an action as right if it produces more happiness for all affected by it than
any alternative action and wrong if it does not. Two qualifications to that
statement are necessary: ‘more happiness’ here means net happiness,
after deducting any suffering or misery that may also have been caused
by the action; and if two different actions tie for the title of producing
the greatest amount of happiness, either of them is right.

The consequences of an action vary according to the circumstances
in which it is performed. Hence, a utilitarian can never properly be
accused of a lack of realism or of a rigid adherence to ideals in defiance
of practical experience. The utilitarian will judge lying as bad in some
circumstances and good in others, depending on its consequences.

Ethics is not Based on Religion

The third thing ethics is not is something intelligible only in the context
of religion. I shall treat ethics as entirely independent of religion.

Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the
very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves’. Plato
refuted a similar claim more than two thousand years ago by arguing
that if the gods approve of some actions it must be because those actions
are good, in which case it cannot be the gods’ approval that makes them
good. The alternative view makes divine approval entirely arbitrary: if
the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping
our neighbours, torture would have been good and helping our neigh-
bours bad. Some theists have attempted to extricate themselves from
this dilemma by maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly
approve of torture; but if these theists want to maintain that good means
what God approves, they are caught in a trap of their own making, for
what can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good – that God
is approved of by God?

Traditionally, the more important link between religion and ethics
was that religion was thought to provide a reason for doing what is right,
the reason being that those who are virtuous will be rewarded by an
eternity of bliss while the rest roast in hell. Not all religious thinkers have
accepted this: Immanuel Kant, a most pious Christian, scorned anything
that smacked of a self-interested motive for obeying the moral law. We
must obey it, he said, for its own sake. Nor do we have to be Kantians
to dispense with the motivation offered by traditional religion. There is
a long line of thought that finds the source of ethics in our benevolent
inclinations and the sympathy most of us have for others. This is, however,
a complex topic, and I shall not pursue it here because it is the subject

4 Practical Ethics

of the final chapter of this book. It is enough to say that our everyday
observation of our fellows clearly shows that ethical behaviour does not
require belief in heaven and hell and, conversely, that belief in heaven
and hell does not always lead to ethical behaviour.

If morality was not given to us by a divine creator, from where did
it come? We know that, like our close relatives the chimpanzees and
bonobos, we have evolved from social mammals. It seems that during
this long period of evolution, we developed a moral faculty that gener-
ates intuitions about right and wrong. Some of these we share with our
primate relatives – they too have a strong sense of reciprocity; and in
their sometimes outraged responses to a flagrant failure to repay a good
turn, we can see the beginnings of our own sense of justice. Observing
a group of chimps living together, Frans de Waal noticed that after one
chimp, Puist, had supported another, Luit, in fending off an attack from
a third, Nikkie, Nikkie subsequently attacked Puist. Puist beckoned to
Luit for support, but Luit did nothing. When the attack from Nikkie was
over, Puist furiously attacked Luit. De Waal comments: ‘If her fury was
in fact the result of Luit’s failure to help her after she had helped him,
this would suggest that reciprocity among chimpanzees is governed by
the same sense of moral rightness and justice as it is among humans.’

From these intuitive responses, shared with other social mammals,
morality has developed under the influence of our acquisition of lan-
guage. It has taken distinct forms in different human cultures, but there
is still a surprisingly large common ground which you, the reader, will
most probably share. It is vital for everything that follows in this book
that we should understand that these evolved intuitions do not necessar-
ily give us the right answers to moral questions. What was good for our
ancestors may not be good for human beings as a whole today, let alone
for our planet and all the other beings living on it. No doubt small human
communities on a lightly populated planet were more likely to survive
if they had an ethic that said ‘Be fruitful and multiply’ and, consistently
with this, favoured large families and condemned homosexuality. Today,
we can and should critically examine any intuitive reactions we may have
to such practices and take account of the consequences of having large
families or of homosexuality, for the world in which we live.

Many people assume that anything natural is good. They are likely
to think that if our moral intuitions are natural, we ought to follow
them, but this would be a mistake. As John Stuart Mill pointed out in
his essay On Nature, the word ‘nature’ either means everything that exists
in the universe, including human beings and all that they create, or it

About Ethics 5

means the world as it would be, apart from human beings and what
humans bring about. In the first sense, nothing that humans do can be
‘unnatural.’ In the second sense, the claim that something humans do is
‘unnatural’ is no objection at all to doing it, for everything that we do is
an interference with nature, and obviously much of that interference –
like treating disease – is highly desirable.

Understanding the origins of morality, therefore, frees us from two
putative masters, God and nature. We have inherited a set of moral
intuitions from our ancestors. Now we need to work out which of them
should be changed.

Ethics is not Relative to the Society in which You Live

The most philosophically challenging view about ethics that I shall deny
in this opening chapter is that ethics is relative or subjective. At least,
I shall deny this view in some of the senses in which it is often asser-
ted. This point requires a more extended discussion than the other
three.

Let us take first the oft-asserted idea that ethics

Philosophy homework help

5/10/22, 7:09 AM Topic: Week 4 Case Discussion Question – New Case Study Group 1

https://seattleu.instructure.com/groups/293194/discussion_topics/7970794/submit 1/7

This is a graded discussion: 2 points possible
due Apr 20

Week 4 Case Discussion Question – New Case Study Group 1
From UCOR 2910 02

12 12

The following clip is from the movie The Matrix. If you are unfamiliar with this movie it might be
good to consult wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Matrix) for a more detailed plot
description. But here is a brief synopsis: It is a science fiction movie about how machines humans
created with artificial intelligence take over our lives and eventually enslave us. They enslave us
by keeping us asleep our entire lives in pods so that they can use our body-heat to power their
machines. In order to keep our warm blood alive and circulating the machines created a computer
virtual reality of pleasurable experiences called the Matrix that they download into our heads.
Connected cognitively to the computer program of the Matrix, humans think the comforting world
they are dreaming is actually reality as such. A few humans woke up and realized the Matrix is not
reality and decided to fight its dehumanizing use of humans while they escaped and now live in
the miserable conditions of the real world. In this scene Cypher, who has escaped from the Matrix
nevertheless goes back into the Matrix in order to sell out his liberated comrades to the machine
agent. His reasoning is that he prefers the virtual pleasures of the Matrix to the miseries of reality
because at least it is more comfortable and pleasurable.

Watch the scene and then state how you might try to ethically convince Cypher not to go
back to the virtual life of pleasures within the Matrix. What ethical reasons could you offer
for why he shouldn’t sink back into the fantasy world of a computer program? Could you
convince him not to go on purely utilitarian principles? If you believe utilitarianism would
be unconvincing, explain how virtue ethics might reason differently (see the lecture notes
comparing and contrasting virtue and utilitarianism
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034376/download?download_frd=1) ). Provide
your initial response by Wednesday, and then at least 2 engagements with group members
you haven’t responded to yet (or haven’t responded to as often), by Sunday.

Something to think about while answering and responding: In connecting this to our modern world,
think about the Matrix as a metaphor for our commercialized society and its mechanized
worldview in which we are far removed from an organic connection to each other and nature at the
point of production. Think about how, especially in our digital age, we now live within a highly
programmed virtual reality of the marketplace, coming in contact with others primarily for
commercial exchange where our lives are mediated everywhere by algorithms, ads, and images
telling us what we need to purchase and consume in order to be happy. How would we reason
with someone who believed there is nothing more to life other than this consumerist virtual reality

5/10/22, 7:09 AM Topic: Week 4 Case Discussion Question – New Case Study Group 1

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of the marketplace and the fabricated pleasures it generates? Can utilitarianism wake us up to
something more or greater about our life together and our human potentials? Can it inspire a
desire to change our society toward higher qualitative relations beyond mere commercialism and
private consumption? Can utilitarianism help us make the essential distinctions between real
pleasures and fake pleasures, external goods and internal goods, true desires or false desires that
might be needed to judge the unreality of the matrix? If life is nothing more than private pleasure
seeking, then why would we ever want to leave a relatively comfortable existence in virtual reality
(or any privileged bubbles) in order to fight against injustice in the messy real world?

Matrix (1999) – Eating Steak and Protein Matrix (1999) – Eating Steak and Protein ……

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Is ignorance truly bliss? What I would try to explain to Cypher is that this is not always true.
While the utilitarianism view says that happiness is just the pursuit of pleasure there is more to
what a person should pursue in life. What he is doing in this situation is throwing the people
who have helped him under the bus so that he can live a fake life that is controlled by
someone else. While the reality of his current situation is not ideal, it is still the reality. What he

Philosophy homework help

BCO225 – CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR FINAL Task brief & rubrics

Task: Written summative assignment

Customer Behavior Strategy

This assessment is a written submission exam and will be released in week 12 of the course.

Use examples to illustrate your point. Include links and images

1. Explain how a company can influence the consumer behavior along the customer journey online and offline. Use an example to

explain how a brand interact online and offline and how both worlds are connected. What is the role of CRM in this interactions.

2. What is cognitive dissonance and how brands can define clusters taking into account this consumer behavior? Explain it using

an example and define how a company could use it to define the strategy per cluster.

3. Explain how DIY is a successful phenomenon among consumers? Is it a win-win situation? Use an example of a company that is

using this strategy successfully.

4. Explain how luxury brands manage to connect with the customer. Highlight differences and commonalities vs mass market

brands.

5. Explain how we can influence consumer behavior through an educational campaign. Use an example to explain a successful

educational campaign.

The report should be in word document format and must be uploaded to a Turnitin folder created on the course Moodle platform.

Formalities:

o Word: Word count: 2000 words.

o Cover, Table of Contents, References and Appendix are excluded of the total word count.

o Font: Arial, size 12,5

o Text alignment: Justified

o The in-text References and the Bibliography have to be in Harvard’s citation style.

Submission: Week (13) – Via Moodle (Turnitin). Submission deadline Sunday 8th of May 2022 at 23:59 CEST

Weight: This task is a 60% of your total grade for this subject.

It assesses the following learning outcomes:

Outcome 1: Understanding Customer behavior and Consumer Needs

Outcome 2: Understanding Customer relationship

Outcome 3: Understanding Customer research

Outcome 4: Understanding Customer journey

Rubrics

Exceptional 90-100 Good 80-89 Fair 70-79 Marginal fail 60-69

Knowledge &
Understanding

(20%)

Student demonstrates
excellent understanding of
key concepts and uses
vocabulary in an entirely
appropriate manner.

Student demonstrates
good understanding of the
task and mentions some
relevant concepts and
demonstrates use of the
relevant vocabulary.

Student understands the
task and provides minimum
theory and/or some use of
vocabulary.

Student understands the task
and attempts to answer the
question but does not
mention key concepts or uses
minimum amount of relevant
vocabulary.

Application (30%) Student applies fully
relevant knowledge from
the topics delivered in
class.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Student applies mostly
relevant knowledge from
the topics delivered in
class.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Student applies some
relevant knowledge from
the topics delivered in
class. Misunderstanding
may be evident.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Student applies little relevant
knowledge from the topics
delivered in class.
Misunderstands are evident.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Critical Thinking
(30%)

Student critically assesses
in excellent ways, drawing
outstanding conclusions
from relevant authors.

Student critically assesses
in good ways, drawing
conclusions from relevant
authors and references.

Student provides some
insights but stays on the
surface of the topic.
References may not be
relevant.

Student makes little or none
critical thinking insights, does
not quote appropriate
authors, and does not
provide valid sources.

Communication
(20%)

Student communicates
their ideas extremely
clearly and concisely,
respecting word count,
grammar and spellcheck

Student communicates
their ideas clearly and
concisely, respecting word
count, grammar and
spellcheck

Student communicates
their ideas with some
clarity and concision. It
may be slightly over or
under the wordcount limit.
Some misspelling errors
may be evident.

Student communicates their
ideas in a somewhat unclear
and unconcise way. Does not
reach or does exceed
wordcount excessively and
misspelling errors are
evident.

Philosophy homework help

41

2
S C I E N C E A N D W O R L D V I E W S

Is the earth dead or alive? The ancient cultures of the East and West and the
native peoples of America saw the earth as a mother, alive, active, and respon-
sive to human action. Greeks and Renaissance Europeans conceptualized the
cosmos as a living organism, with a body, soul, and spirit, and the earth as
a nurturing mother with respiratory, circulatory, reproductive, and elimina-
tion systems. The relationship between most peoples and the earth was an
I–thou ethic of propitiation to be made before damming a brook, cutting a
tree, or sinking a mine shaft. Yet for the past three hundred years, Western
mechanistic science and capitalism have viewed the earth as dead and inert,
manipulable from outside, and exploitable for profits. The death of nature
legitimated its domination. Colonial extractions of resources combined with
industrial pollution and depletion have today pushed the whole earth to the
brink of ecological destruction.

T H E O R G A N I C W O R L D V I E W

The cosmos of the Renaissance world was a living organism. The four ele-
ments (earth, air, fire, and water) that made up the material world below the
moon, and the fifth element (ether) that made the stars and planets were its
material body. The soul was the source of its animate daily motion as the sun,
stars, and planets encircled the geocentric earth every twenty-four hours. The

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spirit, descending from God in the heavens beyond, mingled with the ether
and the ambient air, to be imbibed by plants, animals, and humans on the
earth’s surface.

The living character of the world organism meant not only that the stars
and planets were alive, but that the earth too was pervaded by a force giving
life and motion to the living beings on it. The earth was considered to be a
beneficent, receptive, nurturing female. In the ancient lore, the earth mother
respired daily, inhaling the pneuma, or spirit from the atmosphere. Her “copi-
ous breathing” renewed the life on its surface. The earth’s springs were akin to
the human blood system; its other various fluids were likened to the mucus,
saliva, sweat, and other forms of lubrication in the human body. As the waters
on its surface ebbed and flowed, evaporated into clouds, and descended as
dews, rains, and snows, the earth’s blood was cleansed and renewed. Veins,
veinlets, seams, and canals coursed through the entire earth, particularly in
the mountains. Its humors flowed from the veinlets into larger veins. In many
places the veins became filled with metals and minerals.

The earth, like the human, even had its own elimination system. The
tendency for the earth to break wind was the cause of earthquakes and a
manifestation of the earth mother’s indignation at humans who mined her
entrails. The earth’s bowels were full of channels, fire chambers, glory holes,
and fissures through which fire and heat were emitted, some in the form of
fiery volcanic exhalations, other as hot water springs. The thin layer of soil
on the earth’s surface was its skin. European peasants nurtured the land, per-
formed ritual dances, and returned its gifts to assure continued fertility. Trees
were the earth mother’s tresses. Her head was adorned with fringes and curls
which the lumber industry sheared off.

A commonly used analogy was that of the female’s reproductive and nur-
turing capacity and of mother earth’s ability to give birth to stones and metals
within “her” womb through marriage with the sun. For most traditional cul-
tures, minerals and metals ripened in the uterus of the earth mother, mines
were compared to her vagina, and metallurgy was the human hastening of the
birth of the living metal in the artificial womb of the furnace—an abortion
of the metal’s natural growth cycle before its time. Miners offered propitia-
tion to the deities of the soil and subterranean world, performed ceremonial
sacrifices, and observed strict cleanliness, sexual abstinence, and fasting before
violating the sacredness of the living earth by sinking a mine. Smiths assumed

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an awesome responsibility in precipitating the metal’s birth through smelting,
fusing, and beating it with hammer and anvil; they were often accorded the
status of shaman in tribal rituals, and their tools were thought to hold special
powers.

The image of the earth as a living organism and nurturing mother served
as a cultural constraint restricting the actions of human beings. One does not
readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold, or mutilate her body. As
long as the earth was conceptualized as alive and sensitive, it could be consid-
ered a breach of human ethical behavior to carry out destructive acts against it.
In much the same way, the cultural belief-systems of many American Indian
tribes had for centuries subtly guided group behavior toward nature. Smohalla
of the Columbian Basin Tribes voiced the Indian objections to European
attitudes in the mid-1800s.

You ask me to plow the ground! Shall I take a knife and tear my mother’s
breast? Then when I die she will not take me to her bosom to rest.

You ask me to dig for stone! Shall I dig under her skin for her bones? Then
when I die I cannot enter her body to be born again.

You ask me to cut grass and make hay and sell it, and be right like white
men! But how dare I cut off my mother’s hair?

Such imagery found in a culture’s literature can play a normative role within
the culture. Controlling images operate as ethical restraints or as ethical sanc-
tions—as subtle “oughts” or “ought-nots.” Thus, as the descriptive metaphors
and images of nature change, a behavioral restraint can be changed into a
sanction. Such a change in the image and description of nature was occurring
during the course of the scientific revolution. Today, the organic cosmology,
experienced in some form by almost all of the world’s peoples for all times,
has been superseded.1

T H E R I S E O F C A P I TA L I S M

In the sixteenth century, as the feudal states of medieval Europe were break-
ing up, a new dynamic force emerged that shattered premodern ways of life
and the organic restraints against the exploitation of the earth. Arising in
the city-states of Renaissance Italy and spreading to northern Europe was
an inexorable expanding market economy, intensifying medieval tendencies

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toward capitalist relations of production and capitalist modes of economic
behavior. As trade quickened throughout Western Europe, stimulated by
the European discovery and exploitation of the Americas, production for
subsistence began to be replaced by more specialized production for the
market. The spreading use of money provided not only a uniform medium
of exchange but also a reliable store of value, facilitating open-ended accu-
mulation. Inflation, generated by the growth of population and the flood of
American gold, accelerated the transition from traditional economic modes to
rationally maximizing modes of economic organization. The growth of cities
as centers of trade and handicraft production created a new class of bourgeois
entrepreneurs who supplied ambitious monarchs with the funds and expertise
to build strong nation states, undercutting the power of the regionally based
landowning nobility.

Whereas the medieval economy had been based on organic and renew-
able energy sources—wood, water, wind, and animal muscle—the emerging
capitalist economy was based on non-renewable energy, i.e., coal, and the
inorganic metals—iron, copper, silver, gold, tin, and mercury—the refining
and processing of which ultimately depended on and further depleted the
forests. Over the course of the sixteenth century, mining operations quadru-
pled as the trading of metals expanded. Forests were cut for charcoal and the
cleared lands turned into sheep pastures for the textile industry. Shipbuilding,
essential to capitalist trade and national supremacy, along with glass and soap-
making, also contributed to the denudation of the ancient forest cover. The
new activities directly altered the earth. Not only were its forests cut down,
but swamps were drained, and mine shafts were sunk.

The new commercial and industrial enterprises meant that the older
cultural constraints against the exploitation of the earth no longer held sway.
While the organic framework was for many centuries sufficiently integrative
to override commercial development and technological innovation, the accel-
eration of economic change throughout Western Europe began to undermine
the organic unity of the cosmos and society. Because the needs and purposes
of society as a whole were changing with the commercial revolution, the
values associated with the organic view of nature were no longer applicable;
hence the plausibility of the conceptual framework itself was slowly, but con-
tinuously, being threatened. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
tension between the technological development in the world of action and the

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controlling organic images in the world of the mind had become too great.
The old worldview was incompatible with the new activities.2

E X P E R I M E N TA L S C I E N C E

During the seventeenth century, the organic framework, in which the
mother-earth image was a moral restraint against the exploitation of nature,
was replaced by a new experimental science and a worldview that saw nature
not as an organism but as a machine—dead, inert, and insensitive to human
action. Francis Bacon (1571–1626), following tendencies that had been evolv-
ing throughout the previous century, advocated the domination of nature
for human benefit. He compared miners and smiths whose technologies
extracted ores for the new commercial activities to scientists and technologists
penetrating the earth and shaping “her” on the anvil. The new man of science,
he wrote, must not think that the “inquisition of nature is in any part inter-
dicted or forbidden.” Nature must be “bound into service” and made a “slave,”
put “in constraint,” and “molded” by the mechanical arts. The “searchers and
spies of nature” were to discover her plots and secrets.3

Nature’s womb, Bacon argued, harbored secrets that through technology
could be wrested from her grasp for use in the improvement of the human
condition. Before the fall of Adam and Eve there had been no need for power
or dominion, because they had been made sovereign over all other creatures.
Only by “digging further and further into the mine of natural knowledge,”
Bacon believed, could mankind recover that lost dominion. Nature placed in
bondage through technology would serve human beings. Here “nature takes
orders from man and works under his authority.” The method of science
was not to be achieved by developing abstract notions such as those of the
medieval scholastics, but rather through the instruction of the understanding
“that it may in very truth dissect nature.” “By art and the hand of man,” nature
should be “forced out of her natural state and squeezed and molded.” In this
way “human knowledge and human power meet in one.”4

Thus Bacon, in bold sexual imagery, outlined the key features of the mod-
ern experimental method—constraint of nature in the laboratory, dissection
by hand and mind, and the penetration of nature’s hidden secrets—language
still used today in praising a scientist’s “hard facts,” “penetrating mind,” or

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“seminal” arguments. The constraints against mining the earth were subtly
turned into sanctions for exploiting and “raping” nature for human good.5

The development of science as a methodology for manipulating nature,
and the interest of scientists in the mechanical arts, became a significant pro-
gram during the latter half of the seventeenth century. Other philosophers
realized even more clearly than had Bacon the connections between mechan-
ics, the trades, middle-class commercial interests, and the domination of
nature. Scientists spoke out in favor of “mastering” and “managing” the earth.
French Philosopher René Descartes wrote in his Discourse on Method (1637)
that through knowing the crafts of the artisans and the forces of bodies we
could “render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.”6

John Dury and Samuel Hartlib, followers of Bacon and organizers of the
Invisible College (ca. 1645), connected the study of the crafts and trades to
increasing wealth. The virtuosi of England’s first scientific society, the Royal
Society (founded in 1660), were interested in carrying out Bacon’s proposals
to dominate nature through experimentation. Joseph Glanvill, the English
philosopher who defended the Baconian program in his Plus Ultra (1668),
asserted that the objective of natural philosophy was to “enlarge knowledge by
observation and experiment . . . so that nature being known, it may be mastered,
managed, and used in the services of humane life.” For Glanvill, anatomy, was
“most useful in human life” because it “tend[ed] mightily to the eviscerating
of nature, and disclosure of the springs of its motion.” In searching out the
secrets of nature, nothing was more helpful than the microscope for “the
secrets of nature are not in the greater masses, but in those little threads and
springs which are too subtle for the grossness of our unhelped senses.”7

In his Experimental Essays (1661), English scientist Robert Boyle distin-
guished between merely knowing as opposed to dominating nature in thinly
veiled sexual metaphor: “For some men care only to know nature, others
desire to command her” and “to bring nature to be serviceable to their par-
ticular ends, whether of health, or riches, or sensual delight.”8

The experimental method developed by the seventeenth-century scien-
tists was strengthened by the rise of the mechanical philosophy. Together they
replaced the older, “natural” ways of thinking with a new and “unnatural” way
of seeing, thinking, and behaving. The submergence of the organism by the
machine engaged the best minds of the times during a period fraught with
anxiety, confusion, and instability in both the intellectual and social spheres.

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T H E M E C H A N I S T I C W O R L D V I E W

The mechanical view of nature now taught in most Western schools is
accepted without question as our everyday, common sense reality—a reality
in which matter is made up of atoms, colors occur by the reflection of light
waves of differing lengths, bodies obey the law of inertia, and the sun is in
the center of our solar system. This worldview is a product of the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth century. None of its assumptions were the com-
mon sense view of our sixteenth-century counterparts. Before the scientific
revolution, most ordinary people assumed that the earth was in the center of
the cosmos, that the earth was a nurturing mother, and that the cosmos was
alive, not dead.

As the unifying model for science and society, the machine has perme-
ated and reconstructed human consciousness so totally that today we scarcely
question its validity. Nature, society, and the human body are composed of
interchangeable atomized parts that can be repaired or replaced from outside.
The “technological fix” mends an ecological malfunction, new human beings
replace the old to maintain the smooth functioning of industry and bureau-
cracy, and interventionist medicine exchanges a fresh heart for a worn-out,
diseased one.

The removal of animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos con-
stituted the death of nature—the most far-reaching effect of the scientific
revolution. Because nature was now viewed as a system of dead, inert particles
moved by external rather than inherent forces, the mechanical framework
itself could legitimate the manipulation of nature. Moreover, as a conceptual
framework, the mechanical order had associated with it a framework of values
based on power, fully compatible with the directions taken by commercial
capitalism.9

The emerging mechanical worldview was based on assumptions about
nature consistent with the certainty of physical laws and the symbolic
power of machines. Although many alternative philosophies were available
(Aristotelian, Stoic, gnostic, Hermetic, magic, naturalist, and animist), the
dominant European ideology came to be governed by the characteristics and
experiential power of the machine. Social values and realities subtly guided
the choices and paths to truth and certainty taken by European philosophers.
Clocks and other early modern machines in the seventeenth century became
underlying models for Western philosophy and science.

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Not only were seventeenth-century philosophical assumptions about
being and knowledge infused by the fundamental physical structures of
machines found in the daily experience of Western Europeans, but these
presuppositions were completely consistent with another feature of the
machine—the possibility of controlling and dominating nature. These under-
lying assumptions about the nature of reality have today become guidelines
for decision-making in technology, industry, and government.

The following assumptions about the structure of being, knowledge, and
method make possible the human manipulation and control of nature.

1. Matter is composed of particles (the ontological assumption).
2. The universe is a natural order (the principle of identity).
3. Knowledge and information can be abstracted from the natural

world (the assumption of context independence).
4. Problems can be analyzed into parts that can be manipulated by

mathematics (the methodological assumption).
5. Sense data are discrete (the epistemological assumption).10

The new conception of reality developed in the mid-seventeenth century
shared a number of assumptions with the clocks, geared mills, and force-
multiplying machines that had become an important part of daily European
economic life. First of all, they shared the ontological assumption that nature
is made up of modular components or discrete parts connected in a causal
nexus that transmitted motion in a temporal sequence from part to part.
Corpuscular and atomic theories revived in the seventeenth century hypoth-
esized a particulate structure to reality. The parts of matter, like the parts of
machines, were dead, passive, and inert. The random motions of atoms were
rearranged to form new objects and forms of being by the action of external
forces. Motion was not inherent in the corpuscles, but a primary quality of
matter, put into the mundane machine by God. In Descartes’ philosophy,
motion was initiated at the world’s creation and sustained from instant to
instant throughout created time; for English physicist Isaac Newton (1642–
1727), new motion in the form of “active principles” (the cause of gravity,
fermentation, and electricity) was added periodically to prevent the non-
autonomous world-machine from running down. For German philosopher
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), the universal clock was autono-
mous—it needed no external inputs once created and set into motion. The

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ontology of this classical seventeenth-century science, modified by energy
concepts, has become the framework of the Western common sense view of
reality.

The second shared assumption between machines and seventeenth-
century science was the law of identity, the idea that A is A, or of identity
through change. This assumption of a rational order in nature goes back to
the thought of the philosophers Parmenides of Elea (fl. 500 BC) and Plato
(fourth century BC) and is the substance of Aristotle’s first principle of logic.
Broadly speaking, it is the assumption that nature is subject to law-like behav-
ior; and therefore that the domain of science and technology includes those
phenomena that can be reduced to orderly predictable rules, regulations, and
laws. Events that can be so described can be controlled because of the simple
identity of mathematical relationships. Phenomena that “cannot be foreseen
or reproduced at will . . . [are] essentially beyond the control of science.”11

The formal structural dependence of this mathematical method on the
features of the mechanical arts was beautifully articulated by Descartes in his
Discourse on Method (1636): “Most of all I was delighted with mathematics,
because of the certainty of its demonstrations and the evidence of its reason-
ing; but I did not understand its true use, and, believing that it was of service
only in the mechanical arts, I was astonished that, seeing how firm and solid
was its basis, no loftier edifice had been reared thereupon.”12

The primary example of the law of identity for Descartes was conserva-
tion of the quantity of motion measured by the quantity of matter and its
speed, m|v|. In the late-seventeenth century Newton, Leibniz, English
mathematicians Christopher Wren and John Wallis, and Dutch physicist
Christiaan Huygens all contributed to the correction of Descartes’ law accu-
rately to describe momentum (mv) as the product of mass and velocity rather
than speed, and mechanical energy (mv2) as the product of the mass and
the square of the velocity. Everyday machines were models of ideal machines
governed and described by the laws of statics and the relational laws of the
conservation of mechanical energy and momentum. The form or structure
of these laws, based as they were on the law of identity, was thus a model of
the universe. Although the conversion of energy from one form to another
and, in particular, the conversion of mechanical motion into heat were not
fully understood until the nineteenth century, the seventeenth-century laws
of impact were nevertheless, for most natural philosophers, models of the

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transfer and conservation of motion hypothesized to exist in the ideal world
of atoms and corpuscles.

The third assumption, context independence, goes back to Plato’s insight
that only quantities and context-independent entities can be submitted to
mathematical modeling. To the extent that the changing imperfect world of
everyday life partakes of the ideal world, it can be described, predicted, and
controlled by science just as the physical machine can be controlled by its
human operator. Science depends on a rigid, limited, and restrictive structural
reality. This limited view of reality is nevertheless very powerful, inasmuch
as it allows for the possibility of control whenever phenomena are predict-
able, regular, and subject to rules and laws. The assumption of order is thus
fundamental to the concept of power, and both are integral to the modern
scientific worldview.13

Although Descartes’ plan for reducing complexity in the universe to a
struc tured order was comprehensive, he discovered that the very problem
that Aristotle had perceived in the method of Plato was inherent in his own
scheme. That problem was the intrinsic difficulty, if not impossibility, of suc-
cessfully abstracting the form or structure of reality from the tangled web of
its physical, material, environmental context. Structures are, in fact, not inde-
pendent of their contexts, as this third assumption stated, but integrally tied
to them. In fact, Descartes was forced to admit, “the application of the laws of
motion is difficult, because each body is touched by several others at the same
time. . . . The rules presuppose that bodies are perfectly hard and separable
from all others . . . and we do not observe this in the world.” The enormous
complexity of things thus inhibits the analysis in terms of simple elements.14

Descartes’ method exhibits very precisely the fourth or methodological
assumption that problems can be broken down into parts and information can
then be manipulated in accordance with a set of mathematical rules and rela-
tions. Succinctly stated, his method assumes that a problem can be analyzed
into parts, and that the parts can be simplified by abstracting them from the
complicating environmental context and then manipulated under the guid-
ance of a set of rules.

His method consisted of four logical precepts:

1. To accept as true only what was so clearly and distinctly presented
that there was no reason to doubt it.

2. To divide every problem into as many parts as needed to resolve it.

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3. To begin with objects simple and easy to understand and to rise
by degrees to the most complex (abstraction and context indepen-
dence).

4. To make so general and complete a review that nothing is omitted.

In Descartes’ opinion, this method was the key to power over nature, for
these methods of reasoning used by the geometricians “caused me to imagine
that all those things which fall under the cognizance of man might very likely
be mutually related in the same fashion.” By following this method, “there
can be nothing so remote that we cannot reach to it, or recondite we cannot
discover it.”

Descartes’ method depended on the manipulation of information
according to a set of rules: “Commencing with the most simple and general
(precepts), and making each truth that I discovered a rule for helping me to
find others,—not only did I arrive at the solution of many questions which
I had hitherto regarded as most difficult but . . . in how far, it was possible to
solve them.” In the same manner, the operation of a machine depends on
the manipulation of its material parts in accordance with a prescribed set of
physical operations.

Descartes placed great emphasis on the concept of a plan or form for
ordering this information, drawing his examples from the practical problem
of city planning: “Those ancient cities which, originally mere villages, have
become in the process of time great towns, are usually badly constructed in
comparison with those which are regularly laid out on a plain by a surveyor
who is free to follow his own ideas.” He wished his new ideas to “conform to
the uniformity of a rational scheme.”15

In his De Cive, written in 1642, Hobbes had advocated the application of
this method of analysis to society:

For everything is best understood by its constitutive causes. For as in a watch,
or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot
well be known except it be taken asunder and viewed in parts; so to make a
more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects, it is neces-
sary, I say, not to take them asunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they
were dissolved.16

The fifth assumption shared by seventeenth-century science and the
technology of machines was the assumption that sense data are atomic. Data

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are received by the senses as minute particles of information. This assumption
about how knowledge is received was articulated most explicitly by Hobbes
and the British empiricists John Locke and David Hume. According to
Hobbes, sense data arise from the motions of matter as it affects our sense
organs, directly in the case of taste and touch, or indirectly, through a mate-
rial medium, as in sight, sound, and smell. These sense data can then be
manipulated and recombined according to the rules of free speech: “But the
most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of speech, consisting
of names or appellations and their connection whereby men register their
thoughts . . . without which there had been among men neither common-
wealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace.” Words are abstractions from real-
ity; sentences or thoughts are connections among words: “The manner how
speech serves to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects,
consists in the imposing of names and the connection of them.” Nature can-
not be understood unless it is first analyzed into parts from which informa-
tion can be extracted as sense data: “No man therefore can conceive anything,
but he must conceive it in some place and endowed with some determinate
magnitude; and which may be divided into parts.”17

For Hobbes, the mind itself is a special kind of a machine—a calculating
machine similar to those constructed by Scottish mathematician John Napier
(1550–1617), French philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623–
1662), Leibniz, and other seventeenth-century scientists. To reason is but to
add and subtract or to calculate. “When a man reasoneth, he does nothing else
but conceive a sum total, from the addition of parcels; or conceive a remain-
der, from subtraction of one sum from another; which, if it be done by words,
is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name
of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part to the name of
the other part.” “In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and
subtraction, there is also place for reason; and where these have no place, there
reason has nothing at all to do. . . . For reason . . . is nothing but reckoning, that
is adding and subtracting.”18 This view is manifested in twentieth- century
information theory that, according to philosopher Martin Heidegger, is
“already the arrangement whereby all objects are put in such form, as to assure
man’s domination over the entire earth and even the planets.”19

The new definition of reality of seventeenth-century philosophy and
science was therefore consistent with, and analogous to, the structure of

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machines. Machines (1) are made up of parts, (2) give particulate information
about the world, (3) are based on order and regularity (perform operations in
an ordered sequence), (4) operate in a limited, precisely defined domain of the
total context, and (5) give us power over nature. In turn, the mechanical struc-
ture of reality (1) is made up of atomic parts, (2) consists of discrete informa-
tion bits extracted from the world, (3) is assumed to operate according to laws
and

Philosophy homework help

In about 350 words discuss this question. Be specific in your answer and hit the necessary key points. No references needed

For Patrick Deneen, the liberal political tradition has been decaying from within for many decades (and centuries). Start by describing three ways that Deneen believes that liberalism is declining. In your answer, be sure to reference a few of the specific markers or signposts that Deneen cites along the way as evidence of his decline narrative. Then, in the second half of your answer please argue for or against Deneen’s views on the overall trajectory of liberalism – citing especially the three decline criteria that you have just developed.

Philosophy homework help

They have increased the comforts of the middle classes. But they
have not yet begun to effect those great changes in human destiny,
which it is in their nature and in their futurity to accomplish. Only
when, in addition to just institutions, the increase of mankind shall
be under the deliberate guidance of judicious foresight, can the con-
quests made from the powers of nature by the intellect and energy of
scientific discoverers become the common property of the species,
and the means of improving and elevating the universal lot.

Book IV, Chapter VII
On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes

1. . . . When I speak, either in this place or elsewhere, of “the labour-
ing classes,” or of labourers as a “class,” I use those phrases in com-
pliance with custom, and as descriptive of an existing, but by no
means a necessary or permanent, state of social relations. I do not
recognize as either just or salutary, a state of society in which there is
any “class” which is not labouring; any human beings exempt from
bearing their share of the necessary labours of human life, except
those unable to labour, or who have fairly earned rest by previous toil.
So long, however, as the great social evil exists of a non-labouring
class, labourers also constitute a class, and may be spoken of, though
only provisionally, in that character.

Considered in its moral and social aspect, the state of the labour-
ing people has latterly been a subject of much more speculation and
discussion than formerly; and the opinion that it is not now what it
ought to be has become very general. The suggestions which have
been promulgated, and the controversies which have been excited,
on detached points rather than on the foundations of the subject,
have put in evidence the existence of two conflicting theories,
respecting the social position desirable for manual labourers. The
one may be called the theory of dependence and protection, the
other that of self-dependence.

According to the former theory, the lot of the poor, in all things
which affect them collectively, should be regulated for them, not by
them. They should not be required or encouraged to think for them-
selves, or give to their own reflection or forecast an influential voice
in the determination of their destiny. It is supposed to be the duty of
the higher classes to think for them, and to take the responsibility of
their lot, as the commander and officers of an army take that of the

Book IV, Chapter VII192

soldiers composing it. . . . The relation between rich and poor,
according to this theory (a theory also applied to the relation between
men and women), should be only partly authoritative; it should be
amiable, moral, and sentimental: affectionate tutelage on the one
side, respectful and grateful deference on the other. The rich should
be in loco parentis to the poor, guiding and restraining them like chil-
dren. Of spontaneous action on their part, there should be no need.
They should be called on for nothing but to do their day’s work, and
to be moral and religious. Their morality and religion should be pro-
vided for them by their superiors, who should see them properly
taught it, and should do all that is necessary to ensure their being, in
return for labour and attachment, properly fed, clothed, housed, spir-
itually edified, and innocently amused.

This is the ideal of the future, in the minds of those whose dissat-
isfaction with the Present assumes the form of affection and regret
towards the Past. Like other ideals, it exercises an unconscious influ-
ence on the opinions and sentiments of numbers who never con-
sciously guide themselves by any ideal. It has also this in common
with other ideals, that it has never been historically realized. It makes
its appeal to our imaginative sympathies in the character of a restora-
tion of the good times of our forefathers. But no times can be point-
ed out in which the higher classes of this or any other country per-
formed a part even distantly resembling the one assigned to them in
this theory. It is an idealization, grounded on the conduct and char-
acter of here and there an individual. All privileged and powerful
classes, as such, have used their power in the interest of their own self-
ishness, and have indulged their self-importance in despising, and
not in lovingly caring for, those who were, in their estimation, degrad-
ed by being under the necessity of working for their benefit. I do not
affirm that what has always been must always be, or that human
improvement has no tendency to correct the intensely selfish fillings
engendered by power; but though the evil may be lessened, it cannot
be eradicated until the power itself is withdrawn. This, at least, seems
to me undeniable, that long before the superior classes could be suf-
ficiently improved to govern in the tutelary manner supposed, the
inferior classes would be too much improved to be so governed.

I am quite sensible of all that is seductive in the picture of socie-
ty which this theory presents. . . . As the idea is essentially repulsive
of a society only held together by the relations and feelings arising
out of pecuniary interests, so there is something naturally attractive
in a form of society abounding in strong personal attachments and
disinterested self-devotion. Of such feelings, it must be admitted that

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 193

the relation of protector and protected has hitherto been the richest
source. The strongest attachments of human beings in general are
towards the things or the persons that stand between them and some
dreaded evil. Hence, in an age of lawless violence and insecurity,
and general hardness and roughness of manners, in which life is
beset with dangers and sufferings at every step . . . a generous giving
of protection, and a grateful receiving of it, are the strongest ties
which connect human beings; the feelings arising from that relation
are their warmest feelings; all the enthusiasm and tenderness of the
most sensitive natures gather round it; loyalty on the one part and
chivalry on the other are principles exalted into passions. I do not
desire to depreciate these qualities. The error lies in not perceiving
that these virtues and sentiments . . . can no longer have this beauti-
ful and endearing character where there are no longer any serious
dangers from which to protect. What is there in the present state of
society to make it natural that human beings, of ordinary strength
and courage, should glow with the warmest gratitude and devotion
in return for protection? The laws protect them, wherever the laws
do not criminally fail in their duty. To be under the power of some-
one, instead of being, as formerly, the sole condition of safety, is now,
speaking generally, the only situation which exposes to grievous
wrong. The so-called protectors are now the only persons against
whom, in any ordinary circumstances, protection is needed. The
brutality and tyranny with which every police report is filled are
those of husbands to wives, of parents to children. That the law does
not prevent these atrocities, that it is only now making a first timid
attempt to repress and punish them, is no matter of necessity, but the
deep disgrace of those by whom the laws are made and administered.
No man or woman who either possesses or is able to earn an inde-
pendent livelihood, requires any other protection than that which
the law could and ought to give. This being the case, it argues great
ignorance of human nature to continue taking for granted that rela-
tions founded on protection must always subsist, and not to see that
the assumption of the part of protector, and of the power which
belongs to it, without any of the necessities which justify it, must
engender feelings opposite to loyalty.

Of the working men, at least in the more advanced countries of
Europe, it may be pronounced certain that the patriarchal or pater-
nal system of government is one to which they will not again be sub-
ject. That question was decided when they were taught to read, and
allowed access to newspapers and political tracts; when dissenting
preachers were suffered to go among them, and appeal to their facul-

Book IV, Chapter VII194

ties and feelings in opposition to the creeds professed and counte-
nanced by their superiors; when they were brought together in num-
bers, to work socially under the same roof; when railways enabled
them to shift from place to place, and change their patrons and
employers as easily as their coats; when they were encouraged to seek
a share in the government, by means of the electoral franchise. The
working classes have taken their interests into their own hands, and
are perpetually showing that they think the interests of their employ-
ers not identical with their own, but opposite to them. . . .

2. . . . The poor have come out of leading-strings, and cannot any
longer be governed or treated like children. To their own qualities
must now be commended the care of their destiny. Modern nations
will have to learn the lesson that the well-being of a people must exist
by means of the justice and self-government . . . of the individual cit-
izens. . . . Whatever advice, exhortation, or guidance is held out to the
labouring classes, must henceforth be tendered to them as equals, and
accepted by them with their eyes open. The prospect of the future
depends on the degree in which they can be made rational beings.

There is no reason to believe that prospect other than hopeful.
The progress indeed has hitherto been, and still is, slow. But there is
a spontaneous education going on in the minds of the multitude. . . .
The instruction obtained from newspapers and political tracts may
not be the most solid kind of instruction, but it is an immense
improvement upon none at all. . . . [T]here is reason to hope that
great improvements . . . in . . . school education will be effected by
the exertions either of government or of individuals, and that the
progress of the mass of the people in mental cultivation, and in the
virtues which are dependent on it, will take place more rapidly. . . .

From this increase of intelligence, several effects may be confi-
dently anticipated. First: that they will become even less willing than
at present to be led and governed, and directed into the way they
should go, by the mere authority and prestige of superiors. If they
have not now, still less will they have hereafter, any deferential awe
or religious principle of obedience, holding them in mental subjec-
tion to a class above them. The theory of dependence and protection
will be more and more intolerable to them, and they will require that
their conduct and condition shall be essentially self-governed. It is, at
the same time, quite possible that they may demand, in many cases,
the intervention of the legislature in their affairs, and the regulation
by law of various things which concern them, often under very mis-
taken ideas of their interest. Still, it is their own will, their own ideas
and suggestions, to which they will demand that effect should be

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 195

given, and not rules laid down for them by other people. It is quite
consistent with this that they should feel respect for superiority of
intellect and knowledge, and defer much to the opinions, on any sub-
ject, of those whom they think well acquainted with it. Such defer-
ence is deeply grounded in human nature; but they will judge for
themselves of the persons who are and are not entitled to it.

3. It appears to me impossible but that the increase of intelligence,
of education, and of the love of independence among the working
classes, must be attended with a corresponding growth of the good
sense which manifests itself in provident habits of conduct; and that
population, therefore, will bear a gradually diminishing ratio to cap-
ital and employment. This most desirable result would be much
accelerated by another change, which lies in the direct line of the
best tendencies of the time; the opening of industrial occupations
freely to both sexes. The same reasons which make it no longer nec-
essary that the poor should depend on the rich, make it equally
unnecessary that women should depend on men; and the least which
justice requires is that law and custom should not enforce depend-
ence (when the correlative protection has become superfluous) by
ordaining that a woman, who does not happen to have a provision by
inheritance, shall have scarcely any means open to her of gaining a
livelihood, except as a wife and mother. Let women who prefer that
occupation adopt it; but that there should be no option, no other car-
rière possible for the great majority of women, except in the humbler
departments of life, is a flagrant social injustice. The ideas and insti-
tutions by which the accident of sex is made the groundwork of an
inequality of legal rights, and a forced dissimilarity of social func-
tions, must ere long be recognized as the greatest hindrance to moral,
social, and even intellectual improvement. On the present occasion,
I shall only indicate, among the probable consequences of the indus-
trial and social independence of women, a great diminution of the
evil of over-population. It is by devoting one-half of the human
species to that exclusive function, by making it fill the entire life of
one sex and interweave itself with almost all the objects of the other,
that the animal instinct in question is nursed into the disproportion-
ate preponderance which it has hitherto exercised in human life.

4. . . . In the present stage of human progress, when ideas of
equality are daily spreading more widely among the poorer classes,
and can no longer be checked by anything short of the entire sup-
pression of printed discussion and even of freedom of speech, it is
not to be expected that the division of the human race into two
hereditary classes, employers and employed, can be permanently

Book IV, Chapter VII196

maintained. The relation is nearly as unsatisfactory to the payer of
wages as to the receiver. If the rich regard the poor as, by a kind of
natural law, their servants and dependents, the rich, in their turn, are
regarded as a mere prey and pasture for the poor; the subject of
demands and expectations wholly indefinite, increasing in extent
with every concession made to them. The total absence of regard for
justice or fairness in the relations between the two, is as marked on
the side of the employed as on that of the employers. We look in vain
among the working classes in general for the just pride which will
choose to give good work for good wages; for the most part, their sole
endeavour is to receive as much, and return as little in the shape of
service, as possible. It will sooner or later become insupportable to
the employing classes, to live in close and hourly contact with per-
sons whose interests and feelings are in hostility to them. Capitalists
are almost as much interested as labourers in placing the operations
of industry on such a footing, that those who labour for them may
feel the same interest in the work, which is felt by those who labour
on their own account.

The opinion expressed in a former part of this treatise, respecting
small landed properties and peasant proprietors, may have made the
reader anticipate that a wide diffusion of property in land is the
resource on which I rely for exempting at least the agricultural
labourers from exclusive dependence on labour for hire. Such, how-
ever, is not my opinion. . . .

[A] people who have once adopted the large system of production,
either in manufactures or in agriculture, are not likely to recede from
it; and when population is kept in due proportion to the means of
support, it is not desirable that they should. Labour is unquestionably
more productive on the system of large industrial enterprises; the pro-
duce, if not greater absolutely, is greater in proportion to the labour
employed: the same number of persons can be supported equally
well with less toil and greater leisure; which will be wholly an advan-
tage, as soon as civilization and improvement have so far advanced
that what is a benefit to the whole shall be a benefit to each individ-
ual composing it. And in the moral aspect of the question, which is
still more important than the economical, something better should
be aimed at as the goal of industrial improvement, than to disperse
mankind over the earth in single families, each ruled internally, as
families now are, by a patriarchal despot, and having scarcely any
community of interest, or necessary mental communion, with other
human beings. The domination of the head of the family over the
other members, in this state of things, is absolute; while the effect on

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 197

his own mind tends towards concentration of all interests in the fam-
ily, considered as an expansion of self, and absorption of all passions
in that of exclusive possession, of all cares in those of preservation
and acquisition. As a step out of the merely animal state into the
human, out of reckless abandonment to brute instincts into pruden-
tial foresight and self-government, this moral condition may be seen
without displeasure. But if public spirit, generous sentiments, or true
justice and equality are desired, association, not isolation, of interests,
is the school in which these excellences are nurtured. The aim of
improvement should be not solely to place human beings in a con-
dition in which they will be able to do without one another, but to
enable them to work with or for one another in relations not involv-
ing dependence. Hitherto there has been no alternative for those
who lived by their labour, but that of labouring either each for him-
self alone, or for a master. But the civilizing and improving influ-
ences of association, and the efficiency and economy of production
on a large scale, may be obtained without dividing the producers into
two parties with hostile interests and feelings, the many who do the
work being mere servants under the command of the one who sup-
plies the funds, and having no interest of their own in the enterprise
except to earn their wages with as little labour as possible. The spec-
ulations and discussions of the last fifty years, and the events of the
last thirty, are abundantly conclusive on this point. . . . [T]he relation
of masters and work-people will be gradually superseded by partner-
ship, in one of two forms: in some cases, association of the labourers
with the capitalist; in others, and perhaps finally in all, association of
labourers among themselves.

5. The first of these forms of association has long been practiced,
not indeed as a rule, but as an exception. In several departments of
industry, there are already cases in which everyone who contributes
to the work, either by labour or by pecuniary resources, has a part-
ner’s interest in it, proportional to the value of his contribution. It is
already a common practice to remunerate those in whom peculiar
trust is reposed, by means of a percentage on the profits; and cases
exist in which the principle is, with excellent success, carried down
to the class of mere manual labourers. . . .

Mr. Babbage,2 who also gives an account of this system, observes
that the payment to the crews of whaling ships is governed by a sim-

Book IV, Chapter VII198

2 [Mill cites Babbage’s Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, 3rd ed., chapter 26.]

ilar principle; and that “the profits arising from fishing with nets on
the south coast of England are thus divided: one-half the produce
belongs to the owner of the boat and net; the other half is divided in
equal portions between the persons using it, who are also bound to
assist in repairing the net when required.” Mr. Babbage has the great
merit of having pointed out the practicability, and the advantage, of
extending the principle to manufacturing industry generally. . . .

6. The form of association, however, which if mankind continues
to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that
which can exist between a capitalist as chief and work-people with-
out a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers
themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with
which they carry on their operations, and working under managers
elected and removable by themselves. So long as this idea remained
in a state of theory, in the writings of Owen or of Louis Blanc, it may
have appeared, to the common modes of judgment, incapable of
being realized, and not likely to be tried, unless by seizing on the
existing capital and confiscating it for the benefit of the labourers;
which is even now imagined by many persons, and pretended by
more, both in England and on the Continent, to be the meaning and
purpose of Socialism. But there is a capacity of exertion and self-
denial in the masses of mankind, which is never known but on the
rare occasions on which it is appealed to in the name of some great
idea or elevated sentiment. Such an appeal was made by the French
Revolution of 1848. For the first time, it then seemed to the intelli-
gent and generous of the working classes of a great nation, that they
had obtained a government who sincerely desired the freedom and
dignity of the many, and who did not look upon it as their natural and
legitimate state to be instruments of production, worked for the ben-
efit of the possessors of capital. Under this encouragement, the ideas
sown by Socialist writers of an emancipation of labour to be effected
by means of association, throve and fructified; and many working
people came to the resolution, not only that they would work for one
another, instead of working for a master tradesman or manufacturer,
but that they would also free themselves, at whatever cost of labour
or privation, from the necessity of paying, out of the produce of their
industry, a heavy tribute for the use of capital; that they would extin-
guish this tax, not by robbing the capitalists of what they or their
predecessors had acquired by labour and preserved by economy, but
by honestly acquiring capital for themselves. If only a few operatives
had attempted this arduous task, or if, while many attempted it, a few
only had succeeded, their success might have been deemed to fur-

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 199

nish no argument for their system as a permanent mode of industri-
al organization. But, excluding all the instances of failure, there exist,
or existed a short time ago, upwards of a hundred successful, and
many eminently prosperous, associations of operatives in Paris alone,
besides a considerable number in the departments. . . .

The capital of most of the associations was originally confined to
the few tools belonging to the founders, and the small sums which
could be collected from their savings, or which were lent to them by
other workpeople as poor as themselves. In some cases, however,
loans of capital were made to them by the republican government;
but the associations which obtained these advances, or at least which
obtained them before they had already achieved success, are, it
appears, in general by no means the most prosperous. The most strik-
ing instances of prosperity are in the case of those who have had noth-
ing to rely on but their own slender means and the small loans of fel-
low workmen, and who lived on bread and water while they devoted
the whole surplus of their gains to the formation of a capital. . . .

The same admirable qualities by which the associations were car-
ried through their early struggles, maintained them in their increas-
ing prosperity. Their rules of discipline, instead of being more lax, are
stricter than those of ordinary workshops; but being rules self-
imposed, for the manifest good of the community, and not for the
convenience of an employer regarded as having an opposite interest,
they are far more scrupulously obeyed, and the voluntary obedience
carries with it a sense of personal worth and dignity. With wonderful
rapidity, the associated workpeople have learnt to correct those of the
ideas they set out with which are in opposition to the teaching of rea-
son and experience. Almost all the associations, at first, excluded
piece-work, and gave equal wages whether the work done was more
or less. Almost all have abandoned this system, and after allowing to
everyone a fixed minimum, sufficient for subsistence, they apportion
all further remuneration according to the work done: most of them
even dividing the profits at the end of the year, in the same propor-
tion as the earnings.

It is the declared principle of most of these associations that they
do not exist for the mere private benefit of the individual members,
but for the promotion of the co-operative cause. With every exten-
sion, therefore, of their business, they take in additional members, not
(when they remain faithful to their original plan) to receive wages
from them as hired labourers, but to enter at once into the full bene-
fits of the association, without being required to bring anything in
except their labour: the only condition imposed is that of receiving,

Book IV, Chapter VII200

during a few years, a smaller share in the annual division of profits, as
some equivalent for the sacrifices of the founders. When members
quit the association, which they are always at liberty to do, they carry
none of the capital with them: it remains an indivisible property, of
which the members, for the time being, have the use, but not the
arbitrary disposal; by the stipulations of most of the contracts, even if
the association breaks up, the capital cannot be divided, but must be
devoted entire to some work of beneficence or of public utility. A
fixed, and generally a considerable, proportion of the annual profits is
not shared among the members, but added to the capital of the asso-
ciation, or devoted to the repayment of advances previously made to
it; another portion is set aside to provide for the sick and disabled, and
another to form a fund for extending the practice of association, or
aiding other associations in their need. The managers are paid, like
other members, for the time which is occupied in management, usu-
ally at the rate of the highest paid labour; but the rule is adhered to,
that the exercise of power shall never be an occasion of profit. . . .

The vitality of these associations must indeed be great, to have
enabled about twenty of them to survive not only the anti-socialist
reaction, which for the time discredited all attempts to enable
workpeople to be their own employers—not only the tracasseries of
the police, and the hostile policy of the government since the usurpa-
tion—but in addition to these obstacles, all the difficulties arising
from the trying condition of financial and commercial affairs from
1854 to 1858. Of the prosperity attained by some of them even while
passing through this difficult period, I have given examples which
must be conclusive to all minds as to the brilliant future reserved for
the principle of co-operation. . . .

It is hardly possible to take any but a hopeful view of the
prospects of mankind when, in two leading countries of the world,
the obscure depths of society contain simple working men whose
integrity, good sense, self-command, and honourable confidence in
one another, have enabled them to carry these noble experiments to
the triumphant issue which the facts recorded in the preceding
pages attest.3

From the progressive advance of the co-operative movement, a
great increase may be looked for even in the aggregate productive-
ness of industry. . . .

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 201

3 [Ed.—I have omitted the many specific examples described by Mill.]

[C]o-operation tends . . . to increase the productiveness of labour
. . . by placing the labourers, as a mass, in a relation to their work
which would make it their principle and their interest—at present it
is neither—to do the utmost, instead of the least possible, in
exchange for their remuneration. It is scarcely possible to rate too
highly this material benefit, which yet is as nothing compared with
the moral revolution in society that would accompany it: the healing
of the standing feud between capital and labour; the transformation
of human life, from a conflict of classes struggling for opposite inter-
ests, to a friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all; the
elevation of the dignity of labour; a new sense of security and inde-
pendence in the labouring class; and the conversion of each human
being’s daily occupation into a school of the social sympathies and
the practical intelligence.

Such is the noble idea which the promoters of Co-operation
should have before them. But to attain, in any degree, these objects,
it is indispensable that all, and not some only, of those who do the
work should be identified in interest with the prosperity of the under-
taking. . . .

Under the most favourable supposition, it will be desirable, and
perhaps for a considerable length of time, that individual capitalists,
associating their work-people in the profits, should coexist with even
those co-operative societies which are faithful to the co-operative
principle. Unity of authority makes many things possible, which
could not or would not be undertaken subject to the chance of divid-
ed councils or changes in the management. A private capitalist,
exempt from the control of a body, if he is a person of capacity, is con-
siderably more likely than almost any association to run judicious
risks, and originate costly improvements. Co-operative societies may
be depended on for adopting improvements after they have been test-
ed by success, but individuals are more likely to commence things
previously untried. Even in ordinary business, the competition of
capable persons who, in the event of failure, are to have all the loss,
and in the case of success, the greater part of the gain, will be very
useful in keeping the managers of co-operative societies up to the
due pitch of activity and vigilance.

When, however, co-operative societies shall have sufficiently mul-
tiplied, it is not probable that any but the least valuable work-people
will any longer consent to work all their lives for wages merely; both
private capitalists and associations will gradually find it necessary to
make the entire body of labourers participants in profits. Eventually,
and in perhaps a less remote future than may be supposed, we may,

Book IV, Chapter VII202

through the co-operative principle, see our way to a change in socie-
ty, which would combine the freedom and independence of the indi-
vidual with the moral, intellectual, and economical advantages of
aggregate production; and which, without violence or spoliation, or
even any sudden disturbance of existing habits and expectations,
would realize, at least in the industrial department, the best aspira-
tions of the democratic spirit, by putting an end to the division of
society into the industrious and the idle, and effacing all social dis-
tinctions but those fairly earned by personal services and exertions.
Associations like those which we have described, by the very process
of their success, are a course of education in those moral and active
qualities by which alone success can be either deserved or attained.
As associations multiplied, they would tend more and more to absorb
all work-people, except those who have too little understanding, or
too little virtue, to be capable of learning to act on any other system
than that of narrow selfishness. As this change proceeded, owners of
capital would gradually find it to their advantage, instead of main-
taining the struggle of the old system with work-people of only the
worst description, to lend their capital to the associations; to do this
at a diminishing rate of inte

Philosophy homework help

BCO225 – CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR FINAL Task brief & rubrics

Task: Written summative assignment

Customer Behavior Strategy

This assessment is a written submission exam and will be released in week 12 of the course.

Use examples to illustrate your point. Include links and images

1. Explain how a company can influence the consumer behavior along the customer journey online and offline. Use an example to

explain how a brand interact online and offline and how both worlds are connected. What is the role of CRM in this interactions.

2. What is cognitive dissonance and how brands can define clusters taking into account this consumer behavior? Explain it using

an example and define how a company could use it to define the strategy per cluster.

3. Explain how DIY is a successful phenomenon among consumers? Is it a win-win situation? Use an example of a company that is

using this strategy successfully.

4. Explain how luxury brands manage to connect with the customer. Highlight differences and commonalities vs mass market

brands.

5. Explain how we can influence consumer behavior through an educational campaign. Use an example to explain a successful

educational campaign.

The report should be in word document format and must be uploaded to a Turnitin folder created on the course Moodle platform.

Formalities:

o Word: Word count: 2000 words.

o Cover, Table of Contents, References and Appendix are excluded of the total word count.

o Font: Arial, size 12,5

o Text alignment: Justified

o The in-text References and the Bibliography have to be in Harvard’s citation style.

Submission: Week (13) – Via Moodle (Turnitin). Submission deadline Sunday 8th of May 2022 at 23:59 CEST

Weight: This task is a 60% of your total grade for this subject.

It assesses the following learning outcomes:

Outcome 1: Understanding Customer behavior and Consumer Needs

Outcome 2: Understanding Customer relationship

Outcome 3: Understanding Customer research

Outcome 4: Understanding Customer journey

Rubrics

Exceptional 90-100 Good 80-89 Fair 70-79 Marginal fail 60-69

Knowledge &
Understanding

(20%)

Student demonstrates
excellent understanding of
key concepts and uses
vocabulary in an entirely
appropriate manner.

Student demonstrates
good understanding of the
task and mentions some
relevant concepts and
demonstrates use of the
relevant vocabulary.

Student understands the
task and provides minimum
theory and/or some use of
vocabulary.

Student understands the task
and attempts to answer the
question but does not
mention key concepts or uses
minimum amount of relevant
vocabulary.

Application (30%) Student applies fully
relevant knowledge from
the topics delivered in
class.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Student applies mostly
relevant knowledge from
the topics delivered in
class.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Student applies some
relevant knowledge from
the topics delivered in
class. Misunderstanding
may be evident.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Student applies little relevant
knowledge from the topics
delivered in class.
Misunderstands are evident.
Customer needs, Maslow,
behavior and attitude,
Customer journey, loyalty
program, retention,
customer experience, CRM

Critical Thinking
(30%)

Student critically assesses
in excellent ways, drawing
outstanding conclusions
from relevant authors.

Student critically assesses
in good ways, drawing
conclusions from relevant
authors and references.

Student provides some
insights but stays on the
surface of the topic.
References may not be
relevant.

Student makes little or none
critical thinking insights, does
not quote appropriate
authors, and does not
provide valid sources.

Communication
(20%)

Student communicates
their ideas extremely
clearly and concisely,
respecting word count,
grammar and spellcheck

Student communicates
their ideas clearly and
concisely, respecting word
count, grammar and
spellcheck

Student communicates
their ideas with some
clarity and concision. It
may be slightly over or
under the wordcount limit.
Some misspelling errors
may be evident.

Student communicates their
ideas in a somewhat unclear
and unconcise way. Does not
reach or does exceed
wordcount excessively and
misspelling errors are
evident.

Philosophy homework help

5/4/22, 1:18 AM Reading Assignment Questions: Week 1

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/assignments/7016115?module_item_id=17540426 1/1

Reading Assignment Questions: Week 1

Due Apr 2 by 11:59pm Points 2 Submitting a text entry box or a file upload

Start Assignment

Provide substantive answers to the three (3) questions:

1. In the early sections of McCarthy’s article he discusses what happiness means for Aristotle. Provide
some details from this account about what happiness is and how it was necessarily social.

2. McCarthy’s article emphasizes that for Aristotle “the economic management of the household is not
the acquisition of commodities but the cultivation of human excellence.” What do you think is the
significance of this distinction especially in light of the question above about happiness?

3. From McCarthy’s article describe how the development of the market economy in Ancient Greece
changed its society. More specifically, from this development of a marketized society what happened to
community and how were human nature, human needs, and especially “happiness and the good life”
redefined?

Philosophy homework help

Journal Entry Overview:

Each module will require that you write and submit a thoughtful and reflective journal entry.

These journal entries should be personally reflective, and their primary purpose is for helping you to formulate your own personal responses to the material.

The journal entries are not meant to be necessarily “academic” in nature, and you will be graded on honesty and effort.

Journal Entry Instructions:

Submit a reflective journal entry, in which you:

1. Discuss a topic or issue directly relevant to the subject matter of this module. (For example, this could be a topic related to one of the essay questions about which you did not write, discussing a point that you personally find thought-provoking.)

2. Include your own personal reaction to the topic, and why or how it is personally relevant for you today. (That is, discuss why you personally find the topic to be especially thought-provoking, or how the topic is personally relevant for you, and/or for your own deeper understanding of the philosophy of religion.)

3. Double-space your journal entry, include your name at the top, and be sure to cite all sources quoted or paraphrased from (even if it’s only our textbooks).

This journal entry is DUE by the end of Module 5. Submit it to the Module 5 Journal Assignment dropbox no later than the last day of this module.


Notes:

· See the Grading Rubric attached to this assignment for grading information.

· To see a helpful example of a model journal entry, look in the Start Here module.

· Each journal entry must be written and submitted to its Assignment Dropbox before the end of its module.

Philosophy homework help

They have increased the comforts of the middle classes. But they
have not yet begun to effect those great changes in human destiny,
which it is in their nature and in their futurity to accomplish. Only
when, in addition to just institutions, the increase of mankind shall
be under the deliberate guidance of judicious foresight, can the con-
quests made from the powers of nature by the intellect and energy of
scientific discoverers become the common property of the species,
and the means of improving and elevating the universal lot.

Book IV, Chapter VII
On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes

1. . . . When I speak, either in this place or elsewhere, of “the labour-
ing classes,” or of labourers as a “class,” I use those phrases in com-
pliance with custom, and as descriptive of an existing, but by no
means a necessary or permanent, state of social relations. I do not
recognize as either just or salutary, a state of society in which there is
any “class” which is not labouring; any human beings exempt from
bearing their share of the necessary labours of human life, except
those unable to labour, or who have fairly earned rest by previous toil.
So long, however, as the great social evil exists of a non-labouring
class, labourers also constitute a class, and may be spoken of, though
only provisionally, in that character.

Considered in its moral and social aspect, the state of the labour-
ing people has latterly been a subject of much more speculation and
discussion than formerly; and the opinion that it is not now what it
ought to be has become very general. The suggestions which have
been promulgated, and the controversies which have been excited,
on detached points rather than on the foundations of the subject,
have put in evidence the existence of two conflicting theories,
respecting the social position desirable for manual labourers. The
one may be called the theory of dependence and protection, the
other that of self-dependence.

According to the former theory, the lot of the poor, in all things
which affect them collectively, should be regulated for them, not by
them. They should not be required or encouraged to think for them-
selves, or give to their own reflection or forecast an influential voice
in the determination of their destiny. It is supposed to be the duty of
the higher classes to think for them, and to take the responsibility of
their lot, as the commander and officers of an army take that of the

Book IV, Chapter VII192

soldiers composing it. . . . The relation between rich and poor,
according to this theory (a theory also applied to the relation between
men and women), should be only partly authoritative; it should be
amiable, moral, and sentimental: affectionate tutelage on the one
side, respectful and grateful deference on the other. The rich should
be in loco parentis to the poor, guiding and restraining them like chil-
dren. Of spontaneous action on their part, there should be no need.
They should be called on for nothing but to do their day’s work, and
to be moral and religious. Their morality and religion should be pro-
vided for them by their superiors, who should see them properly
taught it, and should do all that is necessary to ensure their being, in
return for labour and attachment, properly fed, clothed, housed, spir-
itually edified, and innocently amused.

This is the ideal of the future, in the minds of those whose dissat-
isfaction with the Present assumes the form of affection and regret
towards the Past. Like other ideals, it exercises an unconscious influ-
ence on the opinions and sentiments of numbers who never con-
sciously guide themselves by any ideal. It has also this in common
with other ideals, that it has never been historically realized. It makes
its appeal to our imaginative sympathies in the character of a restora-
tion of the good times of our forefathers. But no times can be point-
ed out in which the higher classes of this or any other country per-
formed a part even distantly resembling the one assigned to them in
this theory. It is an idealization, grounded on the conduct and char-
acter of here and there an individual. All privileged and powerful
classes, as such, have used their power in the interest of their own self-
ishness, and have indulged their self-importance in despising, and
not in lovingly caring for, those who were, in their estimation, degrad-
ed by being under the necessity of working for their benefit. I do not
affirm that what has always been must always be, or that human
improvement has no tendency to correct the intensely selfish fillings
engendered by power; but though the evil may be lessened, it cannot
be eradicated until the power itself is withdrawn. This, at least, seems
to me undeniable, that long before the superior classes could be suf-
ficiently improved to govern in the tutelary manner supposed, the
inferior classes would be too much improved to be so governed.

I am quite sensible of all that is seductive in the picture of socie-
ty which this theory presents. . . . As the idea is essentially repulsive
of a society only held together by the relations and feelings arising
out of pecuniary interests, so there is something naturally attractive
in a form of society abounding in strong personal attachments and
disinterested self-devotion. Of such feelings, it must be admitted that

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 193

the relation of protector and protected has hitherto been the richest
source. The strongest attachments of human beings in general are
towards the things or the persons that stand between them and some
dreaded evil. Hence, in an age of lawless violence and insecurity,
and general hardness and roughness of manners, in which life is
beset with dangers and sufferings at every step . . . a generous giving
of protection, and a grateful receiving of it, are the strongest ties
which connect human beings; the feelings arising from that relation
are their warmest feelings; all the enthusiasm and tenderness of the
most sensitive natures gather round it; loyalty on the one part and
chivalry on the other are principles exalted into passions. I do not
desire to depreciate these qualities. The error lies in not perceiving
that these virtues and sentiments . . . can no longer have this beauti-
ful and endearing character where there are no longer any serious
dangers from which to protect. What is there in the present state of
society to make it natural that human beings, of ordinary strength
and courage, should glow with the warmest gratitude and devotion
in return for protection? The laws protect them, wherever the laws
do not criminally fail in their duty. To be under the power of some-
one, instead of being, as formerly, the sole condition of safety, is now,
speaking generally, the only situation which exposes to grievous
wrong. The so-called protectors are now the only persons against
whom, in any ordinary circumstances, protection is needed. The
brutality and tyranny with which every police report is filled are
those of husbands to wives, of parents to children. That the law does
not prevent these atrocities, that it is only now making a first timid
attempt to repress and punish them, is no matter of necessity, but the
deep disgrace of those by whom the laws are made and administered.
No man or woman who either possesses or is able to earn an inde-
pendent livelihood, requires any other protection than that which
the law could and ought to give. This being the case, it argues great
ignorance of human nature to continue taking for granted that rela-
tions founded on protection must always subsist, and not to see that
the assumption of the part of protector, and of the power which
belongs to it, without any of the necessities which justify it, must
engender feelings opposite to loyalty.

Of the working men, at least in the more advanced countries of
Europe, it may be pronounced certain that the patriarchal or pater-
nal system of government is one to which they will not again be sub-
ject. That question was decided when they were taught to read, and
allowed access to newspapers and political tracts; when dissenting
preachers were suffered to go among them, and appeal to their facul-

Book IV, Chapter VII194

ties and feelings in opposition to the creeds professed and counte-
nanced by their superiors; when they were brought together in num-
bers, to work socially under the same roof; when railways enabled
them to shift from place to place, and change their patrons and
employers as easily as their coats; when they were encouraged to seek
a share in the government, by means of the electoral franchise. The
working classes have taken their interests into their own hands, and
are perpetually showing that they think the interests of their employ-
ers not identical with their own, but opposite to them. . . .

2. . . . The poor have come out of leading-strings, and cannot any
longer be governed or treated like children. To their own qualities
must now be commended the care of their destiny. Modern nations
will have to learn the lesson that the well-being of a people must exist
by means of the justice and self-government . . . of the individual cit-
izens. . . . Whatever advice, exhortation, or guidance is held out to the
labouring classes, must henceforth be tendered to them as equals, and
accepted by them with their eyes open. The prospect of the future
depends on the degree in which they can be made rational beings.

There is no reason to believe that prospect other than hopeful.
The progress indeed has hitherto been, and still is, slow. But there is
a spontaneous education going on in the minds of the multitude. . . .
The instruction obtained from newspapers and political tracts may
not be the most solid kind of instruction, but it is an immense
improvement upon none at all. . . . [T]here is reason to hope that
great improvements . . . in . . . school education will be effected by
the exertions either of government or of individuals, and that the
progress of the mass of the people in mental cultivation, and in the
virtues which are dependent on it, will take place more rapidly. . . .

From this increase of intelligence, several effects may be confi-
dently anticipated. First: that they will become even less willing than
at present to be led and governed, and directed into the way they
should go, by the mere authority and prestige of superiors. If they
have not now, still less will they have hereafter, any deferential awe
or religious principle of obedience, holding them in mental subjec-
tion to a class above them. The theory of dependence and protection
will be more and more intolerable to them, and they will require that
their conduct and condition shall be essentially self-governed. It is, at
the same time, quite possible that they may demand, in many cases,
the intervention of the legislature in their affairs, and the regulation
by law of various things which concern them, often under very mis-
taken ideas of their interest. Still, it is their own will, their own ideas
and suggestions, to which they will demand that effect should be

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 195

given, and not rules laid down for them by other people. It is quite
consistent with this that they should feel respect for superiority of
intellect and knowledge, and defer much to the opinions, on any sub-
ject, of those whom they think well acquainted with it. Such defer-
ence is deeply grounded in human nature; but they will judge for
themselves of the persons who are and are not entitled to it.

3. It appears to me impossible but that the increase of intelligence,
of education, and of the love of independence among the working
classes, must be attended with a corresponding growth of the good
sense which manifests itself in provident habits of conduct; and that
population, therefore, will bear a gradually diminishing ratio to cap-
ital and employment. This most desirable result would be much
accelerated by another change, which lies in the direct line of the
best tendencies of the time; the opening of industrial occupations
freely to both sexes. The same reasons which make it no longer nec-
essary that the poor should depend on the rich, make it equally
unnecessary that women should depend on men; and the least which
justice requires is that law and custom should not enforce depend-
ence (when the correlative protection has become superfluous) by
ordaining that a woman, who does not happen to have a provision by
inheritance, shall have scarcely any means open to her of gaining a
livelihood, except as a wife and mother. Let women who prefer that
occupation adopt it; but that there should be no option, no other car-
rière possible for the great majority of women, except in the humbler
departments of life, is a flagrant social injustice. The ideas and insti-
tutions by which the accident of sex is made the groundwork of an
inequality of legal rights, and a forced dissimilarity of social func-
tions, must ere long be recognized as the greatest hindrance to moral,
social, and even intellectual improvement. On the present occasion,
I shall only indicate, among the probable consequences of the indus-
trial and social independence of women, a great diminution of the
evil of over-population. It is by devoting one-half of the human
species to that exclusive function, by making it fill the entire life of
one sex and interweave itself with almost all the objects of the other,
that the animal instinct in question is nursed into the disproportion-
ate preponderance which it has hitherto exercised in human life.

4. . . . In the present stage of human progress, when ideas of
equality are daily spreading more widely among the poorer classes,
and can no longer be checked by anything short of the entire sup-
pression of printed discussion and even of freedom of speech, it is
not to be expected that the division of the human race into two
hereditary classes, employers and employed, can be permanently

Book IV, Chapter VII196

maintained. The relation is nearly as unsatisfactory to the payer of
wages as to the receiver. If the rich regard the poor as, by a kind of
natural law, their servants and dependents, the rich, in their turn, are
regarded as a mere prey and pasture for the poor; the subject of
demands and expectations wholly indefinite, increasing in extent
with every concession made to them. The total absence of regard for
justice or fairness in the relations between the two, is as marked on
the side of the employed as on that of the employers. We look in vain
among the working classes in general for the just pride which will
choose to give good work for good wages; for the most part, their sole
endeavour is to receive as much, and return as little in the shape of
service, as possible. It will sooner or later become insupportable to
the employing classes, to live in close and hourly contact with per-
sons whose interests and feelings are in hostility to them. Capitalists
are almost as much interested as labourers in placing the operations
of industry on such a footing, that those who labour for them may
feel the same interest in the work, which is felt by those who labour
on their own account.

The opinion expressed in a former part of this treatise, respecting
small landed properties and peasant proprietors, may have made the
reader anticipate that a wide diffusion of property in land is the
resource on which I rely for exempting at least the agricultural
labourers from exclusive dependence on labour for hire. Such, how-
ever, is not my opinion. . . .

[A] people who have once adopted the large system of production,
either in manufactures or in agriculture, are not likely to recede from
it; and when population is kept in due proportion to the means of
support, it is not desirable that they should. Labour is unquestionably
more productive on the system of large industrial enterprises; the pro-
duce, if not greater absolutely, is greater in proportion to the labour
employed: the same number of persons can be supported equally
well with less toil and greater leisure; which will be wholly an advan-
tage, as soon as civilization and improvement have so far advanced
that what is a benefit to the whole shall be a benefit to each individ-
ual composing it. And in the moral aspect of the question, which is
still more important than the economical, something better should
be aimed at as the goal of industrial improvement, than to disperse
mankind over the earth in single families, each ruled internally, as
families now are, by a patriarchal despot, and having scarcely any
community of interest, or necessary mental communion, with other
human beings. The domination of the head of the family over the
other members, in this state of things, is absolute; while the effect on

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 197

his own mind tends towards concentration of all interests in the fam-
ily, considered as an expansion of self, and absorption of all passions
in that of exclusive possession, of all cares in those of preservation
and acquisition. As a step out of the merely animal state into the
human, out of reckless abandonment to brute instincts into pruden-
tial foresight and self-government, this moral condition may be seen
without displeasure. But if public spirit, generous sentiments, or true
justice and equality are desired, association, not isolation, of interests,
is the school in which these excellences are nurtured. The aim of
improvement should be not solely to place human beings in a con-
dition in which they will be able to do without one another, but to
enable them to work with or for one another in relations not involv-
ing dependence. Hitherto there has been no alternative for those
who lived by their labour, but that of labouring either each for him-
self alone, or for a master. But the civilizing and improving influ-
ences of association, and the efficiency and economy of production
on a large scale, may be obtained without dividing the producers into
two parties with hostile interests and feelings, the many who do the
work being mere servants under the command of the one who sup-
plies the funds, and having no interest of their own in the enterprise
except to earn their wages with as little labour as possible. The spec-
ulations and discussions of the last fifty years, and the events of the
last thirty, are abundantly conclusive on this point. . . . [T]he relation
of masters and work-people will be gradually superseded by partner-
ship, in one of two forms: in some cases, association of the labourers
with the capitalist; in others, and perhaps finally in all, association of
labourers among themselves.

5. The first of these forms of association has long been practiced,
not indeed as a rule, but as an exception. In several departments of
industry, there are already cases in which everyone who contributes
to the work, either by labour or by pecuniary resources, has a part-
ner’s interest in it, proportional to the value of his contribution. It is
already a common practice to remunerate those in whom peculiar
trust is reposed, by means of a percentage on the profits; and cases
exist in which the principle is, with excellent success, carried down
to the class of mere manual labourers. . . .

Mr. Babbage,2 who also gives an account of this system, observes
that the payment to the crews of whaling ships is governed by a sim-

Book IV, Chapter VII198

2 [Mill cites Babbage’s Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, 3rd ed., chapter 26.]

ilar principle; and that “the profits arising from fishing with nets on
the south coast of England are thus divided: one-half the produce
belongs to the owner of the boat and net; the other half is divided in
equal portions between the persons using it, who are also bound to
assist in repairing the net when required.” Mr. Babbage has the great
merit of having pointed out the practicability, and the advantage, of
extending the principle to manufacturing industry generally. . . .

6. The form of association, however, which if mankind continues
to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that
which can exist between a capitalist as chief and work-people with-
out a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers
themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with
which they carry on their operations, and working under managers
elected and removable by themselves. So long as this idea remained
in a state of theory, in the writings of Owen or of Louis Blanc, it may
have appeared, to the common modes of judgment, incapable of
being realized, and not likely to be tried, unless by seizing on the
existing capital and confiscating it for the benefit of the labourers;
which is even now imagined by many persons, and pretended by
more, both in England and on the Continent, to be the meaning and
purpose of Socialism. But there is a capacity of exertion and self-
denial in the masses of mankind, which is never known but on the
rare occasions on which it is appealed to in the name of some great
idea or elevated sentiment. Such an appeal was made by the French
Revolution of 1848. For the first time, it then seemed to the intelli-
gent and generous of the working classes of a great nation, that they
had obtained a government who sincerely desired the freedom and
dignity of the many, and who did not look upon it as their natural and
legitimate state to be instruments of production, worked for the ben-
efit of the possessors of capital. Under this encouragement, the ideas
sown by Socialist writers of an emancipation of labour to be effected
by means of association, throve and fructified; and many working
people came to the resolution, not only that they would work for one
another, instead of working for a master tradesman or manufacturer,
but that they would also free themselves, at whatever cost of labour
or privation, from the necessity of paying, out of the produce of their
industry, a heavy tribute for the use of capital; that they would extin-
guish this tax, not by robbing the capitalists of what they or their
predecessors had acquired by labour and preserved by economy, but
by honestly acquiring capital for themselves. If only a few operatives
had attempted this arduous task, or if, while many attempted it, a few
only had succeeded, their success might have been deemed to fur-

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 199

nish no argument for their system as a permanent mode of industri-
al organization. But, excluding all the instances of failure, there exist,
or existed a short time ago, upwards of a hundred successful, and
many eminently prosperous, associations of operatives in Paris alone,
besides a considerable number in the departments. . . .

The capital of most of the associations was originally confined to
the few tools belonging to the founders, and the small sums which
could be collected from their savings, or which were lent to them by
other workpeople as poor as themselves. In some cases, however,
loans of capital were made to them by the republican government;
but the associations which obtained these advances, or at least which
obtained them before they had already achieved success, are, it
appears, in general by no means the most prosperous. The most strik-
ing instances of prosperity are in the case of those who have had noth-
ing to rely on but their own slender means and the small loans of fel-
low workmen, and who lived on bread and water while they devoted
the whole surplus of their gains to the formation of a capital. . . .

The same admirable qualities by which the associations were car-
ried through their early struggles, maintained them in their increas-
ing prosperity. Their rules of discipline, instead of being more lax, are
stricter than those of ordinary workshops; but being rules self-
imposed, for the manifest good of the community, and not for the
convenience of an employer regarded as having an opposite interest,
they are far more scrupulously obeyed, and the voluntary obedience
carries with it a sense of personal worth and dignity. With wonderful
rapidity, the associated workpeople have learnt to correct those of the
ideas they set out with which are in opposition to the teaching of rea-
son and experience. Almost all the associations, at first, excluded
piece-work, and gave equal wages whether the work done was more
or less. Almost all have abandoned this system, and after allowing to
everyone a fixed minimum, sufficient for subsistence, they apportion
all further remuneration according to the work done: most of them
even dividing the profits at the end of the year, in the same propor-
tion as the earnings.

It is the declared principle of most of these associations that they
do not exist for the mere private benefit of the individual members,
but for the promotion of the co-operative cause. With every exten-
sion, therefore, of their business, they take in additional members, not
(when they remain faithful to their original plan) to receive wages
from them as hired labourers, but to enter at once into the full bene-
fits of the association, without being required to bring anything in
except their labour: the only condition imposed is that of receiving,

Book IV, Chapter VII200

during a few years, a smaller share in the annual division of profits, as
some equivalent for the sacrifices of the founders. When members
quit the association, which they are always at liberty to do, they carry
none of the capital with them: it remains an indivisible property, of
which the members, for the time being, have the use, but not the
arbitrary disposal; by the stipulations of most of the contracts, even if
the association breaks up, the capital cannot be divided, but must be
devoted entire to some work of beneficence or of public utility. A
fixed, and generally a considerable, proportion of the annual profits is
not shared among the members, but added to the capital of the asso-
ciation, or devoted to the repayment of advances previously made to
it; another portion is set aside to provide for the sick and disabled, and
another to form a fund for extending the practice of association, or
aiding other associations in their need. The managers are paid, like
other members, for the time which is occupied in management, usu-
ally at the rate of the highest paid labour; but the rule is adhered to,
that the exercise of power shall never be an occasion of profit. . . .

The vitality of these associations must indeed be great, to have
enabled about twenty of them to survive not only the anti-socialist
reaction, which for the time discredited all attempts to enable
workpeople to be their own employers—not only the tracasseries of
the police, and the hostile policy of the government since the usurpa-
tion—but in addition to these obstacles, all the difficulties arising
from the trying condition of financial and commercial affairs from
1854 to 1858. Of the prosperity attained by some of them even while
passing through this difficult period, I have given examples which
must be conclusive to all minds as to the brilliant future reserved for
the principle of co-operation. . . .

It is hardly possible to take any but a hopeful view of the
prospects of mankind when, in two leading countries of the world,
the obscure depths of society contain simple working men whose
integrity, good sense, self-command, and honourable confidence in
one another, have enabled them to carry these noble experiments to
the triumphant issue which the facts recorded in the preceding
pages attest.3

From the progressive advance of the co-operative movement, a
great increase may be looked for even in the aggregate productive-
ness of industry. . . .

On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes 201

3 [Ed.—I have omitted the many specific examples described by Mill.]

[C]o-operation tends . . . to increase the productiveness of labour
. . . by placing the labourers, as a mass, in a relation to their work
which would make it their principle and their interest—at present it
is neither—to do the utmost, instead of the least possible, in
exchange for their remuneration. It is scarcely possible to rate too
highly this material benefit, which yet is as nothing compared with
the moral revolution in society that would accompany it: the healing
of the standing feud between capital and labour; the transformation
of human life, from a conflict of classes struggling for opposite inter-
ests, to a friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all; the
elevation of the dignity of labour; a new sense of security and inde-
pendence in the labouring class; and the conversion of each human
being’s daily occupation into a school of the social sympathies and
the practical intelligence.

Such is the noble idea which the promoters of Co-operation
should have before them. But to attain, in any degree, these objects,
it is indispensable that all, and not some only, of those who do the
work should be identified in interest with the prosperity of the under-
taking. . . .

Under the most favourable supposition, it will be desirable, and
perhaps for a considerable length of time, that individual capitalists,
associating their work-people in the profits, should coexist with even
those co-operative societies which are faithful to the co-operative
principle. Unity of authority makes many things possible, which
could not or would not be undertaken subject to the chance of divid-
ed councils or changes in the management. A private capitalist,
exempt from the control of a body, if he is a person of capacity, is con-
siderably more likely than almost any association to run judicious
risks, and originate costly improvements. Co-operative societies may
be depended on for adopting improvements after they have been test-
ed by success, but individuals are more likely to commence things
previously untried. Even in ordinary business, the competition of
capable persons who, in the event of failure, are to have all the loss,
and in the case of success, the greater part of the gain, will be very
useful in keeping the managers of co-operative societies up to the
due pitch of activity and vigilance.

When, however, co-operative societies shall have sufficiently mul-
tiplied, it is not probable that any but the least valuable work-people
will any longer consent to work all their lives for wages merely; both
private capitalists and associations will gradually find it necessary to
make the entire body of labourers participants in profits. Eventually,
and in perhaps a less remote future than may be supposed, we may,

Book IV, Chapter VII202

through the co-operative principle, see our way to a change in socie-
ty, which would combine the freedom and independence of the indi-
vidual with the moral, intellectual, and economical advantages of
aggregate production; and which, without violence or spoliation, or
even any sudden disturbance of existing habits and expectations,
would realize, at least in the industrial department, the best aspira-
tions of the democratic spirit, by putting an end to the division of
society into the industrious and the idle, and effacing all social dis-
tinctions but those fairly earned by personal services and exertions.
Associations like those which we have described, by the very process
of their success, are a course of education in those moral and active
qualities by which alone success can be either deserved or attained.
As associations multiplied, they would tend more and more to absorb
all work-people, except those who have too little understanding, or
too little virtue, to be capable of learning to act on any other system
than that of narrow selfishness. As this change proceeded, owners of
capital would gradually find it to their advantage, instead of main-
taining the struggle of the old system with work-people of only the
worst description, to lend their capital to the associations; to do this
at a diminishing rate of inte

Philosophy homework help


Some Historical Origins of the Philosophical discourse on Ethics

The love (philo) of wisdom (sophy) and its attainment through character-building habit (ethikos)

I. What makes possible the development and organization of a complex society?

a. The production of a social surplus—shared surplus goods and surplus time for higher order activities together.

i. What qualities are required to generate and share a social surplus?

ii. A socially creative nature whose productive activity is oriented toward the end of meeting new needs (creativity and community).

b. In the pre-capitalist period the economy was understood as inherently moral:

i. Production was collectively done by and for the community:

1. Social surplus was developed not only for times of need but for perfecting the community as an end in itself—i.e., to maintain social solidarity and give it higher cultural expressions.

2. Temple institutions were founded originally as storage facilities for accumulating, regulating, and distributing society’s surplus – hence they were already institutions of social justice.

“The Temple serves as an expression of the objective memory and ethical standard for the direction of the economy. Exchange is not to be based on market prices, profits, economic advantage, supply and demand, subjective desires, or marginal utility. Rather, economics is simply a means to maintain the all-important social solidarity that integrates the community for its common efforts and pursuit of happiness. Grace, gift-giving, and hospitality, rather than chrematistics [money making] and money accumulation, are the foundation for economic exchange among citizens in the market.”

McCarthy, “Aristotle on the constitution of Social Justice,” p. 37

ii. With the division of labor these centralized institutions eventually lost sight of their original function and consolidated into the hands of unproductive priests and kings, serving their private ends of luxury consumption and warfare.

1. The social body of primary producers generating the surplus (peasant village communities made up 80% of population) were forced to pay tribute.

2. The irrational expenditure of the social surplus on luxury consumption and warfare however led to unstable and contradictory forms of society.

3. However, as village communities of primary producers developed their productive powers and social solidarity, they recognized their own value and power as creative agents and began to resist the palatial-temple complexes.

4. In Greece peasant village communities and warrior aristocracies eventually joined to topple monarchies.

5. The big shift came from the fall of Bronze Age Mycenaean Greece with its society organized around palatial states and monarchical rule

6. This led to greater freedom in organizing the new Greek city-states (polis) without a monarchy.

a. Society was made up of two contending classes: the village community of primary producers and the warrior aristocracy.

b. Solon (c. 638 BC), one of the first democratic founders, helped push Athens toward higher social formations beyond the war of landlord against peasant and toward the growth and cultivation of free labor beyond debt bondage:

c. As Plutarch later commented about Solon, he reformed society by investing the “crafts with honour” as he “turned the attention of the citizens to arts and crafts.”

d. The work and the life of the primary producers was then becoming dignified to the point that their role as laborers did not exclude them from the role of governing.

II. Wisdom of the Good: This improvement in the life, status, skills and productive technologies of laborers meant that there was a growing recognition, from below, of the objective standards of excellence for creating a more just society.

a. The first appearance of the word
Sophos
is associated with this technical skill and productive excellence. The word Sophos in Greek originally meant wisdom in terms of practical use.

i. Homer refers this wisdom to craft know-how, the Sophos of wood-working or the Sophos of the harp or lyre, etc.

1. This wisdom of objective standards was now recognized as universally available to all who learned the knowledge and practiced the skills necessary.

ii. Sophia as wisdom therefore first emerges, not from increased trade, but rather from innovations in production and its advancement of productive knowledge of those objective standards of excellence for perfectly crafting something:

1. The ethical term of the “good” (agathos) first came to refer, then, to the excellent fulfillment of a social role or practical function

2. After the Homeric period, wisdom of what is good in the city-state eventually expanded into wisdom about how to craft well a holistic life, how to become a well-rounded citizen of the polis.

a. This meant that the expanded sense of wisdom and the Good within the philosophical discourse on ethics came from reflection on how to rationally distribute the social surplus toward more excellently realizing human potentials.

b. The recognition of the dignity of laborers along with a greater understanding of the objective and universally available rationality for perfecting labor and productive technology as socially useful activities for the common good, led to two broad shifts:

i. Demythologization of nature:

1. The more effective the technical skill and technology, and the more knowledge is gained from their rational planning, the more natural causes are known and transparently understood in a rational rather than a magical or mystical way

a. “Rational” for the Greeks meant something other than our modern sense of instrumental rationality and its subject/object dualism for dominating nature. Rather it meant how to cultivate the inherent potentials in something for their highest form—how to fulfill something’s purpose.

2. this enabled the primary producers, equipped with this rational knowledge, to see themselves as active agents with rational causal powers rather than subordinates to magic rituals, mythical deities, or blind fate.

3. This led to greater reflection, from the common people below, on what it meant to be a free person in terms of collective and individual self-determination: hence the robust Greek concept of freedom based on the newfound experience of peasant liberation.

ii. Democratizing of culture:

1. This demythologizing consciousness gave rise to a recognition that the rational development of a democratic society objectively required cultivating the rational excellence of all citizens, not just the aristocratic elite at the top.

a. Just as the objective standards of excellence within a craft skill were universally available to all, it was now recognized that so too were the objective standards of excellence for crafting the good life together.

b. Culture as the means by which to cultivate human excellence then was no longer the exclusive domain of the wealthy, but became guided by a universal end of egalitarianism and its higher wisdom of social organization:

i. “technical and economic developments [led to] … the restructuring of social life in its entirety to make it accord with communal and egalitarian aspirations.” (Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought p. 74)

2. Ethics in Greece began as a discourse reflecting on those objective standards of excellence and their necessary conditions—e.g. rational distribution of surplus for free education/culture—for creating a society of mutual self-realization:

a. It was realized that a democracy required the cultivation of language and reasoning skills in order for everyone to equally deliberate together in a non-manipulative way (rule by rational appeal to a common good rather than by the sheer force of the strongest, might-makes-right)

i. Ethics began as the realization that there are objective standards of excellence for becoming a free-person—for cultivating agency.

b. The word ethics itself—ethikos—refers to practices or habits for educating and cultivating a desire for universal truth and justice—the common good that unites all.

i. It was the educational practice of building up rational powers and social virtues of solidarity around a common good in which all equally share, in order to keep arbitrary private interests and authoritarian power from ruling over all.

III. Sophistry: With the rise of a new emerging middle class of merchants and new money, there arose an ethos of individualistic commercialism which pushed market relations as an end in itself (rather than the market as a means to serving society as a whole)

a. In Athens especially, this led to increasingly antagonistic forms of individualism and inequality which increasingly lost sight of any common good.

b. This divisive context was exploited by the rise of private for-profit schools of rhetoricians called
Sophists
.

i. The Sophists were a movement of private teachers that met society’s collective demand for cultural training by teaching students enough knowledge of various subjects and political skills to give them the appearance of mastery and wisdom.

ii. They denied universal truth and justice and reduced the common good of humanity to a matter of mere conventions relative to the majority rule or market values of any particular place—everything could be bought.

1. Their often-unexamined presuppositions about what it means to be human:

a. Everything is a matter only of appearances, and the facts of appearances differ according to every individual perspective

b. since facts are merely how they happen to appear to this or that individual, their meaning is relative, with no possibility for a true or false judgment of the appearances

c. There is no shared rational standard but only differing conventions of rhetoric for how to assert one’s perspective and individual preferences

d. There is no shared human nature oriented to a common good:

i. Human nature is pre-moral and pre-social: the notions of “humanity” and “human society” indicate nothing other than an aggregate of self-seeking individuals

· This means prior to social relations there is supposedly a pure individual, like a freely floating atom: but has such an individual human ever existed?

ii. With no common nature, reason, or good, each individual can only choose between differing conventions for purely arbitrary reasons that cannot be objectively justified.

iii. This means there is no way to determine whether something is more or less true to realizing our normative form of human nature: no possible critique of oppressive dehumanization.

iv. From this view, then, ethics can only appear as an imposition of arbitrary rules

iii. The object of the Sophists schooling was to teach rhetorical persuasion to individuals, teaching techniques for manipulating whatever the prevailing conventions happen to be in order to win debates and gain political power over the masses.

1. Instead of learning how to reason substantively about the universal interest of the common good, students learned to mask private interests in ethically-sounding rhetoric:

Image result for sophists

· they trained for how to be an effective/impressive speaker rather than a good reasoner.

· Because courses were taught for a hefty sum of money, the appearance of wisdom/excellence and its political power of persuasion was now available only to the wealthiest members of society.

· This meant democracy was sliding into an oligarchy since it was the few individuals at the top who had the most money and time to polish their skills for manipulating the masses.

IV. Philosophy arose, after Socrates, as largely an effort to challenge sophistry and rationally recall the objective standards of excellence by which humanity could universally flourish.

a. With Socrates, Plato, and then Aristotle, they sought to offer free education in every discipline, with emphasis on learning how to reason about a universally shared common good that challenges the arbitrary oligarchies of the marketplace.

i. Against the commercialism and rhetoric, they sought universal wisdom as knowledge of the whole, inquiring about the common good that underlies or unites all human activities.

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Socrates (c. 469 BC): against sophistry he continually argued that just as each craft has objective standards of excellence for fulfilling its specific activity, there must be an ultimate standard of excellence for socially coordinating these activities toward a good society:

“if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn the craft: some indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he should go, teachers abound. And yet, strangely enough, if you want to learn Justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where to go for a teacher.”

Quoted in Xenophon, Memoribilia, (IV, 4.5)

b. Socrates was famous for highlighting the difference between good and bad relativism – the awareness of relativism is only the beginning of the human quest to unite our diverse perspectives into a greater whole of integrated complexity.

i. To claim relativism is to already imply things differ in relation to (all things are relative to) something more: to claim all things are relative to private subjective perspectives is to already contradict this point of view, since one would need a sense of things and other perspectives beyond their own private perspective to make such a claim:

1. Thus, to claim there is absolute relativism without a greater whole is to utter a self-contradiction:

a. if all viewpoints are absolutely different and unrelatable then they all become equally absolute in themselves with no reason to dialogue.

i. If one were totally absorbed in one’s own private perspective, they wouldn’t even know this much.

ii. Moreover, if such relative viewpoints become absolute in themselves that means they no longer differ according to their varying relations to a greater whole since there is no greater whole, but rather absolute nothingness.

iii. but if all positions are equally positioned over nothingness, then none are more true or false than any other

iv. thus, all differing positions would collapse into the opposite of relativism: absolute sameness with no relative differences or diversity.

2. Rather to claim that viewpoints are relative, is to presuppose that they are relative to something more, which means it implies that all viewpoints are a part of a greater whole:

a. thus, the recognition of relativism—if it is not to be self-contradictory—is at the same time a consciousness that there is more to reality beyond our limited viewpoints: we understand ourselves as relational participants in a larger process which can only be known through cooperative dialogue.

ii. Historically, such unreflective contradictory relativism has typically been the viewpoint of middle- and upper-class privilege: living in a bubble of private wealth and consumerism habituates people to think that there is no greater whole, no social dependencies, no cooperative qualities, no common good, but rather reality is like a meaningless marketplace in which we are all just private consumers out to get our own.

c. The schools of Plato and Aristotle, following Socrates, continued ethics as a matter of freely educating about the objective nature of those universal principles of justice, goodness and truth guiding the political organization of an increasingly diversified society toward a greater whole.

i. They were some of the first to point out the contradictions to democracy when it rejects reasoning about the common good and instead pursues only individualistic commercialism and its schools of sophistry:

1. A key feature of Aristotle’s thought is in recalling that the economy is naturally a social activity oriented to the ethical aims human self-realization, serving the objective ends of creating a society of mutual flourishing.

a. He was one of the first to critically recognize that once this relationship is reversed and society is bent to serve the market and private profit, democratic society inevitably regresses into an oligarchy.

b. On Aristotle’s terms the sophist’s notion of the human is an abstraction not true to reality. He begins instead with the notion of human nature as inherently social and uniquely purposeful

i. he then elaborates what it is that makes us distinctively human animals (do we have distinctive needs and capacities beyond base biology?) and enquires about the objective conditions necessary by which to realize our highest form.

2. Discourse on ethics then began, not as a private affair simply about individual character or merely about rule following and obeying the law, but as a public dialogue about the common good and social justice required for realizing humanity’s distinctive qualities in a society of mutual flourishing.

Philosophy homework help

QUESTIONS FOR CASE 1:

1. What are the key ethical issues involved in the case about TAXES, TAX EXPERTS AND TAX LAWS? Explain what the article is about.

2. Is the practice of employing tax experts from big accounting firms at the U.S. Treasury Department for short periods, after which they often go back to the firms where they worked, ethical? Why or why not?

3. The tax breaks that big corporations get through the work of tax experts who go on the merry-go-round described in the article—are they ethically justifiable? Why or why not? Refer to two examples from the article.

4. Do you think middle class and working class taxpayers are paying higher taxes due to the practices described in the article that provide enormous tax breaks to rich U.S. corporations? Why or why not?

QUESTIONS FOR CASE 2:

1. What is the main idea that Peter Singer is discussing in this essay?

2. What does he mean by “relative poverty,” “absolute poverty” and “absolute affluence”?

3. What is Singer’s “argument for an obligation to assist”?

4. Do you agree with him that we have a moral duty to help those living in absolute poverty? Why or why not?

5. Singer discusses several common objections to providing money and aid to assist the poor in developing countries. What are two of those objections? What are Singer’s arguments against those two objections? Do you agree or disagree with Singer’s arguments against them? Why?

6. What role should multinational corporations play in alleviating poverty in the countries where they do business? Should they simply continue to do their day-to-day business there? Or should they do more than that? If so, what should they do? Explain.

THANK YOU FOR BEING A GREAT CLASS! HAVE A WONDERFUL SUMMER!

Philosophy homework help

5/10/22, 7:10 AM Topic: Week 5 Case Discussion Questions – New Case Study Group 1

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Week 5 Case Discussion Questions – New Case Study Group 1
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Watch the videoclip explaining Kant’s reasoning about never lying even in the scenario involving
an axe murderer. Explain why you agree or disagree with Kant. If you disagree with Kant, first try
to explain your reasons with him according to his own principles. Does the categorical imperative
of never lying conflict with other versions of his categorical imperative (e.g. treat others as ends)?
If you find that there is no internal conflict within Kant’s other versions, then articulate the ethical
framework outside Kant’s that best supports your disagreement. If you agree with Kant about
never lying, even to an axe murderer, then try to explain how this is justified in light of his more
socially inclined versions of the categorical imperative, such as his ideal of a “kingdom of ends” —
could Kant’s ethics here actually help build a community of trust and mutual flourishing? After
providing your answer, you will need to substantively engage with answers from two other
students by Sunday.

Kant’s AxeKant’s Axe

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Philosophy homework help


What is Capitalism???

Picture by Tess Martin

1.
What is capitalism?

a. Free Market?

i. There have been various types of free markets throughout history, so a free market for the exchange of goods is not historically unique to capitalism.

ii. But markets have always been considered a means to social ends, whereas with capitalism we see instead an inversion in which society itself has now become a means to producing for market ends.

iii. What is unique then about capitalism that enabled it to remake society into a means exclusively for market exchange?

b. Private ownership of the social means of production for private profit as opposed to the social ownership of the social means of production for the common good.

c. Private ownership of the social means of production is then the key, and it means society’s common productive means are now owned by private corporations for the sake of their own private profit: this ownership differs from:

i. State “socialism”: State ownership of the means of production – more often this is better referred to as State Monopoly Capitalism rather than socialism proper (which often had more to do with collective democratic ownership rather than centralized state ownership).

ii. Worker socialism: closer to socialism proper, socialized/democratized ownership of the means of production by the producers themselves, whether through worker’s councils or some type of cooperative. (USSR tried to operate this way before quickly devolving into State Monopoly Capitalism under Stalin, same thing with China and Mao)

d. Historical Background: How did society’s means of production become privatized by private commercial corporations and reoriented toward the end of private profit? (or in Aristotle’s language: how did the means and ends of production, which were oriented toward satisfying real human needs and social goods, become inverted into the private pursuit of money making as now the end?)

i. For most of human history production was a social project for the sake of the community of producers themselves rather than generating merely exchangeable commodities for the private profit of a few individuals.

ii. More importantly the social means for producing society were socially owned in some form, since a wealth of tools, technologies, infrastructure, and resources are always collective products made possible only by many hands and minds working together across generations.

1. In ancient times large empires did not own all the social means of production. There were of course state-owned lands, wealthy landowners and palaces as well as slavery, but the dominant mode of production for producing subsistence for most of society were still rural village communities (often more than 80% of the population) oriented around social use values rather than mere market exchange.

iii. The rise of Mercantile Capitalism: During the Medieval age in Europe some of the land was owned by various manor lords (feudal landlords) while serfs rented/owned a portion of that land and used their own tools to produce goods both for the landlord and for themselves. Also, various peasant communities still existed outside the manors too.

1. Villages were constructed around a “commons” or “greens” as public lands shared by all—often Church and monastery lands contributed to these commons as well.

2. Through advances in productive technologies as well as the ability of workers to better politically organize against feudal lords, workers gained a certain amount of independence.

3. This led to the breakdown of feudalism and the short-lived development of worker-owned guilds and cooperatives prior to the rise of capitalism (13th to 16th century).

4. Certain craftsmen became middlemen buying and selling goods from other craftsmen for the market and long-distance trade.

5. Through exploiting their monopolistic controls on buying cheap and selling high, and therein accumulating money for which there was a growing commercialized demand in terms of loans, these middlemen rose from the upper strata of the laboring classes to that of a new class of wealthy merchants, investors and bankers—the bourgeoisie or middle class of high finance: hence, the banking dynasties like the Fuggers.

a. Accumulating capital first took place in exploiting the making of money for its own sake. This was called “usury” which was the exploitative charging of interest on loans.

b. A certain drive begins to develop that no longer aims to produce quality goods according to the purposes of meeting real needs for community building, but to privately maximize monetary profit through exploiting demand, driving down the costs of resources and labor as low as possible in order to increase private gain through market exchange.

c. In turn, profit was used to buy up or capture more capital (productive means) from social ownership.

d. But these early private endeavors were not just the result of cunningly industrious individuals. Instead they relied heavily on a militarized state to colonize foreign lands.

i. Colonization exploded at the beginning of capitalism because it was needed to open up new routes for cheaper resources, labor, and capital, and for controlling foreign mines in order to acquire a monopoly on precious metals to back the rise of monetary accumulation.

ii. But colonization is only possible through the use of military power backing certain state-sanctioned enterprises

e. This concentration of wealth also allowed for the private acquisition of more lands at home, also with the help of the state military—the Reformation was not simply about church doctrines, but more so it was about the state commandeering of the “commons” as well as taking lands previously owned by the Catholic church and its monasteries for the market interests of privatization, i.e. “enclosing the commons”, which evicted many workers who were now landless with nothing to sell but their own labor for a wage.

f. As most of the common public lands in Europe were privatized (enclosed, fenced in, etc) this led to a cycle of more expeditions for the continued colonization of new lands and resources.

g. Increasing colonization requires not only a heavy military but also a larger workforce

h. And since private profit is generated by running down the cost of resources, land, capital, and most importantly, labor, the colonization process also led to the largest commercialized slave trade in recorded history—the Transatlantic slave trade (12 to 15 million Africans were exported between 16th–19th century)

i. As private ownership of money, land, and the means of production in the form of slave labor accumulated, the growing pool of landless wage laborers began to lose any negotiating leverage.

i. The price of wage labor was driven down even more so with the institutionalization of the Transatlantic slave trade, which provided early capitalists with a fixed source of cheap labor to help rapidly accumulate capital.

j. The actual history of mercantile capitalism as that initial stage of capital accumulation is therefore fraught with violence and far more complicated than the myths told by economists about some innocent individual merchants who just happened to be more industrious compared to the rest of the supposedly lazy workers.

iv. Industrial capitalism:

1. As private capital gained more power through privatizing more lands and resources for large scale industry the state role diminished only somewhat in the form of nationalized economies. But there was still a race to colonize new lands for cheaper resources and labor, and to monopolize markets which continued to rely on state involvement

a. colonization continued well into the 20th century and was driven by a ceaseless desire to accumulate capital—WWII was largely driven by Germany’s attempt to play catch-up in the Western game of colonization

v. Financial capitalism:

1. As a direct result of industrialization which allowed for a mass of enormous corporations to grow, there was a greater drive to expand operations which meant the need for more investors, more financing, more backers to share the risk taking—this also meant more of an intimate interrelation of corporations with banking, stock markets, and shareholders.

vi. State welfare capitalism:

1. But this high-risk financialization of expansion also led to a boom and bust cycle from which the Great Depression came.

2. This led to another iteration of capitalism with more government oversight in terms of supplementing the busts, doing the work that businesses should have been doing by taking care of the social welfare of the workforce – social security, workers comp, unemployment insurance, health care, legislation establishing and empowering trade unions, etc. (basically supplementing labor’s wage with a social wage)

3. This “state” phase is really a misnomer, since history shows that capitalism is an inherently unstable system that cannot exist on its own without government intervention and state superintending in some form and at some level, as we already saw since its inception at its mercantilist phase (pace libertarian claims about a self-regulating “free” market that needs no government involvement—
there has never been a capitalist “free” market without state involvement
).

vii. Globalized capitalism (aka: Neoliberalism):

1. The rise of multinational corporations also still relies on certain world powers to regulate and police the expansion of the global market. (e.g., think of how much capital benefits from its freedom of movement compared to workers being bound by national borders).

2. But in our present neoliberal moment we have shifted from having a market to becoming more fully a market-ruled society, with private capital not simply relying on state help but more directly controlling the very existence of the state. Hence since the 1970s there has a been a vast shift toward greater forms of:

a. Privatization of not only the economy, but also of social and health services, public services, and even political goods (hence, the current battle to take back healthcare and childcare as a public service).

b. Deregulation of the economy insofar as it serves the interests of private corporations. (e.g. deregulated the commercial use of natural resources; deregulated labor organizing, disempowering unions; deregulated the financial industry leading to bigger banks and more predatory lending).

c. Consumerism and the debt economy: citizens come to view themselves as mainly consumers who are empowered through credit which means the increase in debt.

2.
What are the key Features of Capitalism?

a. Companies: the privatization of the social means of production turns into its own type of society—a new social entity—but in an abstract way divorced from the actual producers and the public good.

i. As Shaw notes, more than “church or state”, within capitalism it is now the company that has possibly become the most important organization in the world. (the new oligarchies?)

b. Profit Motive: This is the driving force and end goal for economic activity, the very reason of existence for companies as privatizing the social means of production: from C-M-C to M-C-M’

i. Shaw quotes Heilbroner: “the profit motive, as we understand it, is a very recent phenomenon. It was foreign to the lower and middle classes of Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and medieval cultures, only scattered throughout the Renaissance times, and largely absent in most Eastern civilizations.”

ii. Throughout much of history, the selfish pursuit of private monetary gain was either looked down upon as dishonorable or merely tolerated. But now it has become a celebrated goal for life. (precisely the opposite of what Aristotle said is natural to being human)

iii. What does it say about us that we tend to think everyone, for all times and places, has always been driven by a profit motive? (is this to naively and falsely project from our own contingent experience within our Western capitalist societies?)

c. Competition: the supposed salve to monopolies forming and that which supposedly regulates the profit motive from getting out of control.

i. Competition tends not to be an answer to monopolies so much as a continual reshuffling of them

ii. Is it a coincidence that British political economists in the 19th century were celebrating this idea of competition as a kind of natural selection in the marketplace while Darwin and other biologists began describing in nature a violent process of competitive struggle for existence through the survival of the fittest?

1. Didn’t Aristotle and Kant say, in their own different ways, that what makes us human is precisely our ability to transcend an animalistic fight for the survival of the fittest by living in solidarity together around higher ideals beyond violent competition?

d. Private Property: It is important to note that the right to private property is not simply about an individual’s personal possessions, which other societies prior to capitalism had, and since socialist societies can have personal possessions too.

i. Private property here means the private ownership of the social means of production and distribution – the right to take up land as exclusively one’s own to use for private profit.

ii. The heart of capitalism is about using money to make more money by investing in private accumulation of the productive means and other related assets.

3.
What are some classical moral justifications?

a. As Shaw states: “rarely are we presented with fundamental criticisms of, or possible alternatives to, our socioeconomic order. It is not surprising, then, that most of us blithely assume, without ever bothering to question, that our capitalist economic system is a morally justifiable one.” This is obviously a major question that we need to ask!

b. The two dominant responses:

i. The right to private property:

1. John Locke was one of the original founders of this idea, which he used to justify the private colonial appropriation of Native American “wastelands” as he called them. But he relied on a naïve sense of individual labor:

a. Basically, he claimed that if you’re the first one to sink your shovel into something, it is yours (which of course colonizers neglected to consider the fact that indigenous people had worked this land well before their own shovels entered it).

b. But this fails to account for the inherently social nature of labor—it assumes that prior to social formations we lived as private asocial individuals who labored alone only for private gain (e.g. the hypothetical idea of the “state of nature” in Hobbes and Locke):

i. But can one clear a field alone, build a home or a society alone, or make a complex machine alone, let alone do anything of minimal skill without some form of socialization? Not only is labor social, but it relies on past forms of social labor that have made one’s own labor possible in the first place (nurturing upbringing and education etc).

ii. Also, it assumes that nature is just a dead mechanism there to be privately possessed rather than a living dynamism to be creatively shared.

c. Moreover, as Shaw rightly notes, capitalism as the making of money off money through legalized usury as interest, takes leave of Locke’s paradigm since gaining interest on money is now an acquisition of profit and a certain kind of property that one did not directly produce through their own labors.

ii. The invisible hand: this has been the more influential attempt throughout the history of capitalism: It is essentially a justification for promoting the selfishness of the profit motive. As the early British political economist, Bernard Mandeville said—the market somehow is responsible for turning private vices into public benefits.

1. But how does the market magically/miraculously turn unintended consequences from private self-interest into public benefits for all?

a. Supposedly through the laws of supply and demand and competition.

b. But as we already discussed above, the history of capitalism has shown that the market is unstable and anarchic, leading to ruin, rather than miracles, without government force. Thus, the hands organizing the market are hardly invisible or law-like.

4.
What are some fundamental criticisms of capitalism?

a. It is an inherently unstable economic system that continually generates widespread inequality and poverty the more wealth it produces, since it generates abundance by simultaneously running down the cost of, and thus depleting, labor and land.

i. It is not government intervention that causes these things as if the market would self-correct if we took an absolute laissez faire approach.

1. The history of capitalism has shown that government intervention is needed to keep the market from collapsing under its own internal crises—hence the history of military and police intervention, expanding colonization to supplement markets, debt bondage, and continual bailouts to failing corporations (not to mention all the needed extra public services and welfare to care for a society in a way that the market cannot).

2. Moreover, the current trend toward government deregulation and increasing privatization has now led to the widest inequality gaps within recent history, with more private wealth consolidated into the hands of a smaller few over against the rest (hence the rhetoric around the 1% and the 99%)

3. The “all boats are rising” argument tends to set up a diversionary straw man by pointing to some past or alternative society in order to show how better off we are despite the inequality.

a. But this fails to see the real problem, which is the fact that the more wealth is produced the more inequality is generated, which should be the opposite trend in a system that is able to create so much social surplus.

b. E.g., recent tax cuts for corporations by the Trump administration were justified by a “trickle down” argument claiming they would allow companies to create more jobs and invest in their employees; yet records show that companies used the tax cuts to buy back more of their own stocks in order to boost stockholder value.

b. It has a lowly view of human nature that is also uncritically accepted as unchangeable (which always helps those who want to say this is the best we can do).

i. It denies that humans are inherently social, cooperative, creative and rationally purposeful, driven by higher ends beyond mere commerce for private profit.

1. Capitalism not just assumes, but habituates, promotes, fosters, ensures, and demands that we see ourselves as inherently selfish individuals. It has no patience for higher ideals about what it means to be human since this would mean challenging its sovereign rule of the profit motive.

2. It is no coincidence that early defenders of capitalism who justified its hidden hand as the only way to regulate the chaos of unchangeably selfish individuals were also people who accepted a religious doctrine of the inherent sinfulness of humans as selfish animals who cannot change their own nature but must instead rely on the hidden hand of a god for salvation (market providence).

a. This is why the notion that Shaw mentions of “market fundamentalism” is apt here: many thinkers have noted the religious quality of capitalism and its defenders since they rely on a blind acceptance that humans are fated to be selfish and cannot do anything about it except faithfully participate in the dictates of a god-like market (resign yourself to the matrix).

3. But its assumption that human nature cannot change itself denies the socially evolving history of humanity in which, through many ups and downs, humans have creatively transformed their nature to a degree beyond mere survival and violent competition.

ii. It assumes that we only find well-being through ever greater access to material consumption—we are primarily consumers. But then this leads to people working more, in order to gain more purchasing power in order to consume more, rather than working less in order to have more leisure time in pursuing higher ideals and relationships rather than consumption.

1. Social psychologists have found that populations of industrialized nations who have more money and consume more are often unhappier than those in other “less developed” societies.

c. Its privatizing drive and profit motive tends toward oligarchical consolidations of power both economically and socio-politically. Moreover, competition isn’t the salve to this problem but often fosters the divisive drive even more so.

d. Speaking of competition—the evidence is still not very clear as to whether competition is the great driver of innovation. How creative can we be if we’re competing within a cutthroat survival-of-the-fittest.

i. Market competition might not be the engine of innovation that capitalists often claim it is: most of the great innovations throughout history have come from either non-market sources (artistic, religious, scientific/educational, or political communities) or from productive communities cooperating together, or from institutions sheltered from market competition:

1. Producing for exchange value in order to make money often does not encourage taking the necessary long-term risks to be innovative since the aim is not to socially benefit humankind or solve its major plights, but rather the short term aim of making money through proven commercial means according to whatever the market demands.

a. Hence, a recent business magazine asked “is pursuing a cure for cancer really a viable business pursuit?”

2. Think more recently about major innovations that led to various advances in medical technologies, cures, vaccines, telecommunications, computers, the internet, etc.

a. The possibilities for these innovations were driven not by the profit motive and market cost/benefit analysis, but by being fostered and developed within non-market institutions such as government labs, hospitals, military institutions, NASA, non-profit organizations, universities and research institutions, etc. – they required long hours of cooperative work pursuing real social needs.

e. Its privatized mode of production for commodity exchange inherently exploits and alienates the laborer.

i. All of the above could be boiled down to this problem:

1. If the production process by which a society is able to subsist, and progress, is itself inherently social, then privatizing this social process so that its surplus is now privately consumed by the owners, is inherently backwards, using our social capacities, not as ends in themselves, but as means for benefitting a few.

ii. This is a deeper criticism than merely pointing out that there is poverty, or there are income inequalities, or that ideologically there is a quasi-religious notion of a depraved humanity dependent on a magical invisible hand:

1. rather it gets to the heart of how and why the very structures of the capitalist production process, which produces for exchange value rather than use value, necessarily generates these material inequalities and false self-perceptions in the first place.

Philosophy homework help

Capabilities and Social Justice

Author(s): Martha Nussbaum

Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, International Relations and the New

Inequality (Summer, 2002), pp. 123-135

Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association

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Capabilities and Social Justice

Martha Nussbaum

University of Chicago

Women in much of the world lack support for fundamental func-
tions of a human life. Unequal social and political circumstances
give women unequal human capabilities. This paper critiques
other approaches to these inequalities and offers a version of the
capabilities approach. The central question asked by the capa-
bilities approach is not, “How satisfied is this woman?” “How
much in the way of resources is she able to command?” It is,
instead, “What is she actually able to do and to be?” The core
idea seems to be that of the human being as a dignified free
being who shapes his or her own life, rather than being passively

NOTE: The present article is closely related to the arguments of my book Women
and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), Introduction and chapter 1, hereafter WHD. The
book also contains detailed discussion of Sen’s views and differences between his

version of the approach and my own. For earlier articulations of my views on capa-
bilities see the following: “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political
Distribution,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (Suppl.) (1988), pp. 145-184;
“Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in R. B. Douglass et al., eds., Liberalism and the
Good (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-252; “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristo-
telian Approach,” in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), hereafter QL; “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Founda-
tions of Ethics,” in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds., World, Mind and Ethics:
Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995), pp. 86-131; “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense
of Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory 20 (1992), pp. 202-246; “Human Capa-
bilities, Female Human Beings,” in M. Nussbaum and J. Glover, eds., Women, Culture,
and Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 61-104, hereafter WCD; “The
Good as Discipline, the Good as Freedom,” in David A. Crocker and Toby Linden,
eds., Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship (Lan-
ham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 312-411; “Women and Cultural Uni-
versals,” chapter 1 in Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 29-54, hereafter SSJ; and “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham
Law Review 66 (1997), pp. 273-300.

? 2002 International Studies Association

Published by Blackwell Publishing Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

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124 Martha Nussbaum

shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a flock
or herd animal. The basic intuition from which the capabilities
approach begins, in the political arena, is that human abilities
exert a moral claim that they should be developed. Capability,
not functioning, is the appropriate political goal.

It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political
economy come the rich human being and rich human need. The
rich human being is … the human being in need of a totality of
human life-activities.

-Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844

I found myself beautiful as a free human mind.

-Mrinal, heroine of Rabindranath Tagore’s “Letter from a Wife”
(1914)

I. DEVELOPMENT AND SEX EQUALITY

Women in much of the world lack support for fundamental functions
of a human life. They are less well nourished than men, less healthy,
more vulnerable to physical violence and sexual abuse. They are

much less likely than men to be literate, and still less likely to have preprofes-
sional or technical education. Should they attempt to enter the workplace, they
face greater obstacles, including intimidation from family or spouse, sex dis-
crimination in hiring and sexual harassment in the workplace-all, frequently,
without effective legal recourse. Similar obstacles often impede their effective
participation in political life. In many nations women are not full equals under
the law: they do not have the same property rights as men, the same rights to
make a contract, the same rights of association, mobility and religious liberty.’
Burdened, often, with the “double day” of taxing employment and full respon-
sibility for housework and child care, they lack opportunities for play and the
cultivation of their imaginative and cognitive faculties. All these factors take
their toll on emotional well-being: women have fewer opportunities than men
to live free from fear and to enjoy rewarding types of love-especially when,
as often, they are married without choice in childhood and have no recourse
from a bad marriage. In all these ways, unequal social and political circum-
stances give women unequal human capabilities.

‘For examples of these inequalities see WHD, chapter 3; and my “Religion and
Women’s Human Rights,” in Paul Weithman, ed., Religion and Contemporary Liberal-
ism (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp. 93-137; also in SSJ.

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Capabilities and Social Justice 125

According to the Human Development Report 1999 of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), there is no country that treats its women as
well as its men, in areas ranging from basic health and nutrition to political
participation and economic activity.

One area of life that contributes especially greatly to women’s inequality is
the area of care. Women are the world’s primary, and usually only, caregivers
for people in a condition of extreme dependency: young children, the elderly,
those whose physical or mental handicaps make them incapable of the relative
(and often temporary) independence that characterizes so-called normal human
lives. Women perform this crucial work, often, without pay and without recog-
nition that it is work. At the same time, the fact that they need to spend long
hours caring for the physical needs of others makes it more difficult for them to

do what they want to do in other areas of life, including employment, citizen-
ship, play and self-expression.2

My aim in this brief presentation will be first to indicate why I believe other
approaches to these inequalities are not fully adequate and the capabilities
approach is needed. Then I shall mention some very general features of the
capabilities approach to show how it can handle the problems other approaches
fail to handle.

II. DEFICIENCIES OF OTHER APPROACHES

Prior to the shift in thinking that is associated with the work of Amartya Sen,3

2 See Eva Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (New
York: Routledge, 1999); Nancy Folbre, “Care and the Global Economy,” background
paper for Human Development Report 1999; Mona Harrington, Care and Equality:
Inventing a New Family Politics (New York: Knopf, 1999); Joan Williams, Unbending
Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999).

3The initial statement is in Sen, “Equality of What?” in S. McMurrin, ed., Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
reprinted in Sen, Choice, Welfare, and Measurement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell; and
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); see also various essays by Sen in Resources,
Values, and Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell; and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Black-
well and MIT Press, 1984); and Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1985); see also his “Well-Being, Agency, and Freedom,” The Dewey Lectures
1984, The Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985); “Capability and Well-Being,” in QL,
pp. 30-53; and “Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice,” in WCD, pp. 153-198;
also, his Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Clarendon Press; and Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1992). See also J. Drbze and A. Sen, Hunger and Public
Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and India: Economic Development and Social
Opportunity (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1995).

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126 Martha Nussbaum

and with the Human Development Reports of the UNDP,4 the most prevalent
approach to measuring quality of life in a nation used to be simply to ask about
GNP per capita. This approach tries to weasel out of making any cross-cultural
claims about what has value-although, notice, it does assume the universal
value of opulence. What it omits, however, is much more significant. We are
not even told about the distribution of wealth and income, and countries with
similar aggregate figures can exhibit great distributional variations. (Thus South
Africa always did very well among developing nations, despite its enormous
inequalities and violations of basic justice.) Circus girl Sissy Jupe, in Dickens’s
novel Hard Times, already saw the problem with this absence of normative
concern for distribution. She says that her economics lesson didn’t tell her
“who has got the money and whether any of it is mine.” 5 So too with women
around the world: the fact that one nation or region is in general more prosper-
ous than another is only a part of the story: it doesn’t tell us what government
has done for women in various social classes, or how they are doing. To know
that, we’d need to look at their lives. But then we need to specify, beyond
distribution of wealth and income itself, what parts of lives we ought to look
at-such as life expectancy, infant mortality, educational opportunities, health
care, employment opportunities, land rights, political liberties. Seeing what is
absent from the GNP account nudges us sharply in the direction of mapping out

4Human Development Reports: 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 (New York: United Nations
Development Programme). For related approaches in economics see Partha Dasgupta,
An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Bina
Agarwal, A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sabina Alkire, Operationalizing Amartya Sen’s
Capability Approach to Human Development: A Framework for Identifying Valuable
Capabilities, D. Phil. Dissertation, Oxford University, 1999; S. Anand and C. Harris,
“Choosing a Welfare Indicator,” American Economic Association Papers and Proceed-
ings 84 (1993), pp. 226-249; Frances Stewart, “Basic Needs, Capabilities, and Human
Development,” in Avner Offer, ed., In Pursuit of the Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996); Prasanta Pattanaik, “Cultural Indicators of Well-Being: Some
Conceptual Issues,” in UNESCO, World Culture Report; Culture, Creativity, and Mar-
kets (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 1998), pp. 333-339; Meghnad Desai, “Poverty and
Capability: Towards an Empirically Implementable Measure,” Suntory-Toyota Inter-
national Centre Discussion Paper No. 27, London School of Economics Development
Economics Research Program, 1990; Achin Chakraborty, The Concept and Measure-
ment of the Standard of Living, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California at Riverside,
1996. For discussion of the approach see K. Aman, ed., Ethical Principles for Devel-
opment: Needs, Capabilities or Rights (Montclair, N.J.: Montclair State University
Press, 1991); K. Basu, P. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura, eds., Choice, Welfare, and
Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995).

5 See the discussion of this example in Nussbaum and Sen’s “Introduction” to QL.

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Capabilities and Social Justice 127

these and other basic goods in a universal way, so that we can use the list of
basic goods to compare quality of life across societies.

A further problem with all resource-based approaches, even those that are
sensitive to distribution, is that individuals vary in their ability to convert
resources into functionings. (This is the problem that has been stressed for
some time by Amartya Sen in his writings about the capabilities approach.)
Some of these differences are straightforwardly physical. Nutritional needs vary
with age, occupation and sex. A pregnant or lactating woman needs more nutri-
ents than a nonpregnant woman. A child needs more protein than an adult. A
person whose limbs work well needs few resources to be mobile, whereas a
person with paralyzed limbs needs many more resources to achieve the same
level of mobility. Many such variations can escape our notice if we live in a
prosperous nation that can afford to bring all individuals to a high level of
physical attainment; in the developing world we must be highly alert to these
variations in need. Again, some of the pertinent variations are social, connected
with traditional hierarchies. If we wish to bring all citizens of a nation to the
same level of educational attainment, we will need to devote more resources to
those who encounter obstacles from traditional hierarchy or prejudice: thus
women’s literacy will prove more expensive than men’s literacy in many parts
of the world. If we operate only with an index of resources, we will frequently
reinforce inequalities that are highly relevant to well-being. As my examples
suggest, women’s lives are especially likely to raise these problems: therefore,
any approach that is to deal adequately with women’s issues must be able to
deal well with these variations.

If we turn from resource-based approaches to preference-based approaches,
we encounter another set of difficulties.6 Such approaches have one salient
advantage over the GNP approach: they look at people, and assess the role of
resources as they figure in improving actual people’s lives. But users of such
approaches typically assume without argument that the way to assess the role of
resources in people’s lives is simply to ask them about their satisfaction with
their current preferences. The problem with this idea is that preferences are not
exogenous, given independently of economic and social conditions. They are at
least in part constructed by those conditions. Women often have no preference
for economic independence before they learn about avenues through which
women like them might pursue this goal; nor do they think of themselves as
citizens with rights that were being ignored, before they learn of their rights and

6Chapter 2 of WHD gives an extensive account of economic preference-based
approaches, arguing that they are defective without reliance on a substantive list of
goals such as that provided by the capabilities approach. Again, this is a theme that has
repeatedly been stressed by Sen in his writings on the topic (see note 3.)

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128 Martha Nussbaum

are encouraged to believe in their equal worth. All of these ideas, and the pref-
erences based on them, frequently take shape for women in programs of edu-
cation sponsored by women’s organizations of various types. Men’s preferences,
too, are socially shaped and often misshaped. Men frequently have a strong
preference that their wives should do all the child care and all the housework-
often in addition to working an eight-hour day. Such preferences, too, are not
fixed in the nature of things: they are constructed by social traditions of privi-
lege and subordination. Thus a preference-based approach typically will reinforce
inequalities: especially those inequalities that are entrenched enough to have
crept into people’s very desires. Once again, although this is a fully general
problem, it has special pertinence to women’s lives. Women have especially
often been deprived of education and information, which are necessary, if by no
means sufficient, to make preferences a reliable indicator of what public policy
should pursue. They have also often been socialized to believe that a lower
living standard is what is right and fitting for them, and that some great human
goods (for example, education, political participation) are not for them at all.
They may be under considerable social pressure to say they are satisfied with-
out such things, and yet we should not hastily conclude that public policy should
not work to extend these functions to women. In short, looking at women’s
lives helps us see the inadequacy of traditional approaches; and the urgency of
women’s problems gives us a very strong motivation to prefer a nontraditional
approach.

Finally, let us consider the influential human rights approach. This approach
has a great deal to say about these inequalities, and the language of rights has
proven enormously valuable for women, both in articulating their demands for
justice and in linking those demands to the earlier demands of other subordi-
nated groups. And yet the rights framework is shaky in several respects. First,
it is intellectually contested: there are many different conceptions of what rights
are, and what it means to secure a right to someone. (Are rights prepolitical, or
artifacts of laws and institutions? Do they belong to individual persons only, or
also to groups? Are they always correlated with duties, and who has the duties
correlated with human rights? And what are human rights rights to? Freedom
from state interference primarily, or also a certain positive level of well-being
and opportunity?) Thus to use the language of rights all by itself is not very
helpful: it just invites a host of further questions about what is being recom-
mended. Second, the language of rights has been associated historically with
political and civil liberties, and only more recently with economic and social
entitlements. But the two are not only of comparable importance in human
lives, they are also thoroughly intertwined: the liberties of speech and associ-
ation, for example, have material prerequisites. A woman who has no opportu-
nities to work outside the home does not have the same freedom of association

as one who does. Women deprived of education are also deprived of much

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Capabilities and Social Justice 129

meaningful participation in politics and speech. Third, the human rights approach
has typically ignored urgent claims of women to protection from domestic vio-
lence and other abuses of their bodily integrity. It has also typically ignored
urgent issues of justice within the family: its distribution of resources and oppor-
tunities among its members, the recognition of women’s work as work. This
neglect is not accidental, because the rights approach is linked with the tradi-
tion of liberal political philosophy that typically recognizes a distinction between
the public and the private realms, and puts the family off-limits for purposes of
state action. Fourth and finally, the rights approach is often linked with the idea
of negative liberty, and with the idea of protecting the individual from state
action. Although rights of course need not be understood in this way, their
history, at least in the Lockean tradition, does lend itself to that sort of inter-
pretation, and the focus on such areas of negative liberty has been a persistent
obstacle to making progress for women in areas ranging from compulsory edu-
cation to the reform of marriage.

III. HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN CAPABILITIES

I shall now argue that a reasonable answer to all these concerns-capable of
giving good guidance to governments establishing basic constitutional princi-
ples and to international agencies assessing the quality of life-is given by a
version of the capabilities approach.

The central question asked by the capabilities approach is not, “How satis-
fied is this woman?” or even “How much in the way of resources is she able to
command?” It is, instead, “What is she actually able to do and to be?” Taking a
stand for political purposes on a working list of functions that would appear to
be of central importance in human life, users of this approach ask, Is the person
capable of this, or not? They ask not only about the person’s satisfaction with
what she does, but about what she does, and what she is in a position to do
(what her opportunities and liberties are). They ask not just about the resources
that are present, but about how those do or do not go to work, enabling the
woman to function.

To introduce the intuitive idea behind the approach, it is useful to start from
this passage of Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, written
at a time when he was reading Aristotle and was profoundly influenced by
Aristotelian ideas of human capability and functioning:

It is obvious that the human eye gratifies itself in a way different from the
crude, non-human eye; the human ear different from the crude ear, etc…..
The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense. For the
starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract
being as food; it could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it would be
impossible to say wherein this feeding activity differs from that of animals.

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130 Martha Nussbaum

Marx here singles out certain human functions-eating and the use of the senses,
which seem to have a particular centrality in any life one might live. He then
claims that there is something that it is to be able to perform these activities in
a fully human way-by which he means a way infused by reasoning and socia-
bility. But human beings don’t automatically have the opportunity to perform
their human functions in a fully human way. Some conditions in which people
live-conditions of starvation, or of educational deprivation-bring it about
that a being who is human has to live in an animal way. Of course what he is
saying is that these conditions are unacceptable, and should be changed.
Similarly, the intuitive idea behind my version of the capabilities approach

is twofold: first, that there are certain functions that are particularly central in
human life, in the sense that their presence or absence is typically understood to
be a mark of the presence or absence of human life. Second, and this is what
Marx found in Aristotle, that there is something that it is to do these functions
in a truly human way, not a merely animal way. We judge, frequently enough,
that a life has been so impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of the
human being, that it is a life in which one goes on living, but more or less like
an animal, not being able to develop and exercise one’s human powers. In
Marx’s example, a starving person just grabs at the food in order to survive, and
the many social and rational ingredients of human feeding can’t make their
appearance. Similarly, the senses of a human being can operate at a merely
animal level-if they are not cultivated by appropriate education, by leisure for
play and self-expression, by valuable associations with others; and we should
add to the list some items that Marx probably would not endorse, such as expres-
sive and associational liberty, and the freedom of worship. The core idea seems
to be that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her
own life, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world in
the manner of a flock or herd animal.

At one extreme, we may judge that the absence of capability for a central
function is so acute that the person isn’t really a human being at all, or any
longer-as in the case of certain very severe forms of mental disability, or
senile dementia. But I am less interested in that boundary (important though it
is for medical ethics) than in a higher one, the level at which a person’s capa-
bility is “truly human,” that is, worthy of a human being. The idea thus contains
a notion of human worth or dignity.

Notice that the approach makes each person a bearer of value, and an end.
Marx, like his bourgeois forebears, holds that it is profoundly wrong to sub-
ordinate the ends of some individuals to those of others. That is at the core of

what exploitation is, to treat a person as a mere object for the use of others.
What this approach is after is a society in which individuals are treated as each
worthy of regard, and in which each has been put in a position to live really
humanly.

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Capabilities and Social Justice 131

I think we can produce an account of these necessary elements of truly
human functioning that commands a broad cross-cultural consensus, a list that
can be endorsed for political purposes by people who otherwise have very
different views of what a complete good life for a human being would be. The
list is supposed to provide a focus for quality of life assessment and for political
planning, and it aims to select capabilities that are of central importance, what-
ever else the person pursues. They therefore have a special claim to be sup-
ported for political purposes in a pluralistic society.7

The list is, emphatically, a list of separate components. We cannot satisfy
the need for one of them by giving people a larger amount of another one. All
are of central importance and all are distinct in quality. The irreducible plurality
of the list limits the trade-offs that it will be reasonable to make, and thus limits

the applicability of quantitative cost-benefit analysis.
The basic intuition from which the capability approach begins, in the polit-

ical arena, is that human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be devel-
oped. Human beings are creatures such that, provided with the right educational
and material support, they can become fully capable of these human functions.
That is, they are creatures with certain lower-level capabilities (which I call
“basic capabilities'” 8) to perform the functions in question. When these capa-
bilities are deprived of the nourishment that would transform them into the
high-level capabilities that figure on my list, they are fruitless, cut off, in some
way but a shadow of themselves. If a turtle were given a life that afforded a
merely animal level of functioning, we would have no indignation, no sense of
waste and tragedy. When a human being is given a life that blights powers of
human action and expression, that does give us a sense of waste and tragedy-
the tragedy expressed, for example, in the statement made by Tagore’s heroine
to her husband, when she says, “I am not one to die easily.” In her view, a life
without dignity and choice, a life in which she can be no more than an append-
age, was a type of death of her humanity.

IV. FUNCTIONING AND CAPABILITY

I have spoken both of functioning and of capability. How are they related?
Getting clear about this is crucial in defining the relation of the “capabilities
approach” to our concerns about paternalism and pluralism. For if we were to

7 Obviously, I am thinking of the political more broadly than do many theorists in
the Western liberal tradition, for whom the nation-state remains the basic unit. I am
envisaging not only domestic deliberations but also cross-cultural quality of life assess-
ments and other forms of international deliberation and planning.

8See the fuller discussion in WHD, chapter 1.

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132 Martha Nussbaum

take functioning itself as the goal of public policy, a liberal pluralist would
rightly judge that we were precluding many choices that citizens may make in
accordance with their own conceptions of the good. A deeply religious person
may prefer not to be well-nourished, but to engage in strenuous fasting. Whether
for religious or for other reasons, a person may prefer a celibate life to one
containing sexual expression. A person may prefer to work with an intense
dedication that precludes recreation and play. Am I declaring, by my very use
of the list, that these are not fully human or flourishing lives? And am I instruct-
ing government to nudge or push people into functioning of the requisite sort,
no matter what they prefer?
It is important that the answer to this question is no. Capability, not func-

tioning, is the appropriate political goal. This is so because of the very great
importance the approach attaches to practical reason, as a good that both suf-
fuses all the other functions, making them fully human, and also figures, itself,
as a central function on the list. The person with plenty of food may always
choose to fast, but there is a great difference between fasting and starving, and
it is this difference that we wish to capture. Again, the person who has normal
opportunities for sexual satisfaction can always choose a life of celibacy, and
the approach says nothing against this. What it does speak against (for exam-
ple) is the practice of female genital mutilation, which deprives individuals of
the opportunity to choose sexual functioning (and indeed, the opportunity to
choose celibacy as well).9 A person who has opportunities for play can always
choose a workaholic life; again, there is a great difference between that chosen
life and a life constrained by insufficient maximum-hour protections and/or the
“double day” that makes women unable to play in many parts of the world.
Once again, we must stress that the objective is to be understood in terms of

combined capabilities. To secure a capability to a person it is not sufficient to
produce good internal states of readiness to act. It is necessary, as well, to
prepare the material and institutional environment so that people are actuall

Philosophy homework help

B O O K I · T H E H U M A N G O O D

SUBJECT O F O UR I NQUIRY

All human activities aim at some good: some goods subordinate to
others

1. E V E RY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and
choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.* But a
certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others
are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where
there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the prod-
ucts to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions,
arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical
art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory,
that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single
capacity — as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the
equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every
military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under
yet others — in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be pre-
ferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former
that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activ-
ities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart
from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

The science of the human good is politics
2. If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire
for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this),
and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else
(for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our
desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and
the chief good.* Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great
influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at,
be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline
at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capaci-
ties it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authorita-
tive art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics

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appears to be of this nature;* for it is this that ordains which of the
sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citi-
zens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and
we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this,
e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of
the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and
what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include
those of the others, so that this end must be the human good. For
even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the
state seems at all events something greater and more complete
whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the
end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for
a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our
inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

NATURE O F THE SCIE NCE

We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits
of. The student should have reached years of discretion

3. Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.
Now noble and just actions, which political science investigates,
exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought
to exist only by convention, and not by nature.* But goods exhibit
a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for
before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and
others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in
speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the
truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which
are only for the most part true, and with premisses of the same kind,
to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore,
should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an
educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far
as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to
accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand
from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he
is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject

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is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an
all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man
is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science;* for he is
inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions
start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to
follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because
the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no
difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the
defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing
each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as
to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who
desire and act in accordance with reason, knowledge about such
matters will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be
expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

WHAT IS T HE H UMAN GO OD?

It is generally agreed to be happiness, but there are various views as to
what happiness is. What is required at the start is an unreasoned
conviction about the facts, such as is produced by a good upbringing

4. Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all
knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we
say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods
achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for
both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say
that it is happiness,* and identify living well and faring well with
being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and
the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former
think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or
honour; they differ, however, from one another — and often even
the same man identifies it with different things, with health when
he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignor-
ance, they admire those who proclaim some great thing that is
above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from
these many goods there is another which is good in itself * and
causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions
that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to
examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

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Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between
arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was
right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘Are we
on the way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference,
as there is in a racecourse between the course from the judges to
the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with
what is evident, things are evident in two ways — some to us, some
without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things
evident to us. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures
about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of
political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the
fact is a starting-point,* and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will
not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought
up has or can easily get starting-points. And as for him who neither
has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.

Discussion of the popular views that the good is pleasure, honour,
wealth; a fourth kind of life, that of contemplation, deferred
for future discussion

5. Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which
we digressed.1 To judge from the lives that men lead, most men,
and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground)
to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the rea-
son why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say,
three prominent types of life — that just mentioned, the political,
and thirdly the contemplative life.* Now the mass of mankind are
evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to
beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that
many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus.*
A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of
superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness
with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political
life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since

1 a30.

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it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on
him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something of
one’s own and not easily taken from one. Further, men seem to
pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their merit; at
least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured,
and among those who know them, and on the ground of their vir-
tue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.
And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than hon-
our, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat
incomplete;* for possession of virtue seems actually compatible
with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the
greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so
no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all
costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently
treated even in the popular discussions. Third comes the contem-
plative life, which we shall consider later.1

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion,
and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely
useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather
take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for them-
selves. But it is evident that not even these are the end; yet many
arguments have been wasted on the support of them. Let us leave
this subject, then.

Discussion of the philosophical view that there is a Form of good
6. We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss
thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made
an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by
friends of our own.* Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better,
indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to
destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers
or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to
honour truth above our friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of
classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which
is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea
embracing all numbers); but the term ‘good’ is used both in the
category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation,

1 1177a12–1178a8, 1178a22–1179a32.

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and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the
relative (for the latter is like an offshoot and accident of being); so
that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods.
Further, since ‘good’ has as many senses as ‘being’* (for it is predi-
cated both in the category of substance, as of god and of reason, and
in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is
moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the
right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the
like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases
and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the
categories, but in one only. Further, since of the things answering
to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science
of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the
things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for oppor-
tunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine,
and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by
the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what
in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself ’, if (as is the case) in ‘man
himself ’ and in a particular man the account of man is one and the
same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ;
and if this is so, neither will ‘good itself ’ and particular goods, in so
far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for
being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which
perishes in a day.* The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible
account of the good, when they place the One in the column of
goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.*

But let us discuss these matters elsewhere;1 an objection to
what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the
Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the
goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good
by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce
or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are
called good by reason of these, and in a different way. Clearly, then,
goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in
themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then,
things good in themselves from useful things, and consider
whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea.
What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those

1 Cf. Met. 986a22–6, 1028b21–4, 1072b30–1073a3, 1091a29–b3, b13–1092a17.

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that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelli-
gence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we
pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would
place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other
than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be
empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in
themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as some-
thing identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow
and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in
respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse.*
The good, therefore, is not something common answering to one
Idea.

But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the
things that only chance to have the same name.* Are goods one,
then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one
good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly, as sight is in the
body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps
these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect
precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch
of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there
is some one good which is universally predicable of goods, or is
capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not
be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable.* Perhaps, however, someone might think it worth while
to have knowledge of it with a view to the goods that are attainable
and achievable; or, having this as a sort of pattern, we shall know
better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall
attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash
with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim
at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one
side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the
arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid
is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter
will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this ‘good
itself ’, or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better
doctor or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study
health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the
health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. But
enough of these topics.

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The good must be something final and self-sufficient. Definition of
happiness reached by considering the characteristic function of man

7. Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it
can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different
in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then
is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is
done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture
a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and
pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever
else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will
be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one,
these will be the goods achievable by action.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same
point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there
are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g.
wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something
else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evi-
dently something final.* Therefore, if there is only one final end,
this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the
most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that
which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is
never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the
things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that
other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that
which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of some-
thing else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this
we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else,
but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose
each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,
judging that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the
other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for
anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems
to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by
self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by

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himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children,
wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is
born for citizenship.* But some limit must be set to this; for if we
extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends’
friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question,
however, on another occasion;1 the self-sufficient we now define as
that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in noth-
ing; and such we think happiness to be;* and further we think it
most desirable of all things, not a thing counted as one good thing
among others* — if it were so counted it would clearly be made more
desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which
is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is
always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-
sufficient, and is the end of action.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good
seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired.
This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function
of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and,
in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good
and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem
to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and
the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he
born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each
of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man
similarly has a function apart from all these?* What then can this
be? Life seems to belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is
peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and
growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems
to be shared even by the horse, the ox, and every animal. There
remains, then, an active life of the element that has reason; of this,
one part has it in the sense of being obedient to reason, the other in
the sense of possessing reason and exercising thought.* And, as ‘life
of the rational element’ also has two meanings,* we must state that
life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the
more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an
activity of soul which follows or implies reason, and if we say ‘a so-
and-so’ and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in
kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without

1 i. 10, 11, ix. 10.

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qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being
added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player
is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if
this is the case [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind
of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a
rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good
and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed
when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate virtue: if
this is the case], human good turns out to be activity of soul exhib-
iting virtue,* and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance
with the best and most complete.*

But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not
make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short
time, does not make a man blessed and happy.

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably
first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would
seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what
has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or
partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are
due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remem-
ber what has been said before,1 and not look for precision in all
things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords
with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the
inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle
in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is
useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort
of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the
same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may
not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the
cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be
well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is a
primary thing and first principle. Now of first principles we see some
by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation,
and others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try
to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to deter-
mine them correctly, since they have a great influence on what
follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the
whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

1 1094b11–27.

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Our definition is confirmed by current beliefs about happiness
8. But we must consider happiness in the light not only of our
conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said
about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false
one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three
classes,* and some are described as external, others as relating to
soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and
truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating
to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to
this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is
correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and
activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among
external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is
that the happy man lives well and fares well; for we have practically
defined happiness as a sort of living and faring well. The character-
istics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to
belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some iden-
tify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with
a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these,
accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others
include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have
been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent
persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one
respect, or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one
virtue our account is in harmony;* for to virtue belongs virtuous
activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place
the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity.
For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result,
as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but
the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be
acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the
most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who
compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who
act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul,
and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant;

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e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spec-
tacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are
pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the
lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict
with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but
the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by
nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are
pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious
charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said,
the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good;
since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly,
nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly
in all other cases.* If this is so, virtuous actions must be in them-
selves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of
these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges
well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have
described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant
thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the
inscription at Delos —

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But most
pleasant it is to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or
one — the best — of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said,1 it needs the external goods as well; for
it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper
equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political
power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which
takes the lustre from happiness — good birth, goodly children,
beauty;* for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or
solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a
man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or
friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said,2
then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition;
for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune,
though others identify it with virtue.

1 1098b26–9. 2 ibid.

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Is happiness acquired by learning or habituation, or sent by god or
by chance?

9. For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is
to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of
training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by
chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable
that happiness should be god-given* and most surely god-given of
all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would
perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems,
however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and
some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike
things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the
best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed.

It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are
not maimed as regards thei

Philosophy homework help

In about 350 words discuss this question. Be specific in your answer and hit the necessary key points.

4. Nicholas Wolterstorff thinks that there are two dualities that characterize the political allegiances of Christians. What are these two dualities and what is their relationship with each other? In your answer, please reference at least two biblical passages and/or theological commitments that Wolterstorff uses to ground his two dualities model. How should Christians conceive of their citizenship commitments in view of these two dualities? What ought Christians to do whenever breakdowns or conflicts occur between the different political entities to whom they are accountable? Please be specific and use illustrations for full credit.

Philosophy homework help

5/4/22, 1:18 AM Reading Assignment Questions: Week 2

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/assignments/7016118?module_item_id=17540430 1/1

Reading Assignment Questions: Week 2

Due Apr 9 by 11:59pm Points 2 Submitting a text entry box or a file upload

Start Assignment

After reading Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics along with my lecture notes, and then Martha
Nussbaum’s article, “Aristotelian Social Democracy”, provide substantive answers–with references to the
texts–to the following questions. Remember to look over the Reading Assignment Rubric before
answering the questions:

1. In the Nicomachean Ethics how does Aristotle define the ultimate good of Happiness and how does
he distinguish it from 3 ways most people view happiness? (be sure to use the lecture notes as an aid in
answering these questions about Aristotle’s thought)

2. In Politics, what makes us distinctively human animals? More specifically, what does Aristotle mean
when he calls humans by nature “political animals”? What is the significance of comparing
and contrasting with bees?

3. In his Politics what are the two types of “arts of acquisition” (i.e. economic activity – see lecture notes)
and how are they linked to the different value systems of exchange-value or use-value?

4. Speaking of the difference between exchange-value and use-value, what does Aristotle mean by
“false wealth” and “real wealth” and why is this distinction important for practicing virtue ethics?

5. According to Martha Nussbaum how does Aristotle’s understanding of the “common meals” in Athens
highlight the priority of the common good, and how does this guide the equitable distribution of property?

6. According to Nussbaum what is the guiding question for the Aristotelian approach to the good that
distinguishes it from other approaches (both the utilitarian approach and the Rawlsian/Kantian liberal
approach as she mentions)? Explain her example of how it more deeply treats the issue of gender
inequality amongst Bangladeshi women.

7. Within Nussbaum’s list of “Basic Human Functional Capabilities” explain why she holds the capability
for “practical reason” as high as she does and why education is so important for such.

Philosophy homework help

B O O K I · T H E H U M A N G O O D

SUBJECT O F O UR I NQUIRY

All human activities aim at some good: some goods subordinate to
others

1. E V E RY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and
choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.* But a
certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others
are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where
there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the prod-
ucts to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions,
arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical
art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory,
that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single
capacity — as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the
equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every
military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under
yet others — in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be pre-
ferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former
that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activ-
ities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart
from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

The science of the human good is politics
2. If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire
for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this),
and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else
(for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our
desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and
the chief good.* Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great
influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at,
be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline
at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capaci-
ties it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authorita-
tive art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics

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appears to be of this nature;* for it is this that ordains which of the
sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citi-
zens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and
we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this,
e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of
the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and
what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include
those of the others, so that this end must be the human good. For
even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the
state seems at all events something greater and more complete
whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the
end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for
a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our
inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

NATURE O F THE SCIE NCE

We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits
of. The student should have reached years of discretion

3. Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.
Now noble and just actions, which political science investigates,
exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought
to exist only by convention, and not by nature.* But goods exhibit
a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for
before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and
others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in
speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the
truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which
are only for the most part true, and with premisses of the same kind,
to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore,
should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an
educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far
as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to
accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand
from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he
is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject

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T HE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I.3

5

is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an
all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man
is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science;* for he is
inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions
start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to
follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because
the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no
difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the
defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing
each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as
to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who
desire and act in accordance with reason, knowledge about such
matters will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be
expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

WHAT IS T HE H UMAN GO OD?

It is generally agreed to be happiness, but there are various views as to
what happiness is. What is required at the start is an unreasoned
conviction about the facts, such as is produced by a good upbringing

4. Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all
knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we
say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods
achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for
both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say
that it is happiness,* and identify living well and faring well with
being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and
the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former
think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or
honour; they differ, however, from one another — and often even
the same man identifies it with different things, with health when
he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignor-
ance, they admire those who proclaim some great thing that is
above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from
these many goods there is another which is good in itself * and
causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions
that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to
examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

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6

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between
arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was
right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘Are we
on the way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference,
as there is in a racecourse between the course from the judges to
the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with
what is evident, things are evident in two ways — some to us, some
without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things
evident to us. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures
about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of
political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the
fact is a starting-point,* and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will
not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought
up has or can easily get starting-points. And as for him who neither
has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.

Discussion of the popular views that the good is pleasure, honour,
wealth; a fourth kind of life, that of contemplation, deferred
for future discussion

5. Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which
we digressed.1 To judge from the lives that men lead, most men,
and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground)
to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the rea-
son why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say,
three prominent types of life — that just mentioned, the political,
and thirdly the contemplative life.* Now the mass of mankind are
evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to
beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that
many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus.*
A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of
superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness
with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political
life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since

1 a30.

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it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on
him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something of
one’s own and not easily taken from one. Further, men seem to
pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their merit; at
least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured,
and among those who know them, and on the ground of their vir-
tue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.
And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than hon-
our, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat
incomplete;* for possession of virtue seems actually compatible
with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the
greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so
no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all
costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently
treated even in the popular discussions. Third comes the contem-
plative life, which we shall consider later.1

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion,
and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely
useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather
take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for them-
selves. But it is evident that not even these are the end; yet many
arguments have been wasted on the support of them. Let us leave
this subject, then.

Discussion of the philosophical view that there is a Form of good
6. We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss
thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made
an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by
friends of our own.* Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better,
indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to
destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers
or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to
honour truth above our friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of
classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which
is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea
embracing all numbers); but the term ‘good’ is used both in the
category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation,

1 1177a12–1178a8, 1178a22–1179a32.

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and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the
relative (for the latter is like an offshoot and accident of being); so
that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods.
Further, since ‘good’ has as many senses as ‘being’* (for it is predi-
cated both in the category of substance, as of god and of reason, and
in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is
moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the
right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the
like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases
and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the
categories, but in one only. Further, since of the things answering
to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science
of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the
things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for oppor-
tunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine,
and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by
the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what
in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself ’, if (as is the case) in ‘man
himself ’ and in a particular man the account of man is one and the
same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ;
and if this is so, neither will ‘good itself ’ and particular goods, in so
far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for
being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which
perishes in a day.* The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible
account of the good, when they place the One in the column of
goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.*

But let us discuss these matters elsewhere;1 an objection to
what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the
Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the
goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good
by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce
or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are
called good by reason of these, and in a different way. Clearly, then,
goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in
themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then,
things good in themselves from useful things, and consider
whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea.
What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those

1 Cf. Met. 986a22–6, 1028b21–4, 1072b30–1073a3, 1091a29–b3, b13–1092a17.

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that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelli-
gence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we
pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would
place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other
than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be
empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in
themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as some-
thing identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow
and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in
respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse.*
The good, therefore, is not something common answering to one
Idea.

But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the
things that only chance to have the same name.* Are goods one,
then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one
good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly, as sight is in the
body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps
these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect
precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch
of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there
is some one good which is universally predicable of goods, or is
capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not
be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable.* Perhaps, however, someone might think it worth while
to have knowledge of it with a view to the goods that are attainable
and achievable; or, having this as a sort of pattern, we shall know
better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall
attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash
with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim
at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one
side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the
arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid
is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter
will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this ‘good
itself ’, or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better
doctor or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study
health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the
health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. But
enough of these topics.

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The good must be something final and self-sufficient. Definition of
happiness reached by considering the characteristic function of man

7. Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it
can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different
in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then
is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is
done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture
a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and
pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever
else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will
be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one,
these will be the goods achievable by action.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same
point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there
are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g.
wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something
else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evi-
dently something final.* Therefore, if there is only one final end,
this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the
most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that
which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is
never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the
things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that
other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that
which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of some-
thing else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this
we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else,
but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose
each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,
judging that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the
other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for
anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems
to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by
self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by

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himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children,
wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is
born for citizenship.* But some limit must be set to this; for if we
extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends’
friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question,
however, on another occasion;1 the self-sufficient we now define as
that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in noth-
ing; and such we think happiness to be;* and further we think it
most desirable of all things, not a thing counted as one good thing
among others* — if it were so counted it would clearly be made more
desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which
is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is
always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-
sufficient, and is the end of action.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good
seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired.
This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function
of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and,
in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good
and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem
to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and
the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he
born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each
of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man
similarly has a function apart from all these?* What then can this
be? Life seems to belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is
peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and
growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems
to be shared even by the horse, the ox, and every animal. There
remains, then, an active life of the element that has reason; of this,
one part has it in the sense of being obedient to reason, the other in
the sense of possessing reason and exercising thought.* And, as ‘life
of the rational element’ also has two meanings,* we must state that
life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the
more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an
activity of soul which follows or implies reason, and if we say ‘a so-
and-so’ and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in
kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without

1 i. 10, 11, ix. 10.

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qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being
added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player
is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if
this is the case [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind
of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a
rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good
and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed
when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate virtue: if
this is the case], human good turns out to be activity of soul exhib-
iting virtue,* and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance
with the best and most complete.*

But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not
make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short
time, does not make a man blessed and happy.

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably
first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would
seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what
has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or
partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are
due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remem-
ber what has been said before,1 and not look for precision in all
things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords
with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the
inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle
in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is
useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort
of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the
same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may
not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the
cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be
well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is a
primary thing and first principle. Now of first principles we see some
by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation,
and others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try
to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to deter-
mine them correctly, since they have a great influence on what
follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the
whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

1 1094b11–27.

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Our definition is confirmed by current beliefs about happiness
8. But we must consider happiness in the light not only of our
conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said
about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false
one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three
classes,* and some are described as external, others as relating to
soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and
truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating
to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to
this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is
correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and
activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among
external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is
that the happy man lives well and fares well; for we have practically
defined happiness as a sort of living and faring well. The character-
istics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to
belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some iden-
tify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with
a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these,
accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others
include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have
been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent
persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one
respect, or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one
virtue our account is in harmony;* for to virtue belongs virtuous
activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place
the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity.
For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result,
as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but
the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be
acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the
most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who
compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who
act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul,
and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant;

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e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spec-
tacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are
pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the
lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict
with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but
the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by
nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are
pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious
charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said,
the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good;
since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly,
nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly
in all other cases.* If this is so, virtuous actions must be in them-
selves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of
these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges
well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have
described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant
thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the
inscription at Delos —

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But most
pleasant it is to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or
one — the best — of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said,1 it needs the external goods as well; for
it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper
equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political
power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which
takes the lustre from happiness — good birth, goodly children,
beauty;* for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or
solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a
man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or
friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said,2
then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition;
for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune,
though others identify it with virtue.

1 1098b26–9. 2 ibid.

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Is happiness acquired by learning or habituation, or sent by god or
by chance?

9. For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is
to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of
training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by
chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable
that happiness should be god-given* and most surely god-given of
all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would
perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems,
however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and
some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike
things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the
best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed.

It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are
not maimed as regards thei

Philosophy homework help

Security department sizes and composition are impacted by several factors. These factors are number of
data centers and Points of Presence (POPs), the industry, the company culture, whether the company is
international and number of employees.

The first is the number data centers and points of presence. The cost of the security stack increases for
each Point of Presence, but the number of data centers also speaks the complexity of the network. Of
course, the more POPs, the more budget to pay and maintain the hardware and the more people will be
needed to run everything.

The next factor is the industry. The type of industry will directly impact the composition and size of the
department. A Defense sector company for instance would very likely have a larger Security Operations
Center and Security Incident Response Team than say a college of similar size. The Defense sector simply
has a greater threat and more regulations.

Company culture usual has an impact on what type of work is done within IT and what is done within
the IT Security group. There really is no rule as to where everything should be located, so it’s usually a
result of decisions made years before and no one coming up with a compelling enough reason to change
it. Almost all IT Security departments have responsibility for Policy, Security Awareness, Risk
Management and Incident Response. Most IT groups have responsibility over managing firewalls, even
though the security department usually comes up with the standards. Most companies also have
Identity and Access Control reporting somewhere in IT, although that trend is changing. I will list other
common groups that could report in either or maybe even under someone else like a Chief Risk Officer.
Vulnerability Management, Vendor Risk Management, Customer Assurance, Could Security, Security
Architecture, Mergers and Acquisitions, Regulatory Compliance, Privacy & Physical Security.

And this isn’t and exhaustive list. There are many ways to form a department to accomplish all the work
required. Some industries will even have product specific security teams that report within a business
unit and not to the corporate IT or IT Security team. There are pros and cons to every department
configuration, but the goal should be to make sure that all the security needs are being met in a
proactive and mature (not ad hoc) fashion and that no team is responsible for something another team
has authority over and that all teams with any security responsibility are communicating effectively with
the others. Regardless of company or department composition, a Security Council is recommended.

When it comes to the guidance for how large a department should be and how much budget they
should manage, there is some industry guidance.

https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/focus/cio-insider-business-insights/technology-investments-
value-creation.html

For our purposes, we will use an average Fortune 500 company and we will round down to keep the
math simple. IT spend will be 3% of Revenue. Revenue for our company will be $10 Billion dollars.

There is a lot of information out there about how much IT Security spend should be as a percentage of
the IT budget. I found articles claiming that the average was as high as 10%. From personal experience,
only financial institutions spend as much as 10% and most Fortune 500 companies are a lot closer to 3-
5%. For our purposes because I want to make it realistic, we will use 5% of IT spend. The last piece of the
puzzle is that most IT Security departments spend 70% of their budget on labor.

Average salary for an individual contributor in IT Security is $80,000, realizing you will have some junior
folks making less and one or two senior folks making more. An average manager will make $120,000 and
the CISO will likely be a director or low paid VP, averaging around $200,000.

An average ratio of individual contributor to manager is 5-7 people. The CISO will have as many direct
reports as necessary but it of the company requires a lot of teams, you may even see one or two senior
managers or possibly even a director over 2-3 managers.

The other factors to consider for our mythical company will be that there are 12,000 employees, two
data centers and two POPs. It is also publicly traded and only domestic, spread across a dozen states,
one of which is California.

The last descriptive piece is that this is a manufacturing company that makes widgets but does not
handle direct sales. They do have very cool widgets and spend a lot of money on R&D to make sure they
have the coolest widgets on the market.

The important thing to remember is that there is no wrong answer, but you will need to make a best
guess for department composition and staffing levels.

Philosophy homework help

19ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

CHAPTER ONE

ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY

Aristotle was born in Stagira in the northeastern part of Greece in the early
part of the fourth century BCE. He was raised in a wealthy family and was
provided all the privileges and benefi ts of his class position. His father was
the physician to the king of Macedonia. Around 367 he joined the Academy
of Plato in Athens. After twenty years of lectures, seminars, and research,
he became tutor to Alexander the Great. In 335 he formed his own school
of philosophy in the public gymnasium named the Lyceum. This chapter
will focus on those ideas of Aristotle that were specifi cally infl uential on
the development of the theories, methods, and ideals of nineteenth-century
European social theorists, including his ethical and political writings on
social justice, critique of political economy and unnatural market activities,
theory of knowledge and science (episteme, phronesis, and techne), analysis
of the virtuous life and political happiness (eudaimonia), and investigation
into the social constitution of a democratic polity.1

Aristotle’s dreams of human potentiality and civic happiness were
tempered by his sociological awareness of the institutional limits and struc-
tural possibilities of Athenian democracy. Dreams were always measured
by potentialities, political values by social institutions, and the Athenian
imagination by empirical reality. The deep-blue skies of Athens that inspired
the mind to soar to unimagined and unimaginable heights of the sublime
and the beautiful during the classical period were always restrained by the
stark landscape of Attica. The blending together of the worlds of philosophy
and social science led Emile Durkheim to the conclusion that this ancient
philosopher, along with Plato, was one of the fi rst sociologists.2 To make
this argument more precise, Aristotle was the fi rst to examine a variation
of the “AGIL” schema, that is, the interconnections among economics,
politics, personality development (character, virtue, and cultural pedagogy),

19

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20 DREAMS IN EXILE

and law and social institutions. He saw the complex interweaving between
virtue and social institutions, ideas and structures, moral action and politics.3
The discussion of ethics was to be framed by a broader consideration of the
legal constitution and moral economy of the Athenian polity. The fi elds of
ethics, politics, and economics were to be the integrated basis of a critical
moral philosophy of political science, as well as the social foundation for
the realization of human nature.

In the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, Aristotle examines the
relationship between the good and constitutions, that is, between the vir-
tuous life and the political institutions that nurture and sustain it. These
two works should be viewed as one joint statement about the nature of
the good life. The Nicomachean Ethics begins with an examination of the
“function of man,” moral and intellectual virtue, and political happiness,
and it quickly opens two paths of analysis. The fi rst is clearly philosophical,
as each following book in the work details the specifi c ethical principles of
virtue and the common good in terms of practical wisdom, social justice,
and the friendship of virtue. The second path is sociological, as Aristotle
attempts to give institutional life to his ethical principles. He knew that
by themselves, without proper institutional support and protection, social
ideals would wither and die. By means of empirical examples and historical
research, he delves into the details of the ancient political constitutions of
Sparta, Crete, and Carthage; he discusses the various forms of the correct
and deviant political arrangements; he examines the democratic polity in
general and the Athenian constitution from Solon to Pericles in particular;
and he outlines the decline of a moral economy based on friendship and
justice into a political economy of class, wealth, and power. The moral ideals
of friendship, social justice, and practical knowledge are juxtaposed with their
institutional counterparts of a moral economy, correct political constitutions,
and ideal democratic polity. Philosophy and sociology are elegantly com-
bined in Aristotle to offer the reader a delicate balance between principles
and structures, ideals and reality, cultural values and social institutions. It
is this very combination of ethical and political refl ection within historical
research—a practical science—that may be Aristotle’s lasting contribution
to social theory in the nineteenth century.

HAPPINESS AS VIRTUE, NOBILITY, AND REASON

Immanuel Bekker, who was a classicist at the University of Berlin, cre-
ated the fi rst modern edition in Greek of Aristotle’s grand works in the
nineteenth century. The Nicomachean Ethics examines the nature of virtue
(arete), character, knowledge, and justice, whereas the Politics concentrates
on the moral economy and political institutions that make the realization of
virtuous living and the good life possible. Before Aristotle delves into these

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21ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

issues, he focuses on the simple question of the ultimate telos, or purpose, of
human existence. He characterizes this question as “the function of man,”
which colors the development of his philosophical, historical, and sociologi-
cal analyses. Some have argued that the Nicomachean Ethics deals with the
moral life of the individual, whereas the Politics examines the social life.
Although this is technically correct, it misses the necessary dynamic that
Aristotle is making between the individual and social moments of human
life; the two components are inextricably bound together since one without
the other is impossible.

Aristotle raises the issue of the central function or activity of man as
the crucial question that will permit the philosopher access to the nature
of happiness and the highest good for humanity. Every activity, whether it
is medicine, military strategy, or the arts, seeks some particular good as its
goal. It may be health, victory in war, or the creation of a beautiful piece
of artwork. Although Aristotle inquires into these particular activities, he
is ultimately searching for the fi nal good in itself. This is the good without
qualifi cation or reservation. He begins with a philosophical anthropology
based on nature (physis) that grounds his understanding of the law, con-
stitution (politeia), and moral economy. He rejects the notion that honor,
pleasure, and virtue are ends in themselves, because they are used as means
to further the happiness of the individual. He asks: what is that human
activity which produces the greatest happiness and is an end in itself—that
which is done for no higher good than the activity itself? The continuation
of life, nutrition, growth, and perception are not characteristics specifi c to
humans, as they are shared by all living animals. Further, Aristotle quickly
and unceremoniously rejects the view of the individual that will become the
foundation for modern natural rights and utilitarian thinkers. The function
of man is to achieve a certain kind of distinctively human life that involves
an “activity of the soul which follows or implies a rational principle.”4 Life
means more than mere continuance of existence or search for private pleasure
or personal happiness. Rather, it involves a rational activity undertaken for
the moral perfection of goodness and nobility. Aristotle contends that the
fl ute player, the sculptor, and the artist have distinct functions. It is in the
performance of their activities according to the highest standards that the
good of the activity resides. Whether it is playing a song, creating a frieze,
or painting a fresco, the activity of each person expresses the highest good
of each function. According to Aristotle, happiness is the fi nal good without
qualifi cation; it does not require any further activity or purpose. Being self-
suffi cient and pleasant in itself, it is the end of all other action.

That activity, which is so distinctive of human beings in general, is
the rational life in search of virtue and happiness.5 It is in the exercise and
expression of rational thought and refl ection in a good and noble manner
that the defi ning characteristics of human life are to be found. Aristotle

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22 DREAMS IN EXILE

proceeds to take the reader on a journey of profound signifi cance as he
outlines before us the nature of a life in pursuit of reason. Some secondary
interpreters have stressed the moral autonomy, human dignity, and moral
sensitivity within Aristotle’s ethics. Although they are important issues, they
must be connected in the end to the profoundly radical political dimension
of his discourse.6 Practical reason is not a cognitive capability or philosophi-
cal contemplation that is exercised in isolation from others, but rather a
political moment of intersubjective dialogue. It is the foundation of human
happiness and a democratic polity. Aristotle turns to examine the nature of
virtue as both intellectual (episteme, techne, and phronesis) and moral (courage,
temperance, truthfulness, friendliness, nobility, honor, and justice). In the
practice of virtue, the individual is bonded to the constitutional polity by
practical wisdom, deliberative judgment, and social justice. The exercise of
practical reason entails individual deliberation, a moral economy, political
constitution, and the law. The individual and social elements are analytically
distinct for the sake of analysis and clarity, but personality and politics are
indistinguishable in reality.

Happiness, then, is the most prized, beautiful, and pleasant activity
possible that realizes the full potential of human beings as political animals.
It is that which is good and noble in itself, that is, self-conscious, virtuous
activity within the polis. The concept that captures the full ramifi cation
of this activity is practical reason, which has both a micro and a macro
component. Rejecting Plato’s theory of the Idea of the good as the philo-
sophical contemplation of the essential truths and absolute Forms, Aristotle
views practical wisdom (phronesis) as the nurturing of reason and virtue
within the more contingent and empirical process bounded by the political
constitution. Action is framed by the historical circumstances and lived
experiences of law, tradition, education, and politics. These institutions help
create the fi rm and stable “states of character” or moral personality that
rationally direct virtuous activity toward the good life. As Aristotle views
it, all virtuous action is concerned with pleasure and pain, which are the
passions that help motivate us in certain directions and ultimately defi ne our
moral character. But the passions are also the reason why certain individuals
become bad. Virtue is measured by the rule of pleasure and pain and our
reactions to them. In our search for moral excellence and in our reaction
to pleasure and pain, character is formed. In some cases, pleasure may force
us into disreputable and bad actions, while in others, the avoidance of pain
could restrain us from noble and courageous actions. It is for these reasons
that culture and education (paideia) are central to the full development of
the proper moral character with its appropriate sensitivity to and balance
of the passions under the guidance of refl ective moderation and softened
temperance. A cultured reason, matured over time and cognizant of tradi-
tion, helps the individual navigate carefully through the dangerous and

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23ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

confl icting passions of Scylla and Charybdis. Reason restrains our passions
and moderately guides our desires by applying the right rule. Only in this
way is moral excellence possible.

Although Aristotle argues that the virtuous act must be pleasurable,
pain too may be associated with virtue. Temperance is developed by the
avoidance of certain extreme pleasures, while a courageous and noble reac-
tion to pain and misfortune can be the basis for happiness and a “greatness
of soul.” Happiness is measured by how the noble individual responds to
the circumstances of life. Aristotle is aware, however, that in the case of
Priam, who watched the fall of mighty Troy from its lofty towers, these
circumstances on rare occasions may so totally overwhelm the individual
that even a virtuous life cannot result in happiness. Virtue must be a self-
consciously chosen pleasurable act undertaken in order to satisfy the state
of the soul. But even an excess of pleasure and pain can be dangerous. For
the lover of virtue, action is a pleasure which through learning and the law
becomes ingrained in the citizen’s character. In Aristotle’s eyes, a person
who does not receive pleasure from virtuous activity can never be virtuous.
“Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world.”7
It is a way of life that realizes the natural potentiality of human beings by
combining the passions and reason.

We become virtuous not by knowing about virtue, but by doing virtu-
ous acts. Aristotle outlines the general conditions in which actions become
moral: the actor must have clear knowledge of the goals and the proper means
of reaching them; he must choose them freely; and the decision must come
from his unchanging character. Knowledge, reason, self-determination, moral
autonomy, and a virtuous character ground action as morally good. Activities
undertaken for different reasons and under different conditions cannot be
morally justifi ed. Aristotle summarizes his argument: “Virtue, then, is a state
of character concerned with choice lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative
to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle
by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”8

The ultimate goal of practical wisdom is not knowledge but action.
Just as the builder and lyre player excel only through continuous work and
practice, the virtuous and just develop their abilities through the practice
of virtue and justice. Over time this action becomes habituated into the
character and values of the citizen. Individual experience becomes institu-
tionalized in education, legislation, tradition, and the constitution. Aristotle
contends that most people seek refuge in the abstract theory of philosophers
in order to avoid the diffi cult task of implementing the principles of reason.
He draws the analogy of the patient who freely seeks advice from a physician
but who is equally loathe to act upon it. Knowledge offers us consolation
and retreat while action requires a transformation of life and character. A
life of virtue involves following the intermediate path, avoiding the extreme

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24 DREAMS IN EXILE

vices of excess and defi cit; it is a search for the middle. A moderate life of
neither too much nor too little provides the moral guidelines for economic
activity and communal participation. Just as in the creation of a great piece
of art, any more or less would destroy its perfection. Excess or defi cit of any
virtue destroys that virtue and goodness. An extreme of courage, meaning
too little or too much, could result in rashness or cowardice, and an excess
of temperance could result in self-indulgence or a defi ciency in sensitivity.

How moderation is to be achieved is not through a mechanical mea-
surement of the mean, but through accumulated wisdom of the best course
of action in particular cases resulting from years of experience and critical
judgment. Although acting rationally with moderation is a universal principle,
it must be applied in individual cases. The universal rule, the right rule of
reason, must be adapted and adjusted to the particular circumstances of the
moral situation. Thus, reason harmonizes the universal and the particular in
each case. The result is a life of intermediate passions and actions. According
to Aristotle, a virtuous life is one characterized by friendliness, generosity,
magnifi cence, good temperament, modesty, temperance, truthfulness, cour-
age, nobility, honor, and justice. When the goodness of character of moral
virtues is joined to the virtue of practical reason and understanding, the
result is happiness and a good life.

In the Athenian political community, three major types of persons
inhabited the shops and the exciting arena of the agora: philosophers,
citizens, and workers. Corresponding to them were three different life ac-
tivities—theoretical contemplation (theoria), political activity (praxis), and
utilitarian work (poiesis)—with their three corresponding forms of knowl-
edge—episteme, or the universal and theoretical knowledge of the philosopher,
phronesis, or the practical knowledge and political wisdom of the citizen, and
techne, or the instrumental skills and technical knowledge of the artisan and
worker. It is around these distinctions that Aristotle develops his theory of
ethics and the virtuous life of practical reason. The Nicomachean Ethics is
so structured that the central focus of the work involves an examination
of the practical wisdom (phronesis) of the citizen in the discharging of his
constitutional duties and obligations through political participation within
the community. This analysis of practical wisdom is framed by the fi rst few
books on the particular nature of happiness and the good life, moral virtue,
the good character, individual deliberation, and discursive rationality. This
emphasis on the nature of the moral individual is balanced by a discussion
of the structural features of the polity which encourage and habituate prac-
tical wisdom. These institutions include friendship, citizenship, household
economy, and social justice. The Politics develops further this macro-socio-
logical inquiry into the correct political constitutions, moral economy, and
critique of unnatural wealth acquisition in the market. This relationship
between the virtuous life and law is best articulated in the Greek word for

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25ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

deliberation (bouleusis) and the word for one of the main political organs
in Athenian politics besides the Assembly and the jury courts, that is, the
Boule, or Council of Five Hundred. The distinction between the individual
and society disappears in the act of personal refl ection and public delibera-
tion, as the citizen expresses his full potential as a rational human being
with others in public speech. In the life of the Athenian citizen, equilibrium
is established, virtue assured, and practical wisdom achieved. These are the
highest aspirations toward which human beings strive and the basis for a
virtuous and happy life; they are the fullest realization of human potential
and the function of man.

Aristotle’s remarkable achievement is to defi ne the parameters of ethics
and the function of humanity in terms of virtue, wisdom, and justice sup-
ported and nurtured through the historical and social structures of Athenian
law and a moral economy based on the ethical priorities of family, friendship,
and citizenship.9 Philosophy and sociology are integrated in a common cause
of defi ning the ultimate goals and natural law of the ancient community.
Aristotle’s theory of ethics and politics represents the ancient response to the
question of the ultimate meaning and purpose of human life. The following
subsections of this chapter will outline the philosophical parameters of moral
and intellectual virtue by examining the forms of happiness, knowledge,
and friendship found in classical Greece. After this analysis, the argument
turns to Aristotle’s sociology, with an inquiry into the history and structure
of the moral economy, social justice, and best political constitution. Virtue
and reason can be given real existence, just as the good life and happiness
can best develop within the concrete economic and political institutions
of the ancient polis.

The political dimension of human beings, both as an integral part
of the defi nition of humanity and as its ultimate goal of perfection and
self-suffi ciency, is not an arbitrary construction of a social contract among
competing individuals or groups. Rather, it is the essence of humanity to be
a political animal. Unlike other living species who associate in groups and
even express feelings of pleasure and pain through vocalizations, humans are
the only ones who can engage in speech and, thus, exercise reason. Aristotle
views the ability to reason in philosophy and in public to be the highest
expression of the essence and function of man. Only humans can reason
about ethics and politics; only humans can deliberate about the meaning of
life; and only humans can talk about the nature of a just society. In this way,
humans are capable of living the good life according to the values of moral
and intellectual virtue as they are publicly articulated in the agora and Pynx.
Speech and reason are, for Aristotle, civic qualities that can be manifested
only in the public act of deliberation and discourse. In the end, the state,
through which the good life and fullest development of human beings are
accomplished, has a natural priority over all other forms of associations

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26 DREAMS IN EXILE

because it is the fi nal end of human existence. Just as the hand and foot act
according to the broader purpose of the whole body, the family and village
associations are subordinate to the overall design and goals of the political
community. Humanity does not just engage in political activity by simply
forming constitutions and creating laws; they defi ne their very being, their
very essence, by participating in politics. Every social action is simply a
supportive activity bound to the ultimate purpose of nature. The end of the
good life is public happiness, defi ned as a life of virtuous activity, that is, a
moderate, just life based upon human reason. This is what Aristotle refers
to as the superiority and beauty of the soul. He concludes Book 1 of the
Politics with the comment that the true concern of the economic management
of the household is not the acquisition of commodities but the cultivation
of human excellence (arete) and the development of the virtue of citizens.
Economics for the ancient Greeks is ultimately an ethical science.

DEFENDING MORAL ECONOMY (OIKONOMIKE) AGAINST
POLITICAL ECONOMY (CHREMATISTIKE)

Aristotle’s theory of social ethics focuses on the relationship between morality
and politics, between virtue and structures. In his subtle blending of empirical
and philosophical reason, he concentrates mainly on the social structures that
affect and nurture virtuous life. In response to Plato, he is concerned less with
knowledge of the forms of virtue than acting in a moderate and temperate
fashion. His purpose is to develop the personal dispositions, passions, and
social foundations for happiness and a just society. Since his goal is action
rather than simply knowledge, he emphasizes the social and political means
for promoting practical wisdom. This explains why at the end of his work
on social ethics Aristotle explicitly begins to direct his attention toward an
examination of the structures of law, constitutions, and justice. In the last
paragraph of the Nicomachean Ethics he writes, “Now our predecessors have
left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore,
that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the
constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability our philosophy
of human nature.”10 Since the virtuous citizen is by nature political, Aristotle
sets out to examine the available empirical and historical evidence about
the nature of Greek constitutions, their origins and development. He is
specifi cally interested in how they are organized, administered, maintained,
and which are the best. Virtuous activity and happiness are possible only
within a well-ordered political community; politics structures the way people
interrelate, deliberate, and decide the crucial public questions that affect
their lives. Reason, freedom, and virtue are always aspects of political life
for the ancients, and the structures of politics provide the context in which
they are defi ned and developed.

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27ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

Before Aristotle introduces his analysis of politics and constitutions
in the Politics, he fi rst examines the general nature of a moral economy at
the level of the oikos (household) and the polis (state). In this fi rst chapter,
he also creates his masterful and infl uential critique of political economy
and market exchange. Aristotle’s theory of economics is developed in four
chapters in Book 1 of the Politics.

Aristotle begins his study by outlining the natural ways of life through
his analysis of slavery, the family, household economy, the historical develop-
ment of the state, and the market economy. In each case Aristotle seeks the
“natural law” that governs the social relationships within each association,
thus examining the interactions between the master-slave, husband-wife,
citizens in the state, and economic exchange (metabletike or allage) among
polis members. His purpose is to portray the natural forms of family life,
property acquisition, market exchange, and political constitutions. Since
economics is embedded in and subservient to the general values of the
political community, Aristotle’s economics provides the foundation stone
for the later development of his theory of law and politics. For him, there
are two kinds of natural acquisition of material goods or property: barter
(C-C) and limited exchange (C-M-C). Corresponding to them, there are
the deviant forms of economic activity, which include market exchange for
profi t (M-C-M’) and the fi nancial gain of interest (M-M’). The natural forms
of property acquisition are based on satisfying the needs of the household
and maintaining self-suffi ciency within the family and community. The
formal goal of the household (and polis) is economic autonomy by which
the family is capable of subsisting on the products of its own agricultural
production (autarchy).

The unnatural forms of economy are based on self-interest and eco-
nomic gain that undermine the natural forms of social existence in the
polis. With unnatural acquisition, the law and constitution are unable to
sustain themselves, thereby perverting the functions or goals of man and the
state. With the development of a market economy, utilitarian values, and
the unlimited accumulation of property, the natural law of the economy is
unsustainable, and with it a society founded upon virtue, reason, and de-
liberation is unsustainable. More than any other aspect of his social theory,
this critique of political economy—market and property—will have enor-
mous impact on nineteenth-century social theorists. Aristotle asks whether
economic management of slaves, wife, and children within the household
is part of household management or whether it requires a different form of
knowledge and set of skills than the acquisition of property in an agrarian
economy. Recognizing that there are philosophers on both sides of the is-
sue, he contends that family and farming are to be seen as part of wealth
acquisition, since life and the good life require a fi rm economic foundation.
For this reason he moves to a consideration of the nature of property.

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28 DREAMS IN EXILE

Aristotle begins his study of property with an analysis of slavery and
then turns to an examination of the natural acquisition of property within
the family in household management. In Book 1, chapter 8, he outlines the
history of material acquisition by which human beings have obtained the
means of sustaining different ways of life. From nomadic living, hunting,
warfare, piracy, and fi shing to agriculture, Aristotle investigates the main
forms of productive labor. Nature has provided humans with the means of
sustenance. Because nature is teleological and formed in such a way that
everything has a purpose, it has providentially provided the goods and modes
of production necessary for the continuance of human life. “If then nature
makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be
th

Philosophy homework help

This week’s reading was an academic reference article on the nature of privacy. You can download it here: 


MoorePrivacyIEE.pdf

In two pages or so double spaced, reflect on the various definitions of privacy, what can be said in favor or against a few of them, and the moral status of privacy.

Academic reference articles are not intended to present argument for a specific thesis, but rather to introduce you to a variety of views on an issue and provide a guide to literature on these views. If you are interested in privacy and choose to do research on a privacy related topic, some of the authors and works cited in this article will likely be useful in developing your argument.

A seminar paper is not a research paper. You should not be citing any sources besides the assigned reading. The seminar paper will just be your own short explanation of the key arguments and points from the reading. Think of this as a cleaned-up version of your notes on the reading. A seminar paper is what you would write up for yourself in preparation for contributing to a seminar, a conversation about a reading. In our case, the seminar will be our weekly discussion board.

Philosophy homework help


Summary of Utilitarianism, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics

I. Utilitarian:

a. Some aspects:

i. It is empirical, basing itself on observing whatever humans happen to enjoy and dislike in the present moment.

ii. It presupposes that humans are driven by nothing more than sensory pleasure and pain.

iii. It is primarily focused on the ends of pleasure without regard to the means.

iv. Justice is therefore about maximizing utility for pleasure amongst the greatest amount of people, while minimizing pain.

b. Some pros:

i. It at least considers that we are embodied beings, and our felt pleasures and pains are an important part of morally determining a meaningful and happy life.

ii. It appears simple and nonjudgmental in accepting all preferences as equal.

c. Some cons:

i. it makes justice and rights a matter of calculation rather than principle, so that majority rule can easily step over individuals and minorities.

ii. Its supposed nonjudgmental character actually covers up a more severe prejudice that reduces all pleasures to a single uniform measure of value, which Bentham refers to as money.

iii. This tends to sweep morality under the rug since it no longer reasons about meaningful qualitative distinctions amongst our preferences and how we should value some over others according to a norm beyond fleeting commercial interests.

II. Deontology:

a. Some aspects:

i. It is rational, based in the coherent, consistent, universal nature of reason, rather than based on empirical fluctuations between different societies and times.

ii. It presupposes that humans are inherently rational according to a free will able to determine its own ends above the tug of war between sensory pleasures and pains. The will is only free when it acts according to the autonomy of its own reason rather than according to externally determined instincts, sensations or commercial interests.

iii. Its primary focus is on the rightness of the motive behind the act, and not on the results or consequences of the act—as a formal concern about whether the will acted freely in obeying reason alone, it is not only unconcerned with consequences but also unconcerned with whether the person is becoming virtuous through that act.

iv. Justice is about respecting the free will, and thus about making sure majority might doesn’t encroach on the individual right to make one’s own rational choice.

b. Some pros:

i. It holds to a normative conception of the human in its rational capacities beyond fleeting sensations of pleasure and pain

ii. On this basis, and thus against utilitarians, it grounds justice and rights on a principle of human dignity rather than calculation – individual rights are worthy of respect regardless of what the majority finds desirable.

iii. Respect of rights also does not require challenging all the preferences and desires that people do indeed have, since the point of justice is to respect the freedom of choice itself (though in its rational form).

c. Some cons:

i. The normative conception of the human tends to focus too much on the highly abstract form of pure practical reason at the expense of our inherently embodied social nature, thus failing to properly consider the moral weight of our loves, desires, and pursuit of happiness.

ii. Securing rights in terms of freedom of will and choice alone does not really settle most issues, since almost all issues, small or big, require reasoning about ends, purposes, and meanings: about what is socially, economically, and politically
good
for a properly human life to concretely and holistically become (rather than abstractly recognized only in theory).

iii. Similarly, its abstract focus exclusively on respecting others as ends, fails to account for the required social and civic virtues, along with their required practices and institutions, that could promote and cultivate such respect in the first place.

iv. In other words, it doesn’t adequately address what we should choose in terms of how to become truly dignified beings in both theory and practice.

III. Virtue Ethics:

a. Some aspects:

i. It is rational and empirical, basing its reasoning both on empirically observed qualities and capacities, while reasoning about which ones are potentially distinctive and definitive for a more excellent form of human existence regardless of whether they have yet to be empirically realized.

ii. It presupposes that humans are inherently social and rational. Like Kant, Aristotle held that reason is not a mere instrument but the form of human freedom itself. But unlike Kant, humans are most free when they are able to fully develop their distinctive social and rational capacities, socially in the most holistic sense.

iii. Its focus is on the end goal or common good of happiness, not as pleasure but holistically as well-rounded human flourishing, achievable through the virtues as the right means/practices of building the required character traits/habits.

iv. Justice is about distributing and allocating goods so as to reward and promote social virtues that lead to human excellence.

b. Some pros:

i. More practical and comprehensive in empirically and rationally considering what it means to be an embodied social being.

ii. Has a normative sense of human nature and the common good, beyond commercial interests, to help discern those preferences that are truer to a fully human form of social existence.

iii. Considers reason not in the purely abstract form of a free will alone, but rather in how we substantively reason about common goods and practice social virtues that aim toward, not just the end of respecting individual freedom, but the end of actually making everyone free through social, economic and political organization for the sake of community.

iv. In other words, even if we can’t accept the content of Aristotle’s world, his virtue ethics shows us comprehensively what we should be rationally discussing and arguing about in ethics—mainly, that the freedom of choice, the act of choosing itself, is meaningless unless there is something of a good life of human excellence that we can commonly pursue.

c. Some cons:

i. It is demanding and hard to develop within our fragmented and compartmentalized capitalist society, which does not practice, encourage, or promote certain fundamental social virtues or allow much free time to do so.

ii. It can easily become fixated on narrow conceptions of human nature or the common good and forget that these norms, and how they are to be pursued, are also continually expanding (if the human really is a progressive being) and so must be continually reasoned about and discussed with others.

iii. Similarly, while it is not interested in the elitism of moneyed wealth and power, it can devolve into an exclusionary elitism of moral excellence, forgetting that it is a collective project of building community for the sake of universal flourishing, raising everyone up into human excellence.

Comparison and Contrast chart:

Ethical Paradigm

Normative Standpoint

Dimensions to human being

Main Purpose for ethical action

Primary Means for fulfilling ethical action

Ultimate Social Goal

Utilitarianism

Bentham

Mill

We are only consuming animals without universal standpoint

One-dimensional: pleasure machines with no higher qualities

Maximize and regulate pleasure seeking within given brute nature

Ends justify whatever means

Functional Stability for status quo of commercial society

Deontology

Kant

We are consuming animals, but with a universally shared rational structure

Dualistically two-dimensional:

Pleasure machines + rational will

To restrain and transcend given brute nature when its interests conflict

Focuses on neither ends nor means, but on purifying intentions for obeying duty for duty’s sake

Cosmopolitan respect of individual rights

Virtue

Aristotle

We are inherently social animals with universally shared rational and social potentials for politics

Organically multidimensional: sensible pleasures, social qualities, rational capacities

To transform our brute nature according to its more excellent potentials for holistic development

Virtue as fitting appropriate means to ends: the practice of building up highest powers through habits

A political community of friendship and mutual flourishing

Philosophy homework help

Essay Overview:

Each module will require that you write and submit a thoughtful essay, of 1500 to 2000 words, in response to ANY ONE of the several essay question choices provided within that module.

The assigned essay question is drawn directly from its module’s assigned textbook readings. Your essay should provide a relevant, thorough, and detailed response to the essay question assigned. Draw directly upon our assigned reading in order to carefully craft your response.

Essay Instructions:

1. Write and submit a thoughtful, thorough, substantial essay, of at least 1500 words, in direct response to ONE (your choice) of the Module 5 essay questions below.

2. Draw directly upon our assigned textbook readings for this module in carefully crafting your detailed response.

3. Please double-space your essay, include your name at the top of its first page, and be sure to cite all sources quoted or paraphrased from (even if it’s only our textbooks).

4. Don’t forget to include a bibliography or “works cited” page at the end!

5. This essay is DUE by the end of Module 5. Submit it to the Module 5 Essay Assignment dropbox no later than the last day of this module.

Module 5 Essay Questions:

(Choose just ONE to answer — either 1, 2, or 3):

1. How plausible, in your view, is Dembski’s effort to reinstate design within science? Are his arguments in favor of such reinstatement sound? Are they successful in making their case? Why or why not?

2. What is religious exclusivism? What problems does religious exclusivism possess? Is John Hick’s pluralistic solution ultimately plausible? Why or why not?

3. What is MacIntyre’s argument for the necessity of independent knowledge of the just? Why must such knowledge be necessary? Does the requirement for an independent knowledge of the just, from that of our knowledge of God, lead us to Sartre’s atheism? Why or why not?


Notes

· See the Grading Rubric attached to this assignment for grading information.

· Each essay must be written and submitted to its Assignment Dropbox before the end of its module. (See the Course Schedule for module start/end dates and due dates.)

· For additional guidance and helpful pointers to further assist you in successfully completing your essays, see Writing Philosophy Essays, Writing Thesis Statements, and Sample Essay  in the Start Here module.

Philosophy homework help

19ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

CHAPTER ONE

ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY

Aristotle was born in Stagira in the northeastern part of Greece in the early
part of the fourth century BCE. He was raised in a wealthy family and was
provided all the privileges and benefi ts of his class position. His father was
the physician to the king of Macedonia. Around 367 he joined the Academy
of Plato in Athens. After twenty years of lectures, seminars, and research,
he became tutor to Alexander the Great. In 335 he formed his own school
of philosophy in the public gymnasium named the Lyceum. This chapter
will focus on those ideas of Aristotle that were specifi cally infl uential on
the development of the theories, methods, and ideals of nineteenth-century
European social theorists, including his ethical and political writings on
social justice, critique of political economy and unnatural market activities,
theory of knowledge and science (episteme, phronesis, and techne), analysis
of the virtuous life and political happiness (eudaimonia), and investigation
into the social constitution of a democratic polity.1

Aristotle’s dreams of human potentiality and civic happiness were
tempered by his sociological awareness of the institutional limits and struc-
tural possibilities of Athenian democracy. Dreams were always measured
by potentialities, political values by social institutions, and the Athenian
imagination by empirical reality. The deep-blue skies of Athens that inspired
the mind to soar to unimagined and unimaginable heights of the sublime
and the beautiful during the classical period were always restrained by the
stark landscape of Attica. The blending together of the worlds of philosophy
and social science led Emile Durkheim to the conclusion that this ancient
philosopher, along with Plato, was one of the fi rst sociologists.2 To make
this argument more precise, Aristotle was the fi rst to examine a variation
of the “AGIL” schema, that is, the interconnections among economics,
politics, personality development (character, virtue, and cultural pedagogy),

19

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20 DREAMS IN EXILE

and law and social institutions. He saw the complex interweaving between
virtue and social institutions, ideas and structures, moral action and politics.3
The discussion of ethics was to be framed by a broader consideration of the
legal constitution and moral economy of the Athenian polity. The fi elds of
ethics, politics, and economics were to be the integrated basis of a critical
moral philosophy of political science, as well as the social foundation for
the realization of human nature.

In the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, Aristotle examines the
relationship between the good and constitutions, that is, between the vir-
tuous life and the political institutions that nurture and sustain it. These
two works should be viewed as one joint statement about the nature of
the good life. The Nicomachean Ethics begins with an examination of the
“function of man,” moral and intellectual virtue, and political happiness,
and it quickly opens two paths of analysis. The fi rst is clearly philosophical,
as each following book in the work details the specifi c ethical principles of
virtue and the common good in terms of practical wisdom, social justice,
and the friendship of virtue. The second path is sociological, as Aristotle
attempts to give institutional life to his ethical principles. He knew that
by themselves, without proper institutional support and protection, social
ideals would wither and die. By means of empirical examples and historical
research, he delves into the details of the ancient political constitutions of
Sparta, Crete, and Carthage; he discusses the various forms of the correct
and deviant political arrangements; he examines the democratic polity in
general and the Athenian constitution from Solon to Pericles in particular;
and he outlines the decline of a moral economy based on friendship and
justice into a political economy of class, wealth, and power. The moral ideals
of friendship, social justice, and practical knowledge are juxtaposed with their
institutional counterparts of a moral economy, correct political constitutions,
and ideal democratic polity. Philosophy and sociology are elegantly com-
bined in Aristotle to offer the reader a delicate balance between principles
and structures, ideals and reality, cultural values and social institutions. It
is this very combination of ethical and political refl ection within historical
research—a practical science—that may be Aristotle’s lasting contribution
to social theory in the nineteenth century.

HAPPINESS AS VIRTUE, NOBILITY, AND REASON

Immanuel Bekker, who was a classicist at the University of Berlin, cre-
ated the fi rst modern edition in Greek of Aristotle’s grand works in the
nineteenth century. The Nicomachean Ethics examines the nature of virtue
(arete), character, knowledge, and justice, whereas the Politics concentrates
on the moral economy and political institutions that make the realization of
virtuous living and the good life possible. Before Aristotle delves into these

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21ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

issues, he focuses on the simple question of the ultimate telos, or purpose, of
human existence. He characterizes this question as “the function of man,”
which colors the development of his philosophical, historical, and sociologi-
cal analyses. Some have argued that the Nicomachean Ethics deals with the
moral life of the individual, whereas the Politics examines the social life.
Although this is technically correct, it misses the necessary dynamic that
Aristotle is making between the individual and social moments of human
life; the two components are inextricably bound together since one without
the other is impossible.

Aristotle raises the issue of the central function or activity of man as
the crucial question that will permit the philosopher access to the nature
of happiness and the highest good for humanity. Every activity, whether it
is medicine, military strategy, or the arts, seeks some particular good as its
goal. It may be health, victory in war, or the creation of a beautiful piece
of artwork. Although Aristotle inquires into these particular activities, he
is ultimately searching for the fi nal good in itself. This is the good without
qualifi cation or reservation. He begins with a philosophical anthropology
based on nature (physis) that grounds his understanding of the law, con-
stitution (politeia), and moral economy. He rejects the notion that honor,
pleasure, and virtue are ends in themselves, because they are used as means
to further the happiness of the individual. He asks: what is that human
activity which produces the greatest happiness and is an end in itself—that
which is done for no higher good than the activity itself? The continuation
of life, nutrition, growth, and perception are not characteristics specifi c to
humans, as they are shared by all living animals. Further, Aristotle quickly
and unceremoniously rejects the view of the individual that will become the
foundation for modern natural rights and utilitarian thinkers. The function
of man is to achieve a certain kind of distinctively human life that involves
an “activity of the soul which follows or implies a rational principle.”4 Life
means more than mere continuance of existence or search for private pleasure
or personal happiness. Rather, it involves a rational activity undertaken for
the moral perfection of goodness and nobility. Aristotle contends that the
fl ute player, the sculptor, and the artist have distinct functions. It is in the
performance of their activities according to the highest standards that the
good of the activity resides. Whether it is playing a song, creating a frieze,
or painting a fresco, the activity of each person expresses the highest good
of each function. According to Aristotle, happiness is the fi nal good without
qualifi cation; it does not require any further activity or purpose. Being self-
suffi cient and pleasant in itself, it is the end of all other action.

That activity, which is so distinctive of human beings in general, is
the rational life in search of virtue and happiness.5 It is in the exercise and
expression of rational thought and refl ection in a good and noble manner
that the defi ning characteristics of human life are to be found. Aristotle

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22 DREAMS IN EXILE

proceeds to take the reader on a journey of profound signifi cance as he
outlines before us the nature of a life in pursuit of reason. Some secondary
interpreters have stressed the moral autonomy, human dignity, and moral
sensitivity within Aristotle’s ethics. Although they are important issues, they
must be connected in the end to the profoundly radical political dimension
of his discourse.6 Practical reason is not a cognitive capability or philosophi-
cal contemplation that is exercised in isolation from others, but rather a
political moment of intersubjective dialogue. It is the foundation of human
happiness and a democratic polity. Aristotle turns to examine the nature of
virtue as both intellectual (episteme, techne, and phronesis) and moral (courage,
temperance, truthfulness, friendliness, nobility, honor, and justice). In the
practice of virtue, the individual is bonded to the constitutional polity by
practical wisdom, deliberative judgment, and social justice. The exercise of
practical reason entails individual deliberation, a moral economy, political
constitution, and the law. The individual and social elements are analytically
distinct for the sake of analysis and clarity, but personality and politics are
indistinguishable in reality.

Happiness, then, is the most prized, beautiful, and pleasant activity
possible that realizes the full potential of human beings as political animals.
It is that which is good and noble in itself, that is, self-conscious, virtuous
activity within the polis. The concept that captures the full ramifi cation
of this activity is practical reason, which has both a micro and a macro
component. Rejecting Plato’s theory of the Idea of the good as the philo-
sophical contemplation of the essential truths and absolute Forms, Aristotle
views practical wisdom (phronesis) as the nurturing of reason and virtue
within the more contingent and empirical process bounded by the political
constitution. Action is framed by the historical circumstances and lived
experiences of law, tradition, education, and politics. These institutions help
create the fi rm and stable “states of character” or moral personality that
rationally direct virtuous activity toward the good life. As Aristotle views
it, all virtuous action is concerned with pleasure and pain, which are the
passions that help motivate us in certain directions and ultimately defi ne our
moral character. But the passions are also the reason why certain individuals
become bad. Virtue is measured by the rule of pleasure and pain and our
reactions to them. In our search for moral excellence and in our reaction
to pleasure and pain, character is formed. In some cases, pleasure may force
us into disreputable and bad actions, while in others, the avoidance of pain
could restrain us from noble and courageous actions. It is for these reasons
that culture and education (paideia) are central to the full development of
the proper moral character with its appropriate sensitivity to and balance
of the passions under the guidance of refl ective moderation and softened
temperance. A cultured reason, matured over time and cognizant of tradi-
tion, helps the individual navigate carefully through the dangerous and

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23ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

confl icting passions of Scylla and Charybdis. Reason restrains our passions
and moderately guides our desires by applying the right rule. Only in this
way is moral excellence possible.

Although Aristotle argues that the virtuous act must be pleasurable,
pain too may be associated with virtue. Temperance is developed by the
avoidance of certain extreme pleasures, while a courageous and noble reac-
tion to pain and misfortune can be the basis for happiness and a “greatness
of soul.” Happiness is measured by how the noble individual responds to
the circumstances of life. Aristotle is aware, however, that in the case of
Priam, who watched the fall of mighty Troy from its lofty towers, these
circumstances on rare occasions may so totally overwhelm the individual
that even a virtuous life cannot result in happiness. Virtue must be a self-
consciously chosen pleasurable act undertaken in order to satisfy the state
of the soul. But even an excess of pleasure and pain can be dangerous. For
the lover of virtue, action is a pleasure which through learning and the law
becomes ingrained in the citizen’s character. In Aristotle’s eyes, a person
who does not receive pleasure from virtuous activity can never be virtuous.
“Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world.”7
It is a way of life that realizes the natural potentiality of human beings by
combining the passions and reason.

We become virtuous not by knowing about virtue, but by doing virtu-
ous acts. Aristotle outlines the general conditions in which actions become
moral: the actor must have clear knowledge of the goals and the proper means
of reaching them; he must choose them freely; and the decision must come
from his unchanging character. Knowledge, reason, self-determination, moral
autonomy, and a virtuous character ground action as morally good. Activities
undertaken for different reasons and under different conditions cannot be
morally justifi ed. Aristotle summarizes his argument: “Virtue, then, is a state
of character concerned with choice lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative
to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle
by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”8

The ultimate goal of practical wisdom is not knowledge but action.
Just as the builder and lyre player excel only through continuous work and
practice, the virtuous and just develop their abilities through the practice
of virtue and justice. Over time this action becomes habituated into the
character and values of the citizen. Individual experience becomes institu-
tionalized in education, legislation, tradition, and the constitution. Aristotle
contends that most people seek refuge in the abstract theory of philosophers
in order to avoid the diffi cult task of implementing the principles of reason.
He draws the analogy of the patient who freely seeks advice from a physician
but who is equally loathe to act upon it. Knowledge offers us consolation
and retreat while action requires a transformation of life and character. A
life of virtue involves following the intermediate path, avoiding the extreme

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24 DREAMS IN EXILE

vices of excess and defi cit; it is a search for the middle. A moderate life of
neither too much nor too little provides the moral guidelines for economic
activity and communal participation. Just as in the creation of a great piece
of art, any more or less would destroy its perfection. Excess or defi cit of any
virtue destroys that virtue and goodness. An extreme of courage, meaning
too little or too much, could result in rashness or cowardice, and an excess
of temperance could result in self-indulgence or a defi ciency in sensitivity.

How moderation is to be achieved is not through a mechanical mea-
surement of the mean, but through accumulated wisdom of the best course
of action in particular cases resulting from years of experience and critical
judgment. Although acting rationally with moderation is a universal principle,
it must be applied in individual cases. The universal rule, the right rule of
reason, must be adapted and adjusted to the particular circumstances of the
moral situation. Thus, reason harmonizes the universal and the particular in
each case. The result is a life of intermediate passions and actions. According
to Aristotle, a virtuous life is one characterized by friendliness, generosity,
magnifi cence, good temperament, modesty, temperance, truthfulness, cour-
age, nobility, honor, and justice. When the goodness of character of moral
virtues is joined to the virtue of practical reason and understanding, the
result is happiness and a good life.

In the Athenian political community, three major types of persons
inhabited the shops and the exciting arena of the agora: philosophers,
citizens, and workers. Corresponding to them were three different life ac-
tivities—theoretical contemplation (theoria), political activity (praxis), and
utilitarian work (poiesis)—with their three corresponding forms of knowl-
edge—episteme, or the universal and theoretical knowledge of the philosopher,
phronesis, or the practical knowledge and political wisdom of the citizen, and
techne, or the instrumental skills and technical knowledge of the artisan and
worker. It is around these distinctions that Aristotle develops his theory of
ethics and the virtuous life of practical reason. The Nicomachean Ethics is
so structured that the central focus of the work involves an examination
of the practical wisdom (phronesis) of the citizen in the discharging of his
constitutional duties and obligations through political participation within
the community. This analysis of practical wisdom is framed by the fi rst few
books on the particular nature of happiness and the good life, moral virtue,
the good character, individual deliberation, and discursive rationality. This
emphasis on the nature of the moral individual is balanced by a discussion
of the structural features of the polity which encourage and habituate prac-
tical wisdom. These institutions include friendship, citizenship, household
economy, and social justice. The Politics develops further this macro-socio-
logical inquiry into the correct political constitutions, moral economy, and
critique of unnatural wealth acquisition in the market. This relationship
between the virtuous life and law is best articulated in the Greek word for

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25ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

deliberation (bouleusis) and the word for one of the main political organs
in Athenian politics besides the Assembly and the jury courts, that is, the
Boule, or Council of Five Hundred. The distinction between the individual
and society disappears in the act of personal refl ection and public delibera-
tion, as the citizen expresses his full potential as a rational human being
with others in public speech. In the life of the Athenian citizen, equilibrium
is established, virtue assured, and practical wisdom achieved. These are the
highest aspirations toward which human beings strive and the basis for a
virtuous and happy life; they are the fullest realization of human potential
and the function of man.

Aristotle’s remarkable achievement is to defi ne the parameters of ethics
and the function of humanity in terms of virtue, wisdom, and justice sup-
ported and nurtured through the historical and social structures of Athenian
law and a moral economy based on the ethical priorities of family, friendship,
and citizenship.9 Philosophy and sociology are integrated in a common cause
of defi ning the ultimate goals and natural law of the ancient community.
Aristotle’s theory of ethics and politics represents the ancient response to the
question of the ultimate meaning and purpose of human life. The following
subsections of this chapter will outline the philosophical parameters of moral
and intellectual virtue by examining the forms of happiness, knowledge,
and friendship found in classical Greece. After this analysis, the argument
turns to Aristotle’s sociology, with an inquiry into the history and structure
of the moral economy, social justice, and best political constitution. Virtue
and reason can be given real existence, just as the good life and happiness
can best develop within the concrete economic and political institutions
of the ancient polis.

The political dimension of human beings, both as an integral part
of the defi nition of humanity and as its ultimate goal of perfection and
self-suffi ciency, is not an arbitrary construction of a social contract among
competing individuals or groups. Rather, it is the essence of humanity to be
a political animal. Unlike other living species who associate in groups and
even express feelings of pleasure and pain through vocalizations, humans are
the only ones who can engage in speech and, thus, exercise reason. Aristotle
views the ability to reason in philosophy and in public to be the highest
expression of the essence and function of man. Only humans can reason
about ethics and politics; only humans can deliberate about the meaning of
life; and only humans can talk about the nature of a just society. In this way,
humans are capable of living the good life according to the values of moral
and intellectual virtue as they are publicly articulated in the agora and Pynx.
Speech and reason are, for Aristotle, civic qualities that can be manifested
only in the public act of deliberation and discourse. In the end, the state,
through which the good life and fullest development of human beings are
accomplished, has a natural priority over all other forms of associations

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26 DREAMS IN EXILE

because it is the fi nal end of human existence. Just as the hand and foot act
according to the broader purpose of the whole body, the family and village
associations are subordinate to the overall design and goals of the political
community. Humanity does not just engage in political activity by simply
forming constitutions and creating laws; they defi ne their very being, their
very essence, by participating in politics. Every social action is simply a
supportive activity bound to the ultimate purpose of nature. The end of the
good life is public happiness, defi ned as a life of virtuous activity, that is, a
moderate, just life based upon human reason. This is what Aristotle refers
to as the superiority and beauty of the soul. He concludes Book 1 of the
Politics with the comment that the true concern of the economic management
of the household is not the acquisition of commodities but the cultivation
of human excellence (arete) and the development of the virtue of citizens.
Economics for the ancient Greeks is ultimately an ethical science.

DEFENDING MORAL ECONOMY (OIKONOMIKE) AGAINST
POLITICAL ECONOMY (CHREMATISTIKE)

Aristotle’s theory of social ethics focuses on the relationship between morality
and politics, between virtue and structures. In his subtle blending of empirical
and philosophical reason, he concentrates mainly on the social structures that
affect and nurture virtuous life. In response to Plato, he is concerned less with
knowledge of the forms of virtue than acting in a moderate and temperate
fashion. His purpose is to develop the personal dispositions, passions, and
social foundations for happiness and a just society. Since his goal is action
rather than simply knowledge, he emphasizes the social and political means
for promoting practical wisdom. This explains why at the end of his work
on social ethics Aristotle explicitly begins to direct his attention toward an
examination of the structures of law, constitutions, and justice. In the last
paragraph of the Nicomachean Ethics he writes, “Now our predecessors have
left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore,
that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the
constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability our philosophy
of human nature.”10 Since the virtuous citizen is by nature political, Aristotle
sets out to examine the available empirical and historical evidence about
the nature of Greek constitutions, their origins and development. He is
specifi cally interested in how they are organized, administered, maintained,
and which are the best. Virtuous activity and happiness are possible only
within a well-ordered political community; politics structures the way people
interrelate, deliberate, and decide the crucial public questions that affect
their lives. Reason, freedom, and virtue are always aspects of political life
for the ancients, and the structures of politics provide the context in which
they are defi ned and developed.

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27ARISTOTLE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

Before Aristotle introduces his analysis of politics and constitutions
in the Politics, he fi rst examines the general nature of a moral economy at
the level of the oikos (household) and the polis (state). In this fi rst chapter,
he also creates his masterful and infl uential critique of political economy
and market exchange. Aristotle’s theory of economics is developed in four
chapters in Book 1 of the Politics.

Aristotle begins his study by outlining the natural ways of life through
his analysis of slavery, the family, household economy, the historical develop-
ment of the state, and the market economy. In each case Aristotle seeks the
“natural law” that governs the social relationships within each association,
thus examining the interactions between the master-slave, husband-wife,
citizens in the state, and economic exchange (metabletike or allage) among
polis members. His purpose is to portray the natural forms of family life,
property acquisition, market exchange, and political constitutions. Since
economics is embedded in and subservient to the general values of the
political community, Aristotle’s economics provides the foundation stone
for the later development of his theory of law and politics. For him, there
are two kinds of natural acquisition of material goods or property: barter
(C-C) and limited exchange (C-M-C). Corresponding to them, there are
the deviant forms of economic activity, which include market exchange for
profi t (M-C-M’) and the fi nancial gain of interest (M-M’). The natural forms
of property acquisition are based on satisfying the needs of the household
and maintaining self-suffi ciency within the family and community. The
formal goal of the household (and polis) is economic autonomy by which
the family is capable of subsisting on the products of its own agricultural
production (autarchy).

The unnatural forms of economy are based on self-interest and eco-
nomic gain that undermine the natural forms of social existence in the
polis. With unnatural acquisition, the law and constitution are unable to
sustain themselves, thereby perverting the functions or goals of man and the
state. With the development of a market economy, utilitarian values, and
the unlimited accumulation of property, the natural law of the economy is
unsustainable, and with it a society founded upon virtue, reason, and de-
liberation is unsustainable. More than any other aspect of his social theory,
this critique of political economy—market and property—will have enor-
mous impact on nineteenth-century social theorists. Aristotle asks whether
economic management of slaves, wife, and children within the household
is part of household management or whether it requires a different form of
knowledge and set of skills than the acquisition of property in an agrarian
economy. Recognizing that there are philosophers on both sides of the is-
sue, he contends that family and farming are to be seen as part of wealth
acquisition, since life and the good life require a fi rm economic foundation.
For this reason he moves to a consideration of the nature of property.

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28 DREAMS IN EXILE

Aristotle begins his study of property with an analysis of slavery and
then turns to an examination of the natural acquisition of property within
the family in household management. In Book 1, chapter 8, he outlines the
history of material acquisition by which human beings have obtained the
means of sustaining different ways of life. From nomadic living, hunting,
warfare, piracy, and fi shing to agriculture, Aristotle investigates the main
forms of productive labor. Nature has provided humans with the means of
sustenance. Because nature is teleological and formed in such a way that
everything has a purpose, it has providentially provided the goods and modes
of production necessary for the continuance of human life. “If then nature
makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be
th

Philosophy homework help

Becoming a Philosopher Project PHIL 1013
1

PHIL 1013

Becoming a Philosopher: Creative Project 2

Due Week 7

Assignment: to become a philosopher by choosing a social, religious, or political issue you care

deeply about. You will connect your issue to a philosopher you learned about this term. You should

explain your position with sound logic and emotional connection. Becoming a Philosopher is 2 of 2

Special Projects for the course.

Points Possible: 150

Objectives:

• To demonstrate knowledge of philosophies and philosophers learned in this class

• To integrate reasonable and varying evidence from experience, knowledge, and course

resources

• To achieve a tone that is both personable and academic

• To follow best-practice guidelines for your chosen medium (MLA format for essays)

Steps:

This project has three steps. See each week’s Moodle section for details.

Step 1/Week 5 (25 pts): Choose topic and related philosopher; explain your philosopher and how the

topic relates to that person’s ideas/writings

Step 2/Week 6 (25 pts) Find one source; submit outline or partial draft

Step 3/Week 7 (100 pts): Turn in competed project

Form of Project:

You have the freedom to use the best medium to communicate your new philosophy. I highly

encourage you to choose a different medium from the first project, but it is not required. You may

choose one of those listed below or get approval for another.

• Use at least two credible sources

• Essay: MLA format 3-5 pages

• Video: 3-5 minutes with a slide/image listing sources in MLA format

• PowerPoint: 10-12 slides with a slide listing sources in MLA format

• Platonic dialogue: 5-7 pages; styled as a conversation (dialogue) between you and your

philosopher-friend

Becoming a Philosopher Project PHIL 1013
2

Topics:

You should pick a topic that you care about but that you can still view logically and critically and not

just emotionally. Choose both a current issue and a philosopher whose writing and ideas can help us

understand the issue. Here are some ideas to get you thinking about your own:

• The Social Contract Theory as it applies to vaccine or mandates with Covid-19

• A theologian or religious philosopher’s views of whether we have an obligation to

participate in social justice movements

Content Requirements:

Whatever form the project takes, you should include:

• an introduction of the topic/issue and its relevance to current times (may use source)

• an introduction of the philosopher you are connecting to this issue

o briefly summarize the philosopher’s ideas (may use source)

o if a philosopher from the distant past, explain whether this particular issue existed when

the philosopher was writing/speaking

• a thesis (claim) that briefly summarizes your view about the issue

• the connection between the issue and the philosopher; apply the philosopher’s views to the

issue to refine your personal theory about the issue

• a personal reflection on how the philosopher and the issue affect you and what you feel your

obligation is (whether to convince others, to take action, or just to learn to tolerate others’

beliefs)

o apply the philosopher’s views to our current society

Becoming a Philosopher Project PHIL 1013
3

PHIL 1013 Becoming a Philosopher Scoring Guide

MLA format (10 points)
• MLA format for essays
• Best practices format for non-essay projects

/10

Purpose (15 points)
• Appropriate for subject, purpose, and audience
• Min. of 3 full pages of text for essay; 5 for dialogue
• 10-12 slides for PPT
• 3-5 min. for video

/15

Sources (15 points)
• Reputable sources
• Citation of philosopher’s original work
• Appropriate inclusion of all
• Smooth integration
• Works Cited page in MLA format
• Use of in-text citations

/15

Composition (15 points)
• Grammar and mechanics
• Academic style
• Unity and coherence
• Engaging introduction
• Satisfying conclusion
• Logical organization

/15

Content (45 points)
• Originality/creativity
• College-level analysis
• Inclusion of all content requirements
• More analysis than facts/summary

/45

Total points possible (100)

/100

Philosophy homework help

BUSINESS ETHICS FINAL CASE 1

Read the article below and answer the questions on the final exam pertaining to it..
I

TAXES, TAX EXPERTS, AND TAX LAWS

How Big Accounting Firms Reduce Corporate Taxes By Jumping On and Off the Government Merry-Go-Round

By


Jesse Drucker


 and 


Danny Hakim

· Sept. 19, 2021

For six years, Audrey Ellis and Adam Feuerstein worked together at PwC, the giant accounting firm, helping the world’s biggest companies avoid taxes.

In mid-2018, 
one of Mr. Feuerstein’s clients
, an influential association of real estate companies, was trying to persuade government officials that its members should qualify for a new federal tax break. Mr. Feuerstein knew just the person to turn to for help. Ms. Ellis had recently joined the Treasury Department, and she was drafting the rules for this very deduction.

That summer, Ms. Ellis met with Mr. Feuerstein and his client’s lobbyists. The next week, 
the Treasury granted their wish 
— a decision potentially worth billions of dollars to PwC’s clients.

About a year later, Ms. Ellis returned to PwC, where she was immediately promoted to partner. She and Mr. Feuerstein now 
work together
 advising large companies on how to exploit wrinkles in the
 tax regulations that Ms. Ellis helped write
.

Ms. Ellis’s case — detailed in public records and by people with direct knowledge of her work at the Treasury and at PwC — is no outlier.

The largest U.S. accounting firms have perfected a remarkably effective behind-the-scenes system to promote their interests in Washington. Their tax lawyers take senior jobs at the Treasury Department, where they write policies that are frequently favorable to their former corporate clients, often with the expectation that they will soon return to their old employers. The firms welcome them back with loftier titles and higher pay, according to public records and interviews with current and former government and industry officials.

From their government posts, many of the industry veterans approved loopholes long exploited by their former firms, gave tax breaks to former clients and rolled back efforts to rein in tax shelters — with enormous impact.

After lobbying by PwC, a former PwC partner in the Trump Treasury Department helped write regulations that allowed large multinational companies to avoid tens of billions of dollars in taxes; he then returned to PwC. A senior executive at another major accounting firm, RSM, took a top job at Treasury, where his office expanded a tax break in ways sought by RSM; he then returned to the firm.

Even some former industry veterans said they viewed the rapid back-and-forth arrangements as a big part of the reason that tax policy had become so skewed in favor of the wealthy, at the expense of just about everyone else. President Biden and congressional Democrats are now seeking to overhaul parts of the tax code that overwhelmingly benefit the richest Americans.

“The accounting firms have a desire to get in favorable rules for their clients,” said 
Michael Hamersley, a former tax lawyer at EY and KPMG
. “And the person in the government has a desire to grant their wish because they know they will be rewarded when they get out.”

The so-called 
revolving door
, in which people cycle between the public and private sectors, is nothing new. But the ability of the world’s largest accounting firms to embed their top lawyers inside the government’s most important tax-policy jobs has largely escaped public scrutiny.

In the last four presidential administrations, there were at least 35 instances of round trips from big accounting firms through Treasury’s tax policy office, along with the Internal Revenue Service and the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, and back to the same firm, according to public records and interviews with government and industry officials.

In at least 16 of those cases, the officials were promoted to partner when they rejoined their old accounting firms. The firms often double the pay of employees upon their return from their government sojourns. Some partners end up earning more than $1 million a year.

Federal rules prohibit government officials from working on many matters in which they have financial interests, like having an unwritten agreement to return to their prior firm. The purpose of the rules is to avoid having officials beholden to private parties instead of working on behalf of the public, though it is hard to prove the existence of such financial entanglements.

“Lawyers who come from the private sector need to learn who their new client is, and it’s not their former clients. It’s the American public,” said 
Stephen Shay, a retired tax partner at Ropes & Gray
 who served in the Treasury during the Reagan and Obama administrations. “A certain percentage of people never make that switch. It’s really hard to make that switch when you know where you are going back in two years, and it’s to your old clients. The incentives are bad.”

Pay Cut Now, Rewards Later

Going from an accounting firm into the Treasury means taking a big pay cut. But lawyers know they are likely to be rewarded with significantly higher pay when they rejoin their old firm.

Eric Sloan, a former longtime tax lawyer at Deloitte, said he used to spell this out to young Deloitte lawyers to encourage them to do stints at the Treasury Department.

“Generally, lawyers stay in those positions for two to three years, after which they frequently return to the firms from which they came,” said 
Mr. Sloan, who is now co-chairman of the tax practice at the law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
 The government experiences “allow them to command higher compensation upon their return to the private sector.”

Mr. Sloan and some other industry officials said they didn’t see anything wrong with this practice because the lawyers brought expertise to government.

Representatives of KPMG, EY, PwC, Deloitte and RSM declined to comment.

One early trendsetter was 
Mark A. Weinberger
, a partner at EY and for many years a top tax lobbyist in Washington. During the Clinton administration, he 
championed
 a corporate tax break for research and development that critics said was often abused.

In 2001, President George W. Bush 
appointed him to run 
the Treasury’s small but powerful Office of Tax Policy, which writes the rules to enact federal tax laws.

From that perch, Mr. Weinberger quickly helped reverse a rule that made it harder to qualify for the R&D tax credit.

Mr. Weinberger rejoined EY in April 2002, 14 months after he had left.

“My experience in the private sector undoubtedly made me a better public servant, and my government experience enabled me to better understand and apply public policy in my private sector roles,” Mr. Weinberger said in a statement.

Few dispute that the Treasury Department and the I.R.S. must rely in part on lawyers from the private sector to understand the real-world effects of the tax code and how companies and wealthy individuals try to navigate around it.

“If you want to know where the bodies are buried, you’ve got to get some of those people,” said Chye-Ching Huang, the head of the Tax Law Center at New York University’s law school.

But Mr. Weinberger’s career path has become a defining trend for the Office of Tax Policy. His successors came almost entirely from major law and accounting firms, to which they quickly returned after leaving the government.

Manufacturing Cheesecake

In 2002, a manager at PwC, George Manousos, joined the tax office. He played a key role writing a rule that allowed virtually any company to claim a tax credit intended for U.S. manufacturers, even if they weren’t manufacturing anything. (In one notorious example, The Huffington Post 
reported
 that restaurant companies were claiming to “manufacture” slices of cheesecake from whole cheesecakes.)

When Mr. Manousos returned to PwC a few years later, he was promoted to partner and became the firm’s national leader on the tax rules that he had written. He 
registered to lobby
 the government on that specific provision. The pattern continued in the Obama administration.

In 2013, 
Craig Gerson, a tax lawyer at PwC
 whose specialties included advising private equity firms on how to cut their taxes, joined the Office of Tax Policy as a so-called attorney-adviser. At the time, the Treasury was contemplating whether to crack down on a tax dodge used by private equity firms known as a “fee waiver.” The maneuver allowed executives to avoid taxes on much of their income.

Mr. Gerson oversaw the discussions inside the Treasury. In July 2015, the department 
issued proposed regulations
 that essentially created a road map for how to construct waivers without running afoul of the I.R.S.

About two months later — after two and a half years at the Treasury — Mr. Gerson rejoined PwC, where he resumed his practice advising private equity firms.

Mr. Manousos and Mr. Gerson referred questions to PwC, which declined to comment on behalf of its employees.

‘A Trap for the Unwary’

Around 2010, Deloitte and PwC each devised a lucrative new tax shelter. It enabled multinational companies like 
Bristol Myers Squibb to avoid billions of dollars in federal income taxes
 by routing profits through offshore subsidiaries.

The I.R.S. argued that the transactions violated an anti-abuse provision of the federal tax laws. In 
the case of Bristol Myers
, which PwC had advised on the design of its offshore arrangement, the I.R.S. sought more than $1 billion in back taxes.

In 2015, the Treasury Department 
issued a warning notice
 intended to shut down the shelters.

But companies’ tax advisers protested that the Treasury was going too far. In May 2016, the tax section of the 
American Bar Association wrote a 42-page letter
 pleading to Treasury officials that the government’s actions were “overly broad” and potentially “a trap for the unwary.” One of the men who wrote the letter was Ari Berk, a tax lawyer for Deloitte, among the leading designers of the tax shelters.

Two weeks after sending the letter, Mr. Berk left Deloitte’s Washington offices and moved a few blocks west to work for the Treasury. His assignment was to oversee the regulations he had just been pushing to water down.

In January 2017, Mr. Berk’s office 
issued new regulations
 that 
made it easier for companies
 to shift their profits offshore to avoid U.S. taxes. The most important change mirrored what Mr. Berk had sought in his letter eight months earlier.

That June, Mr. Berk returned to Deloitte. He had been gone barely a year and was immediately promoted to partner. He declined to comment.

Wishes Granted

In the waning days of the Obama administration, the Treasury Department was writing closely watched rules to crack down on so-called corporate inversions, in which American companies merged with firms in low-tax jurisdictions. The transactions allowed the companies to siphon their taxable profits out of the United States.

As they put the final touches on the rules, Treasury officials met with two top PwC

Pamela Olson, shown in 2003, served as assistant secretary for tax policy for barely a year before returning to Skadden Arps. She now works for PwC.Credit…Photo Illustration by The New York Times; Tom Williams/Getty Images

A year later, in 2017, Mr. Harter, a longtime international tax lawyer, returned to the Treasury’s grand headquarters next door to the White House. This time he was there for a job. The Trump administration’s Treasury secretary, Steven Mnuchin, had named him to oversee international tax issues. While he worked there, PwC covered part of the cost of his private health insurance, ethics filings show.

Three months after his appointment, the 
Republican-controlled Congress approved a sweeping tax cut package
 that included 
major changes 
to the rules governing international taxation.

While the new law substantially reduced multinational companies’ tax burdens, it also contained 
a pair 
of 
new taxes
 intended to raise hundreds of billions of dollars 
from companies that had avoided taxes by claiming profits were earned overseas
.

Mr. Harter’s job suddenly became much more important. The tax legislation was 
hastily passed and sloppily written
. It would be up to Mr. Harter to figure out how to put those new taxes into effect.


An intense lobbying campaign
 got underway. Companies wanted to water down the new taxes on offshore revenue and profits. One of the most active lobbyists was Mr. Harter’s former PwC colleague Ms. Olson, who had been the top tax official in the Bush administration’s Treasury Department.

On at least four occasions, Mr. Harter’s office granted requests that were made by Ms. Olson or by corporate trade groups for which she was a lobbyist. The changes included 

letting multinational companies escape a new tax
 on overseas revenue, a move that drew widespread criticism and is likely to cost the federal government tens of billions of dollars over a decade.

This year, 
Mr. Harter returned to PwC
.

“I fully complied with Treasury Department conflicts rules by not meeting with PwC representatives” during a two-year “cooling off” period that restricts government officials from meeting with their former employers, Mr. Harter said. Although he was involved in the construction of the 
offshore tax break
 and met with corporate lobbyists, Mr. Harter said he did not recall meeting with Ms. Olson or other PwC officials on the topic.

Ms. Olson referred questions to PwC.

An Inside Track

The 2017 tax overhaul included a provision that let some people take a 20 percent tax deduction on certain types of business income. But the law — 
known as Section 199A
 — largely excluded an undefined category of “brokerage services.” In 2018, lobbyists for several industries, including real estate and insurance, visited the Treasury to try to persuade officials that the broker prohibition should not apply to them.

On Aug. 1, records show, Ms. Ellis met with her former PwC colleague, Mr. Feuerstein, and three other lobbyists for his client, the National Association of Realtors. They wanted real estate brokers to qualify for the 20 percent deduction.

The meeting took place before the first draft of the proposed rules was even made public, which meant that, right off the bat, Ms. Ellis’s former PwC colleague and his client had an inside track.

When the Treasury published its 
first version
 of the proposed rules a week later, real estate brokers were eligible. The National Association of Realtors 
took credit
 for the victory on its website. (The final rules applied only to brokers of stocks and other securities.)

Ms. Ellis’s meeting with Mr. Feuerstein appeared to violate 
a federal ethics rule
 that restricts government officials from meeting with their former private sector colleagues, said Don Fox, the acting director of the Office of Government Ethics during the Obama administration and, before that, a lawyer in Republican and Democratic administrations.

Mr. Fox described the meeting as improper. “It certainly is going to call into question how that regulation was drafted,” he said. “There’s no way to undo the taint that is now going to be attached to that.”

Over the course of the year, Ms. Ellis met with lobbyists for the insurance, auto and banking industries. The Treasury let their brokers in on the tax break, too. Mr. Mnuchin, the Treasury secretary, approved the decision.

Ms. Ellis returned to PwC in the fall of 2019. She was immediately promoted to partner.

Her colleague drafting the regulations for 199A was Wendy Kribell, a senior lawyer at the I.R.S. This summer, she joined Ms. Ellis at PwC.

A PwC spokeswoman declined to comment on behalf of Ms. Ellis and Mr. Feuerstein. Ms. Kribell didn’t respond to requests for comment.

‘Warmest Congratulations’

The top tax official in President Donald J. Trump’s Treasury Department was David J. Kautter. In addition to serving as assistant Treasury secretary for tax policy, he had a stint as acting I.R.S. commissioner.

Before joining the government, Mr. Kautter had a long history in the accounting industry. He spent 28 years at EY, rising to national tax director during the period when the firm marketed illegal tax shelters, leading to a 
$123 million
 settlement with the Justice Department. (Mr. Kautter has said he was not directly involved in creating shelters, though he has noted that “
I wish I had done things differently.
”)

After a few years in academia, Mr. Kautter joined the country’s fifth-largest accounting firm, RSM.

Soon after he entered the government, Mr. Kautter’s former colleagues at RSM began asking for favorable changes to tax policy, and they got some of what they sought.

“Warmest congratulations to you and your colleagues on the successful enactment” of the 2017 tax cut, Don Susswein, a top official at RSM, 
wrote to Mr. Kautter
 in January 2018. Mr. Susswein urged Mr. Kautter to make it easier to qualify for the Section 199A deduction.

The Treasury 
obliged
.

Nine months later, 
another letter
 arrived. This one, from a group of RSM officials, asked Mr. Kautter and a senior I.R.S. lawyer to help more financial companies qualify for the 199A tax break.

Mr. Kautter’s office 
made that change, too
.

Last year, 
Mr. Kautter returned to RSM
. That meant that five of the last six people to run the Treasury tax office had returned to their previous accounting or law firms after stepping down from their government jobs.

Mr. Kautter said in a statement that he was looking forward to helping RSM’s clients “understand the federal tax rules,” many of which he’d had a hand in crafting.

Philosophy homework help

Introduction

Abu Dhabi2121, which I found to be so interesting and as a result of the Emiratis’ desire to travel in air-conditioned luxury and the availability of domestic oil, Abu Dhabi is on par with any other Western metropolis at the beginning of the twenty-first century when it comes to vehicle dependence, according to the United Nations Development Program.

Part of the point of utopianism is to be provocative. If you like your future riddled with self-driving cars and the magic of nuclear energy, then maybe these scenarios are not for you. And you’re likely to dismiss them as fantasy anyway. But to study utopias – and formulate alternative scenarios to how we now live on this planet – is not an escape into fantasy. It is an active response to the many technological fantasies cast about with extravagance and excess into our lives right now. These fantasies bind us to an unsustainable and unlivable future. If Ecotopia 2121 is but a collection of fantasies, at least they would do less harm to the planet we live on.

It is predicted that many environmental concerns will be rectified in the city, and the city has already demonstrated that it is capable of conquering the current environmental issues that it is facing. The implementation of a new urban layout, which is partially inspired by old-time household homes found in India’s deserts, comes after extreme climate change has caused havoc over the Arabian Peninsula. It is intended that the new urban layout will consist of interconnected communal houses constructed of local sands and muds mixed with native Arabian palm leaves and processed camel dung, which will subsequently be integrated into a new urban architecture.

The cities of Ecotopia 2121 are presented in the form of “scenario art”, which involves a review of both global and local environmental challenges as well as their unique histories and cultures. This allows for a diversity of future scenarios rather than one common vision of the “future city”. What you will see below are a series of artworks, but this is not an art project. We use art as a means of analysis and communication. With that in mind, there are many ecotopian cities of my own creation that such as Abu Dhabi inhabited in the continent.

However, a utopian society as it is brought into being or evolves over time acts to change or revolt against the dominant economy and culture, encouraging each and every person (over some period of time) to learn and adapt to the new or evolving utopian form. For example, an evolving ecotopian city will offer citizens a chance to pursue other forms of freedom beyond the superficial freedom of mobility that a car pretends to offer. Citizens can thus teach themselves (as individuals, as communities, and as societies) to be happy—even happier—without cars.

Despite insistence by car-lovers and by the car industry, cars are not universally loved. This is especially the case for those who cannot afford or cannot operate cars. Cars create a strongly divided society. Those people with a car in a car-dependent city exert great physical power, on a daily basis, over those who do not have a car—threatening them with injury, risking their safety, cutting off their options to walk or cycle freely, and poisoning the air they breathe. The environmental effect of car-free cities is also positive, at least in principle.

In the Abu Dhabi, San Diego and Perth of 2121, nearby natural coastal ecosystems can re-emerge to be healthier and grow over and around the abandoned infrastructure of highways and motorways that once dominated these cities. The air will be cleaner and healthier, too, and water and land pollution will likely decrease in a profound way. In Sao Paulo 2121 and Denver 2121, ecofriendly urban agriculture both within, and just outside, the residential areas, can be fostered and developed thereby cutting the ecological cost of long distance transport and also enabling people to be nearer to the various benefits of the countryside.

The designs collected above highlight different social, technological and environmental experiences that are likely to confound future peoples in urban settings. An example of a city is Masdar city. The plans are highly innovative and could constitute a whole lot more than an architectural mirage. Therefore, Masdar’s managing director Sultan Ahmed Al Jabar is sticking to his dream of a 50,000-strong sustainability oasis despite the economic crisis. It is set to become a reality by 2030, according to his forecasts. Whether the project totaling a costly 20.3 billion euros is economical remains doubtful, however if successful, Masdar City will be the first city in the world to be carbon dioxide- and waste-free – a center for science, work and living. No cars, no waste – instead, electro mobility and bicycles, energy-saving houses, and the world’s biggest solar power plant.

To what extent has the planning method BIM really won through in practice? 11 facts about BIM in practice.

On the desert building site buildings have been erected to date, including also a university specializing in renewable energies. They all stand close to one another and can provide each other with shade. The compact development also keeps routes short and ensures better concentration of the energy. Upon completion the eco-city covering six square meters is also set to be surrounded by a city wall, in front of which visitors and residents park their bicycles in order to switch over to driverless electric vehicles. In addition, an electric monorail takes commuters to their work via a subterranean tunnel system. Today the transport network merely includes two stops for demonstration purposes.

Conclusion

Because Abu Dhabi2121, which was so captivating to me and whose appearance drew my attention, I decided to pursue further study of the city in question. When it comes to car dependence, Abu Dhabi is on par with any other metropolis in the Western world at the dawn of the twenty-first century; this has resulted in part from the Emiratis’ desire to travel in air-conditioned luxury and in part from the availability of domestic oil.

Many environmental issues are expected to be resolved in the city, and the city has already proven that it is capable of overcoming the current environmental issues. A new urban plan, partly inspired by old-time domestic houses of India’s deserts, is implemented after drastic climate change has wreaked havoc throughout Arabia. The new urban plan consists of interconnected communal dwellings made of local sands and muds mixed with native Arabian palm leaves and treated camel dung, which are then incorporated into a new urban design.

References

Alaimo, Stacy. 2012. “Sustainable This, Sustainable That: New Materialisms, Posthumanisms and Unknown Futures.” PMLA 127(3): 558-564.

Oreskes, Naomi and Erik M. Conway. 2013. “The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the Future.” Daedalus 142(1): 40-58.

World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987). Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Philosophy homework help

B O O K V · J U S T I C E

JUSTICE: ITS S P HERE AN D O UTER NATU R E :
IN WHAT S E NS E IT IS A M EAN

The just as the lawful (universal justice) and the just as the fair
and equal (particular justice): the former considered

1. W I TH regard to justice and injustice we must consider what kind
of actions they are concerned with, what sort of mean justice is, and
between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our investiga-
tion shall follow the same course as the preceding discussions.*

We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of charac-
ter which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them
act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that
state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust.*
Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is
not true of the sciences and the faculties as of states of character. A
faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate to
contrary objects, but a state which is one of two contraries does not
produce the contrary results; e.g. as a result of health we do not do
what is the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say
a man walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy man would.*

Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and
often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for
if good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known, and
good condition is known from the things that are in good condition,
and they from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is neces-
sary both that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh and that
the wholesome should be that which causes firmness in flesh. And
it follows for the most part that if one contrary is ambiguous the
other also will be ambiguous; e.g. that if ‘just’ is so, ‘unjust’ will be
so too.

Now ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ seem to be ambiguous, but because
their different meanings approach near to one another the ambigu-
ity escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when
the meanings are far apart, e.g. (for here the difference in outward
form is great) as the ambiguity in the use of kleis for the collar-bone

1129a

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of an animal and for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as
a starting-point, then, the various meanings of ‘an unjust man’.
Both the lawless man and the grasping and unfair man are thought
to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man
will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the
unlawful and the unfair.*

Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with
goods — not all goods, but those with which prosperity and adver-
sity have to do, which taken absolutely are always good, but for a
particular person are not always good. Now men pray for and pursue
these things; but they should not, but should pray that the things
that are good absolutely may also be good for them, and should
choose the things that are good for them. The unjust man does not
always choose the greater, but also the less — in the case of things
bad absolutely; but because the lesser evil is itself thought to be in
a sense good, and graspingness is directed at the good, therefore he
is thought to be grasping.* And he is unfair; for this contains and is
common to both.

Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding
man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts
laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say,
is just.* Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the
common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold
power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those
acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its com-
ponents for the political society. And the law bids us do both the
acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor
throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to
commit adultery nor to gratify one’s lust), and those of a good-
tempered man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and
similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness,
commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-
framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less
well.

This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, although not with-
out qualification, but in relation to another.* And therefore justice
is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and ‘neither evening
nor morning star’ is so wonderful; and proverbially ‘in justice is
every virtue comprehended’.* And it is complete virtue in its fullest

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THE N ICOMACHE AN ETHICS V.1

82

sense because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is com-
plete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in
himself but towards another also; for many men can exercise virtue
in their own affairs, but not in their relations to others. This is why
the saying of Bias is thought to be true, that ‘rule will show the
man’; for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men, and a mem-
ber of a society. For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is
thought to be ‘another’s good’,* because it is related to another; for it
does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a co-partner.
Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards
himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who
exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards
another; for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not
part of virtue but the whole of virtue, nor is the contrary injustice
a part of vice but the whole of vice. What the difference is between
virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they
are the same but their essence is not the same; what, as a relation to
another, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without qualification,
virtue.*

The just as the fair and equal: divided into distributive and
rectificatory justice

2. But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which is
a part of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain.
Similarly it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are
concerned.

That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the
man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts
wrongly indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws away
his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper
or fails to help a friend with money through meanness), when a
man acts graspingly he often exhibits none of these vices — no, nor
all together, but certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame
him) and injustice. There is, then, another kind of injustice which
is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and a use of the word ‘unjust’
which answers to a part of what is unjust in the wide sense of ‘con-
trary to the law’. Again, if one man commits adultery for the sake
of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding
of appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter

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THE NICOMAC HEAN ETHICS V. 2

Philosophy homework help

In about 500 words answer these questions

Nicolo Machiavelli broke with the classical tradition as well, in focusing on power and self-interest as unavoidable aspects of political governance.

1). Talk about what it meant for Machiavelli to take power as the central reality of political theory (and include in your answer at least a brief mention of how Machiavelli conceived of the role of violence in power politics).

2). Describe also how Machiavelli differed from Plato and Aristotle in conceiving of government as being a matter of placating the self-interested desires of agents, rather than being a matter of transforming those self-interested desires into more commendable character states. Use examples as necessary.

3). Finally, interact critically with Machiavelli and state whether you agree or disagree with his assertions about the bankruptcy of ideal theory and the importance of turning to the actual conduct of politics.

Philosophy homework help

Becoming a Philosopher Project PHIL 1013
1

PHIL 1013

Becoming a Philosopher: Creative Project 2

Due Week 7

Assignment: to become a philosopher by choosing a social, religious, or political issue you care

deeply about. You will connect your issue to a philosopher you learned about this term. You should

explain your position with sound logic and emotional connection. Becoming a Philosopher is 2 of 2

Special Projects for the course.

Points Possible: 150

Objectives:

• To demonstrate knowledge of philosophies and philosophers learned in this class

• To integrate reasonable and varying evidence from experience, knowledge, and course

resources

• To achieve a tone that is both personable and academic

• To follow best-practice guidelines for your chosen medium (MLA format for essays)

Steps:

This project has three steps. See each week’s Moodle section for details.

Step 1/Week 5 (25 pts): Choose topic and related philosopher; explain your philosopher and how the

topic relates to that person’s ideas/writings

Step 2/Week 6 (25 pts) Find one source; submit outline or partial draft

Step 3/Week 7 (100 pts): Turn in competed project

Form of Project:

You have the freedom to use the best medium to communicate your new philosophy. I highly

encourage you to choose a different medium from the first project, but it is not required. You may

choose one of those listed below or get approval for another.

• Use at least two credible sources

• Essay: MLA format 3-5 pages

• Video: 3-5 minutes with a slide/image listing sources in MLA format

• PowerPoint: 10-12 slides with a slide listing sources in MLA format

• Platonic dialogue: 5-7 pages; styled as a conversation (dialogue) between you and your

philosopher-friend

Becoming a Philosopher Project PHIL 1013
2

Topics:

You should pick a topic that you care about but that you can still view logically and critically and not

just emotionally. Choose both a current issue and a philosopher whose writing and ideas can help us

understand the issue. Here are some ideas to get you thinking about your own:

• The Social Contract Theory as it applies to vaccine or mandates with Covid-19

• A theologian or religious philosopher’s views of whether we have an obligation to

participate in social justice movements

Content Requirements:

Whatever form the project takes, you should include:

• an introduction of the topic/issue and its relevance to current times (may use source)

• an introduction of the philosopher you are connecting to this issue

o briefly summarize the philosopher’s ideas (may use source)

o if a philosopher from the distant past, explain whether this particular issue existed when

the philosopher was writing/speaking

• a thesis (claim) that briefly summarizes your view about the issue

• the connection between the issue and the philosopher; apply the philosopher’s views to the

issue to refine your personal theory about the issue

• a personal reflection on how the philosopher and the issue affect you and what you feel your

obligation is (whether to convince others, to take action, or just to learn to tolerate others’

beliefs)

o apply the philosopher’s views to our current society

Becoming a Philosopher Project PHIL 1013
3

PHIL 1013 Becoming a Philosopher Scoring Guide

MLA format (10 points)
• MLA format for essays
• Best practices format for non-essay projects

/10

Purpose (15 points)
• Appropriate for subject, purpose, and audience
• Min. of 3 full pages of text for essay; 5 for dialogue
• 10-12 slides for PPT
• 3-5 min. for video

/15

Sources (15 points)
• Reputable sources
• Citation of philosopher’s original work
• Appropriate inclusion of all
• Smooth integration
• Works Cited page in MLA format
• Use of in-text citations

/15

Composition (15 points)
• Grammar and mechanics
• Academic style
• Unity and coherence
• Engaging introduction
• Satisfying conclusion
• Logical organization

/15

Content (45 points)
• Originality/creativity
• College-level analysis
• Inclusion of all content requirements
• More analysis than facts/summary

/45

Total points possible (100)

/100

Philosophy homework help

2

Fallacies in Advertising

Name

University

Course

Date

Q1. Find an example of a fallacy used in popular advertising or any persuasive text. Upload the image/words or provide a link

Figure 1: Business Analytics Discussion (2022)

The discussion in the image above contains fallacies. Fallacies are described as reasoning errors that can deviate the logic from one’s argument. They can either be irrelevant arguments or illegitimate points that lack supporting evidence to the claims.

Q2. Identify the fallacy and why you think this particular type of advertisement represents the fallacy you have chosen.

Advertisement fallacies deviate from logic to convince consumers to buy a service or product. According to Aurelia-Ana, (2018), advertisement messages rely on exaggeration to maintain their impressive attention to their target audience. The effect created is referred to as the Munchausen Effect. By exaggerating the truth, businesses can develop efficient contexts of communication as well as advertise to the public. Fallacies benefit advertisers as they offer the ability to communicate a particular message to the customers and discredit their competitors. The document above shows that advertisement is based on several different fallacies.

Appeal to the people.

           As used in the figure, the fallacy of appealing to the people is by arguing that a certain idea is true since other people also believe it to be the truth. The companies in the discussion intend to conduct a survey on their customers regarding their customer satisfaction with using their products. In return, the information collected is to be used to identify the most preferred items. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize the ability to create advertisement material based on the customers’ responses. The fallacy in the message is to appeal to customers to purchase the same items preferred by the majority.

The False Cause Fallacy.

           The advertisement fallacy based on false cause argues that if events relate to each other, they have a common cause-effect relationship. Two events might occur simultaneously despite having no relation to each other, eliminating correlation. In the figure, the businesses intend to promote a certain product based on the assumption that the product generates a good outcome for the customers. On the contrary, it may mean that the customer’s use of the product develops a positive effect (“Fallacies in advertising”, 2021)

Generalization in Haste

The conclusion drawn from the advertisement fallacy is that the products that receive the positive outcomes in the surveys will be the most preferred. The misconception is based on making conclusions based on limited information and evidence. A product’s effectiveness can be generalized as the best to promote based on only evidence produced by available customers. However, other potential customers may create possible counterarguments.

Old Wisdom

           It assumes that a true idea remains true in the present circumstances, the same as in the past. It appeals to the customers by creating nostalgic feelings and emotions. Hence, the assumption is that products that had a positive outcome in the past surveys can determine the result of future promotions based on the previous preference of the customers. The fallacy further appeals to the popular use of the product. Businesses and companies will decide to promote certain products since data describe them as the most popular. Aurelia-Ana, (2018) notes that the exaggerated fallacious advertisements tend to retain an impressive memory as the best ones. However, some advertisement fallacies may contain errors that could fail to create communication.


References

Aurelia-Ana, V. A. S. I. L. E. (2018). The Műnchausen Effect and the post-truth era advertising messages. Critical analysis on fallacious and enthymematic advertising slogan argumentation. ESSACHESS-Journal for Communication Studies11(2) 22), 51-66.

Business Analytics Discussion. (2022)

Indeed Editorial Team. (2021, June 2). Fallacies in advertising: Definitions and examples. Indeed Career Guide. https://www.indeed.com/career-advice/career-development/advertising-fallacies

Philosophy homework help

5/4/22, 1:19 AM Week 1 Overview: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-1-overview?module_item_id=17540424 1/5

Week 1 Overview

What is ethical reasoning?
What does it mean to reason
meaningfully in an ethical
way? Historically, this has
meant reasoning about a
common good, a normative
form, or an objective and
universal standard of values.
This is a task, however,
complicated unfortunately by
our global economic system.
In our capitalist world, society is subordinated to market demands in an unprecedented
way. Monetary value is the one sovereign measure of value universally accepted, while
all other values must be subordinated to the task of making money. In other words,
conditioned by commercialized society we tend to think ethics has to do only with
personal values like any other private consumer preference, while the only objective
and universal value is money, since this is the only universal standard of exchange we
all publicly live by. The dominant default ethical view within this status quo tends to be
that of moral relativism: ethical values are nothing more than a multitude of arbitrarily
private tastes and feelings. In ethical theory this view is often called “emotivism”: the
belief that ethical values do not refer to anything universal or an objectively shared
nature but rather function in each individual as subjective expressions of absolutely
private emotions and differing beliefs. In this case there is then no possibility to publicly
reason in an ethical way, since ethics is not rational but an expression of private
whims, like consumer preferences. And we all know how easy it is to simply say in an
argument: “Who am I to say? You have your beliefs and I have mine. To each their
own!” Yet, can a democratic society survive without a shared sense of a common good
and a pursuit of mutual understanding, deferring instead our shared universals solely
to the language of money?

5/4/22, 1:19 AM Week 1 Overview: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-1-overview?module_item_id=17540424 2/5

But is it really the case that whenever we make a value judgment such as saying
something is “beautiful”, or “good”, or “right”, or “just”, or “true”, we are always referring
only to arbitrarily private and absolutely individualistic preferences? How would we
ever be able to reach agreement with others? How could we ever identify and reason
about injustice and dehumanization? How could we morally condemn such things as
sexism or racism if all our moral claims about it refer to nothing more than personal
tastes, whether or not we just so happen to privately like it or dislike it? How could we
critically reflect on the distinctions between oppression or liberation, false needs and
real needs, individual preferences and common goods for what it means to be human?
Shouldn’t ethics be about values we commonly share that transcend the relativism of
market evaluation, and that can be publicly reasoned about according to objective
standards? If we accept the moral relativism of our market place, then we need to
realize that while we may have given up on ethics as a universal standard, a measure
of value is still being universally determined, and our social relations organized for us,
by our global capitalist economy with its monetized law of profits over people. This has
become especially evident in our current Coronavirus pandemic, where many pundits,
economists and politicians have called for society to sacrifice those most vulnerable so
that the economy can continue making money. But if you believe that a human life is
worth more than any monetary value and that the economy should serve social life
rather than vice versa, then you’re already assuming an objective standard of value
beyond the market and its moral relativism. The task of doing ethics is then to
articulate and conceptualize these intuitions, dialogue about them publicly, and most
importantly, socially practice them with others. This is no simple task, but while doing
ethics and social analysis are hard work, it is needed now more than ever, otherwise
they will be done for us by the impersonal algorithms of the market.

As we will see, the history of ethics that emerged from Greek philosophy began
precisely as a way to challenge the reduction of values to market exchanges and its
relativism. In fact, ethics began concretely as a communal reflection on real human
needs and the common good that makes any society possible in the first place, but
which was forgotten within the encroaching commercialization of Athenian society.
Doing some history shows us that ethical discourse was in certain ways more robust,
communal, lively, comprehensive, and rational than in current times. The question for
the rest of the course, after the first few weeks, then becomes, how did our society

5/4/22, 1:19 AM Week 1 Overview: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-1-overview?module_item_id=17540424 3/5

eventually get reordered around monetary values so as to lose sight of our common
good and its ethical discourses?

But first, a word about the emphasis on history in this course

Often ethics courses present ethical theories in a vacuum as if they are matters of
abstract calculation—for example, the famous Trolley problem and its algorithmic
formulations! This course, however, will dive into a lot of history since no ethical theory
developed in a vacuum but rather emerged within various social contexts as attempted
solutions to real social issues. Therefore, there are several reasons why doing history
is necessary for doing ethics. First it contextualizes our present, showing us how we
got here. This allows us to better understand our present as a historical product and
therefore open to change, rather than fixed as an eternal given. So much of our
present structures, institutions, practices, behaviors and ideas are often taken as if just
natural givens or the way that humans have always operated. But once we do history
we get a different picture of humanity as open, dynamic, collectively evolving beings
who have gained a certain degree of freedom to creatively change their circumstances
and diversify (might this be an objective need we all share by virtue of our commonly
evolving nature;). Yet we cannot know our present, how we got here, and how we can
creatively change our circumstances for the better if we do not develop this historical
consciousness of who we are. That is, without historical consciousness we cannot
even diagnose the problems of our present and how they emerged, let alone change
them, as our historical blindness will continue to accept oppressive structures as if the
best, or the only, possibility. Secondly, in transforming the present and working toward
a better future, we must draw extensively and positively from the long arc of history,
learning from, participating in, and advancing its bend toward justice. Since our
historical being is a collectively evolving project, we can only gain from drawing on all
the best resources of our past experiences and traditions of wisdom, rather than
remain trapped in a narrowly exclusive focus on STEM. This has become especially
evident with the influence of indigenous wisdom in the struggle for climate justice
against the destructive forgetfulness of capitalist industry.

5/4/22, 1:19 AM Week 1 Overview: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-1-overview?module_item_id=17540424 4/5

While there are many lines of history to explore, our class only has time to introduce
one specific Western line, characterized by utilitarianism and deontology. The reason
for this is simply that these two frameworks dominate public discourse and governance
in our Western capitalist world–but in order to critically engage our history with more
precision, so as to reconstruct a better world, we need to know how and why its
practices and theories emerged. Beginning with virtue ethics from Ancient Greece,
however, will provide us with a starting point that does not fit in so easily within our
Western status quo as it challenges some of its dominant presuppositions (and in this
it even provides points of connection, as we will see near the end of the quarter, with
more organically communal non-Western views).

To read or watch:
Review the materials on the Launchpad page An Introduction to Ethics and its
Historical Origins
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-an-introduction-
to-ethics-and-its-historical-origins) , which includes my video and lecture notes
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034398/download?wrap=1)

(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034398/download?
download_frd=1) which should be consulted before answering the case study
questions.
Read Sandel, What’s the Right Thing to Do, ch.1
Read George McCarthy, chapter 1
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034340?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034340/download?
download_frd=1) “Aristotle on the Constitution of Social Justice and Classical
Democracy”, pp. 19–58

To complete or submit:
Complete the Reading Assignment Questions assignment
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/assignments/7016115) , which is
due by Saturday at midnight
Answer the Case Discussion Questions
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/discussion_topics/7964164)

5/4/22, 1:19 AM Week 1 Overview: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/week-1-overview?module_item_id=17540424 5/5

regarding the Sandel video, which is located on the discussion page. For this first
week, your initial post is due by Wednesday, and all subsequent responses by
Sunday. Please review the Class Participation and Discussion
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/class-participation-and-
discussion) page for discussion expectations.

Philosophy homework help

B O O K V · J U S T I C E

JUSTICE: ITS S P HERE AN D O UTER NATU R E :
IN WHAT S E NS E IT IS A M EAN

The just as the lawful (universal justice) and the just as the fair
and equal (particular justice): the former considered

1. W I TH regard to justice and injustice we must consider what kind
of actions they are concerned with, what sort of mean justice is, and
between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our investiga-
tion shall follow the same course as the preceding discussions.*

We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of charac-
ter which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them
act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that
state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust.*
Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is
not true of the sciences and the faculties as of states of character. A
faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate to
contrary objects, but a state which is one of two contraries does not
produce the contrary results; e.g. as a result of health we do not do
what is the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say
a man walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy man would.*

Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and
often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for
if good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known, and
good condition is known from the things that are in good condition,
and they from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is neces-
sary both that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh and that
the wholesome should be that which causes firmness in flesh. And
it follows for the most part that if one contrary is ambiguous the
other also will be ambiguous; e.g. that if ‘just’ is so, ‘unjust’ will be
so too.

Now ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ seem to be ambiguous, but because
their different meanings approach near to one another the ambigu-
ity escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when
the meanings are far apart, e.g. (for here the difference in outward
form is great) as the ambiguity in the use of kleis for the collar-bone

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81

of an animal and for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as
a starting-point, then, the various meanings of ‘an unjust man’.
Both the lawless man and the grasping and unfair man are thought
to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man
will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the
unlawful and the unfair.*

Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with
goods — not all goods, but those with which prosperity and adver-
sity have to do, which taken absolutely are always good, but for a
particular person are not always good. Now men pray for and pursue
these things; but they should not, but should pray that the things
that are good absolutely may also be good for them, and should
choose the things that are good for them. The unjust man does not
always choose the greater, but also the less — in the case of things
bad absolutely; but because the lesser evil is itself thought to be in
a sense good, and graspingness is directed at the good, therefore he
is thought to be grasping.* And he is unfair; for this contains and is
common to both.

Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding
man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts
laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say,
is just.* Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the
common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold
power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those
acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its com-
ponents for the political society. And the law bids us do both the
acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor
throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to
commit adultery nor to gratify one’s lust), and those of a good-
tempered man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and
similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness,
commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-
framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less
well.

This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, although not with-
out qualification, but in relation to another.* And therefore justice
is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and ‘neither evening
nor morning star’ is so wonderful; and proverbially ‘in justice is
every virtue comprehended’.* And it is complete virtue in its fullest

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THE N ICOMACHE AN ETHICS V.1

82

sense because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is com-
plete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in
himself but towards another also; for many men can exercise virtue
in their own affairs, but not in their relations to others. This is why
the saying of Bias is thought to be true, that ‘rule will show the
man’; for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men, and a mem-
ber of a society. For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is
thought to be ‘another’s good’,* because it is related to another; for it
does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a co-partner.
Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards
himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who
exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards
another; for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not
part of virtue but the whole of virtue, nor is the contrary injustice
a part of vice but the whole of vice. What the difference is between
virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they
are the same but their essence is not the same; what, as a relation to
another, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without qualification,
virtue.*

The just as the fair and equal: divided into distributive and
rectificatory justice

2. But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which is
a part of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain.
Similarly it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are
concerned.

That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the
man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts
wrongly indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws away
his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper
or fails to help a friend with money through meanness), when a
man acts graspingly he often exhibits none of these vices — no, nor
all together, but certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame
him) and injustice. There is, then, another kind of injustice which
is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and a use of the word ‘unjust’
which answers to a part of what is unjust in the wide sense of ‘con-
trary to the law’. Again, if one man commits adultery for the sake
of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding
of appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter

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THE NICOMAC HEAN ETHICS V. 2

Philosophy homework help

This week’s reading was an academic reference article on the nature of privacy.

In one page single spaced, reflect on the various definitions of privacy, what can be said in favor or against a few of them, and the moral status of privacy.

Academic reference articles are not intended to present argument for a specific thesis, but rather to introduce you to a variety of views on an issue and provide a guide to literature on these views. If you are interested in privacy and choose to do research on a privacy related topic, some of the authors and works cited in this article will likely be useful in developing your argument.

A seminar paper is not a research paper. You should not be citing any sources besides the assigned reading. The seminar paper will just be your own short explanation of the key arguments and points from the reading. Think of this as a cleaned-up version of your notes on the reading. A seminar paper is what you would write up for yourself in preparation for contributing to a seminar, a conversation about a reading. In our case, the seminar will be our weekly discussion board.

PLEASE USE ONLY THE READING PROVIDED!!

THANK YOU.

Philosophy homework help

Summary of Main differences between Virtue Ethics and Utilitarianism

1. The two different senses of happiness:

a. Virtue Ethics: Happiness as flourishing according to realizing and enjoying our normative essence or highest potentials – it is about becoming more fully human.

b. Utilitarianism: Happiness as accumulating and consuming immediate sense pleasures – it is about maximizing consumer preferences (without asking if it is ultimately good for humanity because there is no higher human essence to realize)

i. But utilitarianism still presupposes a normative sense of what it means to be human also, which it projects from its experience of the capitalist market.

2. Two different normative senses of the human and reason:

a. Virtue Ethics: We are primarily rational and political animals. This means we are inherently social and creatively relational persons.

i. Reason is that capacity we have to collectively organize our lives together so as to flourish according to our highest social nature as an end in itself.

1. Rationality is teleological (purposeful): to reason means to discover and conceptualize the end or purpose of a thing—it is about knowing what a thing’s most excellent form is, and how to find the fitting means for realizing holistically its qualitative fulfillment.

i. For Aristotle, our rational capacity develops not as an indifferent and purely individual cognitive capacity, but as a social capacity to reason about and imagine together a higher common good.

ii. As rational animals we are not just reason-using animals. The end-goal of reason oriented to the common good is human freedom, and the form of freedom is rational self-determination: the liberation from irrational forces through the rationality of virtuous activity.

b. Utilitarianism: We are primarily consuming and possessive individuals who competitively seek private pleasure by dominating each other—we have no inherent social or rational qualities, but are slaves to instincts, impulses and drives.

“That one human being will desire to render the person and property of another subservient to his pleasures … is a grand governing law of human nature … the grand instrument for attaining what a man likes is the actions of other men.”

James Mill, Government, section IV

i. Reason is not inherent to a social nature as a coordinating activity around higher ends: it is only a cold, indifferent calculator—that capacity we have to perform cost-benefit analysis in service to private irrational wants and market demands.

1. Rationality is purely instrumental—it is a functional device but not the end goal or form of a self-determining being: it’s not about becoming rational but about calculating efficient means to our appetites and irrational ends.

2. This means reason is not purposeful: it pertains solely to quantitative efficiency rather than choosing new qualitative ends. It is not identified with the freedom to choose truly emancipatory ends in themselves, but only to choose various efficient means to whatever predetermined ends (as irrationally given already by drives and instincts or market demands)

3. The two different senses of value:

a. Virtue Ethics: Value is inherent to the object or activity valued—it is the attractive power of the object that draws us.

i. Things have value according to their purpose or use, e.g. a hammer’s value is relative to its function, and its functional use is relative to a higher end in itself (like building a house for the higher quality of living).

ii. Other things have intrinsic value as an end in itself, e.g. a community is to be valued for its own sake: the activity of socializing/fellowship is a qualitative good in itself, since it is true to the fulfillment of our social nature (and not something to be used for lower functions).

1. Economic value is then determined according to the social usefulness for perfecting the objective needs of humanity as an end in itself, rather than human communities being used as a means for privately producing commercial exchange values solely to make money.

b. Utilitarianism: Value is conferred arbitrarily by the mere fact that consumers happen to privately desire something – as long as we get some pleasure (real or perceived), it doesn’t matter what the object is or its objective function.

i. In other words, all value is relative to the contingencies of market exchange and price: it is ultimately set according to the arbitrary dictates of consumer demand and fluctuating monetary price, and not according to inherent qualities, purposes or ends in themselves.

1. Viewing all things as potential units of private pleasure means that all things are potentially commodities to be bought and sold on the market, and therefore measurable by a monetary value. This view requires denying any objective values or intrinsic purposes to nature or humans that might resist monetization.

2. The economic activity of the community does not have any internal purpose or common good, but rather serves the external ends of producing exchange value for the market so that money can be privately accumulated—the social means of production are privatized, and the social form of surplus is in the form of private profit.

4. The two different senses of society:

a. Virtue Ethics: Holism – community is more than a mere aggregate of individuals or a mere convenient alliance: it is made possible by collective creativity, cooperation, and the sharing of social wealth. It thereby emerges into a new whole for its own sake, with greater social relations and qualities that allow individuals to flourish together at a higher level

b. society = a whole greater than the sum of its parts: think of society like a symphony, revealing new properties that make possible new capabilities in the members that would have hitherto been unknown.

i. The purpose of politics is to holistically unfold our higher social and rational capabilities for becoming active agents. It is about becoming active citizens in building community for its own sake.

1. This means politics is essentially oriented to (if not always in actual practice) the common good of transforming our relationships into a community of friends as an end in itself.

c. Utilitarianism: Atomism – society is understood as nothing more than a mere aggregate of private individuals who are externally related, competing with one another to accumulate private property, and coming together only to use each other for their particular ends.

d. Society is a void space in which individuals confront one another as bare individuals and not as members of a greater whole or common good. Think of random billiard balls colliding with each other, producing no greater whole or new properties no matter how they are arranged since they will always remain single units of quantitative force randomly related.

i. In other words, social life is seen as just an artificial body of commercial transactions and legal contracts between competing individuals in order to protect their private property from each other—this is a view that emerges only once a society is habituated to the total privatization of its social means of production—our material life activities are then no longer recognizably communal because they are organized as commodities on the basis of wage contracts for the arbitrary ends of someone else’s private profit.

ii. Politics is not for perfecting humanity as active social agents, but just a procedural and regulatory mechanism for controlling the chaos of competing private self-interests amongst individualistic consumers.

1. Political institutions are simply about maintaining an equilibrium amongst the competing forces of our base nature (i.e. balancing class division), and not about transforming human nature into new relationships that develop higher rational and social qualities (beyond class divisions).

2. Some philosophers characterize this difference of our modern political liberalism as a “politics of lesser evil” rather than a politics of the common good.

Philosophy homework help

SURNAME 4

Course Code and Name:

Instructor’s Name:

Institutional Affiliation:

Date:

Introduction

The social contract theory is diverse, covering many aspects of daily life. Since the onset of Covid-19, the economic crisis looming over the world revived the social contract theory. The social contract theory brings out the role of consumers, workers and savers during the pandemic (Stott et al. 575). While the social contract theory has evolved over the years, a significant strength occurred in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The social contract theory was more vital as people were forced to get vaccinated and wear masks (Stott et al. 574).

Although the move on immunization and wearing masks in public places was meant to protect the people from infections, some take it as depriving them of their freedom. While the government does not meet the economic scars and personal needs, it focuses on these measures to enhance the safety of its citizens. Therefore, the COVID-19 era has revived the social contract theory.

Introduction of philosopher

John Locke developed the social contract theory in 1689. According to the philosopher, the government is created based on the consent of the people (Kanatli). Going against citizens’ support deprives them of their rights. Locke believes that people should get their rights from the government. Therefore, any government action should be based on the people’s consent. The philosopher describes the social contract theory based on the social conventions, norms and expectations of the society (Kanatli). The social contract theory has been in existence since ancient times.

Thesis

The social contract theory is based on natural human rights. A social contract protects people’s rights only if the people accept the obligations to the government (Kanatli). The government should take acceptable actions against the people and not deny them their rights. According to the social contract theory, government actions should be favourable to the people. When the government takes measures against human rights, then a conflict arises between the government and the people. The pandemic has revived the social contract theory in a significant way. The people are forced to wear masks, remain in their houses and get vaccinated to avoid contracting the virus. While such government actions are meant to protect the people, it is against their rights to bring such restrictions.

Connection

Locke lays a foundation in his social contract theory as he connects the people to the government. Applying the sentiments of Locke in such a natural life setting helps understand the context of the social contract theory. It helps understand the boundary the government should not exceed even when protecting its population.

Personal reflection

Human rights are a crucial part of free-living. The government has the right to deprive people of their rights in the case to protect them (Kanatli). Locke’s theory is supported by real-life examples that help distinguish between government dictatorship and protection. In my opinion, the COVIDs era came along with many risks. Government action to protect its citizens was essential to avoid spreading the virus. Although the people’s view was against government actions and felt the government wasn’t right, it was the correct thing to do at the moment. Therefore, I will support the government’s efforts using the social contract theory.

References

Kanatli, Mehmet. Private Property, Freedom and Order: Social Contract Theories from Hobbes to Rawls. Routledge India, 2021.

Stott, Clifford, Owen West, and Mark Harrison. “A turning point, securitization, and policing in the context of Covid-19: building a new social contract between state and nation?.” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 14.3 (2020): 574-578.

Philosophy homework help

1

2

[Assignment Title]

[Student Full Name]

Strayer University

PHI220 – Ethics

[Professor’s Name]

[Date]

Facts

State your relevant facts in bullets below.

Clarify Relevant Concepts

In a short paragraph of five to seven sentences, clarify all relevant concepts.

Choose a Standard

Clearly state the moral standard you are applying to this case.

Conclusion

In a short paragraph of five to seven sentences, state your conclusion. Your conclusion is your response to the question posed at the end of the case.

Sources

List any sources that you use in this assignment.

1. Judith Boss. 2019. Ethics for Life (7th ed.). McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

2. Judith Boss. 2020. Analyzing Moral Issues (7th ed.). NY: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

Philosophy homework help

SURNAME 4

Course Code and Name:

Instructor’s Name:

Institutional Affiliation:

Date:

Introduction

The social contract theory is diverse, covering many aspects of daily life. Since the onset of Covid-19, the economic crisis looming over the world revived the social contract theory. The social contract theory brings out the role of consumers, workers and savers during the pandemic (Stott et al. 575). While the social contract theory has evolved over the years, a significant strength occurred in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The social contract theory was more vital as people were forced to get vaccinated and wear masks (Stott et al. 574).

Although the move on immunization and wearing masks in public places was meant to protect the people from infections, some take it as depriving them of their freedom. While the government does not meet the economic scars and personal needs, it focuses on these measures to enhance the safety of its citizens. Therefore, the COVID-19 era has revived the social contract theory.

Introduction of philosopher

John Locke developed the social contract theory in 1689. According to the philosopher, the government is created based on the consent of the people (Kanatli). Going against citizens’ support deprives them of their rights. Locke believes that people should get their rights from the government. Therefore, any government action should be based on the people’s consent. The philosopher describes the social contract theory based on the social conventions, norms and expectations of the society (Kanatli). The social contract theory has been in existence since ancient times.

Thesis

The social contract theory is based on natural human rights. A social contract protects people’s rights only if the people accept the obligations to the government (Kanatli). The government should take acceptable actions against the people and not deny them their rights. According to the social contract theory, government actions should be favourable to the people. When the government takes measures against human rights, then a conflict arises between the government and the people. The pandemic has revived the social contract theory in a significant way. The people are forced to wear masks, remain in their houses and get vaccinated to avoid contracting the virus. While such government actions are meant to protect the people, it is against their rights to bring such restrictions.

Connection

Locke lays a foundation in his social contract theory as he connects the people to the government. Applying the sentiments of Locke in such a natural life setting helps understand the context of the social contract theory. It helps understand the boundary the government should not exceed even when protecting its population.

Personal reflection

Human rights are a crucial part of free-living. The government has the right to deprive people of their rights in the case to protect them (Kanatli). Locke’s theory is supported by real-life examples that help distinguish between government dictatorship and protection. In my opinion, the COVIDs era came along with many risks. Government action to protect its citizens was essential to avoid spreading the virus. Although the people’s view was against government actions and felt the government wasn’t right, it was the correct thing to do at the moment. Therefore, I will support the government’s efforts using the social contract theory.

References

Kanatli, Mehmet. Private Property, Freedom and Order: Social Contract Theories from Hobbes to Rawls. Routledge India, 2021.

Stott, Clifford, Owen West, and Mark Harrison. “A turning point, securitization, and policing in the context of Covid-19: building a new social contract between state and nation?.” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 14.3 (2020): 574-578.

Philosophy homework help

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Launchpad: An Introduction to Ethics and
its Historical Origins

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This week we will launch off into a brief history of ethics which will also function as an
introductory background to Aristotle’s virtue ethics framework. We will discuss how
ethical discourse first arose in ancient Greece as a way of referring to objective
standards of the Good over against the moral relativism of market relations. My Week
One Lecture Notes
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034398/download?wrap=1)
(https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/files/68034398/download?
download_frd=1) provide further historical background to the historical beginnings of
philosophy and ethics, and it might be best to look it over before doing the readings
and then return to it as a possible aid when answering questions for the readings. After
reading MacIntyre and the lecture notes, move on to George McCarthy’s piece. This
will provide a general introduction to Aristotle’s virtue ethics and its historical context
within the fledgling democracy of ancient Athens, highlighting especially the communal
nature of virtue ethics in its reflection on the common good.

Grasping the history of ethics is key in order to show that ethics began as not only
reflection on a common way of life but its forms of reasoning grew as a public affair
with political significance: it was a matter of engaged citizens collectively reasoning
about the common goods they all share in the pursuit of realizing our full humanity,
rather than a private concern solely with asserting self-interest. Philosophers do not
live in a vacuum of space and time but rather develop their ideas within real historical
contexts in which they are trying to meet real social needs. We will see that some of
the first philosophical reflections on ethics focused not simply on abstractly determining
the “right” thing to do, but rather what is it concretely “good” to be. Within these
readings then, I want you to focus on the historical evolution of the term “the good”,
how it developed and what it referred to in terms of real life social needs and their
objective standards of fulfillment. Was the good originally a term of simple private
preferences and tastes or did it have a social function and an objectively qualitative
point of reference?

What is Ethics?

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Before we dive into the history of ethics, let’s first start with a somewhat basic textbook
primer on how to understand the distinctiveness of ethical discourse—what is ethical
language trying to do? This is merely an initial launching off point for getting the wheels
turning.

The Basics of “Moral Judgments”

A moral judgment is a particular kind of statement. So a good place to begin is to
think about statements in general. There are four main kinds:

1. Description
2. Question
3. Expression
4. Prescription

A question is a statement that requests information or asks about purpose, while an
expression is a statement of personal preference. A descriptive statement is an
attempt to state how the world factually is.
In contrast, a prescriptive statement is an attempt to state how the world should
be according to a purpose. This is why prescriptive statements use words of
value, such as “good,” “bad,” “right,” “wrong,” “should/not,” “ought/not.”
Many prescriptive statements are not seemingly moral in nature in any obvious way.
For example, “You should drink Pepsi rather than Coke” or “You should eat tacos
tonight rather than pizza”. Without knowing any further context, it would be odd to
find someone who insisted that those statements were robustly moral ones.
However, most of us believe that certain prescriptive statements are obviously
moral, such as “You should not murder,” or “slavery is wrong” or “it is good to care
for our planet.” So the definition of a moral judgment is a prescriptive statement
that is morally binding in a universal or objective way.
The important thing to note at this point is that making a moral judgment is to make
a claim to something that is more than an expression of immediate feelings or a
mere factual description of a situation. But the truth of the prescriptive statement
needs to be reasoned about.

The Basics of “Ethical Reasoning”

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A quick (and somewhat narrow) definition of ethical reasoning: the attempt to give
a justification to the prescriptive statements of ‘moral judgments’ by appeal to
a universal or objective standard.
Justification means exactly the same as it does in the case of propositions
(descriptive statements): giving reasons that make the conclusion justified or
right. So a justification is a set of reasons that will take the form of premises.
How do we justify the statement that ‘Socrates is mortal?’ You support that
statement with a valid argument and true premises: 1) Socrates is a human, 2) All
humans are mortal, 3) Therefore Socrates is mortal. The statement that ‘Socrates is
mortal’ is now justified.
The project of justification is not very controversial with descriptive statements, as
demonstrated above. But how about with prescriptive statements? Ethical
reasoning is the attempt to justify certain prescriptive statements – the ones we call
‘moral judgments’ by concluding with an objective referent or what some
philosophers call a “normative claim” of what one ought to do beyond the whims of
private preferences.
When an ethical theory makes a normative claim as to what one ought to do in a
given situation, it has operative in the background a presupposition about
the normative form of human nature—this will be the key premise to look for
as we proceed to analyze the various ethical frameworks:

The normative presupposition in the above descriptive proposition about
Socrates was that “all humans are mortal”
The aspect of mortality is a bare descriptive fact shared by all other living life
forms. But ethical reasons presuppose a normative form distinguishing humanity
beyond this mere fact of bare mortal life:

Here are some examples of ethical presuppositions about the normative
forms that potentially make the human distinctive:

all humans are inherently social
all humans are inherently creative
all humans have an innate capacity for reason

Each premise is not referring to a merely descriptive quantifiable fact about
humanity, but rather they refer to a normatively objective quality or capacity that
attempts to distinguish humanity beyond brute animality and the basic features
we share with all other life forms.

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Ethical reasoning is then fundamentally about judgments on how to fulfill the
presupposed normative qualities of what it means to be human: what
ought to be done in order to remain true to, to preserve, or perfect and
realize those normative qualities beyond brute nature.
This is the most important premise/presupposition to grasp in understanding the
normative ethical theories we will encounter: if an ethical framework views what
it means to be human differently than another framework, then it will reason from
different premises and normative claims as to what we ought to do.
The key moving forward is to ask which ethical framework has the most
comprehensive account of those normative qualities that seem to objectively
define human nature (not just, which framework adds up every possible feature
displayed by human nature, but rather which accounts for the most distinctive
qualities that distinguish us as truly human)

Here it is important to see that within a heavily commercialized society, such as
ours, in which so many decisions about value come down to mere consumer
preference, there is often a conflation of ethical values with an assertion of private
individualistic preferences, as if just another consumer option. This market
standpoint uncritically assumes that the normative form of human nature is that we
are all merely private self-seeking consumers with no common good or shared
values.

But an assertion of private subjective preferences is merely a descriptive and
expressive statement and not yet a prescriptive claim on what we all should do.
You might express current feelings about what you seem to want in the moment,
but ethical reasoning often asks the bigger question of whether those current
wants are really good for you or truly needed for fulfilling our qualitative nature
together—and this question alone implies a different normative form of human
nature than mere consumerism.
Philosophers call the view that values are exclusively private assertions or
preferences emotivism: the reduction of morality to mere assertions of private
feelings without further explanation and so not yet a true form of ethical
reasoning, since it remains expressive/descriptive and thus collapses into moral
relativism.
Emotivism is unable to say why something like sweatshops, or racism, or
sexism, or exploiting our planet is objectively a bad thing: instead, it can only say
I personally happen to like or dislike those things, without reasoning as to

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whether those likes or dislikes are good, true, right, or just as to what it means to
be human and therefore binding for others.
But ethical reasoning aims at making a judgment that is binding on us all.
Some examples:

Asserted Judgment: Sweatshops are bad.
Ethical reason why: because they dehumanize the laborers by using their
labor against the development of their normative form of humanity as
creative and social beings.

Asserted Judgment: Racism or sexism is bad.
Ethical reason why: because it violates the universal dignity we all share
as equally rational, social, and creative beings, regardless of whether
someone has a private preference/bias for certain races or sexes over
others.

Asserted Judgment: Abusing our planet is bad.
Ethical reason why: because it is a common good of universal interest that
we all depend on. The good of the planet has objective standards of
excellence for its care and cultivation regardless of our private preferences
about it — treat it poorly and objectively we will all suffer.

The Basic “Ethical Theories”

In this course we will begin developing and/or refining our ethical reasoning skills,
appealing to normative standards beyond market relativism. We will do this by
working through three basic normative ethical theories that have been influential
throughout history: virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. Here is then our first
introduction to the ethical theories that we will explore throughout the first half of the
quarter:

Virtue ethics: focuses on asking “what is it good to be?” Prescriptive
statements refer to those normative social capacities and creative qualities that
make us distinctively human rather than brute animals. Claims about
the good then refers to those objective criteria or real needs–that which is good
for fulfilling these normative capacities/qualities in their most holistic form.
Utilitarianism: focuses on asking, “what maximizes the most pleasures for the
most people?” Unlike virtue ethics it does not ask about what meets real needs

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for realizing our highest qualities, since it presupposes that we are normatively
private consumers and society is nothing more than a mere aggregate of such
self-seeking individuals. Therefore, its claims about the good refer to whatever
the majority finds pleasing at any given point in time and not about whether
certain pleasures/goods fulfill real needs regardless of majority rule.
Deontology: focuses on asking, “what is the right thing to do for its own sake?”
Unlike the previous two theories it does not make claims about what it is good to
be or to do, but rather about the right principles to obey according to our
inherently rational nature, regardless of consequences and outcomes–it focuses
on the purity of intentions and not pleasures.

The latter two ethical theories, utilitarianism and deontology, are distinctively modern
forms of ethical reasoning, whereas virtue ethics denotes an older and more
comprehensive sense of ethical reasoning. Our exploration will then begin with
elaborating virtue ethic’s historical context and then examining the historical shifts that
led to the other two normative theories in our modern period. Remember, we will want
to ask, what does each ethical theory normatively presuppose about what it
means to be human?

What is Society and Economy?
But, before we begin exploring the historical origins and ethical theories, we need to
also provide some basics about understanding the “economy” and “society”. This is
important for understanding ethics since what each ethical theory presupposes about
humanity is often the product of how their society and economy is structured and
understood. And, in turn, to apply ethics to society and its economics in any
meaningful way requires grasping such structures according to a normative form or
purpose of what society’s economy should be fulfilling. But what is a good starting
point for understanding society, socio-economic structures, and their purpose,
especially considering the diversity of societies throughout history? We can start with
the historical fact that we are historically evolving beings precisely because we are
highly social beings, whose economic activity is always social to a degree:

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Here are a few sociological facts of history that we will have continual reference to
throughout the quarter as we do economic analysis:

Amongst the historical record of diverse human populations, there are nevertheless
some relative constants that distinguish human societies from mere aggregates of
herd animals.
Every human society in the historical record, from hunter and gatherer societies on
forward, is distinguished from other animals by some degree of advanced and
reflexive tool use for inventing new tools.
On this innovative basis every human society develops around, to a certain degree,
a capacity for culture (as evidenced from the earliest cave paintings), and with it the
development of ever more complex language and cultural mediations generationally
passed on and successively added to.

Every human society thereby shows, more or less, a degree of creative freedom
to change its natural circumstances, culturally passing on technologies,
knowledge, and new emergent qualities for how to transform any environment in
more humane ways, rather than relying solely on the slow, given biological
evolutionary processes of genetically transmitting adaptable traits.

Yet any society characterized by the invention of advanced tools and cultural
mediation, the creative diversity of which we find so important in distinguishing
humans from mere animality, is only possible by way of producing a social surplus
(or common wealth)—a surplus of goods and time is needed, beyond mere
subsistence, to take up the advanced labors required for any kind of technological
and cultural mediation (even the tools, resources, skills, greater awareness and
time for something seemingly “primitive” like cave paintings!).
No specifically human society is therefore possible without (to some degree no matter
how minimally) producing, sharing, and distributing a common wealth for its advanced
collective activities! But—and here is the key fact moving forward—no production
of a social surplus is possible without this being a social process that not only
relies on highly cooperative and creative capacities, but in turn reinvests the
surplus back into continuing and advancing these qualities throughout the
whole social body (failure to reinvest the social surplus back into maintaining and
advancing, to some degree, our socially creative qualities has not been a good
survival strategy for human societies throughout history).

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Thus the distinctive trait of cultural freedom within human societies, in relation to
their ability to change given circumstances and determine history, is always a
collective project socially coordinated and reliant upon complex socially creative
qualities to greater or lesser degrees—it seems then that the historical
development of distinctively human societies presupposes certain defining or
normative human capacities and qualities for socially creating together.

And indeed, throughout the historical record, we find as a fact that the
common wealth of any society that makes any degree of freedom possible is
always socially produced by many hands working together. The giant
problem in history is that while every society has relied on socially
producing and sharing an abundance together, we find too many societies
structured so as to obscure this social fact and its required qualities in order
to unevenly accumulate and distribute that wealth upwards away from the
producers.

The main way to critically analyze any society and its economy is then to ask
how it structures the production and sharing of its social surplus, which is
basically to ask how it produces and reproduces its existence together:

Does it produce the right kinds of surplus that meet humanity’s social needs
for continuing and advancing itself, and does it reinvest that social surplus
back into advancing the cooperative and creative qualities of the essential
primary producers and reproducers that made it possible in the first place?
Or, does it funnel the common wealth into the unproductive luxury
consumption and military-colonial endeavors of those elite classes who have
become far removed from the social body of producers/reproducers?
Or, in other words, does it socially organize its economic activity as a means
to serving the holistic development of its social life together? Or, does it
commercially organize its social life as a means subordinated to economic
accumulation for a few.

The growing inequality of our modern capitalist society suggests it is
structured more along the lines of the latter, and we will want to ask later in
the course whether modern ethical theories that presuppose humans as
nothing more than private consuming individuals simply mirror the
dominant social structures of a highly commercialized society that obscure
our commonly shared, socially creative nature.

5/4/22, 1:20 AM Launchpad: An Introduction to Ethics and its Historical Origins: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-an-introduction-to-ethics-and-its-historical-origins 11/12

We will begin with virtue ethics in ancient Athens because it significantly
attempted to recall the former communal structuring of society around
holistic flourishing in the face of rising commercial imperatives for
privatizing the common wealth.

Here are some critical patterns and big ideas that we should focus on in looking
at the history of ethics:

Ethics in Ancient Greece began in community and as a communal affair reflecting
on how to use the social surplus for the common good.
When communities closely work together and share together for their mutual aid,
then they will more organically reason together as to those ends, purposes, goals,
and ideals worthy of investing the community’s collective energy and surplus.
The common good referred to real communal needs; if a society has no real sense
of community then its ethics will often reflect this by also lacking a sense of the
common good, being more individualistic.
The common Good is a key big idea in thinking about the original sense of ethics
in ancient Greece compared to our modern senses of ethics, which often attempt to
articulate a sense of either “rights” or a sense of basic “goods” for meeting bare
physical necessity yet without a notion of a substantive “Good” of humanity’s higher
qualitative needs.

Do humans have higher objective needs beyond mere consumption and
survival?

As we will see for Aristotle, the common Good refers to what is good for building up
a community of active citizens flourishing together around the development of
our higher capacities. But more importantly, while ethics is about realizing our
common Good, the purpose of politics and economics according to Aristotle is to
serve this social and individual pursuit of the common Good.

For Aristotle the economy is a communal endeavor and its ultimate purpose
should be the common Good of meeting the real needs for community building
rather than making money in order to maximize private profit.

5/4/22, 1:20 AM Launchpad: An Introduction to Ethics and its Historical Origins: UCOR 2910 02 22SQ Ethical Reasoning in Business

https://seattleu.instructure.com/courses/1603225/pages/launchpad-an-introduction-to-ethics-and-its-historical-origins 12/12

The key focus of this week then is to see how ethics arose as a reflection
on the common Good as that ultimate purpose of political
and economic activity, especially for a fledgling democracy: it was born
out of a sense of politics and economics as a moral science if democracy
is to survive.

Philosophy homework help

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280292851

Privacy

Article  in  Library Hi Tech · March 2007

DOI: 10.1108/07378830710735867

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The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, First Edition. Edited by Hugh LaFollette.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

364

Privacy
Adam D. Moore

There is little agreement about how to define the term “privacy.” For example,
Warren and Brandeis, following Judge Thomas Cooley, called it “the right to be let
alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 194). Alan Westin (1967) described privacy in
terms of information control. William Parent argued that “privacy is the condition
of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others”
(Parent 1983: 269), while Julie Inness defined privacy as “the state of possessing
control over a realm of intimate decisions, which include decisions about intimate
access, intimate information, and intimate actions” (Inness 1992: 140). Privacy is
also viewed by many as morally valuable and worthy of protection, while others have
viewed it with suspicion. This essay will review each of these areas, including (1) a
brief history of privacy, (2) philosophical definitions of privacy along with specific
critiques, (3) views about the value of privacy, and (4) general critiques of privacy.

A Brief History of Privacy: Classical Greece and China, Locke
and Mill

It is difficult to write about the history of privacy because of an overabundance of
subject matter (Ariès and Duby 1988–91; Moore 2005, 2007). This section will focus
on privacy as developed in two distinct cultures and within two different moral
traditions (see deontology; utilitarianism). While there may be many different
culturally dependent conceptions of privacy there is much overlap and a rich history.
The point of this section is not to highlight a single conception of privacy that runs

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across different cultural and moral traditions. Rather the focus is on a few different
traditions that promote privacy and provide a partial backdrop for current debates.

The distinction between public and private activity was entrenched in Greek
society by the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (see aristotle; plato). Typically
the distinction was cast in terms of political activity compared to isolated intellectual
pursuits (Ariès and Duby 1988–91; Moore 1984). Both Socrates and Aristotle defend
the view that a life of intellectual and private pursuit was a worthwhile life. In Plato’s
Apology Socrates notes, “Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in
other people’s affairs to give this advice in private but do not venture to come before
your assembly and advise the polis.” Socrates goes on to say that had he gone into
politics he would have been put to death for opposing injustice. He ends with, “A
man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life even for a little while,
must be a private citizen, not a public man” (Plato, Apology 31d–32a). Socrates thus
affirms the view that criticism of governmental policy and officials is best pursued
behind walls of privacy.

Aristotle also makes use of a public–private distinction. First, he recognizes a
boundary between affairs of the state or polis and household affairs (Aristotle 1984:
2005–6, 1263b–1264b). Second, contemplative activity – which for Aristotle was
essential for human flourishing – required distance, space, and solitude from public
life (Aristotle 1984: 1861, 1177b). This is one of the first references to what was to
become a dominate theme in Western thought – the good life is not necessarily tied
to public activity (Moore 1984).

Plato, on the other hand, was openly hostile to privacy – deeming it unnecessary
and counterproductive in relation to the ideal state. In the Republic Plato writes, “in
the perfect State wives and children are to be in common … [and] houses … which
are common to all, and contain nothing private, or individual” (Plato 1892: 801,
543a). In the Laws Plato advocates the elimination of private spheres of activity:

The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in
which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that “Friends have all things in
common.” Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women
and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished
from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have
become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men
express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever
laws there are unite the city to the utmost – whether all this is possible or not, I say that
no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer
or better or more exalted in virtue. (Plato, Laws, Ch. 5, 738d–e)

Plato views privacy as something that is inherently disvaluable in relation to the
perfect state. Moreover he recognizes no psychological, sociological, or political
needs for individuals to be able to control patterns of association and disassociation
with their fellows.

The public–private distinction was also well understood by the Warring States
period – 403 bce–221 bce – in China (Moore 1984). Like Aristotle, Confucius

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(551–479 bce) distinguished between the public activity of government and the
private affairs of family life (see confucious). While Plato rejects, Aristotle and
Confucius affirm, many of the six categories of privacy discussed below.

Confucius contends that “a private obligation of a son to care for his father
overrides the public obligation to obey the law against theft” and that “a timid man
who is pretending to be fierce is like a man who is so ‘dishonest as to sneak into
places where one has no right to be, by boring a hole or climbing through a
gap’”(Moore 1984: 223). Han Fei Tzu (280–233 bce) writes:

When T s’ang Chieh [a mythic cultural hero] created the system of writing, he used the
character for “private” to express the idea of self-centeredness, and combined the
elements for “private” and “opposed to” to form the character for “public.” The fact that
public and private are mutually opposed was already well understood at the time of T
s’ang Chieh. To regard the two as being identical in interest is a disaster which comes
from lack of consideration. (Tzu 1964: 106)

While not sophisticated and clearly contentious, the public–private distinction arose
and was a matter of philosophical debate in two distinct cultural traditions. In both
of these cultures privacy was a commodity purchased with power, money, and
privilege. Barriers such as walls, fences, and even servants secured areas of isolation
and seclusion for the upper class. To a lesser degree, privacy was also secured by
those with more modest means.

Within the liberal tradition the public–private distinction has been used to mark
the boundary of justified interference with personal conduct in the political theories
of John Locke and John Stuart Mill (see locke, john; mill, john stuart). For
Locke the public–private distinction falls out of his conception of the state of nature,
the legitimate function of government, and property rights. The sole reason for
uniting into a commonwealth, for Locke, was to remedy the inconveniencies of the
state of nature – the function of government was to secure the rights of life, liberty,
and property (Locke 1980: 5–30). On estates and behind fences, walls, and doors
Lockean individuals secure a domain of private action free from public pressures or
interference.

John Stuart Mill also limits societal or public incursions into private domains.
Mill argues: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”
(Mill 1978: 9). Recognizing that harm could occur through action and inaction, Mill
accepted a version of the doing–allowing distinction (see doing and allowing) –
actions that cause harm are different from failings to prevent harm. In anticipation
of the question “won’t any action someone performs affect others in some way” Mill
offers his doctrine of “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” acts (Mill 1978: 78–82)
and addresses this question in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism (Mill 1861: 41–63). One
view is that, for Mill, strategic rules or rights provide the standard of harm and the
boundary between self-regarding and other-regarding acts. When an action violates
the rights of another, moral harm has occurred and appropriate action or interference

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is warranted by citizens or government agents. Liberty, property, and life rights
appear to be the kinds of rights that Mill endorses. If so, then like Locke, Mill uses
rights to secure individuals the moral space to order their lives independent of social
pressures. While not explicit in their defense, both Locke and Mill promote many of
the central features of privacy mentioned in the following section. Individual liberty
and private property provide a sanctuary against governments and neighbors.
Within private domains individuals obtain intimacy and secrecy, and can control
access to themselves.

Definitions of Privacy

Definitions of privacy are typically grouped into two general types. A descriptive or
nonnormative account describes a state or condition where privacy obtains. An
example would be Parent’s definition: “privacy is the condition of not having
undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others” (Parent
1983:   269). A normative account, on the other hand, makes references to moral
obligations or claims. For example, when DeCew talks about what is of “legitimate
concern of others” she includes ethical considerations (DeCew 1997: 58). There is
little agreement regarding the descriptive or normative components of privacy and
many of the definitions surveyed below could be cast along either dimension. For
example, we could define privacy as being let alone or as a right to be let alone. Privacy
could be cast as a condition that obtains or as a right that a condition obtains.

While admittedly imprecise, different conceptions of privacy typically fall into one
of six categories or combinations of the six (Solove 2002; Moore 2008, 2010): (1) the
right to be let alone; (2) secrecy; (3) intimacy; (4) control over information; (5)
restricted access; and (6) privacy as a cluster concept. We will take them up in turn.

Warren and Brandeis argued:

recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be
taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual … the “right
to be let alone.” Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 194)

While acknowledged as starting the modern debate, the conception of privacy
proposed by Warren and Brandeis has been widely criticized as too vague (Gavison
1980; O’Brien 1979; Allen 1988; Bloustein 1964; Solove 2002). According to this
definition any offensive or hurtful conduct would violate a “right to be let alone,” yet
we may not want to conclude that such conduct is a violation of privacy. For example,
suppose that Smith inadvertently brushes against Jones as they pass each other on a
busy sidewalk – not every violation of a right to be let alone seems to be a privacy
violation. This conception is too narrow as well. Consider the case of covert
surveillance where a target is “let alone” but there is a clear privacy violation

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( Thomson 1975). In this latter case, someone may be let alone in some sense and yet
seemingly have their privacy violated.

Richard Posner has defined privacy as the “right to conceal discreditable facts
about oneself ” – a right to secrecy (Posner 1981: 46). Amitai Etzioni concurs, writing
that privacy is “the realm in which an actor … can legitimately act without disclosure
and accountability to others” (Etzioni 1999: 12). DeCew and others have criticized
this conception of privacy, noting “secret information is often not private (for
example, secret military plans) and private matters are not always secret (for example,
one’s debts)” (DeCew 1997: 48). Moreover it seems that privacy-as-secrecy accounts
cannot accommodate what has come to be called “decisional privacy.” Decisional
privacy, within the US context, has been defined as the freedom to make decisions
about a range of actions and behaviors, including contraceptive use, abortion, child
rearing, and sexual practices. Those who would defend decisional privacy claim that
making a decision about abortion, for example, may not be secret and yet still be a
matter of privacy.

Several authors have defended the view that privacy is a form of intimacy (Fried
1970; Gerstein 1978; Inness 1992; Rosen 2000; Cohen 2002). Jeffrey Rosen writes:
“In order to flourish, the intimate relationships on which true knowledge of another
person depends need space as well as time: sanctuaries from the gaze of the crowd
in which slow mutual self-disclosure is possible” (Rosen 2000: 8). Julie Inness
maintains that privacy is “the state of the agent having control over decisions
concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the agent’s love, caring,
or liking” (Inness 1992: 91). In critique, Solove (2002) and DeCew (1997) note that
financial information may be private but not intimate. Moreover, it is possible to
have private relationships without intimacy and to perform private acts that are not
intimate. Data mining also may pose a threat to individual privacy without affecting
intimate relationships.

Control over personal information has also been offered as a definition of privacy
(Westin 1967; Gross 1971; Fried 1984). Alan Westin writes, “privacy is not simply an
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we
have over information about ourselves” (Westin 1967: 7). Gross argues that privacy
is “the condition under which there is control over acquaintance with one’s affairs”
(Gross 1971: 209). Critics have attacked this conception on grounds that it, like the
secrecy view, cannot account for “decisional privacy.” It also fails to acknowledge a
physical aspect to privacy – control over access to locations and bodies. Finally,
many have noted that whether or not a privacy condition of this sort holds is
unimportant – what we want to know is “should individuals have rights to control
access?” (DeCew 1997; Moore 2008, 2010).

Privacy defined as “limited access to the self ” has been defended by numerous
authors, including Sissela Bok (1983), Anita Allen (1988), and Ruth Gavison (1980).
Bok writes, “privacy is the condition of being protected from unwanted access by
others – either physical access, personal information, or attention” (Bok 1983: 10).
The worry here is that if no protection is available or the condition does not obtain
it would be odd to conclude that privacy interests were not relevant. Gavison offers

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a different account of limited access. On her view limited access consists of “secrecy,
anonymity, and solitude” (Gavison 1980: 433). Solove notes: “Although Gavison
contends that ‘the collection, storage, and computerization of information’ falls
within her conception, these activities often do not reveal secrets, destroy anonymity,
or thwart solitude” (Solove 2002: 1105). If so, such conceptions of privacy may be
too narrow.

Finally, many view privacy as a cluster concept that contains several of the
dimensions noted above. Judith Wagner DeCew (1997) has proposed that privacy is
a concept ranging over information, access, and expressions. Daniel Solove (2002)
has offered a context-dependent approach for defining privacy – for example, in the
context of information we may focus on certain dimensions of privacy that will not
be as important in different contexts like spatial control. Building on restricted-access
views and control-based accounts, Moore (2003, 2008, 2010) has argued that privacy
is the right to control access to and uses of personal information and spatial locations.

The Moral Value of Privacy

Many privacy theorists argue that privacy is morally valuable because it is associated,
in some central way, with autonomy and respect for persons (Benn 1971; Rachels
1975; Reiman 1976; Kupfer 1987; Inness 1992; Rössler 2005) (see autonomy).
Stanley Benn writes: “Respect for someone as a person, as a chooser, implies respect
for him as one engaged on a kind of self-creative enterprise, which could be
disrupted, distorted, or frustrated even by so limited an intrusion as watching”
(Benn 1971: 26). Rachels (1975) argued that privacy is morally valuable because it
allows individuals to control the patterns of behavior necessary for stable and
meaningful relationships. Joseph Kupfer argues that “privacy is essential to the
development and maintenance of an autonomous self ” (Kupfer 1987: 82). Rössler
maintains that privacy is a necessary condition for individual autonomy (Rössler
2005: 42–76). According to these theorists, privacy is morally valuable because it
protects and promotes the sovereign and autonomous actions of individuals – since
autonomy is morally valuable, privacy must be as well.

Allen Westin (1967) argued that the ability to regulate access was essential for the
proper functioning of animals. Building on Westin’s account of separation, Moore
(2003, 2008, 2010) has argued that privacy is necessary for human well-being or
flourishing. Moore notes that “while privacy may be a cultural universal necessary for
the proper functioning of human beings, its form − the actual rules of association and
disengagement − is culturally dependent. The kinds of privacy rules found in differ-
ent cultures will be dependent on a host of variables including climate, religion, tech-
nological advancement, and political arrangements” (Moore 2010: 55). Moore argues
the forms of privacy are culturally relational while the need is an objective necessity.

General Critiques of Privacy

The discussion of privacy, including the definitions and history presented above,
must also include views which challenge the authenticity, legitimacy, and necessity

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of privacy (DeCew 2006). While not exhaustive, presented below are some of the
most forceful critiques of privacy that dominate the literature.

Reductionism

Reductionists argue that privacy is derived from other rights such as life, liberty, and
property rights – there is no overarching concept of privacy but rather several
distinct core notions that have been lumped together (Davis 1959; Thomson 1975;
Peikoff 2004). The nonreductionist views privacy as related to, but distinct from,
other rights or concepts. Viewing privacy in reductionist fashion might mean
jettisoning the idea altogether and focusing on more fundamental concepts. For
example, Frederick Davis has argued that “invasion of privacy is, in reality, a complex
of more fundamental wrongs. Similarly, the individual’s interest in privacy itself,
however real, is derivative and a state better vouchsafed by protecting more
immediate rights” (Davis 1959: 20). Judith Jarvis Thomson agreed, claiming “the
right to privacy is itself a cluster of rights, and that it is not a distinct cluster of rights
but itself intersects with … the cluster of rights which owning property consists in”
(Thomson 1975: 306). The simpler avenue, according to Thomson, is to focus on
this cluster of rights which are more basic or fundamental than the “derivative” right
of privacy.

To illustrate the reductionist view, consider Thomson’s case of a pornographic
picture. Hugh owns a pornographic picture and keeps it locked in his wall safe – so
that no one can see it or even know that he owns it. Larry wants to see the picture
and trains his x-ray device on the wall safe to look in. Thomson argues that Hugh’s
property right to the picture includes the right that others not look at it and thus, in
this case, privacy rights are a kind of property right. Other rights, like the right not
to be listened to or touched, fall under what Thomson calls the “rights over the per-
son” which she claims are analogous to property rights as well. In this way, Thomson
claims that privacy is nothing more than the cluster of rights over the person and
property rights.

Several privacy theorists have offered arguments against this sort of reductionism
(Scanlon 1975; Parent 1983; Inness 1992; DeCew 1997; Moore 2010). Scanlon argues
that the wrongness in cases where Hugh does not own the picture in question and
Larry uses an x-ray device to look, does not depend on property rights. Moreover,
Parent noted that even if correct, all that Thomson shows is that it is unclear if
privacy is reducible to more “basic” rights or the other way around. Perhaps we
should view privacy as more fundamental than property or rights over the person.

The “other values” critique

Anita Allen (2003, 2008), Ferdinand Schoeman (1992), Amitai Etzioni (1999), and
others have argued that privacy is less important, in many circumstances, than
accountability, security, or community rights. The problem with our heightened
sensitivity to privacy violations is that we forget that other, more important, values
are lost or minimized. Anita Allen (2003) has argued that accountability toward
one’s family, race, and society justifiably limits the domain of individual privacy.

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Allen also argued that “spying is useful for protecting children or others in our care
who cannot protect themselves; protecting ourselves from wrongdoers; protecting
the company and the investing public; and protecting the nation” (Allen 2008: 19).

Amitai Etzioni (1999) noted that in our society privacy has been treated as the
highest privileged value to the detriment of other common goods such as public
safety and public health. Etzioni views privacy as a “societal license” that exempts
certain conduct from public scrutiny. Helena Gail Rubinstein writes: “ communitarians
reject the primacy of the individual, and invite members of the community to move
beyond self-interest in favor of a vision of society defined by community ties and a
search for the communal good … individuals should not assert their ‘right to be let
alone’ when it is time to contribute to the collective good” (Rubinstein 1999: 228).
Communitarians like Etzioni and Rubinstein seek to find a balance between
individual rights and social responsibilities (see communitarianism).

Posner’s critique

Richard Posner (1981) has argued that the value of privacy, in an economic sense,
determines how privacy ought to be applied in specific instances. In some cases
privacy should be passed over in favor of economic gains to society. His stance places
a high value on privacy in business dealings since this privacy has potential for
greater impact on the economy. Personal information, on the other hand, does not
deserve the same privacy protection because persons, as opposed to businesses, will
tend to increase personal wealth over the growth of societal wealth. Privacy in
personal information, according to Posner, is typically used to mislead or manipulate
others. Posner writes: “the individual’s right to privacy … the right to control the
flow of information about him … [may include] information concerning … criminal
activity, or moral conduct at variance with the individual’s professed mora